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Abstract 
Apophatic Measures: Toward a Theology of Irreducible Particularity is a work of 
constructive comparative theology examining select writings of ĝDৄkara (Eighth Century, India) 
and Nicholas of Cusa (Fifteenth Century, Germany). It argues that, for ĝDৄkara and Cusa, 
apophasis does not culminate in what Michael Sells calls a “semantic event,” but instead in a 
sensual event. For each, negation removes intellectual distractions, awakening one to a 
heightened state of sensual attentiveness. For ĝDৄkara, this is observed in the embodied 
encounter wherein a teacher incarnates 9HGƗnta scripture to reveal “This Self is Brahman” 
(0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad 2). For Cusa, the intimate encounter between Jesus and the Samaritan 
woman at Jacob’s well (John 4) is paradigmatic of true, attentive sensuality. Employing a 
heuristic device termed “apophatic measure” in its trifold meanings of method, sensuality, and 
particularity, this dissertation contributes to contemporary discourses on the ontology of 
difference, the theo-ethical valuation of diversity, and the singularity of unique bodies. Rather 
than reducing individuals to ethnic, gendered, or other essentializing measures, persons are 
regarded as unique disclosures of ultimate reality. Each person is re/cognized as an 
unprecedented imago Dei or particular manifestation of ƖWPDQ-Brahman. Through the pedagogy 
and performance of apophatic theology, one progressively removes epistemic universals and 
thereby cultivates a phenomenology of irreducible particularity as a vision of God. Awakened to 
an attentive sensuality, one re/cognizes this Self, incarnate before one’s very eyes, as an 
apophatic measure of the immeasurable divine. 
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 Introduction 
Apophatic Measures 
[For the knower of Brahman,] the Self of all beings is seen as one,  
and all beings [are seen] in the Self. Then alone is the meaning of the ĝUXWL 
conclusively proved: “One who sees all beings in the Self alone and [sees] 
the Self in all beings, because of that, harbors no ill will.”1
For while You, O Jesus, walked amid this sensible world, You used fleshly 
eyes that were like ours. For with these eyes You perceived in no other way 
than do we: one thing and then another.
 
2
Diversity and difference are visible and pervasive realities of our cosmopolitan world. 
Gazing upon the ecologies in which we live, move, and have our being, we observe persons of 
differing shapes, colors, religions, and cultures. We regard creatures with differing abilities, 
various orientations, and myriad beliefs. While some in our society increasingly value diversity, 
difference often evokes anxiety, trepidation, or even disgust and violence. Bodies marked by 
variations in ethnicity, sexuality, religion, class or a multitude of other forms of other/ness 
present themselves to our senses, sometimes provoking wonder and curiosity and sometimes 
conjuring fear and trembling.  
 
How might we account for difference, theologically? What theological value might we 
attribute to singularity given cosmological diversity? How are we to reconcile our irreducible 
particularities in the divine economy we call home? How ought we to measure uniqueness in 
light of immeasurable diversity? What might the multiplicity of individuals, cultures, and 
landscapes reveal about the divine? Could it be that the uniqueness of creatures is designed (or 
otherwise intended) to reveal something about God, in whose image we are said to be created?3
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If the Creator’s invisible power (dynamis) and divinity are manifestly revealed through creation,4
This dissertation constructively contributes towards a theology of irreducible particularity 
through comparative theology by means of a heuristic I call the apophatic measure. Learning to 
perceive by means of the apophatic measure, one perceives reality differently. One cultivates a 
sensuality distinct from everyday seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and touching, which 
nevertheless remains embodied, physical. This theological phenomenology of sensuality avoids 
esotericism. Rather than uncovering something hidden, this apophasis seeks to reveal what is 
always already revealed. It aspires to accomplish the accomplished.
 
what might this visible—and dynamic—multiplicity of natural species, ecologies, and persons 
suggest about that Creator’s creativity (and our own)? If it suggests anything at all, could it be 
that part of our theological task is to reflect upon human sensuality, the means by which 
irreducible particulars present themselves to our consciousness?  
5
The phrase “apophatic measure” signals a theological vision whereby one is awakened to 
see particularity, devoid of essentializing reduction.
  
6
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 As a (theological) mode of sensuality, the 
apophatic measure is inherently embodied, and, therefore, personal and relational. Like other 
strategies of apophasis, it is inextricably linked to kataphasis, but is critically distinct from many 
of these in form, method, and sequence. Rather than (or, perhaps, in addition to) unsaying divine 
names and other positive descriptions of God, the apophatic measure seeks to dis/cover and 
5
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3 
remove layers of cognition and language superimposed upon that which is seen by the eye, heard 
with the ear, or touched with the hand, etc. The apophatic measure unsays and unknows what is 
superimposed upon particulars. It does so in order that the divine revelation might be directly 
perceived as an infinite kataphasis: a boundless revelation of the infinite God in, through, and as 
infinite, irreducible particularity. My thesis rests upon the premise that only an infinite number of 
unique images of God suffice to reveal a God-who-is-infinitely. In other words, the Infinite 
God’s revelation is unfinished (infini). 
As modeled throughout this text, there is an intentional equivocation in the phrase 
apophatic measure. The idiom turns upon itself, yielding a triad of meanings. This triad 
structures the project as a whole. Their interconnection undergirds a theological process.  
Apophatic Measure1: Phenomenological Method 
First, the apophatic measure names a theological approach involving the apophasis of 
kataphatic measures. As a method, the apophatic measure performs the negation of all epistemic 
measures by unsaying universals, which is to say linguistic categories of knowledge. In this 
sense, it resembles other forms of negative theology and deconstruction insofar as it calls into 
question the suitability of language to describe reality, whether transcendent or immanent. 
However, the apophatic measure in this first sense is a method by which one cultivates an 
attentive sensuality. By removing epistemic measures, it seeks to attend to particular phenomena 
as they intend to be perceived. As a form of phenomenology, it aspires not simply to bracket or 
suspend (epoché) judgment but to remove all linguistic (pre)conceptions in order to perceive 
phenomena in their irreducible particularity. It asserts that while ultimate (transcendent) reality 
cannot be reduced to words or knowledge, neither can the sensual world before our eyes and 
beneath our toes.  
4 
Apophatic Measure2: Attentive Sensuality 
Second, the apophatic measure names sensuality: an unspeakable measure. In this sense, 
apophasis does not unsay kataphasis, but reveals it in a manner that is available to sensuality but 
unapproachable by knowledge or language. While we can speak, for example, of the softness of 
a child’s cheek or the scent of morning’s dew, these words fall far short of the touch and smell 
they aspire to describe. This is all the more true of the gaze shared by lovers, or the sound of a 
daughter’s heartbeat. In this second sense, the apophatic measure steps towards a theology of 
irreducible particularity, and thus towards the third meaning signified by the phrase.  
Apophatic Measure3: Irreducible Particularity 
Each and every creature, I argue, presents itself as an unprecedented imago Dei (or, 
perhaps, a unique vyakti of ƖWPDQ-Brahman) by virtue of its irreducible particularity. Each 
individual, then, is an apophatic measure in the third sense: an image or kataphatic actualization 
of divine possibility. Each and every this and that constitutes an immanent, visible effect 
ontologically non-different from its transcendental cause. These kataphatic actualizations cannot 
be unsaid because they are, in their very be-ing, unsayable. In this third sense, the apophatic 
measure asserts that true singularity (i.e., that which is incomparable to any other entity), 
measures the divine in a manner that cannot be reduced, replicated, or represented by anything 
other than itself. In short: every other is wholly other.7
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 Every other is encountered as an 
irreducible thou to whom one singularly utters thou art that. The multiplicity of “All This” 
cannot be reduced to a monistic “All.” The unique singularity or quiddity of this or that particular 
gives place to an event which discloses ultimate reality in a manner that is irreducible, 
irreplaceable, and, thus, unspeakable.  
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This trifold meaning of the phrase “apophatic measure” reveals the theological process 
which guides this dissertation’s unfolding: by unsaying all names and linguistic categories, one 
awakens to perceive individuals as unnamable, uncategorical images of God. Through (and as) 
the apophatic measure, difference is re/cognized with theological significance and worth. Just as 
God remains beyond reductive categorization, so too does each image of God. That which makes 
one an imago Dei is not some quality, ability, or attribute commonly shared by others, but rather 
one’s very quiddity: one’s singularity, difference, and unique way of being, without which the 
infinite God’s revelation would be deficient. Each person—each be-ing—is a fold in the 
manifold, vocationally addressed in the vocative: thou art that. 
My notion of the “apophatic measure” emerges through a theological comparison of the 
writings of the Eighth Century 9HGƗQWLQ ĝDৄkara, and the Fifteenth Century Christian Mystic, 
Nicholas of Cusa. Although neither theologian uses any phrase that might be directly translated 
as “apophatic measure,” each writes extensively about apophasis, measuring, and direct 
perception. The phrase functions as a heuristic device that finds comparatively similar impulses 
in each theologian without reducing their differences to identity. To obviate or obscure 
distinctions between these thinkers would be altogether contrary to my thesis and its purpose.  
The phrase “apophatic measure” correlates, but not precisely, with ĝDৄkara’s 
tattvapratibodha, an awakening to the truth of Brahman, an enlightened disposition wherein the 
Highest Self is able to be seen.8 As indicated in the epigraph above, one who is awakened to 
nonduality “sees all beings in the Self alone and the Self in all beings.”9
                                                     
8
 MKBh 1.15 and 2.35. 
 I argue that this neither 
erases the distinctions between nor devalues the particularity of individuals, but rather 
9
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re/cognizes persons as unique, manifest revelations of Brahman. This theological vision is 
exemplified in an intimate, embodied encounter wherein a spiritual guide gazes upon a faithful 
disciple and gracefully reveals: tat tvam asi, “Thou art that [Brahman].”  
The phrase “apophatic measure” also correlates, but not precisely, with Cusa’s “vision of 
God,” wherein the subjective and objective genitives coincide. Becoming learnedly ignorant, as 
Cusa guides, one peers through the apophatic measure to both receive and embody God’s vision. 
From Cusa’s perspective, this theological vision is exemplified in the intimate encounter 
recounted in John 4. Resting beneath the noonday sun at Jacob’s well, Jesus and a Samaritan 
woman reciprocally exchange the gifts of seeing and being seen, uniquely. 
As I will demonstrate, there are many similarities between ĝDৄkara’s and Cusa’s 
understandings of sensuality qua apophatic measure. I argue that these continuities are 
worthwhile and constructively insightful for us today. Equally instructive, and no less 
constructive, are their points of divergence and difference from one another. Principal among 
these are their radically different understandings of language. While it may seem, prima facie, 
counterintuitive, their opposing theologies of language energize the comparison, yielding it all 
the more fruitful. Here again, the phrase “apophatic measure” finds yet another nuance. While 
each cultivates sensuality as a non-linguistic attentiveness, which is to say perceiving-without-
measure, what each means by “measure” is similar in some respects but polar opposite in other 
respects. Though I will return to this later (page 47), a preliminary unfolding is warranted. 
For ĝDৄkara, language (read: Sanskrit) is not a human creation. The transcendental 
meaning of the Veda is eternal, but so, too, are the words themselves. The relationship between 
words, the universals they signify, and corresponding particular entities in the world is eternal, 
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arising coincidentally with the origin of existence.10 Never was there a time when words were 
not. While some other classical Indian traditionVVXFKDV1\Ɨ\DDVVHUW that God is the source of 
the Veda and its language, ĝDৄkara’s tradition denies this.11 As I discuss in chapter two, this 
deeply held and centrally important theological doctrine results in an understanding of kataphatic 
and apophatic theology that necessarily differs from most, if not all, traditional Christian 
understandings. While language, according to ĝDৄkara, is unsuitable to describe Brahman, this is 
not due to any insufficiency inherent to language. While language truly and reliably measures 
Brahman, these measures must be unsaid because Brahman is possessed of infinite measure.12
For Cusa, on the other hand, language is certainly a human creation. It neither truly nor 
reliably measures God. Like many in his theological tradition, Cusa asserts: 
 
[T]he theology of negation is so necessary for the theology of affirmation that 
without it God would not be worshiped as the Infinite God but, rather, as a 
creature. And such worship is idolatry; it ascribes to the image that which 
befits only the reality itself.13
Cusa, in fact, goes a small step (or giant leap) farther. While human language fails to reliably 
measure God, it also fails to reliably measure God’s creation: the natural world in which we live, 
move, and have our being. As I discuss in chapter five, however, the fact that language and other 
technologies, such as mathematics, are human creations is highly significant to Cusa for other 
theological reasons.
 
14
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to be creative. Just as God creates natural forms and natural entities, humans create artificial 
forms and technologies, such as houses.15
Rather than attempting to reconcile these utterly irreconcilable views, I instead accentuate 
the difference in chapter four, allowing these opposites to coincide.
 For him, language exemplifies human creativity and is 
thus imbued with divine significance and responsibility. Because language is a humanly created 
measure of reality, it is insufficient to describe the Infinite God, but for that very reason, 
language measures human creativity, which mimics the Creator’s creativity.  
16
 While their views are 
markedly different from one another, they are certainly not beyond compare. Coincidence neither 
flattens difference nor leaves them in simple opposition, but enfolds them such that each 
unsettles the other. Likewise, ĝDৄkara’s ontology of nonduality is clearly distinct from Cusa’s 
method of the coincidence of opposites, and yet these insights share significant commonalities. 
They enable us to better understand each on their own terms.17
Francis X. Clooney describes one of his comparative theology experiments as “a kind of 
biblio/biography—of what I came to see through these texts.”
 As a comparative theologian, I 
am less interested in tallying similarities and differences and more interested in reading back-
and-forth between them, inviting each to challenge how we read the other.  
18
 His words aptly describe my 
project, as well: “It is about how one is alive, or enlivened, by reading and seeing.”19
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stone” and likewise read Cusa’s ontology of enfolding-unfolding (complicatio-explicatio) 
through the lens of ĝDৄkara’s “progressive dissolution” (SǌUYDSǌUYDSUDYLOƗSDQD).20
Binding or de-fining the boundless infinite satisfies neither ĝDৄkara nor Cusa. We must 
not divorce our sacred, spiritual, or intellectual vision of reality from our everyday vision of the 
physical world in which we live. Ultimate Reality matters. Awakened to the truth, from 
ĝDৄkara’s perspective, one no longer perceives a duality of sacred-profane but is able to regard 
another and reveal, “Thou art that [Brahman], O dear one.” Gazing upon the face of one’s 
neighbor (passing by), one sees as Jesus saw with “fleshly eyes.” In this intimate, embodied 
encounter, sacred coincides with profane and physical vision coincides with spiritual vision. 
From Cusa’s perspective, one sees (through the coincidence of opposites) one’s neighbor as an 
irreducibly particular sacred incarnation: an unprecedented imago Dei. Hearing one another into 
speech,
 Seeing 
through these texts, one gains insight into a poetics of perspective wherein the transcendent is 
seen in, through, and as immanent particularity. The dualistic dichotomy of “sacred” and 
“profane” is progressively dissolved. These two do not become one, but cease to be two 
(advaita). Seeing through the apophatic measure, one perceives the sacrality of particulars. Or: 
the sacred is seen to exist unfoldedly (explicite) as the profane.  
21
Below, I briefly introduce the notions of apophasis and measuring. I then introduce 
ĝDৄkara and Nicholas of Cusa, accompanied by a literature review addressing the specific 
relevance of my study. These introductions are followed by an articulation of my academic 
 seeing one another into living, one’s gaze transubstantiates the profane. 
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methods of Comparative Theology and Constructive Comparative Theology. I then conclude the 
Introduction with a brief outline of the project.  
Apophasis 
Apophatic theology has little to (un)say about bodies, whereas it speaks 
volumes about that which it deems worthy of unsaying.22
Approximating Apophasis 
 
The adjective apophatic in Apophatic Measures derives from the Greek word apophasis, 
often translated as “denial,” “negation,” or “unsaying.” It is related to the Sanskrit words 
DSDYƗGD and apoha, which etymologically mean “saying away” and “to mark away.” Liddell and 
Scott capture the performative grammar of apophasis, defining the term as, “a predication of one 
thing away from another.”23
Often called “negative theology,” it is a method of speaking about the Absolute by means 
of the negation of attributes. As Catherine Keller’s quotation reflects, the negation or (un)saying 
performed in apophatic theology says at least as much as it unsays. The attributes which are 
negated in apophatic theology, as well as those attributes which evade mention altogether, speak 
volumes about which attributes are considered to be “closer” to divine than others. I argue that 
while apophatic theology negates and removes universals from our understandings of God, it 
does not negate particularity. As Aristotle asserts (regarding positive speech), particulars are 
subjects of propositions, of which universals are predicated, but particulars cannot be predicated 
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of anything other than themselves (p192).24
113
 Applying Liddell-Scott’s definition, I argue that 
apophatic theology predicates particulars away from God, but does not remove particulars from 
our understanding of God. As we will see (p ), words have different signifying intentions in 
apophatic speech than do words in kataphatic speech, according to ĝDৄkara’s tradition. 
Apophasis “approximates” by placing things in proximity to God. It draws things close to God 
(ironically) by distancing them from God. In light of Keller’s statement, then, we might say that 
apophatic theology (in general) has not deemed to “unsay” attributes it has considered to be 
sufficiently distant from God, including, for example, theological descriptions from other 
religious traditions. Christians have no need to deny that God is like deep sleep (the SUƗMña, 
p139). Why would we? 
Negating Universals 
ĝDৄkara and Cusa enliven and unfold the array of possible meanings born by negative 
statements and negative nouns. To better understand what negative theology does and does not 
negate, it is necessary to examine how words, especially nouns, function as vehicles of 
knowledge and communication. In ĝDৄkara’s tradition, words simultaneously signify universals 
and particulars, depending upon the speaker’s intention (p110). That is to say that words (1) 
point towards particular objects that manifestly exist here-and-now in the world, (2) they 
measure universal attributes, thereby reducing the infinite manifold of particular things to finite, 
manageable, cognizable bits of knowledge, to which I refer as “measures.” Given these two 
functions of nouns, one must consider whether the negation of a noun negates (1) the first 
function (i.e., particularity), (2) the second function (i.e., universal “measures”), (3) both, or (4) 
neither (p101). For ĝDৄkara, the second is the case (p108). As we will see, Cusa’s position is 
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similar given that universals (“natural forms”) unfold as particular beings (p212), but the 
universals we “know” are ones we have created (“artificial forms”), and thus must be “unknown” 
if we are to perceive particulars attentively.  
For ĝDৄkara and Cusa alike, apophatic theology unsays universal measures in order that 
particulars may be perceived in their particularity as particular entities. This does not mean that a 
particular entity can be reduced to its singular quiddity, as if every common attribute could be 
bracketed in a Husserlian epoche. Rather, nouns tell us something about particular objects; they 
enhance our understanding of what we see and actually enable us to see some things more 
clearly, or even to perceive things that—without these words—we might not have perceived at 
all.  
Removing Ignor/ance 
For example, a radiologist is able to “see” cancer in images where others cannot. This 
ability to see has little to do with the quality of her vision, but has everything to do with the fact 
that she has learned how cancer manifests in these images. Hence, the words and ideas that she 
has learned enhance her ability to see such that she can cognitively perceive things the rest of us 
cannot, though we do, in fact, see them. What is seen is the same, but the cognitions differ. Just 
as medical school trains a radiologist to see things (with fleshly eyes no different than ours) that 
were previously “invisible” (intellectually, not sensually), ĝDৄkara and Cusa train us to perceive 
by removing intellectual obstacles to perception. 
While nouns enable us to see more clearly (like the radiologist) by training us regarding 
“what to look for,” they simultaneously obscure our perception by focusing our attention only (or 
primarily) on attributes that can be reduced or abstracted. The ideas regulate our attention such 
that we ignore some of what is seen for the sake of seeing more narrowly and pointedly. The 
13 
negation of these nouns, then, does not negate the particular attribute measured by that noun, but 
only the measure itself. This negation of the measure is performed for the sake of perceiving the 
particular entity as itself. One is awakened to what the measure ignores. Learning one’s 
ignor/ance, one sees (both intellectually and sensually), differently. Hence, apophasis is in 
service to direct perception.  
Sensual Event 
In his influential work, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, Michael Sells avers, “the 
smallest semantic unit [in negative theology] is not the sentence or proposition, but the double 
sentence or dual proposition.”25 In other words, every positive assertion about God should be 
followed with a negation of that assertion. The method does not end with that negation; rather, it 
is a continual process of kataphasis and apophasis (saying and unsaying).26 Sells states the goal 
of his work clearly and concisely: “The goal [of this study] is to identify the distinctive semantic 
event within the language of unsaying, what I will be calling the ‘meaning event’.”27
My research findings agree with (and are guided by) Sell’s assertion that apophasis is 
performative, culminating in an event. This is why I focus on each author’s “methods.” These are 
methods that must be performed, not simply discussed or analyzed. Like several of the 
 I argue that, 
for ĝDৄkara and Cusa, apophasis does not culminate in a ‘meaning event’ at all—but, rather, in a 
sensual event: a unique vision of the sacred in and as the particular.  
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theologians Sells examines, the apophatic performances revealed by ĝDৄkara and Cusa culminate 
in an “event” that occurs in the silent after/math of the process. Rather than an endless 
progression of assertion and negation, theirs are methods which culminate in their own collapse. 
Different, though, from the theologians Sells examines, the culminating performative event, for 
ĝDৄkara and Cusa, is not a “meaning event” because the event occurs at the moment when 
“meaning” is erased. The apophatic measure1 qua method is performed, linguistic measures are 
removed for the sake of perceiving reality in its infinite particularity. In this poetics of 
perspective wherein sacred and profane coincide (Cusa) or are progressively dissolved (ĝDৄkara), 
the “meaning event” is actually a sensual event: Diverse bodies are regarded… sacredly. 
Measuring 
Mathematicians measure with their minds alone  
the forms of things separated from all matter.  
Since we wish the object to be seen,  
we will use a more sensate wisdom.28
Measuring the Immeasurable 
 
I investigate WKHJUDPPDURIQHJDWLRQLQWKHZULWLQJVRIĝDৄkara and Cusa in order to 
reveal the necessity, activity, objective content, and aftermath of theological negation. From their 
perspectives, all knowledge, which is necessarily mediated through language, measures reality, 
which is infinite. In order to see the infinite qua infinite, it is necessary to negate the measure 
thereof (i.e., knowledge) without negating the truth of that measure (i.e., what is known), and, 
therefore, without negating the truth of that which is measured (i.e., particularity).29
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are particulars, what we know or cognize are measures which simultaneously reveal and conceal 
the particulars we see.30
As indicated by my subtitle, Towards a Theology of Irreducible Particularity, negating 
measures of reality draws our attention, our gaze, towards the reality that is measured, a reality 
that is irreducibly particular (apophatic measure3). Sensuality, then, becomes an apophatic 
measure2: a measuring aware of its measuring and, thus, its perspectival limitations (ignor/ance).  
 
I emphasize the word “measure” because ĝDৄkara and Cusa employ various terms that 
are related to “measuring,” both in etymology and signification. In Sanskrit, key epistemological 
terms such as SUDPƗ۬DPƗWUDPƗ\Ɨ and even mƯPƗۨVƗ all derive from the verbal root ¥PƗ 
(“to measure”). Likewise, key epistemological terms in Latin, such as PƝQV, PHQWLVPƝQVLǀand 
PƝQVǌUD derive from verbs such as PƝWLRU (“to measure”).31
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 More than this, though, unlike the 
word “universal,” the word “measure” (in English) reminds us of the critical distinction between 
the measure qua measure and the measure as a placeholder for that which is measured. The 
measure tells us something about the measured. It reveals an aspect or attribute of this being’s 
be-ing without representing, signifying, or replacing the thing itself. The measure simultaneously 
reveals and conceals the being’s be-ing itself. Nouns organize and measure reality, powerfully, 
truly and (often) hegemonically, but they do not replace or subsume that reality. Neither, then, 
does their negation negate the unrepresentable reality they intend to re/present. Instead, their 
negation reminds us that words mediate the immediate; words measure the immeasurable. 
31
 For example, the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D UpaniৢDGVWDWHV³7KHTXDUWHUVLHWKHIRXUVWDWHVRI5HDOLW\DUHWKHPHDVXUHV
(PƗWUƗ) and the measures are the quarters.” Also, Cusa’s third premise in De Beryllo is “man [sic] is the measure 
(mensuram) of things.” 
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Measuring Particularity 
I use the word “measure” to refer to words and ideas which organize reality such that 
reality can be cognized. As finite measures of the infinite universe, words and ideas do more than 
measure reality, so I employ the word “measure” in reference only to their measuring function. 
Chapters three and five examine this epistemic measuring from the perspectives of ĝDৄkara and 
Nicholas of Cusa, respectively. What is the relationship of these “measures” to actual and 
potential existence? Do words measure actually existing things or potentially existing things or 
some combination of these? ĝDৄkara and Cusa offer starkly different perspectives on these 
questions. Beyond the obvious differences between these two thinkers, perhaps the most 
significant difference between them is their different understandings of the origin of words and 
the relationship between words, ideas, and material existents.  
As Keller has shown, the reluctance to “unsay” material bodies suggests a lack of 
urgency to do so given the presumed distance of God from particular material bodies. As Keller 
has argued, this marks a weakness or systematic oversight which stands contrary to the very 
rationale of apophatic theology. Agreeing with her, I argue that the negation of measures 
culminates in the direct perception of unique material bodies, which are seen to be revelations of 
the Ultimate. Stated otherwise, I seek to unsay sacrality. As the genealogy and etymology of the 
word “sacred” suggests, the divine is thought to be set apart from, distanced, or at least hidden 
within materiality. From this perspective (which is a SǌUYDSDN܈in I seek to refute), apophatic 
theology would unsay particularity through a panoply of negations, including and especially the 
particularity of material bodies. Through the negation of material bodies, the sacred (which is 
thought to be hidden within, like a pious interiority of a sacred castle) is dis/closed.  
I challenge this view by examining the role of particularity, sensuality, and sensible 
bodies in the apophatic theologies of ĝDৄkara and Nicholas of Cusa. For these theologians, 
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language mediates knowledge, which measures particularity. Apophasis unsays the measuring of 
particularity, thereby constituting a pedagogical method of religious praxis for the sake of 
sensuality. Apophasis, for these theologians, does not un/cover a “pious interiority,” imprisoned 
by a material body, garrisoned in a sacred castle. It does not subtract materiality, progressively 
chipping it away, like a marble sculptor, through an anamnesis of a reified form.  
Unity fulfilled in Diversity 
Rather, apophasis unsays sacrality by denying the distance measured (read: 
superimposed) by the word “sacred.” That which sets some-thing apart from all other entities, 
which is to say its uniqueness, makes it sacred. I focus, therefore, on the theological method of 
each author and the function of particularity within those methods. Having negated all reductive 
measures (i.e., all universals), sensuality emerges as an apophatic measure whereby one 
perceives the unique particularity of particulars. Their methods highlight the irreducibility—and 
inherent sacrality—of particularity. Their methods dis/close the en/closure of the sacred, so that 
the sacred might be seen super/ficially, which is to say on the face of one’s neighbor. Interpreting 
Paul, Cusa reasons that there must be an inherent theological value to uniqueness and diversity, 
since the Creator’s power and divinity are manifestly revealed in creation (Rom 1:20). In other 
words, if God creates freely, willfully, and purposefully, then diverse particulars must have some 
free, willful, purpose. The infinite unity of ultimate reality is fulfilled and manifestly revealed 
only through the infinite diversity of creatures, which cannot, therefore, be set apart from (or 
ontologically other than) sacrality. By negating all universals, one arrives, finally, at a hyper-
linguistic or non-verbal perception of the irreducible uniqueness of each and every creature as an 
indispensable disclosure of the infinite Divine.  
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Several implications follow from this. First, diversity and difference are imbued with 
divine significance. Second, classical theistic articulations of the imago Dei doctrine become 
inadequate. Third, creativity and theosis take on new meaning. Fourth, comparative theology 
emerges as an inherently necessary aspect of apophatic theology. Analyzing these and other 
implications, I argue that a creature’s unique quiddity (or irreducible particularity) manifestly 
reveals Ultimate Reality in an unprecedented manner. Unity is fulfilled in—and measured by—
diversity. Unsaying oppositional distinctions between “sacred” and “profane”—either by 
dissolving duality (ĝDৄkara) or gazing upon creation through the coincidence of opposites 
(Cusa)—one is awakened to perceive. While no fewer than infinite sacred images reveal the 
infinite, sensuality must be aroused—beyond measure—if any one image, in particular, is to be 
perceived.  
7KH&DUGLQDO7HDFKHUƖGLĝDৄNDUDƖFƗU\D 
Historical and Methodological Background 
8QIRUWXQDWHO\ZHNQRZYHU\OLWWOHDERXWWKHKLVWRULFDOSHUVRQNQRZQWRXVDVĝDৄkara. 
Although there are numerous traditions and hagiographical stories about this great thinker, their 
historical veracity is dubious. What we know of him is gleaned from his writings, which are 
anything but autobiographical in nature. 
$FFRUGLQJWRWUDGLWLRQĝDৄkara travelled all over India engaging in theological debate 
and, while doing so, founded four schools, one in each of the four corners of India. These 
schools remain active today and are headed by teachers who assume the name ĝD۪NDUƗFƗU\D. 
Understandably, this tradition has led to academic confusion and debate concerning the 
authorship of some texts which are attributed to ĝDৄNDUƗFƗU\D but may not have been written by 
³ƖGLĝDৄNDUƗFƗU\D” or “the first UHYHUHGWHDFKHUQDPHGĝDৄkara.”  
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What we can say for certain is that the teacher known to us as ƖGLĝDৄNDUƗFƗU\D
(henceforth simply ³ĝDৄkara”) is defined by scholars as the author of the 8WWDUDPƯPƗۨVƗVǌWUD 
%KƗ܈ya (UMSBh), which is a commentary on a laconic text consisting of four books about 
Brahman, or Ultimate Reality. This commentary was written probably in the early half of the 
eighth century.32
The UMS is attributed to %ƗGDUƗ\D৆a, and is considered to be related to the 
3ǌUYDPƯPƗۨVƗVǌWUD (PMS), attributed to Jaimini. The nature of this relationship is contested. 
Some argue that the two texts were originally portions of one single text.
 Tradition places him in Southern India, especially in Kaladi, Kerala. Strictly 
speaking, the 8WWDUDPƯPƗۨVƗVǌWUD (UMS) is not a revealed scriptural text, but is an integral text 
in the 9HGƗQWD tradition which organizes the Upaniৢads and serves as an exegetical guide, of 
sorts.  
33
 Jaimini cites 
%ƗGDUƗ\D৆a in the PMS and %ƗGDUƗ\D৆a cites Jaimini in the UMS.34
Given the indisputable fact that there is a wide range of theological perspectives that 
ULJKWO\IDOOXQGHUWKHKHDGLQJ³3ǌUYD0ƯPƗূVƗ” and an equally wide range that rightly falls 
 Regardless of the precise 
historical relationship, it is clear that the 3ǌUYDPƯPƗূVƗ schools of thought and the 
8WWDUDPƯPƗূVƗ schools of thought are closely related and share much in common. While the 
differences between the two schools of thought should not be overlooked, they should be kept in 
perspective.  
                                                     
32
 The oldest extant subcommentary on the %UDKPDVǌWUDEKƗ܈\D is 9ƗFDVSDWL-0LĞUD¶V %KƗPDWƯ, dated to the early 
half of the ninth century. The %KƗPDWƯ UHIHUVWRRWKHUVXEFRPPHQWDULHVRQWKH%6%KLQFOXGLQJ3DGPDSƗGD¶V
PañcapƗGLNƗZKLFKVXJJHVWVWKDW3DGPDSƗGD¶VWHDFKHUĝDৄNDUD, was active no later than the mid-eighth century. 
See Nakamura, Hajime, and Trevor Leggett. $+LVWRU\RI(DUO\9HGƗQWD3KLORVRphy. Vol. 1. Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1983. 
33
 For a thorough treatment of the debate, see $NOXMNDU$VKRN³8QLW\RIWKH0ƯPƗূVƗV+RZ+LVWRULRJUDSK\
Hides History.” In Vacaspativaibhavam: A Volume in Felicitation of Professor Vachaspati Upadhyaya , edited by 
Shashiprabha Kumar, 821–900. Delhi: D. K. Printworld. See also footnote 43, below. 
34
 For example, PMS I.1.5 is attributed to %ƗGDUƗ\D৆D. 
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under the heading “8WWDUDPƯPƗূVƗ” or “9HGƗQWD” the significance of the historical question and 
specific taxonomy is not altogether clear. Although ĝDৄkara argues against other 0ƯPƗীsakas in 
some of his commentaries, this does not even distinguish him from other 0ƯPƗীsakas who 
argue amongst themselves. -DLPLQLĝDEDUD.XPƗULOD Bha৬৬a, and 3UDEKƗNDUD 0LĞUD disagree on 
a number of significant theological and exegetical points regarding the PMS. Likewise, ĝDৄkara, 
5ƗPƗQXMDDQG0ƗGKYDGLVDJUHHRQDQXPEHURIVLJQLILFDQWWKHRORJLFDODQGH[HJHWLFDOSRLQWV
UHJDUGLQJWKH8067KHIDFWWKDWĝDৄkara may disagree with other 0ƯPƗীsakas on certain 
significant doctrinal points should not obviate the fact that these theologians have a great deal 
PRUHLQFRPPRQWKDQKDVXVXDOO\EHHQUHSUHVHQWHGLQDFDGHPLFOLWHUDWXUHRQĝDৄkara. Moreover, 
I argue that ĝDৄkara’s apophatic theology is best understood in light of the kataphatic theology of 
the earlier SǌUYDPƯPƗূVƗ schools. This does not require, however, that we regard the 
XWWDUDPƯPƗূVƗ schools as supersessionist relative to the SǌUYDPƯPƗূVƗ schools any more than 
one would regard calculus as superseding arithmetic. 
Both schools regard the Veda as authoritative scripture. There are four different branches 
of the Veda: ۿJ<DMXU6ƗPDand Atharva. Each of the four, in turn, contain four portions: the 
SaۨKLWƗportion, or hymn section which date at least to 1000 BCE and perhaps millennia older, 
the %UƗKPD۬a portion, which describe ritual, sacrificial activities to be performed (yajña-s), the 
ƖUD۬yaka portion, which include philosophical reflections on the rituals, and the Upani܈ad 
portion, which include theological teachings and stories describing the nature of the Self (ƖWPDQ) 
and the nature of Ultimate Reality (Brahman). The PMS is concerned with the proper exegesis of 
the %UƗKPD৆a portion of the Veda DQGWKXVWKH3ǌUYDPƯPƗূVƗVFKRROVRIWKRXJKWDUH
ritualistically oriented. The UMS applies similar exegetical methods to the Upaniৢads, so the 
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8WWDUDPƯPƗূVƗ schools of thought are regarded as “more” theologically oriented.35
ĝDৄkara’s commentary on the UMS is the oldest extant commentary thereupon. Although 
WKHUHDUHPDQ\WH[WVDWWULEXWHGWRWKLVĝDৄkara, consensus among academics has limited the list of 
authentic compositions. This list includes commentaries on the oldest and most influential 
Upaniৢads, including the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka, &KƗQGRJ\D, and 7DLWWLUƯ\D Upaniৢads, a commentary 
on the %KDJDYDGJƯWƗ and an independent pedagogical text known as the 8SDGHĞDVƗKDVUƯ 
(Thousand Teachings). Although many scholars include the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND %KƗৢya (MKBh) 
DPRQJĝDৄkara’s authentic works, there are those who argue against it.
 Since the 
Upaniৢads are considered to be the final portion of the Veda, they are also referred to as 9HGƗQWD, 
which literally means the “end of the Veda.”  
36
7KHSULPDU\DUJXPHQWDJDLQVWĝDৄkaran authorship seems to be that the author of the 
MKBh exhibits a less sophisticated understanding of Buddhist schools of thought than does the 
author of the UMSBh. As Wilhelm Halbfass points out, however, this may merely suggest that 
WKH0.%KLVDQHDUO\ZRUNE\ĝDৄkara relative to the UMSBh. I have found no convincing 
evidence againsWĝDৄkaran authorship of the MKBh.
  
37
ĝDৄkara was trained as a 0ƯPƗীsaka and applies 0ƯPƗূVƗ hermeneutics to 9HGƗQWD. As 
noted, the diversity between 0ƯPƗীsakas, even on doctrines that are considered to be central, is 
too often overlooked when taking into account ĝDৄkara’s relationship to the SǌUYDPƯPƗূVƗ 
  
                                                     
35
 I place the word “more” in scare quotes for the following reason. If one attempts to define the word “theological” 
regarding the 8WWDUDPƯPƗূVƗ schools, one will be hard pressed to find a way to do so that would not always already 
include the 3ǌUYDPƯPƗূVƗ schools. At the risk of introducing an orientalistic analogy, one could say that the 
Hebrew scriptures are legalistically and ritualistically oriented in a way that the Greek scriptures are not, but it 
would be quite wrong to say that they latter are “more” theologically oriented than the former.  
36
 Mayeda, Suthren Hirst, Halbfass, Hacker, Rambachan, DQG)RUWDOODUJXHWKDWLWLVWKHVDPHĝDৄNDUD1DNDPXUD
and Wood argue against it. Richard King declines to argue the point, but does not suggest that there is any reason to 
doubt the authenticity. 
37
 +DMLPH1DNDPXUDDUJXHVDWVRPHOHQJWKDJDLQVWĝDৄNDUDQDXWKRUVKLS,FULWLFDOO\H[DPLQHKLVDUJXPHQWEULHIO\LQ
Chapter One. 
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tradition. This should not be surprising in the least, given that 0ƯPƗীsakas such as Jaimini, 
ĝDEDUD.XPƗULla, and 3UDEKƗNDUD lived in different centuries, different contexts, and brought to 
their discipline different questions, concerns, and historical realities. Even in its earliest stages of 
development, )UDQFLV;&ORRQH\KDVDUJXHGĝDEDUDGHSDUWVIURP-DLmini on a number of 
teachings, such as their differing notions of DSǌUYD.38
Regarding their epistemologies, I argue that ĝDৄkara’s understanding of perception does 
not significantly differ from ĝDEDUD¶VSRVLWLRQ As I discuss (p
 On numerous points, the doctrinal 
differences between the 3UDEKƗNDUD school and the Bha৬৬a school are sharper and more 
VLJQLILFDQWWKDQGRFWULQDOGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQĝDৄkara and either 3UDEKƗNDUD or .XPƗULOD.  
103)ĝDEDUDGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQ
two moments of perceptual cognition, which later 0ƯPƗীsakas refer to as conceptual perception 
(savikalpa pratyak܈a) and non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpa pratyak܈a). Ganganatha Jha has 
shown that .XPƗULOD and 3UDEKƗNDUD develop this doctrine in more or less opposite directions.39 
.XPƗULOD, for example, compares non-conceptual perception to that of a new-born infant, 
privileging conceptual cognition.40 For 3UDEKƗNDUD, on the other hand, only non-conceptual 
perception yields valid perceptual cognition since conceptually differentiating one thing from 
another requires recollection (memory), which is not a valid means of knowledge.41
                                                     
38
 Clooney, Francis Xavier. 7KLQNLQJ5LWXDOO\5HGLVFRYHULQJWKH3ǌUYD0ƯPƗۨVƗRI-DLPLQL Vol. 17. Vienna: 
Sammlung De Nobili Institut für Indologie der Universität Wien, 1990. 
 As John 
Taber has shown, the later advaitin Ma৆ঌana 0LĞUD develops the nirvikalpa doctrine in an even 
more extreme manner, suggesting that “there is no difference in the nonconceptualized 
39
 Jha, Ganganatha. 7KH3UƗEKƗNDUD6FKRRORI3ǌUYD0ƯPƗPVƗ. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978, 37ff. 
40
 .XPƗULOD, ĝORNDYƗUWWLND 4.112, Jha 3UDEKƗNDUD School, 37.  
41
 Jha (1978), 39. 
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perceptions of a cow and a horse!”42
Without accepting or denying the entirety of the theory proposed by Herman Jacobi, 
$VNR3DUSRODDQG$VKRN$NOXMNDUFRQFHUQLQJWKHRULJLQDOXQLW\RIWKHWZR0ƯPƗূVƗVFKRROV
and texts, my research stipulates, as a working hypothesis, the idea that the 3ǌUYD-0ƯPƗۨVƗVǌWUD 
(attributed to Jaimini) and the Uttara-0ƯPƗۨVƗVǌWUD (attributed to %ƗGDUƗ\D৆a) are well 
XQGHUVWRRGDV³WZRSRUWLRQVRIRQHVLQJOHZRUNFDOOHG0ƯPƗূVƗVǌWUD´
 Unlike .XPƗULOD, 3UDEKƗNDUD, and Ma৆ঌana 0LĞUD, there is 
no evidence to suggest that ĝDৄkara’s position differs substantially from ĝDEDUD¶V/LNHĝDEDUD
ĝDৄkara refuses to privilege either conceptual perception or non-conceptual perception, all the 
ZKLOHDFNQRZOHGJLQJDJDLQOLNHĝDEDUDWKHGRFWULQDl necessity of distinguishing between these 
two epistemological moments. The reason, simply stated, is this: when error occurs (such as 
mistaking a rope for a snake), the error arises at the moment of cognition (pratyayaۊ), which is 
simultaneous with conceptual/linguistic perception; the infallibility of perception is thereby 
preserved while explaining the origin of error. Linked to this, and following the same logic, is 
the concern over the infallibility of Vedic scripture. 
43
 As Parpola points out, 
“There are references to %ƗGDUƗ\D۬a in the MS [3ǌUYD-0ƯPƗۨVƗVǌWUD], and there are references 
to Jaimini in the BS [Uttara-0ƯPƗۨVƗVǌWUDaka %UDKPDVǌWUD].”44
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 Taber, John A. $+LQGX&ULWLTXHRI%XGGKLVW(SLVWHPRORJ\.XPƗULODRQ3HUFHSWLRQ7KH³'HWHUPLQDWLQRI
3HUFHSWLRQ´&KDSWHURI.XPƗULOD%KDܒܒD¶VĝORNDYƗUWWLND. RoutledgeCurzon Hindu Studies Series. New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2005. 95. 
 Moreover, as P.M. Modi has 
HPSKDVL]HGĝDৄkara interprets four tad uktam (“it has been stated”) VǌWUDV in the 
%UDKPDVǌWUDEKƗৢya as references to the 3ǌUYDPƯPƗۨVƗVǌWUD, thereby treating the four DGK\Ɨ\DV 
43Parpola, Asko. “On WKH)RUPDWLRQRIWKH0ƯPƗূVƗDQGWKH3UREOHPV&RQFHUQLQJ-DLPLQLZLWK3DUWLFXODU
Reference to the Teacher Quotations and the Vedic Schools.” Wiener Zeitschrift Für Die Kunde Südasiens Und 
Archiv Für Indische Philosophie 25 (1981): 145–77. 147. See also Clooney (1990), 26.  
44
 Aklujkar (2011), 842. 
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of the UMS as if they are joined to the twelve DGK\Ɨ\DV of the PMS.45 Likewise, ĝDৄkara refers 
WRĝDEDUDVYƗPƯDVƗFƗU\D.46
In the course of my research, this hypothesis has held up well. While I do not seek to 
confirm the theory, the textual evidence strongly suggests that the relationship of each school to 
the other is multifaceted, to say the least. Not only does Jaimini cite %ƗGDUƗ\D৆a in PMS I.1.5, 
EXWĝDEDUD¶VFRPPHQWDU\WKHUHXSRQGUDZVXSRQWKH apophatic tradition received from the 
ancient <ƗMñavalkya dialogues with 0DLWUH\ƯDQGRWKHUV, which are recorded in the 
B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad. Rather than distinguishing between the two schools on historical 
grounds, it is sufficient to note that they exegete two different sets of scripture (%UƗKPD۬as and 
Upani܈ads). Without speculating further, on theoretical/historical grounds, regarding the 
relationship of these scriptures and schools, my research methodology proceeds under the 
assumption that ĝDৄkara’VDSRSKDVLVLVEHVWXQGHUVWRRGLQWKHFRQWH[WRI0ƯPƗূVƗ¶VNDWDSKDVLV
especially in light of the distinct authoritative spheres of perception and scripture. 
 
Review of Secondary Literature 
This study adds to the list of comparative studies on ĝDৄkara. Francis Clooney’s 
Theology After 9HGƗQWD is, arguably, the theoretical model for the theological method now 
referred to as the “new comparative theology” and in that text, Clooney has selected ĝDৄkara and 
Thomas Aquinas as interlocutors.47
                                                     
45
 UMS III.3.26 refers to PMS X.8.15, UMS III.3.33 refers to PMS III.3.8, UMS III.3.50 refers to PMS XI.4.7, and 
UMS III.4.42 refers to PMS I.3.8-9. Parpola reproduces a chart assembled by Modi (1937, p515) which was 
republished in Modi (1956) p295. As Parpola does acknowledge, however, Modi’s purpose is to argue against 
ĝDৄNDUD 
 A decade earlier, John Taber published his comparative 
46
 UMSBh III.3.53, Ghambirananda, 740.  
47
 Clooney, Francis Xavier. 7KHRORJ\$IWHU9HGƗQWD$Q([SHULPHQWLQ&RPSDUDWLYH7KHRORJ\. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1993. 
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philosophical examination of ĝDৄkara, Fichte, and Heidegger.48 More recently, John Thatamanil 
has examined ĝDৄkara’s writings in dialogue with Paul Tillich.49
As Jacqueline Suthren Hirst has shown in her ĝD۪NDUD¶V$GYDLWD9HGƗQWD$:D\RI
Teaching, ĝDৄkara’s writings are valuable not only because of what he has to teach us, but also 
because of the manner in which he teaches. My work is indebted to Suthren Hirst’s important 
research, and seeks to build upon it through a close examination of one small but significant 
aspect of his pedagogical method which Suthren Hirst has not examined in her publications. His 
linguistic philosophy exploits the grammar of negation culminating in the embodied encounter of 
teacher and student. Seeking to better understand the pedagogical emphasis he places on this 
intimate encounter, I analyze the quality of the relationship between teacher and student, 
including his assertion that the guru should literally gesture to the student’s body, emphasizing 
the indexical signification of the word “this” in “this Self is Brahman.”
 While there may be nothing 
intrinsic to ĝDৄkara’s theology that lends itself to comparative theology any more than other 
paragons of Hindu thought, his is an important voice of the tradition, rich with ideas that 
challenge western philosophical and theological presuppositions, which is an important goal of 
comparative study. Unlike previous comparative studies, the current work does not focus 
primarily on ĝDৄkara’s UMSBh, but instead on his commentary on the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND This 
study constructively contributes to the field of Indological studies on ĝDৄkara in several ways.  
50
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 Taber, John A.. 7UDQVIRUPDWLYH3KLORVRSK\$6WXG\RIĝD۪NDUD)LFKWHDQG+HLGHJJHU. Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1983. 
 This embodied context 
is indispensable because the grammatical signification of the indexical, “this,” only signifies its 
49
 Thatamanil, John J. The Immanent Divine: God, Creation, and the Human Predicament. Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2006. 
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 MUBh 2. See also %DQQRQ%UDG³7KRX7KDWDQG$Q2WKHU+HDULQJĝDৄNDUD¶V,QGH[LFDOVDQG)LQGLQJ&XVD¶V
Seeking God,” Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies: Vol. 27, Article 6 (2014). 
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particular referent when uttered by a teacher directly to a student, especially when accompanied 
by a physical gesture, such as pointing to the student’s heart. 
Similarly, Haesook Ra has shown that ĝDৄkara carefully composed his B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka 
Upaniৢad %KƗৢya with a view to cultivating in the reader a particular method and hermeneutical 
skill. His writing style trains his reader in exegetical methods which enable one to read the 
scriptural texts upon which he comments such that the scripture (not his commentary) remains 
central and uniquely revelatory. As Ra shows, ĝDৄkara nurtures within the reader a power of 
discernment which equips his reader with the necessary tools to cosmologically orient oneself 
within the world through the praxis of reading. Building upon Ra’s work, the current study 
examines ĝDৄkara’s hermeneutic strategy of coordination (upasaۨKƗUD), noting especially how 
the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad coordinates teachings on Brahman drawn from the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka and 
&KƗQGRJ\D Upaniৢads. 
:KLOHWKHUHKDYHEHHQQXPHURXVLPSRUWDQWFRQWULEXWLRQVWRĝDৄkaran scholarship, many 
RIWKHVHKDYHDWWHPSWHGWRH[WULFDWHĝDৄkara’s teaching from his context and method. In his 
LPSRUWDQWFRUUHFWLYHWRWKLVWHQGHQF\6ZDPL6DWFKLGƗQDQGHQGUDKDVDUJXHGWKDWĝDৄkara’s 
theological method is a two-part method of DGK\ƗURSDand DSDYƗGD, superimposition and 
apophasis. In his 0HWKRGRIWKH9HGƗQWD6DWFKLGƗQDQGHQGUDGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWWKLVPHWKRGRI
kataphasis and apophasis is modeled in the Upaniৢads and DGRSWHGE\ĝDৄkara and many 
theologians in the tradition after him.51
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on consistencies with and divergenceVIURPĝDৄkara’s work in the later tradition. I demonstrate 
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WKDWĝDৄkara’s two-part method of DGK\ƗURSD-DSDYƗGDis well understood in relation to the 
HDUOLHU0ƯPƗূVƗWUDGLWLRQDVZHOO  
Likewise, Richard De Smet has rightly observed that for most of India’s pre-colonial 
history, “nobody would [have] even dream[ed] of pretending that ĝDৄkara’s advaita… was a 
purely rational philosophy.”52 And yet, “in spite of [ĝDৄkara’s] assertion that his teaching is 
beyond the reach of reason and entirely based upon the testimony of that revelation which he 
believes to be infallible,”53 many modern scholars present his thought as philosophy rather than 
as scriptural theology. As De Smet has shown, only once the theological character of ĝDৄkara’s 
teaching is acknowledged does it become “possible to explain and interpret [his teachings] in 
their right perspective.”54
The current project also builds upon important insights raised by John Thatamanil in his 
various publications emphasizing ĝDৄkara’s apophatic methods. As he notes: 
 Agreeing with De Smet’s emphasis on theological method, I assert, 
moreover, that ĝDৄkara’s teachings (and methods) are best understood within his particular 
theological tradition without presuming, a priori, that ĝDৄkara significantly or substantially 
diverges from that theological tradition. 
8OWLPDWHO\WKH8SDQLVKDGVDVUHDGE\ĝDৄkara contend that Brahman is 
ineffable and beyond language and thought. It is immanent as ground but 
transcendent as mystery. One can know that one is Brahman but Brahman 
itself cannot be known.55
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ĝDৄkara’s apophasis asserts “the unchangeable immutability of Brahman as world-ground.”56 
According to Thatamanil, Brahman, as the infinite ground of being, “upholds but is not 
equivalent to those particulars.”57 As such, “what draws the Advaitin’s attention is not the 
particular being of things qua particular.”58
I share Thatamanil’s concerns and his critique of this perspective. While the ultimacy of 
Brahman as world ground promises to foster an understanding of interconnection and mutual 
dependency, it comes at an unnecessarily high price if it forsakes particularity and contingency 
in the process. As a corrective, Thatamanil turns to the Christian understandings of the 
FRQWLQJHQF\RIEHLQJDQG0ƗGK\DPDND%XGGKLVWRISUDWƯW\DVDPXWSƗGD or “dependent co-
arising.”
 Thatamanil criticizes this view, arguing that it 
devalues particularity, individuality, and the unique contingency of Being.  
59
However, the current work argues that LIZHXQGHUVWDQGĝDৄkara’s apophasis within the 
context of 0ƯPƗূVƗNDWDSKDVLVWKHQLWEHFRPHVFOHDUWKDWĝDৄkara’s nondualism is not monism. 
As Anantanand Rambachan avers, “not-two is not one… It is not necessary, I contend, to deny 
the reality and value of the many to affirm the infinity of the one.”
  
60
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emphasizes that Brahman, from ĝDৄkara’s perspective, is the ground of being. However, there is 
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because names and forms are not suited to name particulars. The seer of sight can neither be seen 
QRUQDPHGEXWWKHVHHU¶VVLJKWLVQHYHUORVW$VWKHVHHURIVLJKWƖWPDQQHFHVVDULO\VHHV
an/other, since relationality is epistemologically inherent to perception, but the enlightened soul 
recognizes the “other” as not-other than Brahman. One sees one’s neighbor as the tvam in tat 
tvam asi. As a particular manifestation of Brahman, the other before my eyes cannot be reduced 
WRQDPHDQGIRUPZKLFKDUHXQGHUVWRRGLQWKH0ƯPƗূVƗZRUOGYLHZDVXQLYHUVDOVTXDOLI\LQJ
particulars. Particulars, ĝDEDUDLQVLVWVare the ƗĞUD\Dor ground of universals, not the reverse.61 
%UDKPDQLVQRWIRUĝDৄkara, the universal of universals, but the particular of particulars. The 
knower of Brahman is one by whom the highest Self is able to be seen.62 It is for this reason that 
a guru is able to physically gesture to a student and utter “This Self is Brahman.” I argue that 
ĝDৄkara’s discourse on Brahman does not devalue particularity, but instead draws our attention 
to particularity as the manifold manifestation of the unmanifest.63
The degree to which my work and reading of ĝDৄkara has been influenced and shaped by 
Anantanand Rambachan’s various publications is difficult to overstate. In Accomplishing the 
Accomplished, Rambachan underscores the necessity of understanding ĝDৄkara’s theological 
method if one hopes to grasp his meaning. Rambachan offers a critique of nineteen and twentieth 
century Neo-9HGƗQWD, which tend to emphasize either mystic experience or philosophical 
reflection (or both in tandem) instead of scriptural revelation. As Rambachan shows time and 
again in his publications, ĝDৄkara regards the Veda to be the only source of liberating 
knowledge.
 
64
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described as a theologian rather than a philosopher. In A Hindu Theology of Liberation, 
Rambachan explains: 
One of the central purposes of theology and the theological method, 
traditionally understood, is the ascertainment and defense of the meaning of 
revelation. Theology aimed to resolve internal inconsistencies in the revealed 
source of knowledge and to demonstrate that it does not contradict 
knowledge derived from other SUDPƗ۬as. If at the heart of the theological 
method is a rational understanding and exposition of the meaning of 
revelation (SUDPƗ۬a YLFƗUD), then ĝDৄkara stands solidly in this tradition, and 
his work is theological.65
In his Advaita Worldview and other publications, he argues that “too much energy has been 
expended in Hinduism in establishing the so-called unreality of the world and too little on seeing 
the world as a celebrative expression of brahman’s fullness.”
  
66
 By returning to the texts, which 
is to say not only ĝDৄkara’s commentaries but also the sacred revelations upon which he 
comments, one begins to see the world “positively as the outcome of the intentional creativity of 
brahman, expressing and sharing brahman’s nature.”67
Advaita… offers a wisdom about human beings and the world that requires 
and enables us to affirm the equal work and dignity of every human being 
and inspires the work of justice and the overcoming of suffering.
 Like Rambachan (and in no small part 
because of his writing), my work emphasizes the profound importance of the human relationship 
between guru and disciple, which ĝDৄkara underscores repeatedly, as well. My work seeks to 
resound, in its own way, Rambachan’s assertion that: 
68
The current study is also informed by Andrew Fort’s The Self and Its States, which 
examines ĝDৄkara’s commentary on the Ɨgama prakara۬a of ĝDৄkara’s 0Ɨ۬ڲǌN\D .ƗULND
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%KƗ܈ya in light of transpersonal psychology.69
Finally, the current project is significantly informed by the work of Francis X. Clooney. 
While this is certainly the case in terms of the methods of comparative theology, it is no less true 
with respect to my approach to ĝDৄkara’s writings. As Clooney has emphasized, “Advaita has 
suffered at the hands of readers who have discussed its themes without sufficient attention to the 
manner in which these are inscribed in the Text.”
 While Fort’s work has been an exceptionally rich 
resource for the current study, my aim and approach to the text are substantially different. 
Nevertheless, Fort’s careful reading of ĝDৄkara’s commentary on the first prakara۬a and his 
excellent translation of that portion of the text have informed my own reading implicitly. 
70
 Michael Sells has noted a similar concern in 
academic treatments of other apophatic theologies. Sells distinguishes between apophatic theory 
and apophatic discourse and emphasizes that the latter is, first and foremost, a performance. It 
“risks being trivialized when its meaning is defined and paraphrased discursively… apophatic 
texts have suffered in a particularly acute manner from the urge to paraphrase the meaning in 
non-apophatic language…”71 /LNHZLVHĝDৄkara’s non-dualism (advaita) suffers when 
paraphrased as “monism” (ekatva).72
Similarly, as Clooney has shown, “the literary and rhetorical characteristics of the 
Advaita texts make them by design unsuitable for replacement by a summation of their main 
 My phrase “apophatic theological method,” employed 
throughout this dissertation, intends to capture something of what Sells describes as the 
apophatic “performance.” 
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ideas or the abstraction of their main themes.”73 While this, to some extent, echoes what De 
Smet has said about the importance of reading ĝDৄkara as a theologian, Clooney’s point is 
somewhat different and, to some extent, earned only through his extensive study of both purva- 
and uttara- PƯPƗۨVƗ. As he explains, there is a “tension between knowledge as skill and 
knowledge as insight [which] grows throughout the Text.”74 That is to say that the entire corpus 
of 9HGƗQWD, from %ƗGDUƗ\D৆a’s VǌWUDV to ĝDৄkara’s commentaries and subsequent 
subcommentaries, are ultimately oriented towards cultivating exegetical skills so that one might 
grasp the meaning of the Upaniৢads. ĝDৄkara, like those before and after him, does not aspire to 
extract, summarize, distill, or even explain the scriptures, thereby replacing the texts with their 
abstracted content and obviating the need to actually read those sacred texts.75
For ĝDৄkara, the upaniৢads cannot tell us about Brahman, but they fail in so 
rich, engaging and persuasive a way that we alter our way of living and 
realize Brahman in a radical revision of our own identities.
 As Clooney 
explains, the UMS, UMSBh, and other commentaries cultivate a skill of reading that prepares 
(and requires) one to (re)read the sacred texts, but, in doing so, also trains one to read oneself and 
the world differently. Beautifully capturing the apophatic impulse, Clooney writes: 
76
Underscoring the significance of these insights, Clooney cultivates and applies the theological 
methods learned from 9HGƗQWD and demonstrates how they might be used to read across religious 
boundaries. In many ways, the central methods of what is now called the “new comparative 
theology” are not other than the central methods of 9HGƗQWD theology. Clooney explains 
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ĝDৄkara’s method of DGK\ƗVD, whereupon (1) one superimposes one reality upon another, (2) 
without forgetting the distinct particularity of either reality, (3) temporarily and for a set purpose. 
Applying this method to texts from different religious traditions, Clooney explains that “the 
familiar is seen anew, read differently because there is superimposed upon it something 
significantly different.”77
Likewise, by superimposing ĝDৄkara’s teachings upon Cusa’s and Cusa’s upon 
ĝDৄkara’s, my goal is neither to synthesize nor reconcile them, forgetting (even temporarily) the 
distinct particularity of either reality. Rather, the superimposition of one text upon another 
compels us to see each one anew. Here, too, though, there exists a “tension between knowledge 
as skill and knowledge as insight”
  
78
 which never intends to replace the practice of actually 
reading either theologian, and always, moreover, constitutes a skill (a Socratic arête) which bears 
the possibility of altering our way of living through a radical re/cognition of our own identities.79
The German Cardinal: Nicholas of Cusa 
  
Historical and Methodological Background 
,QVKDUSFRQWUDVWWRĝDৄkara, about whom we know remarkably little, Nicholas of Cusa’s 
life is exceedingly well documented, catalogued, and studied. The former president of the 
American Cusanus Society, Morimichi Watanabe, has well stated, “It is perhaps accurate to say 
that no other medieval writer’s life has been so carefully and minutely examined as Cusanus’.”80
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Cusa’s life and activities in 1976 for a publication entitled Acta Cusana. While still incomplete, 
five volumes have been published thus far, exceeding 2,500 pages, often detailing Cusa’s 
activities by time of day, location, and persons in the room with him at the time. The sheer 
volume of primary literature overwhelms, as does the steady stream of research and publications 
about Cusa and his influence. I will introduce his life and writings only briefly here along with a 
select review of secondary literature. Since much is lost when his writings are divorced from 
their historical context, it is fitting to give a more complete biography in the chapters on his 
writings. 
Known to us today as Nicholas of Cusa (or Cusanus), Nicholas Cryfftz or Krebs81
Having lost faith in the increasingly contentious council, Cusa traveled to Constantinople 
in 1437 at the request of Pope Eugenius IV. He returned with the Byzantine emperor, Patriarch, 
and Greek bishops to meet with Eugenius at the Union Council of Ferrara-Florence.
 was 
born in 1401 in the small village of Kues on the Moselle River in Germany. After studying canon 
law at Padua (decretorum doctor, 1423), he studied philosophy and theology at the University of 
Cologne (1428). He became an active participant in the Council of Basel in 1430, composing a 
pivotally important document of the conciliar movement, De concordantia catholica (On 
Universal Concord, 1433, henceforth DCC).  
82
                                                     
81
 Krebs means “crab” or “crayfish” and so Nicholas was also referred to in his time as Nicholas Cancer. His 
cardinal seal notably features a crab, or crayfish, with a cardinal’s hat. 
 On his 
return voyage, Cusa experienced a profound epiphany, which inspired his De docta ignorantia 
(On Learned Ignorance, 1440, henceforth DDI). Therein, he articulates some of his best known 
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ideas, including his notion of the coincidentia oppositorum, his observation that there is no 
proportion between the finite and the infinite, his assertion that the earth is not the center of the 
universe but is in perpetual motion in an infinite universe, and his theological cosmology of 
complicatio-explicatio, i.e., the universe as a divine unfolding. In a companion to this treatise, 
Cusa outlines his epistemology in De coniecturis (On Conjectures, 1443). Therein he argues that 
what is commonly referred to as human “knowledge” is simply conjecture, mediated through 
language and perspective. His analysis of perception and cognition is informed especially by 
Protagoras’ assertion that the human mind (mens) is the measure (mensurare) of things. 
Elevated to cardinal by Pope Nicholas V in 1448 and subsequently appointed papal legate 
to Germany, Cusa’s writing shifts primarily to dialogues in Platonic form. The devastating 
impact of the destruction of Constantinople in 1453, on Cusa personally as well as to the Empire 
as a whole, can hardly be overstated. Immediately after learning of the news, he composes an 
imaginative dialogue of a divine ecclesiastical council. Writing in the voice of representatives 
from world religions, De pace fidei (On the Peace of Faith, 1453) applies to the diversity of 
world religions his earlier assertion that “all being and living is constituted by concordantia, but 
all concordance is a concordance of differences.”83
Just weeks later, Cusa completes his celebrated masterpiece, De visione Dei (On the 
Vision of God, 1453, henceforth DVD) and begins its companion piece, De beryllo (On the Beryl 
Stone, 1458, henceforth DB), both addressed to the Benedictine monks at Tegernsee Abbey. As 
explained in the opening pages of DVD, Cusa sends the text to Tegernsee accompanied by a 
painting, which he instructs the monks to hang on the north wall of the Abbey. While the content 
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of the painting seems to be inconsequential, it contains a “most peculiar feature.” From 
whichever vantage one views the painting, its eye seems to gaze directly at the viewer. DVD 
choreographs a dialogical exercise whereby the monks are instructed in a method to see the 
invisible God, first in the painting, then in the “visible” person of Jesus (Col 1:15) who “sees 
with fleshly eyes not unlike our own,”84
In a strikingly different tone and approach, De beryllo strives to see the Creator’s 
invisible power and divinity as it is manifestly revealed in natural creation (Rom 1:20). With the 
imaginative use of an intellectual beryl stone (a lens that magnifies and minimizes) DB further 
develops Cusa’s cosmology of unfolding (explicatio) and epistemology of enfolding 
(complicatio) while simultaneously articulating a theological humanism of creativity as the 
unfolding of human will and purpose in the technologies of language, mathematics, and 
craftsmanship.  
 and finally in one another. What begins, then, as an 
effort to have a vision of God becomes, through the coincidence of the subjective and objective 
genitives, an experience of God’s vision in and through one’s seeing and being seen by one’s 
neighbor.  
In addition to his theological texts, too numerous to introduce here, Cusa also composed 
at least fifteen texts on mathematics. He was the first to conceive of the notion of the 
infinitesimal and was captivated by the problem of “squaring a circle,” i.e., an attempt to 
reconcile the circumference of a circle with the perimeter of a comparably sized square. Since his 
mathematics are utterly inseparable from his theology and epistemology, I discuss his approach 
to the quadrature of the circle beginning on page 268. 
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Cusa completed De beryllo while effectively imprisoned, having taken refuge in Castle 
Andraz after one of several assassination attempts by Archduke Sigismund and various German 
nationalist factions who sought independence from the Holy Roman Empire. Just two weeks 
after he completed DB, he left Germany for Rome.  
Although it is outside of the scope of my research, the texts that Cusa composed during 
his time in Rome are some of his most remarkable. His longtime friend, Aeneas Sylvius 
Piccolomini, now reigning as Pope Pius II, appointed him as vicar general in temporal affairs 
over the papal territories. While his attempts to reform the Roman curia were frustrated at every 
turn, his theology reaches a maturation and convergence that struggles to take shape in DVD and 
DB. Attempting to rethink the ontological relationship between actuality and possibility, he 
composes Trialogus de possest (Trialogue on Actualized-Possibility, 1460) and De non aliud 
(On the Not-Other, 1462). In light of newly translated works of Diogenes Laërtius, he composed 
De venatione sapientiae (On the Pursuit of Wisdom, 1463).  
In the final months before his death in 1464, he penned one of his most striking and 
provocative texts, subtly but significantly shifting many of his earlier ideas. Turning away 
somewhat from his 1460 trialogue on actualized-possibility (possest), and deepening his 
apophasis by again rethinking the ontology of actuality and possibility, Cusa now contemplates 
God as posse ipsum, Possibility Itself, in the fittingly entitled De apice theoriae (On the Summit 
of Contemplation, DAT). Cusa does not distance himself from his earlier works, but instead 
encourages his reader to return to them, informed by his later works. He insists that the ideas 
coalescing in DAT were already at play in his earlier texts, most notably his De quaerendo Deum 
38 
(On Seeking God, 1445, DQD).85
Review of Secondary Literature 
 In chapter four, I analyze DQD through the hermeneutic lens 
of DAT. 
In The Individual and the Cosmos in the Philosophy of the Renaissance, Ernst Cassirer 
effectively initiates a wave of twentieth century scholarship on Nicholas of Cusa.86
Any study that seeks to view the philosophy of the renaissance as a 
systematic unity must take as its point of departure the doctrines of Nicholas 
Cusanus… only they represent a ‘single focal point’ in which the most 
diverse rays are gathered.
 He argues: 
87
Emphasizing Cusa’s theological humanism and irreducible particularity, Cassirer notes that each 
unique fold in the manifold universe is indispensible, with its “own special kind of activity and, 
correspondingly, its own incomparable value.”
  
88
Individuality is not simply a limitation; rather, it represents a particular value 
that may not be eliminated or extinguished. The One that is ‘beyond being’ 
can only be grasped through this value… only by virtue of this thought do the 
multiplicity, the difference, and the heterogeneity of these forms cease to 
appear to be a contradiction of the unity and universality of religion and 
become instead a necessary expression of that universality itself.
 Moreover, in a passage that exemplifies the title 
and central argument of Cassirer’s influential book, and in many ways articulates the central 
thesis of this dissertation, he explains that, for Cusa:  
89
                                                     
85
 DAT, 16, Hopkins trans., 1430. Cusa also mentions here De Dato Patris Luminum (On the Gift of the Father of 
Lights, 1445) and De visione Dei, 1453. 
 
86
 Cassirer, Ernst. The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy. Translated by Mario Domandi. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. (Originally published in 1927). 
87
 Ibid., 7. 
88
 Ibid. 27, citing DDI II.12. 
89
 Ibid. 28-29. 
39 
Hence, rather than regarding the one and the many as a philosophical problem requiring 
resolution or reconciliation, Cassirer regard’s Cusa’s work as one in which oneness can only find 
existential expression in multiplicity. The individual cannot understand herself through any 
“quantitative expression” of part and whole, but only as a unique and irreducible particular, the 
site of infinite being’s becoming. In Cusa’s De visione Dei, Cassirer sees a “pure 
interpenetration” in which and through which one sees God in oneself and oneself in God.90
In the published version of her dissertation on Cusa’s anthropology, Pauline M. Watts 
emphasizes the “active and creative role that man [sic.] plays in the formation of his own history 
and culture.”
 The 
current study expands and develops Cassirer’s important insights regarding this 
“interpenetration.” Plainly stated, I articulate Cusa’s doctrine of imago Dei in terms more or less 
identical with Cassirer’s view represented in the passage cited above. 
91
… unfolds from itself ‘rational things’ (rationalia) rather than ‘real things’ 
(entia realia). It does not know ‘real things’ but only ‘rational things,’ the 
unfoldings or explicationes of its own creative core or complicatio. The 
human mind both unfolds rational things from itself and assimilates the 
rational things of its own creation. In the process, it gives them meaning.
 As she explains, the human mind: 
92
Building upon Watt’s work, I examine the role of perception in the meaning-giving process she 
describes above. For Cusa, this meaning-giving occurs in a variety of ways and always poses a 
kind of double-edged sword. Meaning-giving is an act of creativity and is, to that extent, 
exemplary of Cusa’s understanding of imago Dei. Giving meaning to the world is a creative act 
which brings us closer to the Creator. However, this same meaning-giving creativity obscures 
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God’s revelation, especially the natural world. By more closely examining Cusa’s method, I 
build upon Watt’s research by clarifying how apophasis constitutes a coincidence of opposites 
which simultaneously reveals human creativity as a meaning-giving act while also negating that 
creative meaning-giving for the sake of revealing the natural world from a new perspective. 
While Watt’s work certainly addresses Cusa’s perspectivalism, it is underdeveloped in this 
regard. The current study revises this underdevelopment, especially in light of Karsten Harries’ 
important contributions in this area, which are discussed below. 
Watts also argues: 
Increasingly, Cusanus leaves behind the attempt to explain doctrinally or 
systematically the way in which man [sic.] is the image and likeness of God 
and instead comes to see that the endless variety and originality of human 
activity is itself the source of man’s godlike nature.93
While agreeing with the spirit and intention of Watt’s statement, I argue that Cusa does not leave 
behind doctrinal or systematic explanations of the imago Dei. While I certainly agree that “the 
endless variety and originality of human activity is itself the source of [the human person’s] 
godlike nature,” I argue that this is rooted in Cusa’s doctrinal and systematic theology. As he 
emphasizes throughout De Beryllo, God does not create accidentally or arbitrarily, but only 
willfully, freely, and intentionally. Moreover, God’s entire creation reveals a natural harmony or 
concordance: an ecological image of the Creator. As I argue beginning on page 
  
288, Cusa 
understands the imago Dei in Trinitarian terms as creation, Christ, and creativity. Thus, human 
creativity is only divine when it is creative in the Spirit of individual and ecological concordance. 
Moreover, Watts demonstrates the importance of reading DVD and DB together, in light 
of one another. She argues that these two texts, each dedicated to the monks at Tegernsee Abbey, 
were intended to be read together and: 
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… represent a kind of syncretic vision, in which man’s [sic.] contemplation 
of the divine results not in de-personalization but in self-realization and from 
which emerges a compelling statement of both divine and human power.94
Watts concludes that Cusa “explores human creativity in relation to theology in the De visione 
dei and in relation to epistemology in the De Beryllo.”
 
95
 While Watts’ scholarship on Cusa is 
rich with insights that inform my own reading of his work, I find her distinction between 
theology and epistemology to be overstated. All of Cusa’s work, including even his 
mathematical treatises, are saturated as much with his theology as his epistemology. As I 
demonstrate, Cusa faithfully seeks to understand the Creator’s will and purpose through our 
creative measure of the natural world (DB) in a manner consistent with and informed by Jesus’s 
vision (DVD). In other words, by learning to see like Jesus sees, we learn to see the sacrality of 
our ecology. While my specific analysis of DB and DVD differs subtly but significantly from 
Watts’, it remains consistent with the conclusion that she draws, namely, that Cusa “has 
sacralized the secular. In doing so, he has assigned a new and crucial role to will in both divine 
and human action.”96
My research is also influenced by the writings and thought of H. Lawrence Bond. In the 
medieval mindset, Bond explains, religious icons were regarded as a kind of “text.” Since few 
laypersons of the age were literate (and fewer still in Latin), religious icons were an important 
means of communicating the Christian story. Bond suggests that the very text of DVD itself, 
which begins with a meditation on an icon, was intended to: 
  
… serve as a kind of icon, ministering to the reader in the manner of an icon, 
picturing by its own form, with words or other symbols, so as to signify, 
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convey, and transpose the reader from one state of awareness or experience to 
another.97
When one regards an icon of a face with devotion and sincerity, at a certain point the gaze 
reverses. Instead of seeing the icon, one becomes seen by it. As Bond notes, the same 
phenomenon is masterfully crafted by Cusa in his DVD. Striving to have a vision of God, we 
first see the image, then “we see ourselves in God” and in the final stage, “we are not the seers, 
we are the seen.”
 
98
 Bond concludes, “God is the eternal subject of seeing.”99
Bond is certainly not the only scholar to draw attention to this reversal of the gaze in 
Cusa’s DVD. Unlike others, though, he argues that the text is not merely about an icon but 
performs the way a medieval icon performs. Bond offers a unique and insightful approach to 
textual engagement. Cusa’s words do more than communicate ideas, they evoke the reader’s 
imagination, quite literally. Unlike a painted icon, the mental image conveyed by the text is far 
from static; this image of God can see and speak to the reader, who is seen and addressed by God 
through the imaginative reversal of the iconic text. This imago Dei is dynamic (Rom 1:20). 
  
The heuristic device I have termed the “apophatic measure” will be deployed to develop 
Bond’s articulation of the text as icon in a new, but similar, direction. Because “God is the 
eternal subject of seeing,”100
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 as Bond has stated, then one departs from the iconic text with a 
changed sense of perception. In other words, one learns to see differently by means of the 
apophatic measure, which is learned from the iconic text. Building upon Bond’s contribution, I 
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consider how Cusa’s method edifies his reader such that one learns to see the natural world and 
other creatures after the text, in a manner similar to the iconic vision conveyed in and through 
the text itself. As discussed above (page 32), Clooney redeploys ĝDৄkara’s method of DGK\ƗVD as 
a comparative, textual hermeneutic whereby “the familiar is seen anew, read differently because 
there is superimposed upon it something significantly different.”101
In a challenging but remarkable essay that continues to receive increased academic 
attention, Michel de Certau analyzes “The Gaze of Nicholas of Cusa” in his posthumously 
published article in Diacritics.
 Similarly, I redeploy Bond’s 
“iconic text” as a sensual apophatic measure whereby one learns to see the world differently 
because one finds oneself to be seen (by God through the iconic text). 
102
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 Taking into account the socio-political environment of its 
writing, de Certau highlights Cusa’s use of voice and perspective in DVD. The nouns subtly but 
significantly shift. In chapter one, Cusa’s “I” indexes Cusa himself and the “you” indexes the 
monks at Tegernsee, the intended readers of the text. In chapter three, Cusa shifts first to “we,” 
indexing both teacher and student. In chapter four, however, Cusa begins to speak from the 
vantage of the Benedictine brothers. The “I” indexes the reader and the “you” indexes God. De 
Certeau imbues the nominal shift in perspective with profound meaning. Though the “you” 
indexes God, it bears an important trace of the brothers themselves as images of God. Moreover, 
Cusa’s attention to “the brother in the East” maps not too subtly onto the Ottomans who now 
occupy what was recently Eastern Christendom. What Cusa makes imaginatively explicit in his 
De pace fidei is creatively performed in his De visione Dei, completed just weeks later. 
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While a great deal of academic attention has been rightly given to Cusa’s DVD, far less 
has been given to its companion piece, De beryllo. Karsten Harries is one of very few scholars 
who devote considerable attention to this text.103
Finally, and most importantly, this study is profoundly indebted to the work of Catherine 
Keller. Without drawing any specific historical connection to Cusa, Keller’s discussion of the 
Iberian Convivencia, which is to say the idea of Christians, Muslims, and Jews peacefully “living 
together” on the Iberian peninsula, shapes her reading of Cusa’s De pace fidei in particular, and 
her understanding of Cusa’s pneumatology of concord. The idea of Convivencia, though perhaps 
not the word itself, arises in Cusa’s theology through the influential writings of the thirteenth 
century Catalan theologian Ramon Lull.
 Harries draws numerous connections between 
Leon Battista Alberti, Cusa’s younger contemporary, and the rediscovery of Protagoras by each. 
Harries is also one of few scholars to give detailed attention to Cusa’s architectural metaphors, 
especially his notion that an actual house, while a mere image of the architect’s vision, exists 
more truly in the image than in the archetype because only the former provides shelter. Harries’ 
work shapes my reading of Cusa’s DB in ways too numerous to articulate here, and my own 
work is deeply indebted to his. However, Harries tends to read Cusa as a philosopher rather than 
as a theologian and, as a result, often overlooks the role of scripture, such as Romans 1:20 in DB 
and Colossians 1:15 in DVD. Moreover, Harries does not read DB and DVD in light of one 
another, as a coincidence of opposite perspectives on the notions of seeing, being seen, and the 
imago Dei. Thus, the current study synthesizes, to some extent, the views held by Watts, Bond, 
de Certeau, and Harries. 
104
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 There are numerous studies of Lull’s influence on Cusa, which are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Lull, like Cusa, has applied apophatic theology to his understanding of what 
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Through her constructive reading of Cusa’s entrance “into the cloud” of ignorance, where 
opposites coincide,105 Keller explores the possibility of a “just and sustainable conviviality, for 
life-together beyond tribal origins and between empires.”106
Furthermore, Keller has emphasized that, for Cusa, the coincidence of contradictories is 
simultaneously “both the impassable wall and the passage through it.”
 As she emphasizes, Cusa’s 
anthropology of imago Dei is rooted in his cosmology such that each and every creature is a 
“finite infinity,” a fold in the divine unfolding. In other words, Cusa’s emphasis on creativity, 
freedom, and concord applies equally to all creatures; his imago Dei is not anthropocentric, but 
cosmic. Whereas Keller’s work draws primarily from Cusa’s De docta ignorantia (DDI) and 
DVD, the current study finds additional grounding for her constructive theology in Cusa’s DB. 
As already noted, Cusa’s DB is inspired and supported by Romans 1:20: “Ever since the creation 
of the world, God’s eternal power and divinity, invisible though they are, have been understood 
and seen through created things.” Cusa’s pneumatology (and ecclesiology) of concordance is 
founded in the notion that nature’s harmonious concord reveals God’s creative intention for 
concordant living-together (Convivencia). Hegemony, dominion, discord, and “tribal origins” are 
counter to the Spirit of God’s creativity, as Keller shows.  
107
                                                                                                                                                                           
might be called a theology of religions, and has also employed Augustine’s notion of the coincidence of opposites to 
similar effect. On the relationship between Lull and Cusa, see: Lohr, Charles H. 2004. “Nicolaus Cusanus and 
Ramon Lull: A Comparison of Three Texts on Human Knowledge.” Traditio 59 (January): 229–315; and also Pindl-
Büchel, Theodor. 1990. “The Relationship Between the Epistemologies of Ramon Lull and Nicholas of Cusa.” 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Journal of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64 (1): 
73–87. As Morimichi Watanabe notes, Cusa’s personal library includes 68 manuscripts containing 39 works by Lull. 
See Christianson (2011), 156-166. 
 The coincidence of 
105
 DVD, 9.38. 
106
 Keller, Catherine. Cloud of the Impossible: Negative Theology and Planetary Entanglement. Insurrections: 
Critical Studies in Religion, Politics, and Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. 
107
 Keller, Catherine, “The Cloud of the Impossible: Embodiment and Apophasis” in Apophatic Bodies. Routledge, 
2010, 25-44. 28. 
46 
contradictories is a device, central to Cusa’s methodology, which is not merely an epistemic 
limit, but also an apophasis of that very limit. Following Keller’s lead, the current project 
develops her emphasis on material bodies by turning to sensuality and perception. She notes:  
The concurrence of apophasis and embodiment might then turn out to be no 
accident but a coincidence indeed: not an inevitability, not an impossibility, 
but an aporia turned porous. Like a cloud.108
Keller’s insight in this regard influences my reading of Cusa, but also my reading of ĝDৄkara. 
Each of them emphasize aporia—pushing it to the breaking point. They stretch aporia to porosity 
(p
 
203). For each, as for Keller, apophasis reveals that embodiment is no accident. In the 
aftermath of unsaying, one learns to see bodies.  
In her essay, “Is That All?,” Keller examines the sensual encounter between Jesus and the 
Samaritan woman at Jacob’s well in John 4. Analyzing the economy of gift in this evangelical 
scene, Keller gives attention to the reciprocity of the verbal exchange between Jesus and this 
unnamed woman. In the same essay, Keller also draws upon Cusa’s cosmological assertion in 
DDI that “through all things God is in all things” and “through all things all are in God.”109
329
 Since 
her purpose is to offer a response to John Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy, it is beyond the scope of 
her essay to discuss Cusa’s own reading of John 4. The current study (p ) extends Keller’s 
reading of the verbal reciprocity of John 4 by incorporating Cusa’s sermon on the text, which 
emphasizes a reciprocity of gazes (found also in DVD), as well as a reciprocal openness akin to 
hospitality. The embodied encounter between Jesus and the Samaritan woman, in other words, 
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models what I am calling the “apophatic measure,” which is rooted in sensual reciprocity 
enabled by a kenosis of expectation whereby one is able to see and be seen by the other. 
Comparative Theology: Three Contexts 
“It is always necessary to be more than one in order to speak,  
several voices are necessary…”110
As a work of Comparative Theology, this dissertation examines the apophatic theological 
methods of two exceptional and unique theologians. Not surprisingly, the comparison is not 
premised on any historical connection between the two. In De coniecturis, Cusa states that 
“intellectual religion and the abstract mathematical arts prevail” in India, though he seems to 
have little actual exposure to Indian thought, whether directly or indirectly.
 
111
As is already clear, ĝDৄkara and Cusa write out of and to strikingly different worlds. 
They bring to our comparative table radically different commitments, convictions, and concerns. 
The religious teachings (i.e., doctrines) they receive, hold, and convey differ considerably. My 
intention is neither to compare nor contrast their doctrines, with one notable exception. As 
mentioned earlier, ĝDৄkara and his 0ƯPƗূVƗ predecessors insist on the unauthored, eternal 
relationship between word, universal meaning, and particular entities. As Bogdan Diaconescu 
demonstrates, this commitment distinguishes the school from others and places it at odds with 
other orthodox schools of classical Indian thought.
 In De pace fidei, 
he seems only vaguely familiar with Indian thought or theology, and even this vague familiarity 
is entirely tangential to the current study.  
112
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0ƯPƗূVƗ, is neither a human creation nor is it created by god; language exists eternally, without 
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beginning. For Cusa, however, language is a human technology which exemplifies, par 
excellence, human creativity and meaning-making. In the absence of any historical basis for 
comparison and in the face of such a striking doctrinal contradiction, it becomes necessary to 
identify the motivation and basis for this comparison. 
Stated (too) simply, the basis for comparing these two very different theologians lies in 
their apophatic theological methods, which underscore the onto-cosmological nonduality of the 
one and the many. Their apophatic methods culminate in direct perception, especially vision. 
Their verbal/conceptual negations become a means for seeing more clearly. In large part, the 
historical and doctrinal differences between them become a means by which to focus attention on 
their methods. This is not to say that doctrinal differences and historical context become 
irrelevant, but rather to argue quite the opposite. This requires elaboration. 
First, the absence of any historical connection is, itself, a motivation for comparison. 
Because ĝDৄkara’s context is arrestingly different from Cusa’s context, it is hardly surprising that 
the questions and concerns confronting each theologian are sharply distinct. Confronted by 
0DKƗ\ƗQD%XGGKLVPĝDৄkara faced the challenge of explaining how negative theology is 
distinct from nihilism. Having stated, for example, that Brahman is unnamable because Brahman 
is devoid (ĞǌQ\DP) of any cause governing the introduction of words, a SǌUYDSDN܈in concludes 
that Brahman is simply an empty void (ĞǌQ\DP). Hence, ĝDৄkara’s context requires him to 
explain why apophasis does not lead to nihilism (p150).  
Cusa, on the other hand, writes from a context bounded by two empires: his own Holy 
Roman Empire and the surging Ottoman Empire (p253). He writes, in the context of Renaissance 
humanism, conscious of the imperialistic dangers implicit in a burgeoning modernism that 
emphasized objective knowledge as a source of human hegemony. His apophasis is guided by 
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humility, rooted in the limits of human epistemology. Like theologians before him, Cusa 
acknowledges that we do not know God. He adds, though: We also do not know the world in 
which we live, move, and have our being (Acts 17:28). In other words, he writes against his 
context, turning to apophasis as a means to undermine the arrogance of imperialism, even as he 
(ironically?) serves as a Cardinal within that imperialistic hierarchy. (As de Certeau observes, 
Cusa’s words and actions sometimes reflect a coincidence of opposites.) However, he also writes 
from a context wherein the uniqueness of Jesus is challenged by Islam. Thus, he advocates 
apophasis in order to emphasize the limits of human knowledge while simultaneously asserting 
explicitly kataphatic doctrines of Christology.  
Because Cusa and ĝDৄkara employ similar apophatic theological methods, but do so in 
strikingly different historical contexts with differing concerns and motivations, the comparison 
enables us to examine similar methods in differing contexts. To a limited extent, then, the 
comparison enables us to distinguish between the method and the contextual concerns without 
obviating or dismissing those contextual concerns. Moreover, the comparison enables us to pose 
questions raised in one context to the other.  
While my research finds their methods to be more similar than different, this renders 
differences all the more instructive and insightful. Due to the encounter (imagined or real) with 
nihilism, ĝDৄkara emphasizes that apophasis is a method: a means to see. The specter of nihilism 
shifts ĝDৄkara’s discussion to epistemology and language. It occasions an emphasis on 
perception, the reality of external objects, and an account of particularity. Cusa, on the other 
hand, is not troubled by nihilism, but with a humanistic arrogance born from an illusion of 
epistemic certainty. For reasons different from ĝDৄkara’s, he also turns to a discussion of 
epistemology and language. While his context does not require that he distinguish apophasis 
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from nihilism, his context does compel him to account for particularity, especially the unique 
particularity of Jesus in light of the challenges occasioned by Islam. Motivated by very different 
impulses, then, each defends his apophatic theological method on the grounds of epistemology, 
language, and the direct perception of particularity. In other words, it is precisely because their 
contexts are so different that the comparison bears fruit. 
Second, the comparison highlights a profound doctrinal difference with respect to 
language and its origins. As noted, ĝDৄkara adheres to the 0ƯPƗূVƗ doctrine regarding the 
eternal, unauthored connection between word and meaning. Cusa, in contrast, does not merely 
take it for granted that language is a human creation, but regards this as exemplary of human 
creativity and inherent divinity. The two doctrines are not merely different, they are, arguably, 
polar opposites.  
Were one to examine either ĝDৄkara’s method or Cusa’s method in isolation, the 
importance of their respective doctrines of language might be overlooked. In the context of 
comparison, however, this difference is seen to be crucial. The comparison in no way obviates 
the distinction, but marks it all the more clearly. Hence, what otherwise might be regarded as a 
doctrinal difference of marginal importance is revealed to be a doctrine marking a fundamental 
difference between ĝDৄkara’s 9HGƗQWD and Cusa’s Christian humanism.  
This dissertation, then, is an encounter of three contexts. The first context is ĝDৄkara’s 
9HGƗQWD and the perceived threat of nihilism. The second context is Cusa’s Christian mysticism 
colored by his anti-imperialist humanism on one side and religious conflict on the other. The 
third context is the comparative encounter of these theologians and their writings. In this context 
(and only in this context), nihilism becomes a challenge for Cusa’s apophasis and humanism 
EHFRPHVDFKDOOHQJHIRUĝDৄkara’s apophasis. Delving deeply into the thought and method of 
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one of these thinkers raises issues and concerns when we read the other that might not otherwise 
arise. Reading the two together in this third, academic context bears the potential to lead us into a 
deeper appreciation of each.  
Francis Clooney describes comparative theology as a praxis through which “the engaged 
reader is ‘inscribed’ into an ever more complexly composed context, in order to write after and 
out of it.”113
Constructive Comparative Theology 
 As Clooney has shown, comparative theology is a misnomer if one understands 
“comparison” to be a purely objective and calculative evaluation of the similarities and 
differences of two juxtaposed texts. Rather, comparative theology indicates a constructed 
context; it is a context that is constructed by the texts themselves and into which the reader 
involves herself by doing nothing more—and nothing less—than taking the texts seriously, 
theologically. 
As stated above, Comparative Theology occurs at the intersection of three contexts. 
Constructive Theology is a theological engagement with the pressing issues of today which 
nevertheless remains rooted in the theological tradition and heritage which it receives. In the 
same way that a scholar cannot adequately exegete a text without considering the context of its 
author, neither can a scholar adequately write, in this third context, without taking into account 
FRQWHPSRUDU\FRQFHUQV-XVWDVWKHVSDFHRIFRPSDULVRQHQDEOHVXVWRSRVHĝDৄkara’s questions 
to Cusa and vice versa, it also requires that we acknowledge our own questions, allowing 
ĝDৄkara and Cusa to speak to our contemporary theological issues. As “the engaged reader is 
‘inscribed’ into an ever more complexly composed context,”114
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theological concerns, thereby enabling (if not demanding) the comparative theologian to 
constructively contribute to contemporary theology. While I must write in a voice that is faithful 
to both ĝDৄkara and Cusa, I must also write in a voice that speaks to contemporary theologians, 
especially theologians in my own Reformed Protestant (Congregationalist) tradition. 
It is necessary to emphasize, then, that this dissertation is a work of theology in addition 
to being a comparison of theologies. It is, to borrow Anselm’s oft-quoted aphorism, an exercise 
in faith seeking understanding. While concerned with two historical figures and their historical 
contexts, it is not, strictly speaking, a historical examination. Although concerned with doctrinal 
similarities and differences, it is not, strictly speaking, a doctrinal comparison. To the extent that 
ĝDৄkara and Cusa are theologians, each writes from a position of faith while seeking to render 
that faith understandable and communicable. Likewise, as a comparative theologian writing in 
this third, academic context, my own writing is an exercise of faith seeking understanding. 
Thoroughly mindful of the fact that not all readers will be equally interested in the details of 
ĝDৄkara’s method and Cusa’s method, I nevertheless write from and to this third, academic 
context motivated by the firm conviction that ĝDৄkara and Cusa, alike, are able to speak to 
contemporary concerns, especially issues of ultimate concern shared by contemporary Protestant 
theologians. 
Most importantly, this work of comparative theology seeks to offer constructive 
contributions to the notions of particularity and diversity. While our society increasingly tends to 
value diversity and difference, it is often difficult to articulate, on theological grounds, the 
inherent value of difference. While it may (or may not) be taken for granted that diversity is to be 
celebrated, it is challenging to defend the appreciation of diversity without resorting to 
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relativism. It is all the more challenging to articulate the inherent value of diversity and 
difference in terms of theological doctrines that imply exclusion of religious others.115
While it is beyond the scope or even aspiration of this dissertation to formulate a 
systematic theology conducive to an appreciation of the inherent value of difference/diversity, I 
nevertheless intend it to contribute towards such an appreciation. Through a comparative 
theological analysis of the apophatic methods of ĝDৄkara and Nicholas of Cusa, this study 
signals towards a theology of irreducible particularity. I argue that, for each, apophasis negates 
universals. For each, universals are understood to be measures of particularity. Universals, which 
are necessarily linguistic in nature according to both ĝDৄkara and Cusa, constitute a means by 
which we come to know one another, the natural world in which we live, and even the 
transcendent. Thus, universals are indispensable because they constitute the very means by 
which we come to know and understand our world. For ĝDৄkara, these universals are eternal and 
unauthored. For Cusa, universals exemplify the pinnacle of human creativity and meaning-
making. However, for each, universals also reduce and essentialize difference and diversity. For 
Cusa, universals simultaneously represent the creation of meaning, but also the obfuscation of 
God’s creation. For ĝDৄkara, universals constitute a valid means of knowledge, but 
simultaneously constitute ignor/ance insofar as they measure the immeasurable (cleaving the 
non-dual). For both, the negation of universals, which measure particularity, cultivate a means by 
which to directly perceive reality. Although this reality is infinite and thus imperceptible qua 
infinity, this infinite reality is, nevertheless, manifest before our very eyes qua particularity (Rom 
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1:20, p256). Without this or that particular, infinite reality would be incomplete. Brahman is “All 
This” (each this and every that, nondually, p165) The infinite would fail to be truly boundless if 
it did not include “you,” in particular.  
What I have termed the “apophatic measure” is nothing other than a direct perception of 
the infinite qua particularity. This perception is not attained, however, by dispensing with 
universals (since these constitute the very epistemic means of knowing), but rather by coming to 
understand universals qua measures, which obscure infinite reality by reducing particulars to 
essentials, even as they make those very particulars knowable and distinguishable from one 
another. Becoming attentive to the fact that one measures, one begins to measure differently. 
These apophatic theological methods (apophatic measure1) culminate in a direct perception 
(apophatic measure2) of irreducible particularity (apophatic measure3) for the very reason that 
difference and diversity bear an inherent—and absolute—value. They neither decry nor dispense 
with universals. One still measures, but does so with humility, awe, and wonder (p341). Hence, 
from two very different doctrinal perspectives (each faithfully rooted in those doctrines), ĝDৄkara 
and Cusa offer methods (irreducible to any postulate) by which the difference and diversity of 
particulars (be they other persons, cultures, animals, ecologies, or even ideas) are inherently 
valued as unique manifestations of infinite reality (without which, reality would be incomplete), 
and yet their theologies avoid relativism by also insisting on the indispensable value of universal 
measures, which are eternal for ĝDৄkara and exemplary of the imago Dei for Cusa. 
Chapter Outline 
In light of the three contexts of comparative theology described above, this dissertation is 
divided into three parts, oriented around its seemingly simple two-word title: Apophatic 
Measures. Without feigning an objective view from nowhere, the first two parts are primarily 
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descriptive. In Part One, I examine ĝDৄkara’s apophatic theological method in light of his 
theological tradition and the text upon which he is commenting. In Part Two, I examine Cusa’s 
apophatic theological method in his context. Since Comparative Theology is a praxis of reading, 
back-and-forth, from one tradition to the other, it makes little sense to postpone comparison once 
each theologian has been introduced. Hence, while I focus on Cusa in Part Two, I do so 
comparatively for the sake of elucidating both ĝDৄkara and Cusa, building upon Part One. Part 
Three is more explicitly and directly comparative. While remaining faithful to each tradition, this 
comparison occurs in the third context of contemporary academic theology. Hence, Part Three 
bears the fruit of the project in the form of constructive comparative theology,116
 
 with an eye 
towards a theology of irreducible particularity wherein difference and diversity are regarded for 
their inherent theological value and import. Therein, I consider the constructive implications of 
this experiment with respect to apophatic theology and comparative theology, more broadly, and 
also to Christian doctrines of theosis and imago Dei.  
                                                     
116
 That is not to say that constructive theology is the only fruit born by comparative theology. Comparative reading 
is fecund in and of itself, inscribing the comparative theologian into an ever more complex context that is, in and of 
itself, worthy of the effort. However, many of these benefits are reaped only by the comparative scholar and remain 
inaccessible to those who do not perform the academic work and reading themselves. On this, see especially 
Clooney (1993), 223. Constructive theology, on the other hand, compels the theologian (comparative or otherwise) 
to translate what has been learned in and through one’s research such that it directly contributes to contemporary 
theological concerns. 
 Part One: Apophatic Measures in ĝDৄkara 
ĝUXWL is an authority only in matters not perceived by means of ordinary 
instruments of knowledge such as perception—i.e., it is an authority as to 
the mutual relation of things as means to ends, but not in matters lying 
within the range of perception…117
 “ĝUXWL literally means ‘that which is heard’ and designates those scriptures that are 
considered to be revealed and that enjoy supreme authority.”
  
118
 Strictly speaking, the term 
“scripture” (literally, “writing”) is a misnomer, despite the fact that I and others employ that term 
to refer to the Veda.119 While I (and most of “us” who stand “outside” the tradition) receive these 
revelations primarily in the form of texts, one gradually learns to “hear” the ĞUXWL, aided 
especially by sage commentators and patient teachers. Drawing from the advaitin commentator, 
$PDOƗQDQGD)UDQFLV&ORRQH\OLNHQVWKHĞUXWL to a spiritual score: “the musical notes are already 
being played distinctly even when one still lacks the capacity to distinguish them.”120 Just as one 
gradually cultivates a “refined ear for music,” one learns to read the texts and “notices what was 
previously unheard.”121
As ĝDৄkara explains in the epigraph above, ĞUXWL and perception (pratyak܈a) have 
differing purposes and differing scopes of authority. As Anantanand Rambachan notes, this, “has 
helped the tradition avoid some of the conflicts between religion and the empirical sciences that 
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 BGBh 18:66, Rambachan’s translation. Rambachan (2015), 50. 
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 Rambachan (2015), 110. 
119
 “Scripture” is an English cognate of the Latin VFUƯSWǌUD, from VFUƯEǀ, “to engrave; to draw; to write.” There is 
ample justification for continuing to refer to the Veda as “scripture.” Two should suffice: (1) We typically receive 
the Veda as a sacred text, (2) the term “scripture” implies far more than “writing” just as the word ĞUXWL implies far 
more than “that which is heard.” 
120
 Clooney (1993), 127. 
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often stand in the way of constructive dialogue between these disciplines.”122
In chapter one, I introduce the method and structure of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad (MU) 
and GauঌDSƗGD’s .ƗULND (GK). While the 9HGƗQWD tradition has come to regard some or all of the 
text as ĞUXWL, I aver that ĝDৄkara did not consider any part of the text to be revealed. This is 
significant because the text has a different purpose, from ĝDৄkara’s perspective: it models 
theological methods whereby one learns to hear the ĞUXWL properly. The organizational structure 
of the twelve prose verses (now referred to as the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad
 Clearly 
distinguishing between the purposes and authoritative scopes of ĞUXWL and perception is one 
critically important goal of Part One of this dissertation. My argument, in brief, is this: By 
learning to read the texts in the way that ĝDৄkara teaches us to read them, we gradually learn to 
hear the ĞUXWL. By learning to hear the ĞUXWL, we also learn to perceive differently.  
123
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 Rambachan (2015), 50-1. 
) is nearly as important 
as the theological content of those verses. The content is drawn from various scriptural teachings, 
not in order to abridge and replace those teachings, but to harmonize them. In it, the 9HGƗQWD 
scriptures are grasped together (sa۪/graha) so that they might be seen, synoptically. The text 
paradigmatically exemplifies two hermeneutic methods: coordination (upasaۨKƗUD) and 
harmonization (samanvaya). By orchestrating particular scriptural passages in this way, the text 
teaches us how to hear the ĞUXWL, coordinately and harmoniously. Echoing Clooney’s (and 
$PDOƗQDQGD¶VDQDORJ\If the ĞUXWL is a graceful revelation which is to be heard, then the 
0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\DWRJHWKHUZLWKLWV.ƗULNDDQG%KƗৢya, might be described as ear training. It cultivates 
an aesthetic sensuality—beyond measure. 
123
 For convenience and out of respect for the later 9HGƗQWD tradition, I consistently refer to the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D’s 12 prose 
verses as an UpaniৢDG7KHPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUGupani܈DG further justifies this decision. See note 234 on p89, 
below. See also Rambachan (2015), 200 n.2.  
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Chapter two extends and deepens this analysis by shifting focus to ĝDৄkara’s commentary 
on the texts introduced in chapter one. As both commentator and preceptor, this ƗFƗU\D teaches 
us how to read the MU and GK. By teaching us to read these texts, I argue, he prepares us for the 
event (prayoga) of hearing the ĞUXWL. He does this, in part, by examining the relationship between 
words, universals, and particular entities in the world. This arises through a discussion of the 
relationship between AUM and all speech (MU 1). Only after one has properly understood 
scriptural kataphasis can one then begin to understand scriptural apophasis. Words positively 
measure Brahman, possessed of infinite measure (kataphasis). Negation removes these measures, 
enabling one to realize Brahman, without measure (apophasis). This arises through a discussion 
of the four “measures” of Brahman disclosed in MU 2-7. 
It is one thing to suggest that the MU coordinates and harmonizes various ĞUXWL teachings, 
but quite another to unfold this in practice. Only through the latter does one begin to hear. 
Having outlined ĝDৄkara’s theological method in a somewhat abstract way in chapter two, 
chapter three examines this method in its practical application. By learning to read the 
0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D, one learns to hear the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka and &KƗQGRJ\D Upaniৢads harmoniously. By 
learning to hear the ĞUXWL, one then begins to perceive the world differently, in light of ĞUXWL’s 
truth. Following ĝDৄkara’s lead, I first distinguish between sensuality in the state of deep sleep 
and the awakened state (the third and fourth “measures”), and only then examine how sensuality 
in the awakened state differs from sensuality in everyday wakefulness (the first “measure”).  
We will return to these themes and insights in chapter six, where learning to hear the ĞUXWL 
coincides with being seen differently. The methods examined in Part One fold back on 
themselves. Given that one perceives the world differently (apophatic measure2) after one has 
learned to hear the ĞUXWL (apophatic measure1), it logically follows that a spiritual teacher 
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(ĞUotriya) perceives his/her student differently (apophatic measure3) than the student perceives 
himself/herself. Perceiving an/other as this Self (MU 2), the guru incarnates the Word (ĞDEGD), 
giving voice to the text, so that it may be heard (ĞUXWL). 
 One: Learning to Hear Harmoniously: Method and Structure of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D 
.ƗULND  
“AUM”—that sacred syllable is all this. (MU 1) 
The 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND%KƗৢya teaches its reader how to read the 9HGƗQWD scriptures. It 
does so by arranging scriptural teachings, coordinating them with one another. Observing its 
structure and organization, one attends to its intentions. It models a way of reading scripture, 
coordinately, so that ĞUXWL might be heard, harmoniously.  
This chapter introduces the text of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND %KƗৢya, especially its 
organizational structure. It is a complex text consisting of four divisions. The first division 
includes twelve prose verses, which are widely considered to be revealed scripture (referred to as 
the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad). Interspersed between these twelve verses are metered verses, 
attributed to GauঌDSƗGD. While the three subsequent divisions are also attributed to GauঌDSƗGD 
(collectively referred to as the GauঌDSƗGD .ƗULND, significant theological discrepancies suggest 
that they were composed by different authors. ĝDৄkara’s commentary, however, treats the entire 
text as one composition (collectively referred to as the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND. 
The twelve verses of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad (MU) teach about the non-dual Brahman 
by modeling an apophatic theological method, which ĝDৄkara mimics. In the first section below, 
I introduce the MU, including an original translation. An analysis of its structure follows. The 
twelve verses are organized into three divisions (MU 1, MU 2-7, and MU 8-12). Without 
overlooking the obvious import of their content, my focus is limited to the organizational 
structure insofar as this arrangement represents a hermeneutical key which unlocks the meaning 
of the text as a whole. 
The second section introduces GauঌDSƗGD’s .ƗULND. The latter portions of the text contain 
views opposed by ĝDৄkara in his commentary. In short, the later prakara۬as suggest that there is 
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no distinction between the ordinary waking state and the dream state, arguing that what is seen in 
the waking state is merely an illusion, analogous to dream. ĝDৄkara opposes this view. Thus, 
while his commentary on the first prakara۬a is primarily concerned with distinguishing between 
the state of deep sleep and the enlightened state of 7XUƯ\D, his disagreement with the perspective 
represented in prakara۬as two through four require him to clearly distinguish between 
“perception” in the WXUƯ\D and “seeing” in the quotidian waking state.  
The final section turns to ĝDৄkara’s analysis of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND (MK) as a whole. 
While later 9HGƗQWLQV consider the twelve prose verses of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D to be an Upaniৢad, I 
argue that ĝDৄkara does not. He simply treats the entire text as a single composition. The MK it 
is highly significant to him because it models the 9HGƗQWD methods of coordination and 
harmonization. In other words, ĝDৄkara chooses to compose a commentary on the MK because it 
models the proper method by which to read scriptural texts. It epitomizes a spiritual practice 
which compels its reader to perform that practice for himself/herself by (re)reading the 9HGƗQWD 
scriptures. By learning to read, coordinately, one learns to hear the ĞUXWL, harmoniously. 
The 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad 
The 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad (MU) is the shortest of all the Upaniৢads, consisting of just 
twelve prose verses. The full text is translated below. The Sanskrit text is reproduced in the 
Appendix (p344). It begins and ends with a reflection on the sacred syllable AUM ({). Between 
these is a meditation on Brahman, or ultimate reality, which is said to be the Self (ƖWPDQ) 
possessed of four quarters, which are also called measures (MU8). The ideas presented in the 
MU, especially the middle section on the four quarters, suggest that the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad 
constitutes a substantial influence upon it, as I show later (p139). The two reflections on AUM 
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suggest the influence of the &KƗQGRJ\D Upaniৢad. Like the MU, the &KƗQGRJ\D Upaniৢad begins 
with a veneration of AUM and a tripartite reflection upon it.  
Hajime Namakura dates the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad to the first two centuries CE, in contrast 
to the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka and &KƗQGRJ\D Upaniৢads, which predate the Buddha.124 Richard King 
narrows the range of the MU to the second century CE.125 According to Nakamura, there is no 
evidence prior to the eighth century to suggest that the twelve prose verses of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D 
were considered to be an Upaniৢad, even though the text itself had been a part of the tradition 
well before that time.126 The first to do so seems to be ĝDৄkara’s student, 6XUHĞYDUD.127 Centuries 
later, 9HGƗQWLQV such as 5ƗPƗQXMD considered the entire first prakara۬a of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND 
to be ĞUXWL.128
The Text  
  
1
 “AUM”—that sacred syllable is all this. Its explanation is: All that was, is, 
and shall be is simply AUM. And, moreover, that which transcends the three 
periods of time, that, too, is simply AUM.  
2
 All this is certainly Brahman. This Self is Brahman. That [Brahman] is this 
Self, possessed of four quarters. 3 9DLĞYƗQDUD (the Universal One), who is 
fixed in the waking state, who is conscious of the external, who possesses 
seven limbs and nineteen mouths, and who enjoys material things, is the first 
quarter. 4 Taijasa (the Luminous One), who is fixed in the dream state, who is 
conscious of the thing, who possesses seven limbs and nineteen mouths, and 
who enjoys subtle things, is the second quarter. 5 Where the sleeper does not 
desire any desirable thing [and] does not see any dream, that is deep sleep. 
3UƗMña (The Wise One), who is fixed in the state of deep sleep, who is 
unified, who is a mass of consciousness, who consists of bliss, who is 
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certainly an enjoyer of bliss, [and] who is the entrance to the mind, is the 
third quarter. 6 This is the Lord of all. This is the knower of all. This is the 
inner controller. This is the womb of all, indeed the origin and dissolution of 
beings. 7 They consider the fourth [to be]: Not conscious of internal things, 
not conscious of external things, not conscious of both (internal and external 
things), not a mass of consciousness, not conscious, not unconscious. Unseen, 
beyond the ordinary, ungrasped, undefined, unthought, not to be defined, 
whose essence is certainty of the one Self, tranquility of the manifold, 
pacified, auspicious, [and] non-dual. That is the Self; that is to be known. 
8
 With respect to the syllables, AUM is this Self. With respect to the 
measures, the quarters are the measures and the measures are the quarters: 
“A”, “U”, [and] “M”. 9 9DLĞYƗQDUD, whose place is the waking state, is the 
first measure, “a”, [so named] because of obtaining (ƗSWL) or because of being 
first (ƗGLPDWWYD). One who knows this certainly obtains all that is desired and 
becomes first. 10 Taijasa, whose place is the dream state, is the second 
measure, “u”, [so named] because of raising upwards (utkar܈a) or from 
equanimity (ubhayatva). One who knows this certainly elevates the expanse 
of knowledge, becomes equal, and no one in his/her lineage will be ignorant 
of Brahman. 11 3UƗMña, whose place is the state of deep sleep, is the third 
measure, “m”, [so named] because of measuring (miti) or merging (DSƯWL). 
One who knows this verily measures all this and becomes its mergence. 
12
 The Fourth is without measure, beyond the ordinary, the tranquility of the 
manifold, auspicious, [and] non-dual. Thus, AUM is indeed the Self. One 
who knows this enters the Self by the Self. 
The Score  
Attending carefully to the text, one observes a certain rhythm and cadence within the 
MU. Like a musical score, its twelve verses contain patterns and tropes in variation. ĝDৄkara’s 
commentary echoes these patterns, in somewhat of a spiritual call and response. Continuing the 
musical analogy, one might divide the opus into three movements: verse 1, vv.2-7, and vv.8-12. 
Each movement includes an overture, three positive descriptions, and a negative description. 
Like a fugue, there are thematic parallels between 2-7 and 8-12, interrupted by verse 6 which 
presents an exception to the symmetry. As a means of analyzing the structure of the MU, I begin 
with a preliminary look at verse 1, then 8-12, and finally 2-7. The full text is presented again on 
the next page, arranged in a score to emphasize its rhythmic symmetry.  
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 Section One Section Two Section Three 
Preface 1 “AUM”—
that sacred 
syllable is all 
this. Its 
explanation is: 
2 All this is certainly Brahman.  
This Self is Brahman.  
That [Brahman] is this Self, possessed of four quarters. 
8
 With respect to the syllables, AUM is this self. 
With respect to the measures, the quarters are the 
measures and the measures are the quarters: “A”, 
“U”, [and] “M”. 
Positive 
description 
1 All that is 
(bhavat)… 
3
 9DLĞYƗQDUD (the Universal One/common to all), who is 
fixed in the waking state, who is conscious of the 
external, who possesses seven limbs and nineteen mouths, 
and who enjoys material things, is the first quarter. 
9
 9DLĞYƗQDUD, whose place is the waking state, is the 
first measure, “A”, [so named] because of obtaining 
(ƗSWL) or because of being first (ƗGLPDWWYD). One 
who knows this certainly obtains all that is desired 
and becomes first. 
Positive 
description 
… was 
(EKǌWDP) … 
4
 Taijasa (the Luminous One), who is fixed in the dream 
state, who is conscious of the internal, who possesses 
seven limbs and nineteen mouths, and who enjoys subtle 
things, is the second quarter. 
10
 Taijasa, whose place is the dream state, is the 
second measure, “U”, [so named] because of raising 
upwards (utkar܈a) or from equanimity (ubhayatva, 
lit. “bothness”). One who knows this certainly 
elevates the expanse of knowledge, becomes equal, 
and no one in his/her lineage will be ignorant of 
Brahman. 
Positive 
description 
… and shall be 
(bhavi܈yat) is 
simply AUM 
…
 
5
 Where the sleeper does not desire any desirable thing 
[and] does not see any dream, that is deep sleep. 3UƗMña 
(The Wise One), who is fixed in the state of deep sleep, 
who is unified, who is a mass of consciousness, who 
consists of bliss, who is certainly an enjoyer of bliss, 
[and] who is the entrance to the mind, is the third quarter. 
11
 3UƗjña, whose place is the state of deep sleep, is 
the third measure, “M”, [so named] because of 
measuring (miti) or merging (DSƯWL). One who knows 
this verily measures all this and becomes its 
mergence. 
[Exception]  6 This is the Lord of all. This is the knower of all.  
This is the inner controller.  
This is the womb of all,  
indeed the origin and dissolution of beings. 
 
Negative 
description 
And, 
moreover, that 
which 
transcends 
(DWƯWD) the 
three periods 
of time, that, 
too, is simply 
AUM 
7
 They consider the fourth [to be]: Not conscious of 
internal things, not conscious of external things, not 
conscious of both (internal and external things), not a 
mass of consciousness, not conscious, not unconscious. 
Unseen, beyond the ordinary, ungrasped, undefined, 
unthought, not to be defined, whose essence is certainty 
of the one Self, tranquility of the manifold, pacified, 
auspicious, [and] non-dual. That is the Self; that is to be 
known. 
12
 The Fourth is without measure, beyond the 
ordinary, the tranquility of the manifold, auspicious, 
[and] non-dual. Thus, AUM is indeed the Self. One 
who knows this enters the Self by the Self. 
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The first verse of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad gives us our first impression of the importance 
of the number four in the text. AUM, we hear, is all that was, is, and shall be, but AUM is also 
that which transcends these. Hence, AUM is thrice defined positively (all that was, is, and shall 
be), and once negatively (something that is other than all that was, is, and shall be). It is 
described spatially (“all this”) as well as temporally. Like verse one, the second and third 
movements follow the pattern of three kataphatic descriptions followed by apophasis.  
Skipping for the moment to the third section (vv.8-12), perhaps the first, most obvious 
thing we notice is that although AUM is said to have four quarters, AUM only has three letters. 
“A” is positively described in verse 9, “U” in verse 10, and “M” in verse 11. While we might 
expect verse 12 to tell us that the fourth quarter is the whole, “AUM,”129
Turning back to the second movement, one notices a parallel between verses 8-12 and 
verses 2-7. In verse two, we are told that the Self is fourfold. Verses 3, 4, and 5 describe this 
fourfold Self in positive terms while verse 7 describes the Self in wholly negative terms. Verse 6 
enigmatically punctuates the score, disrupting the rhythm in mystic cadenza on ƮĞYDUD, the Lord 
of all and the womb of all. This divine syncopation presents itself as an exegetical challenge 
about which there is no shortage of debate.
 instead we are told what 
it is not. AUM is without measure (DPƗWUD), the stilling of the multiplicity, and is not-two 
(advaita). AUM is also positively described here as “auspicious” and as the Self. 
130
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 That is to say, one might expect here a discussion of the relationship between the letters of AUM discussed in 
verses 9-DQGWKHV\OODEOH$80,QĝDEDUD¶V%KƗৢ\D RQ3ǌUYDPƯPƗূVƗVǌWUD,IRUH[DPSOHDIWHUDVVHUWLQJWKH
eternal connection between word and meaning, the question is asked, “what is it that is called the ‘word’?” (Jha, I, 
ĝDEDUDUHDVRQVWKDWDZRUGPXVWEHVRPHWKLQJPRUHWKDQVXPRILWVOHWWHUV$OWKRXJK³FRZ´VLJQLILHVDQDQLPDO
WKHOHWWHUV³F´³R´DQG³Z´EHDUQRUHODWLRQWRWKHVLJQLILHGDQLPDOĝDEDUDFRQFOXGHVWKDWD³ZRUG´LVWKH
constituent letters together with hearer’s ‘impressions’ (saۨVNƗUDs) of the letters (Jha, I, 20). Therefore, since MU 9-
11 tells us something about the constituent letters of AUM, one would expect verse 12 to tell us something about the 
relation of these letters to the syllable AUM.  
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Spiritual Practice 
The organization of the text functions as a kind of hermeneutical key to unlock its 
meaning. The author or redactor of the text, in effect, organizes and refines specific teachings 
from the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka and &KƗQGRJ\D Upaniৢads. Even the individual verses coordinate 
multiple teachings from these Upaniৢads (p157). Thus, the text organizes and coordinates 
teachings at the macro level, drawing from multiple Upaniৢads, but also at the micro-level, 
drawing together diverse teachings contained within these Upaniৢads. The methodological form 
and structure of the text, therefore, is every bit as rich with meaning as the content presented 
through the words of the text.  
The MU is well understood as a spiritual exercise: a pedagogy of apophatic theological 
practice and performance. If not scripture, it is certainly scriptural. Like a symphonic score, it 
enfolds various scriptural voices, coordinating them with one another in a harmonious concord. 
Like measures of a musical composition, its four measures beckon us to not simply read it, but to 
perform it.131
The GauঌDSƗGD .ƗULND and its Complications 
 Just as a musician must rehearse, an advaitin must practice this etude to perform its 
spiritual praxis. Its four quarters measure diverse teachings, notating them in a score waiting to 
performed so that these voices might be heard, concordantly.  
The Four Prakara৆as 
At least since the time of ĝDৄkara and likely well before, the twelve prose verses of the 
0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad have been connected with a collection of memorial metered verses 
(.ƗULND-s) organized into four topical sections or prakara۬as. In most cases, as in ĝDৄkara’s 
commentary, the twelve prose verses are interspersed within the twenty-nine verses of the first 
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section, usually referred to as the ƖJDPD-prakara۬a. The term ƗJDPDis sometimes used to refer 
to scripture itself, and other times used to refer to the traditional study of scripture. Hence, the 
title ƖJDPD-prakara۬a can be understood as either “the topical section about scripture,” or “the 
topical section about the traditional study of scripture.”  
Traditionally, all four prakara۬as have been attributed to GauঌDSƗGD, who is traditionally 
LGHQWLILHGDVĝDৄkara’s parama-guru, which is to say that he was the teacher of 
*RYLQGDSƗGƗFƗU\DZKRLQWXUQZDVĝDৄkara’s guru.132 Beyond the traditional attribution, little is 
known about the historical author or authors. As King notes, it is possible that “GauঌDSƗGD´LV
not a name at all. It could be an honorific title given to a teacher or teachers from the Gauঌa 
region (Bengal).133
There is wide scholarly consensus, however, that the four prakara۬as were most likely 
not composed by the same person.
 
134
 Based simply upon the styles and content of the 
prakara۬as, it is more likely to be the work of three authors, composing prakara۬as 1, 2-3, and 
4, respectively. As King notes, it is not necessary to presume that the four prakara۬as were 
composed in the chronological order in which they are traditionally arranged.135
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 Wood, Thomas E. 7KH0Ɨ۬ڲǌN\D8SDQL܈DGDQGWKHƖJDPDĝƗVWUD$QInvestigation into the Meaning of the 
9HGƗQWD. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990. Xiii. 
 While the 
second and third prakara۬as seem to be in full agreement with one another, significant 
differences in thought are observed when compared to the first prakara۬a. The fourth is 
markedly different from the other three. It begins, for example, with a reverential homage to the 
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Buddha and concludes with a second reference to the Buddha.136 Unlike the other prakara۬as, 
the fourth section lacks any explicit reference to the Upaniৢads.137
The first prakara۬a closely adheres WRWKHYHUVHVRIWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D8SDQLৢad. It reflects 
upon each of the four states of consciousness described in MU 2-7: The vDLĞYƗQDUD (the waking 
state), the taijasa (the dream state), the pUƗMña (the state of deep, dreamless sleep), and what is 
simply called the tXUƯ\D ³WKH)RXUWK´ĝDৄkara comments upon each of these four states in the 
first prakara۬a, as we would expect, and devotes most of his attention to the tXUƯ\D and its 
apophatic language, also as we would expect.  
 
The second and third prakara۬as, however, devote much attention to the first two states, 
the vDLĞYƗQDUD and the taijasa. The straightforward meaning of these verses suggests that there is 
ultimately no difference between the waking state and the dream state.138 If this is true, however, 
WKHQĝDৄkara’s commentary reverses the original author’s meaning.139
                                                     
136
 MK 4.1 and 4.99. 
 In these prakara۬as, he 
clarifies and emphasizes the distinction between the vDLĞYƗQDUD and the taijasa. In effect, the 
flow of his commentary proceeds from a discussion of apophatic theology (i.e., the important but 
subtle distinctions between various meanings of negative speech) to a discussion of epistemology 
137
 ĝDৄNDUD emphasizes this point in his introduction to the MKBh and again in his introduction to the fourth 
prakara۬D. 
138
 E.g., “The wise say that the states of waking and dream are same, in view of the similarity of the objects (seen in 
both the states) and in view of the well-known ground of inference.” MK 2.5, Panoli 361. 
139
 In the introduction to his Critique of the Brahma 6ǌWUDV, P.M. Modi makes the important distinction between a 
EKƗ܈\DNƗUD (i.e., a commentator), a guru (teacher), and an ƗFƗU\D (i.e., an authoritative doctor of a tradition). While 
Modi’s stated intention in that work is to critique ĝDৄNDUD’s commentary in order to retrieve what he considers to be 
%ƗGDUƗ\D৆D’s intended meaning, he is careful also to add that ĝDৄNDUD is not simply a commentator but is an 
authoritative doctor. It is fitting to make this distinction here, also. Subsequent adherents of the advaita 9HGƗQWD 
tradition regarded ĝDৄNDUD to be more than a commentator. It should not trouble us, then, that his commentary seems 
WRUHYHUVHWKHVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGPHDQLQJRIWKH.ƗULNDHVSHFLDOO\WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKDWĝDৄNDUD does not consider 
any portion of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D UpaniৢDGRU.ƗULNDWREHUHYHDOHGVFULSWXUH6HH0RGL30A Critique of the 
Brahmasutra (3.2.11-4). Bhavnagar: Modi, 1943, especially vol. I, xvi-xvii. 
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and “measures,” before turning to a defense of direct perception of actual particulars in 
RSSRVLWLRQWRVXEMHFWLYHLGHDOLVWDQGQLKLOLVWRSSRQHQWV/LNHĝDৄkara’s commentary, therefore, 
chapter three of this dissertation proceeds from discussions of apophasis to epistemology to 
direct perception of particulars. 
The fourth prakara۬a, considerably longer than the other three, makes only tangential, if 
any, reference to the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D 7H[W7KH0DKƗ\ƗQD%XGGKLVWLQIOXHQFHXSRQWKHWH[WLV
considerable, as Richard King demonstrates.140 ĝDৄkara explains that the purpose of the fourth 
prakara۬a is to present logical, non-Vedic arguments in order to refute non-Vedic reasoning that 
runs counter to non-duality.141 In his commentary on the penultimate verse of the text, ĝDৄkara 
states that while what was taught by the Buddha comes very near to non-dualism, “this Supreme 
Reality, which is non-dual, is to be experientially known only in the 9HGƗQWD texts.”142
GauঌDSƗGD DV7HDFKHUƖFƗU\D 
  
Despite ample evidence suggesting that the four prakara۬as of the MK were composed 
by three different authors, it is nevertheless FOHDUIURPĝDৄkara’s commentary that he inherited 
WKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D8SDQLৢad embedded within the ƖJDPD-prakara۬a and he treats it, together with 
the other three prakara۬as as a single text with four chapters. It is far from clear, however, that 
KHUHJDUGHGWKHWZHOYHSURVHYHUVHVRIWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\DDVĞUXWLas I argue below (p71). Though he 
never cites the MU in his Upaniৢadic commentaries,143 he does quote from GauঌDSƗGD’s .ƗULND 
at least twice.144
                                                     
140
 King (1995). 
 ,QKLVFRPPHQWDU\RQ%UDKPDVǌWUD,KHTXRWHVWKHHQWLUHW\RIMK III.15: 
141
 MKBh Intro, Panoli 301-302. 
142
 MKBh 4.99. 
143
 The same is true of the 0DLWUƗ\D۬Ư8SDQL܈DG. One might expect some reference to the catu܈SƗWin BUBh II.1 on 
WKHGLVFRXUVHEHWZHHQ*ƗUJ\DDQG$MƗWDĞDWUXUHJDUGLQJWKHVOHHSLQJPDQLQRULQBUBh IV.3 on the same topic. 
Likewise, one might expect some reference to it in BUBh 96LQFHĝDৄNDUDWHQGVWRTXRWHSULPDULO\IURPĞUXWL 
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And thus, those who know the tradition say: “A Creation [theory] which is 
put forth by one or another [example] such as clay, iron, spark of fire, etc., 
that is a means of introduction. Difference does not exist on any account.”145
In his commentaU\RQ%UDKPDVǌWUD,,he quotes the entirety of MK I.16: 
 
With respect to this,146 it is said by the teachers who know the tradition of the 
PHDQLQJRI9HGƗQWD³:KHQWKHLQGLYLGXDOVHOIDVOHHSGXHWREHJLQQLQJOHVV
PƗ\Ɨ is awakened, then he perceives the unborn, sleepless, dreamless 
nonduality.”147
Based on these two passages, it is evident WKDWĝDৄNDUDFRQVLGHUHGWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D.ƗULND to be a 
humanly composed work. Although he does not use the name GauڲDSƗGD, he refers to the author 
as an ƗFƗU\D (an expert teacher),
 
148
                                                                                                                                                                           
VRXUFHVWKHIDFWWKDWKHGRHVQRWFLWHWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\DSURVHSURYLGHVFRPSHOOLQJ (but inconclusive) evidence that he 
does not consider the text to be ĞUXWL. 
 DQGDVDNQRZHURIWKH$GYDLWD9HGƗQWDWUDGLWLRQHis use of 
the plural form, ƗFƗU\DLۊ (“by the teachers”), could indicate that he recognized the composite 
nature of the .ƗULND. More likely, though, the plural form is simply honorific. Regardless, it is 
FOHDUWKDWLIRQHGHVLUHVWRNQRZWKHWUDGLWLRQWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D.ƗULND provides a reliable source, 
DFFRUGLQJWRĝDৄkara. It teaches us how to read, so that we might hear. 
144
 Andrew Fort identifies the %KƗৢ\D on &KƗQGRJya UpaniৢDG9,,DVDWKLUGUHIHUHQFHWRWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D
.ƗULND+HUHĝDৄNDUD praises what is discussed by the four chapters by those who are followers of the tradition 
(֚᭥ᮧֈ֑֞֐֊֚֡֒֟᳊ᱧ֌֟֊֎᳍եᮧշ֒օռֆ᳥֑֧֡֊Panoli, v4, 900). Fort takes this as a reference to the four prakara۬Ds 
of the GauঌDSƗGƯ\D .ƗULND6HH)RUW+RZHYHUZKLOH)RUWPD\FHUWDLQO\EHFRUUHFWLWLVGLIILFXOWWREHFHUWDLQ
that prakara۬D-catu܈ܒD\HQD in this instance refers to the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND 
145
 BUBh I.4.14. 
146
 The topic of the section is the VDWNƗU\DYƗGD doctrine in light of the relationship between the Self and the three 
states (waking, dream, and deep sleep). The thought of the Agama Prakara۬D can be seen throughout the %KƗৢ\D on 
this verse. 
147
 BUBh II.1.9 
148
 See note 139. 
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9HGƗQWD-artha-VƗUD-sa۪graha 
The entire text, ĝDৄkara explains, explicates the first sentence: “All this is the letter 
AUM.” It enfolds what the rest of the text unfolds. He makes no distinction between the prose 
portions and the verse portions, noting simply that the text consists of four chapters beginning 
with “the letter AUM”. He refers to the text neither as ĞUXWL nor as an upani܈ad.  
According to Wilhelm Halbfass, “ĝDৄkara considers neither GauঌDSƗGD’s verses nor the 
prose of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D “Upaniৢad” to be ĞUXWL.”149 As he explains, ĝDৄkara’s comments on the 
structure and method of GauঌDSƗGD’s text are “very significant insofar as the relationship 
between reason and revelation are concerned.”150 Halbfass’ conclusion begs the question: Why 
has ĝDৄkara chosen to comment on the text? Why is this text significant to him?151
ĝDৄkara describes the text as “a synopsis of the essence of the meaning of 9HGƗQWD«”
 
152
 
He describes the Bhagavad *ƯWƗ in a strikingly similar manner: “This *ƯWƗ-ĝƗVWUDEHLQJD
synopsis of the essence of the meaning of the Veda in concise form…”153
                                                     
149
 Halbfass, Wilhelm. 6WXGLHVLQ.XPƗULODDQGĝD۪NDUD. Reinbek: Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, 
1983, 36. 
 It is reasonable to 
conclude WKDWOLNHWKH*ƯWƗĝDৄNDUDGRHVQRWUHJDUGWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D.ƗULND as ĞUXWL, but does 
150
 Halbfass (1983), 35. 
151
 HajimH1DNDPXUDLQFRQWUDVWDUJXHVWKDWĝDৄNDUDGRHVFRQVLGHUWKHWH[WWREHĞUXWL, but that the commentary on 
WKHWH[WZDVQRWZULWWHQE\ĝDৄNDUD+HUHDVRQVWKDWLIĝDৄNDUDFRQVLGHUHGWKHWH[WWREHLPSRUWDQWHQRXJKWRZULWHD
commentary thereupon, then he would have cited it in his commentaries, which he does not. While disagreeing with 
1DNDPXUD¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHHYLGHQFHKHQHYHUWKHOHVVUDLVHVDQLPSRUWDQWSRLQW,IĝDৄNDUDGRHVQRWFRQVLGHUWKH08
to be ĞUXWLthen why would he write a commentary on it? Nakamura (1983), 42ff. 
152
 MUBh Introduction. The word “synopsis” does not quite capture the sense of sa۪JUDKD, which derives from the 
root ¥graۊ, meaning ‘to seize, to grasp’. When ĝDৄNDUD uses the term 9HGƗQWD, it typically refers to the upaniৢDGV
themselves. The description used here is not one that we would expect to see if ĝDৄNDUD considered the text to be 
revealed scripture. It is what we might expect to see, though, if ĝDৄNDUD considered the text to be a pedagogical work 
by a human ƗFƗU\D teaching the essence of 9HGƗQWLF thought. 
153
 BGBh Intro. It is surprising that ĝDৄkara describes the *ƯWƗ as ĞƗVWUD, which is more commonly used 
by him to designate scripture. ĝDৄkara does not seem, though, consider the *ƯWƗ to be a revealed text, and 
is likely using the word in a broader sense, and certainly as an honorific. 
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consider it to be an important text, authored by an ƗFƗU\D who knows the tradition.154 It is a 
pedagogical text, teaching readers traditional methods of scriptural interpretation. While teaching 
us to read, it trains us to hear. As Halbfass suggests, GauঌDSƗGD’s didactic methods were 
“subsequently included in and adapted to >ĝDৄkara’s] understanding of ĞUXWL itself.”155
Harmoniously Coordinating Particulars 
 The 
import of the text, therefore, lies in the apophatic method it models. Hence, I focus on the 
pedagogical method disclosed in the text, especially the role of sense perception therein.  
Coordination (UpasaۨKƗUD) and Harmonization (Samanvaya) 
UpasaۨKƗUD is a theological practice whereby one coordinates two or more particular 
scriptural teachings on Brahman. %ƗGDUƗ\D৆a describes this practice in section III.3 of his 
%UDKPDVǌWUD, which P.M. Modi describes as “the most important portion of the entire 
%UDKPDVǌWUD.”156 ĝDৄkara’s 8WWDUDPƯPƗূVƗ tradition insists that diverse teachings on Brahman 
must be coordinated with one another. By grasping the harmony between these teachings, one 
grasps the proper meaning of ĞUXWL. This method of coordination is only properly learned from 
within the tradition, from a qualified teacher who passes down these hermeneutic methods 
through the succession of teachers. Due to the nature of Brahman, Anantanand Rambachan 
explains, “unusual [pedagogical] methods, with which a teacher must be familiar, are a necessity, 
and these are received through immersion in a tradition.”157
                                                     
154
 6XUHĞYDUDUHIHUVWR08DVĞUXWL6XUHĞYDUDGRHVKRZHYHUPDNHDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHSURVHSRUWLRQRIWKH
text and the verse section; we find no VXFKGLVWLQFWLRQLQDQ\RIĝDৄNDUD¶VZRUNV 
 Even the Upaniৢads themselves, 
155
 Halbfass (1983), 36. 
156
 Modi, (1943). I, xiii. 
157
 Rambachan (2015), 47. 
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Rambachan notes, “are structured in the form of dialogues between students and their 
teachers.”158
Building upon Modi’s Critique, Francis Clooney has shown WKDW9HGƗQWD¶VHPSKDVLVRQ
coordination (upasaۨKƗUD) and harmonization (samanvaya) establishes a “tension between 
knowledge as skill and knowledge as insight.”
 
159
By learning the skill of upasaۨKƗUD, one learns how to read the Upaniৢads. Having 
learned this method, one can then read other texts, too. Having learned to hear sruti, 
harmoniously, one can then train that refined ear elsewhere, coordinating other polyphonic 
voices. Clooney states: “To do/know Advaita entails becoming—or being made into—a certain 
kind of person who makes distinctions in certain ways, thereby transforming all of her or his 
relations.”
 For the comparative theologian, acquiring this 
skill is necessarily but fruitfully difficult. It requires attentiveness to the methods of 9HGƗQWD and 
its modes of organization. One cannot simply read the texts, extract doctrines or ideas, and 
translate or transport these to a different context. At the same time, though, it indicates a more 
profound value of comparative theology. One learns new theological methods, new skills, and 
new ways to approach texts other-wise, having acquired not simply the other’s knowledge, but 
the other’s wisdom regarding the skillful arrangement of texts and the paths they lay for us. 
160
                                                     
158
 Ibid. 38. There are, of course, numerous exceptions. 
 The methods of upasaۨKƗUD and samanvaya change how we read and hear—all 
texts and voices. 
159
 Clooney (1993), 73. 
160
 Clooney (1993), 11. 
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Seeing and Grasping Together, Concordantly 
Given the importance Modi and Clooney attribute to upasaۨKƗUD, I argue that the MK is 
a significant text for ĝDৄkara because of the apophatic theological method it models and teaches. 
TKHWZHOYHYHUVHVRIWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D8SDQLৢad coordinate particular meditations on AUM from 
the &KƗQGRJ\D8SDQLৢad with the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad’s meditations on consciousness in 
waking, dream, and deep sleep. It does so not to merge them together, as if their meaning was 
identical. Rather, it harmonizes them, thereby cultivating a particular religious praxis of 
theological listening. I suggest that this is why ĝDৄkara describes the MK as veGƗQWD-artha-VƗUD-
sa۪graha. Aided by its teachings, one “grasps together” (sa۪graha) ĞUXWL’s diverse teachings on 
Brahman. Drawing them into one text, it offers a synopsis—not a synthesis—whereby various 
teachings might be seen with the same eye.  
For example, in his commentary on MU ĝDৄkara provides a litany of aphoristic 
scriptural quotations, including 7DLWWLUƯ\D8SDQLৢDG,³$80LV%UDKPDQ´DQG&KƗQGRJ\D
Upaniৢad II.2.23, “All this is but AUM.” He does so in order to model the skill of coordination, 
not simply because they mention AUM. His intention is certainly not to supplant these teachings 
with an abridged synthesis, but to draw them together so they might be seen together, 
synoptically, and thus heard, harmoniously. He does not claim that these passages have the same 
meaning, as if one could simply read one, disregarding the others. Each particular teaching on 
Brahman is unique and, thus, indispensible.  
While the coordination of various texts assert the underlying identity of that which is 
signified by the names “Brahman,” “AUM,” and “ƖWPDQ,” it does not follow that the names are 
synonymous with one another. In one context, for example, I am called by the name “Brad.” In 
another, I am called “father” and in another, “son.” If one is to grasp who I am, these names must 
be understood coordinately, without losing sight of the particular distinctions between these 
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names, which are certainly not synonymous. The differences are retained, but are heard, 
concordantly. Likewise, each particular passage coordinated by the MU must be understood in 
its own right, in its own context. And yet, each text must also be heard in coordinated harmony 
with the others: a symphony of distinct voices that are heard (ĞUXWL) concordantly.  
Learning to Hear, Harmoniously 
In effect, our understanding of any one particular passage remains provisional. 
UpasaূKƗUDLVDSUDFWLFHRIEDFN-and-forth reading, a kind of apophasis by means of 
kataphasis.161 Following a OLWDQ\RIVFULSWXUDOUHIHUHQFHVDQGEULHIH[SODQDWLRQĝDৄkara cites 
&KƗQGRJ\D9,³7KHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLVDYHUEDOKDQGOHDQDPH´162
%\FRRUGLQDWLQJWKHVFULSWXUHVLQWKLVZD\ĝDৄkara effectively compels us to go back and 
hear WKHSDVVDJHVDERXW$80LQOLJKWRIWKHWHDFKLQJEHWZHHQ8GGƗODNDDQGKLVVRQ, even 
though the latter passage makes no mention of AUM. Likewise, coordinating these passages with 
MU 1 shapes how we hear CU VI.1. It should be heard in its own right, and in its particular 
 Unlike the other passages 
cited, CU VI.1 makes no mention of AUM. In an intimate pedagogical discourse between father 
and son, 8GGƗODNDexplains to ĝYHWDNHWXWKDWE\SHUFHLYLQJDOXPSRIFOD\RQHLVDEOHWR
perceive every modification of that clay, such as a bowl or statue, etc. These modifications of 
clay have distinct forms and distinct names, but are clay, nevertheless. Realizing that they are 
clay does not mean, of course, that the distinct forms cease to be distinct. Rather, the point is that 
these distinct forms derive from the same source (clay) and do not cease to be clay even in their 
particular forms of lump, bowl, statue, etc.  
                                                     
161
 See Suthren Hirst, Jacqueline. 2005. ĝDۨNDUD¶V$GYDLWD9HGƗQWD$:D\RI7HDFKLQJ. New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 145-151.  
162
 Olivelle, Patrick. 1998. The Early Upani܈DGV$QQRWDWHG7H[WDQG7UDQVODWLRQ. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 247.  
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context, just as a bowl is a bowl, a lump is a lump, a statue is a statue, etc. But the particular 
meaning also contributes to a larger meaning, from a different perspective, just as a bowl is clay, 
a lump is clay, and a statue is clay. The point is not to abstract a universal meaning from 
particular texts. Rather, the point is that one grasps the meaning of each particular teaching only 
when the teachings are heard, concordantly. Their particularity is neither discarded nor 
synthesized into a unison. Rather, the multiplicity of different ĞUXWL voices are heard (ĞUDYD۬a) in 
harmony. 
Each of the three movements of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D8SDQLৢad models upasaۨKƗUD. The first 
section FRRUGLQDWHVDOLWDQ\RIWHDFKLQJVRQ$80ZKLFKĝDৄkara has, in turn, coordinated with 
the pedagogical encounter of 8GGƗODNDDQGĝYHWDNHWXLQ&89,7KHVHFRQGVHFWLRQFRRUGLQDWHV
various teachings on the states of waking, sleep, and deep sleep drawn from the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka 
Upaniৢad. The third section then coordinates the first two sections7KHUHIRUHWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D
models and performs the skill of upasaۨKƗUDZKLFKĝDৄkara likewise models.  
In her dissertation on ĝDৄkara’s B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad %KƗৢya, Haesook Ra closely 
examines how the teacher’s use of scriptural citations changes over the course of the text. As Ra 
shows, ĝDৄkara’s citations early in the text are typically fewer in number, are more closely and 
obviously associated with the root text (such as the litany of citations on AUM discussed above), 
and are accompanied by relatively lengthy explanations. Later in the text, his citations tend to be 
accompanied by brief explanations, or none at all; they begin to draw from passages that are 
more subtly connected to the root text (such as the citation to CU VI.1 discussed above).163
                                                     
163
 Ra, Haesook. Sankara as Writer: Method and Style in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad Bhasya. 2011. Collections of 
the Harvard University Archives. Dissertations. 
 By 
doing so, ĝDৄkara is not simply explicating the meaning of the root text through his commentary; 
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he models, performs, and teaches the skill of upasaۨKƗUD, cumulatively over time. Learning to 
read in this way, one cultivates a refined ear. Through upasaۨKƗUD, one learns to hear.164
If my own emphasis at times seems to overstress the structure and method of the texts, it 
is because these are too often underemphasized and appreciated in studies on ĝDৄkara. As 
highlighted in my review of the literature on ĝDৄkara in the Introduction, a growing number of 
VFKRODUVVXFKDV6ZDPL6DWFKLGƗQDQGHQGUD-DFTXHOLQH6XWKUHQ+LUVW+DHVRRN5DDQG)UDQFLV
Clooney recognize that ĝDৄkara does not (primarily) write commentaries in order to explain the 
meaning of those texts, thereby replacing scriptural texts with his own; instead, he writes, as a 
teacher, in order to teach the reader how to prepare to hear those texts. He teaches us a 
theological method for the sake of theoĺORJ\ZKLFKLVWRVD\KHDULQJDQGUHFHLYLQJWKH
graceful revelation of those texts. The method he teaches is not his own creation, but one which 
he has received from his VDPSUDGƗ\D (succession of teachers). Because the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D teaches 
this method as well, coordinating and harmonizing a multiplicity of particular ĞUXWL teachings, 
ĝaৄkara describes it as YHGƗQWD-artha-VƗUD-sa۪graha, “a synopsis of the essence of the meaning 
of 9HGƗQWD” Learning to grasp these teachings together, we learn to hear. 
 
Conclusions 
As this chapter has shown, WKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D.ƗULND %KƗৢya is a highly complex text. 
,QWHUVSHUVHGLQWKHWZHOYHYHUVHVRIWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D8SDQLৢad, we find the first of four prakara۬as 
traditionally attributed to GauঌDSƗGD)ROORZLQJWKLVDUHWZRprakara۬as, likely composed by a 
                                                     
164
 Hajime Nakamura’s interpretation of the evidence is quite the reverse of my own. He argues that ĝDৄNDUD 
considers the MU to be a “relatively unimportant” UpaniৢDGZKLFKLVZK\1DNDPXUDUHDVRQVĝDৄNDUD never cites 
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different author than the first, which is in turn followed by another prakara۬a which is most 
OLNHO\WKHFRPSRVLWLRQRI\HWDQRWKHUDXWKRUĝDৄkara, however, treats all four prakara۬as 
WRJHWKHUZLWKWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\DSURVHYHUVHVDVRQHVLQJOHWH[W, even as he subtly argues against the 
views in prakara۬as 2-4.  
Unlike the first prakara۬a, the latter three suggest that there is no real distinction 
between objects seen in the waking state and objects seen during dreams, since both are illusory. 
ĝDৄkara opposes this view. While his primary objective in the first prakara۬a is to distinguish 
between the states of deep sleep and the WXUƯ\D, his disagreement with the later prakara۬as 
compel him to emphasize the veracity of perception and the reality of particular external objects. 
Hence, his method in this text proceeds from a discussion of apophasis to a discussion of 
epistemology and the perception of particular entities. In Chapter Three, I model this process in 
my own analysis of ĝDৄkara’s commentary. 
By examining the structure of the MU text, it becomes clear that the twelve verses may 
be divided into three units which feature a pattern of three positive descriptions followed by a 
negative description. The first unit orients the text through various teachings on AUM, drawn 
SULPDULO\IURPWKH&KƗQGRJ\D8SDQLৢad, which are coordinated into a single verse (MU 1). The 
second unit (MU 2-7) draw from a range of teachings found in the B৚haGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad, 
coordinating these into a concise meditation. The third unit (MU 8-PRGHOVWKH9HGƗQWD
practice of coordination. Rather than simply combining or summarizing these teachings, the very 
structure of the text reveals a method by which one can understand these diverse teachings in 
light of one another. 
The import of the text, from ĝDৄkara’s perspective, is primarily in the method that it 
models. While he does not consider the text to be ĞUXWL, he nevertheless considers it to be a text 
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which is important for the tradition because it teaches readers how to coordinate various 
scriptural teachings with one another. In other words, the purpose of the text is not to teach about 
Brahman. Rather, it exemplifies a method by which to know Brahman, which can be known only 
from the scriptures of 9HGƗQWDZKHQSURSHUO\heard, coordinately and harmoniously.165
For these reasons, my focus remains primarily fixed on the method of the text, especially 
the centrally important role played by sense perception in that method. Rather than extracting 
and decontextualizing ĝDৄkara’s theology, I emphasize that his teaching is inextricable from his 
method. To that end, the next chapter narrows focus to ĝDৄkara’s method in the context of his 
theological tradition. Chapter three then examines this method in practice, coordinating passages 
from the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad so that they may be heard, harmoniously.  
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 Two: ĝDৄkara’s Apophatic Theological Method 
The ‘system’ of Advaita is a well-planned event, not a theory.166
As we have seen, the twelve verses of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad can be divided into three 
units. The first draws together teachings on AUM from the &KƗQGRJ\D Upaniৢad, the second unit 
coordinates various passages from the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad on the catu܈SƗW doctrine, and the 
third harmonizes these two meditations. Here, my focus narrows to ĝDৄkara’s apophatic 
theological method through a close, analytical reading of his commentary on the first of these 
three units, including his introduction to the text as a whole. My intention is neither to explicate 
the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D text by examining, for example, its indebtedness to the &KƗQGRJ\D Upaniৢad, nor 
is my intention to explicate ĝDৄkara’s commentary thereupon. Rather, my intention is to expound 
ĝDৄkara’s methodology, viz.: What does he consider to be the goal and subject matter of the text? 
What is his philosophy of language and why does he discuss the relationship between signifiers 
and signified given that the root text does not seem to introduce this topic? What is his method of 
teaching the text? Prior to this, I begin with a more methodological discussion regarding my 
approach to ĝDৄkara’s writings in light of other scholars, most notably Francis X. Clooney, SJ. 
 
The first section builds upon my assertion (p13) that ĝDৄkara’s apophasis culminates in a 
sensual event rather than a meaning event. Thus, it reflects the first meaning of “apophatic 
measure” (i.e., method, p3). The second section examines ĝDৄkara’s commentary on AUM (MU 
1). Here, I reflect upon AUM as an apophatic measure primarily in the first sense but folding into 
the second (i.e., sensuality). The final section examines ĝDৄkara’s method of “progressive 
dissolution” (apophatic measure1), by which one both measures and unmeasures Brahman, 
gradually awakening to attentive sensuality (apophatic measure2). 
                                                     
166
 Clooney (1993), 102. 
81 
Sensual Event: From Reading to Hearing 
Textual Knowledge as Event  
Contrary to what we might assume, ĝDৄkara’s intention as a commentator is not primarily 
to explain what the text means. To do so would imply that he is able to articulate the meaning of 
ĞUXWL more truly or more clearly than the eternal words of the Veda are able to do. His 
commentaries do not seek to add anything to the text, but rather to equip the EKƗ܈ya reader with 
the tools necessary to read the root text so that the ĞUXWL might be heard.167 Naturally, though, he 
also seeks to dispel wrong readings along the way. His scholastic methods teach readers how to 
read and think in accordance with his 0ƯPƗূVƗ tradition.168 ĝDৄkara’s commentaries prepare his 
readers to hear scripture’s revelation; he allows the text to speak for itself.169
This is certainly true with the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND %KƗৢya. Neither the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad 
nor the GauঌDSƗGD .ƗULND purports to give a philosophy of language, and yet ĝDৄkara’s 
commentary unfolds a philosophy of language insofar as this is propaedeutic to reading the text 
properly. The MK’s apophatic discourse presumes that its reader will understand the operative 
relations between signifier and signified, particularly when the former is negated. Moreover, the 
philosophical topics that he does take up for discussion are discussed only insofar as they are 
necessary to understand how to read the negative speech found in the text itself. The 
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philosophical portions are strictly pragmatic. They equip one to read the MK, which trains one’s 
ear to hear the ĞUXWL. 
$V,KDYHGLVFXVVHGHOVHZKHUHĝDৄkara does not consider scriptural contemplation to be 
an effective method of realizing brahmanjñƗQD because realization requires one to cede all 
agency, action, and effort to the ĞUXWL, whereas contemplation requires agency and effort.170 For 
ĝDৄkara and his theological tradition, scripture is an authoritative means of knowledge because it 
is eternal, and because of its independence from other means of knowledge.171
56
 It instructs us 
with respect to things that cannot be perceived (p ).172 If one does not grasp the scripture’s 
meaning, contemplation or meditation may be beneficial, but these must be followed by direct 
perception (ĞUDYD۬a) of ĞUXWL.173 For one who is properly prepared to hear the ĞUXWL from a 
teacher who is a knower of Brahman, the meaning will be clear and direct. If one does not grasp 
the meaning upon the first hearing, then there is no reason why multiple hearings alone will 
help.174 While considerable effort and learning may be required to train one’s ear to hear the 
ĞUXWL, final realization only dawns in a moment of grace, devoid of all effort, agency, and 
action.175
In his Theology After 9HGƗQWD, Francis Clooney explains: 
 
… the final resolution of the tension between the Text and its truth, between 
reading and the products of reading, cannot be expressed as the content of a 
text; the truth remains a well-guarded and exhaustingly prepared-for event 
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which can occur only in the practiced, educated reader. The ‘system’ of 
Advaita is a well-planned event, not a theory.176
As previously mentioned (p
 
56), Clooney draws an analogy from the later commentator 
$PDOƗQDQGDZKRcompares the cultivation of a refined musical ear to gradually becoming 
“skilled in hearing the upaniৢads.”177 Even highly skilled commentators, like ĝDৄkara and 
$PDOƗQDQGDFDQQRWVXEVWLWXWHIRUWKHHYHQWRIKHDULQJĞUXWL. Their intention is to prepare us to 
pay attention, in order that we might hear what ĞUXWL intends.178
Prayoga and Apophatic Performance 
  
To understand Advaita 9HGƗQWD as Uttara 0ƯPƗূVƗ is to understand the event of reading 
the text in a unique way. In Thinking Ritually, Clooney has underscored the centrality of the 
event of the sacrifice for Jaimini and the later 3UƗEKƗNDUD school. He summarizes:  
Prayoga is an event: a particular happening in a particular time and place, 
done by a particular person. It is where the many ritual connections are 
realized and actualized. There is no abstract prayoga because prayoga is by 
definition an occurrence in time and space.179
The importance of carefully preparing for and structuring this event cannot be overstated and is 
precisely the raison d’être of 0ƯPƗূVƗ. This inquiry into dharma is an inquiry into the proper 
arrangement of word, purpose and action.
 
180
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6LPLODUO\,DUJXH8WWDUD0ƯPƗূVƗSUHSDUHVUHDGHUVIRUWKHHYHQWRIKHDULQJ9HGƗQWD 
scriptures. Just as “there is no abstract prayoga´LQ3ǌUYD0ƯPƗূVƗ, there is no abstract prayoga 
in Uttara 0ƯPƗূVƗ. The event of hearing181 the ĞUXWL is an occurrence in time and space. As 
such, it requires an enlightened teacher who embodies the scripture, giving it voice so that it may 
be heard, directly and particularly.182
Like the event of sacrificial performance, 9HGƗQWD’s prayoga is an event that requires 
much preparation, acquiring and developing the skills necessary to hear the scripture.
  
183
 As 
Wilhelm Halbfass explains, reasoning and scriptural exegesis are essential prerequisites which 
bring about receptivity for meaning, but neither anticipate nor replace “that insight which can 
only result from the ‘hearing’ of the Upaniৢadic statements.”184 In other words, just as 3ǌUYD
0ƯPƗূVƗSUHSDUHVRQHIRUWKHHYHQWRIVDFULILFLDOSHUIRUPDQFH8WWDUD0ƯPƗূVƗSUHSDUHVRQH
for the event of hearing the Upaniৢads.185
For .XPƗULOD Bha৬৬a, an earlier contemporary of ĝDৄkara in the 3ǌUYD0ƯPƗূVƗ
tradition, the event of reading the Veda itself becomes a ritualized action. As he explains, a 
verbal injunction must indicate three factors which are actually to be brought into being (arthi 
EKƗYDQƗ): (1) what is to be done, (2) the instrumental means for that, and (3) the method or 
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process by which it is to be accomplished.186 For example, (1) rice is brought into being (2) by 
cooking, which is accomplished (3) by burning fuel for the fire.187 In order for the event of the 
sacrifice to actually take place, however, the scripture must bring into being an agent who will 
perform the sacrifice. Hence, the verbal injunction itself brings three factors into being (ĞƗEGƯ 
EKƗYDQƗ): (1) a motivation to perform the sacrifice (2) through knowledge that one is enjoined to 
perform it (3) by DUWKDYƗGD-s which extol the excellence of performing the sacrifice.188 In other 
words, the ƗUDPEKDۊ or commencement of the sacrifice is extended back to the origination of the 
desire to perform the sacrifice, which itself is a result of the event of reading.189
Among other reasons, this is significant because it reduces the human agent to a means 
while privileging the ĞUXWL itself as the true agent, since the word itself brings into being the 
motivation to sacrifice.
 
190
 Ritualization, then, is theorized at the level of word and meaning. The 
words themselves bring into being an inclination to perform the ritual, just as the proper 
performance of the ritual brings-into-being the results of the sacrifice.191
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revelation of Brahman, not the human ƗFƗU\D or guru, despite the fact that the latter is necessary 
to utter the words of scripture directly and particularly to a student.192
Although ĝDৄkara explicitly rejects an understanding of scriptural study as a practice akin 
WR%UƗKPD৆ical sacrifices, he consistently does so for one and only one reason: because 
brahmanjñƗQDcannot be the result of any cause.
 
193
 He avers that if brahmanjñƗQD were the 
result of some cause, then it would be something that could be brought into being and would, 
consequently, be something that could cease to be.194 What gives the karma NƗ۬ڲa (sacrificial 
portion) of the scripture its authority is the fact that it reveals dharma, which is imperceptible, 
and it is imperceptible because it is something which is to be brought into being and, thus, does 
not exist at the time it is to be known.195 Dharma, though, is not an effect; it is the enactment of 
the relationship of word, referents, and acts.196
The Upaniৢads, however, do not enjoin actions and therefore do not tell us about 
something to-be-done.
  
197
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things are in the world, because this is the within the scope of perception.198 In the same way that 
perception has no authority to convey knowledge about imperceptible things, scripture has no 
authority to convey knowledge about perceptible things.199 As Anantanand Rambachan 
emphasizes, perception and scripture have distinct purposes and correspondingly distinct 
scopes.200
For ĝDৄkara, this is both a doctrinal and methodological point. He is not willy-nilly 
extending the canon, so-to-speak, from the EUƗKPD۬as to the upani܈ads. ĝUXWL is only 
authoritative with respect to things that are imperceptible.
 
201
 But the Self is not imperceptible. As 
his SǌUYDPƯPƗۨVƗ predecessor, ĝDEDUD, explains, despite the fact that it is unseen (ad܀܈ܒam) as 
an object, the Self is self-perceived.202 It is unseen, says ĝDEDUD because it is not possible to see 
this one by another.203 Unlike dharma, which must be brought into being, ĝDৄkara explains that 
the Self is a settled fact; it is cognized in the form of a noun and therefore is not something to be 
accomplished by means of scripture.204 In other words, because the Self is self-perceived, it is 
not within the scope of ĞUXWL to reveal the Self to us. And yet, the Self cannot be realized without 
ĞUXWL.205
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cannot be accomplished by other means; it would not be a valid means of knowledge if it merely 
imitated what is known by other means.206
Learning Ignorance 
  
How do we make sense of this? How can it be that scripture does not reveal the Self, 
since the Self is self-perceived and not imperceptible, and yet the Self cannot be self-perceived 
without scriptural revelation? Is this not a contradiction? 
There is something imperceptible which cannot be known by any other means and which 
is revealed by the jñƗQD NƗ۬ڲa scriptures. These scriptures reveal what the Self is not, thereby 
removing cognitions superimposed on the Self through teachings such as “not this, not that” 
(neti, neti).207 Thus, they reveal a method by which one becomes a knower of Brahman when 
one perceives the highest Reality (SDUDPƗUWKDGDUĞƯ) and “enters” one’s own Self, which belongs 
to the highest reality, by means of one’s very own Self.208 Having attained nonduality, one 
knows “I am the supreme Brahman,” which is the unborn Self that is perceptible and before 
one’s very eyes.209 Unlike the %UƗKPD৆as, therefore, the 9HGƗQWD scriptures do not enjoin actions 
through verbal commands210 since the Self is cognized in the form of a noun.211 The 9HGƗQWD 
scriptures do not bring-into-being something unprecedented akin to a ritual or its result, since the 
Self is a settled fact.212 They do not bring-into-being a psychological orientation,213
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not even inculcate in us knowledge or awareness that we did not previously have since the 
inherent nature of the Self is such that it is eternally attained.214 Rather, 9HGƗQWD scriptures 
indicate the Brahman that is immediate and direct, which is our very Self. They do so by 
instructing us about the unreality/nonexistence of duality which we could not know by any other 
means.215
There are several conclusions that can be drawn based on this approach to ĝDৄkara as an 
uttaramƯPƗۦsaka. His commentaries merely prepare his reader for the event of hearing the ĞUXWL. 
In the same way that SǌUYDPƯPƗۦsaka commentators are less concerned with explicating the 
meaning of SaূKLWƗK\PQVIRUH[DPSOHDQGRQO\LQWHUHVWHGin explaining the hymns to the 
extent that this might be necessary to prepare one for the performance of a ritual,
 Scriptural DSDYƗGD reveals—and removes—our ignorance of Brahman… and of 
ourselves.  
216
 ĝDৄkara, as 
an XWWDUDPƯPƗۦsaka, is less concerned with explicating the text upon which he is commenting 
and more concerned with preparing the EKƗ܈ya reader for the event of hearing the ĞUXWL itself.217
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understanding of scriptural authority and scope is consistent with his 0ƯPƗীsaka predecessors 
and this is reflected in his methodology.218 Just as the karma NƗ۬ڲa portion of the Veda prepares 
one for the event of the sacrificial ritual, the jñƗQD NƗ۬ڲa portion prepares one for the realization 
of Brahman. In the same way that studying the %UƗKPD৆as is no substitute for the performative 
event of the yajña, neither is the study of the Upaniৢads a substitute for the experiential 
realization (vijñƗQD, DQXEKƗYD) of Brahman. And yet, the Upaniৢads remain utterly indispensable 
for this realization. In the same way one could not possibly know how to perform sacrifices (or 
even that they are to be done) without the %UƗKPD৆a portion of the Veda, neither can one realize 
the truth of Brahman without the 9HGƗQWDSortion of the Veda.219
Removing Ailments (MKBh Introduction) 
 Only by hearing the ĞUXWL can 
one’s ignorance be learned. 
As I have argued, ĝDৄkara’s apophatic theological method is best understood in light of 
the methods and doctrines of his theological tradition, viz. 0ƯPƗূVƗ. As a commentator, 
however, it must also be recognized that his careful pedagogical style models the very methods 
of the text upon which he is commenting. While there may be broad consistencies in his methods 
from one text to another, he tailors his method to best suit the text upon which he comments. In 
the previous chapter, I examined the methods, structure, and patterns of tKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D.ƗULND. 
As discussed below, ĝDৄkara mimics and models these patterns, especially those of the ƖJDPD 
prakara۬a (i.e., the first of the GK’s four chapters).220
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 2IFRXUVHKLV3ǌUYD0ƯPƗীVDND predecessors and contemporaries did not agree with one another on every 
doctrinal point and sometimes disagree more profoundly with one another than with ĝDৄNDUD, challenging what is 
too often perceived as a sharp taxonomic divide between these traditions, but which is continually challenged by 
Parpola, Clooney, Slaje, Taber, and others. 
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 MKBh 4.99. 
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 See also Ra (2011) Suthren Hirst (2005) with respect to ĝDৄNDUD’s mimicking of the styles of the B৚KDGƗUD৆\DND 
DQG7DLWWLUƯ\D8SDQLৢDGV 
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Traditionally, philosophical treatises and commentaries in 9HGƗQWD begin with a 
treatment of the purpose, subject-matter, connection, and a description of one who is qualified to 
read the text.221 These four prerequisites are often referred to as anubandha-catu܈ܒaya. ĝDৄkara 
states that since the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND is a synopsis of the essence of the meaning of 9HGƗQWD, 
then the purpose, subject-matter, and connection are the same as they are with the 9HGƗQWD 
texts.222 The purpose of the text, he explains, is the non-dual state and the subject matter is the 
means to accomplish that purpose. In other words, the text reveals a method, viz., apophasis. The 
non-dual state is attained by the negation of duality. Since the universe of duality is the result of 
ignorance, it is destroyed by knowledge.223 Hence, the subject-matter of the text is a method by 
which ignorance and duality are removed.224
The negative aspect of this theological method is worth emphasizing. As I argued in the 
previous chapter, the MK prepares its reader for the sensual event of hearing the ĞUXWL, 
harmoniously, by coordinating particular teachings from diverse scriptural passages. I now add 
that this method prepares its reader by removing obstacles that prevent one from hearing the 
ĞUXWL. The “knowledge” given in the text is not an end unto itself. Rather, this knowledge is the 
means for removing ignorance. Even the word PƗ\Ɨ indicates knowledge;
 
225
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 Prayojanam, abhidheya, sambandhaۊ, and DGKLNƗUƯQ, respectfully. 
 it is for the sake of 
222
 See p67, above. ĝDৄNDUD does not use the term DGKLNƗUƯQ here. However, as will be addressed below, he discusses 
the topic implicitly. 
223
 MKBh, Intro. 
224
 Clooney points out another possible reading: The subject-matter of the text is the occasion or site of the use of a 
method by which ignorance and duality are removed. 
225
 MKBh 3.24, discussed on p173, below. 
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instruction226 and does not exist for another moment after the cessation of duality227 because the 
means does not possess the same reality as the end itself.228
ĝDৄkara offers a helpful analogy in his introductory comments to the MK. One who 
suffers from a disease becomes well when the disease is removed. The medicine or other 
treatment is not an end unto itself, it is a means of removing the cause of the ailment. The 
medicine makes one well only indirectly—by removing the illness.
  
229
 The purpose of the text is 
the non-dual state, but this is accomplished only indirectly—by negating duality. Hence, 
“knowledge” in this case is entirely negative; knowledge is the removal/negation of duality and 
thus does not exist after duality is removed since the cessation of duality “brings about 
simultaneously the cessation of the distinction between the knower, known, and knowledge.”230
Analogously, antibiotics do not, strictly speaking, make one well; antibiotics remove the 
bacteria that cause disease. Having removed that which causes dis/ease, one is at ease.
  
231
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 MKBh 1.18. 
 While 
this may be easy to understand in the case of antibiotics, note that it represents a radically 
different understanding of “knowledge” than that to which we are generally accustomed. 
“Knowledge” is not something positive that we acquire, learn, store in the mind, and recall. 
“Knowledge” here, for example, is nothing like learning the names of the fifty state capitals and 
reciting them alphabetically. Rather, “knowledge” is the negation (apophasis) of ignorance. 
227
 MUBh 7. 
228
 MKBh 3.26. 
229
 For an excellent development of this analogy (which ĝDৄNDUD also uses elsewhere), and its implications for the 
study of religion, writ large, see Thatamanil (2006). 
230
 MUBh 7. 
231
 Credit goes to Richard Bannon, MD, for pointing out this insightfully apophatic etymology. 
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,JQRUDQFHWKHQPXVWEHVRPHWKLQJSRVLWLYHNDWDSKDWLFĝDৄkara variously describes it as 
darkness, as conception, and as a veil.232
This point is emphasized throughout the MKBh (and, in fact, thrRXJKRXWĝDৄkara’s other 
ZULWLQJVEXWLWLVTXLWHRIWHQRYHUORRNHGRUIRUJRWWHQLQFRQWHPSRUDU\WUHDWPHQWVRIĝDৄkara’s 
thought.
 Ignorance impedes direct perception; knowledge 
removes the impediment, enabling direct perception. ĝDৄkara effectively reverses the ordinary 
meaning of the terms “knowledge” and “ignorance.” By learning one’s ignorance, the dark, 
conceptual veil is removed, preparing one to hear the ĞUXWL. 
233
 While the purpose of the text is the non-dual state, the subject-matter, according to 
ĝDৄkara, is a method. The “means” revealed by the text is knowledge that removes ignorance. 
The purpose of the text is not to “learn” something; the purpose of going to the doctor is not to 
acquire antibiotics. We come to the text as a means to remove ignorance; we come to the doctor 
as a means to remove illness.234 Hence, “knowledge” is functionally negative, and does not exist 
for another moment after it has fulfilled its purpose.235
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 Respectively: MKBh 1.14, et. al.; MUBh 7, MKBh 2.32, 3.5, and 3.7; BUBh I.4.7, Panoli 208. 
 Like any tool, knowledge is not, in and of 
233
 Jacqueline Suthren Hirst and Francis Clooney consistently emphasize that ĝDৄNDUD is an apophatic theologian. 
Suthren Hirst has shown that ĝDৄNDUD even combines positive descriptions and analogies to apophatic effect. See, for 
H[DPSOH6XWKUHQ+LUVW-DFTXHOLQH³,PDJHVRIĝDূNDUD8QGHUVWDQGLQJ the Other.” International Journal of Hindu 
Studies 8.1 (2004): 157–181. As far as I am aware, however, no contemporary scholar has discussed the specific 
point made here regarding the functionally negative definition of “knowledge” in ĝDৄNDUD’s works. Numerous 
authors have emphasized the positive aspect of ĝDৄNDUD’s use of the term ignorance (DYLG\Ɨ). Examples include 
,QJDOOV³ĝDীNDUDRQWKH4XHVWLRQ:KRVH,V$YLG\Ɨ"´Philosophy East and West 3.1 (1953): 69–72, and 
Thatamanil (2006). 
234
 We see this elsewhere in ĝDৄNDUD’s writings, as well. In the introduction to his commentary on the B৚KDGƗUD৆\DND 
UpaniৢDGĝDৄNDUD emphasizes that the text itself is not upani܈DG. The text is merely a means, a tool, for upani܈DG 
and thus it is called by that name. In his introduction to the Ka৬KD UpaniৢDGĝDৄNDUD states that the word upani܈DG 
derives from the root sad, meaning “to destroy.” He further explains that, “‘knowledge’ is called upani܈DG because it 
is a destroyer of ignorance, etc., the seed of saۨVƗUD (KaUBh, Intro)0RUHRYHUĝDৄNDUDH[SODLQVWKDWLWLV
impossible for a “mere book” to destroy ignorance: “Therefore, the primary signifying force of the word upani܈DG is 
knowledge, but it is used reverently to denote the book” (KaUBh, Intro). 
235
 MUBh 7. 
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itself, good or bad. Its function is the removal of ignorance, which is invariably defined 
positively as the cause of duality.236
It is for this reason that this dissertation is focusing RQĝDৄkara’s apophatic theological 
method, rather than attempting to explicate his teachings on Brahman. He does not teach about 
Brahman. That is neither the purpose nor subject-matter of his commentary. Instead, his purpose 
is to provide his reader with the tools and methods needed to realize the truth of Brahman, which 
can only arise from the direct perception (ĞUDYD۬a) of ĞUXWL, uttered by a teacher directly to a 
student. Hence, I focus RQĝDৄkara’s theological method, because teaching this method is 
precisely his purpose and subject-matter. When practiced and performed, his method prepares 
readers for the sensual event of hearing ĞUXWL, concordantly. 
 Removing ailments, ĞUXWL heals our dis/ease. 
Measuring AUM (MUBh 1) 
Thus far, I have examined ĝDৄkara’s theological method from a broad perspective, 
attending especially to an understanding of textual knowledge as an event. When a properly 
prepared student hears the 9HGƗQWD scripture uttered directly and particularly by a teacher, the 
resulting knowledge removes ignorance. Ignorance is not a lack, absence, or deficiency of 
knowledge, but has been described in positive terms, akin to an illness, infection, or obstruction. 
It is removed by knowledge as one might remove an infection by administering antibiotics. 
Learning one’s ignorance, together with its cause, one prepares to perceive. 
In this section, the focus is further refined, turning attention to ĝDৄkara’s commentary on 
the opening verse of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad. This brief verse constitutes the first of three 
movements of the Upaniৢad. Subsequent movements unfold its rhythmic themes in variation, as 
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 Others have also emphasized this positive aspect of “ignorance” in ĝDৄNDUD’s thought. See Thatamanil, (2006), 
DQG,QJDOOV'DQLHO++³ĝDীNDUDRQWKH4XHVWLRQ:KRVH,V$YLG\Ɨ"´Philosophy East and West 3.1 (1953): 69–
722QO\6DWFKLGƗQDQGHQGUDKRZHYHUDOVRKLJKOLJKWVWKHQHJDWLYHDVSHFWRINQRZOHGJH6HH6DWFKLGƗQDQGHQGUD
(1989).  
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discussed earlier (p63). In MUBh 1, ĝDৄkara builds the reader’s confidence in the ability of the 
MU text to indicate Brahman while simultaneously undermining the competency of the words of 
the text to signify Brahman. While Brahman cannot be expressed by words (anabhidheyatvaۨ), 
the words of the text reliably indicate Brahman237
Francis Clooney observes a similar method in the Upaniৢadic corpus more broadly:  
 provided that the reader understands the power 
and limitation of words as well as their function within the structure of the text. One must 
understand how language measures meaning in order to understand how negation indicates 
Brahman. 
They thereby maintain a certain ironic detachment from their own 
formalizing activity, assuring textually that knowledge can never be 
adequately communicated by its texts: Texts serve their proper function when 
they call into question their own reliability and adequacy.238
As demonstrated below, ĝDৄkara draws our attention away from ontology to epistemology by 
drawing our attention to the relationship between words and meanings as a means to an end. By 
focusing on the relationship between signifiers and signified, he affirms the reliability and 
adequacy of the text to indicate Brahman while simultaneously calling into question the 
adequacy of the words of the text to describe Brahman.
  
239
Signifying Relations 
 It is critical to distinguish between 
indicating (i.e., “pointing out”) and describing (i.e., “naming”). In chapter three, I revisit this 
relationship to show that the universals signified by signifiers are measures of particulars. 
“AUM”—that sacred syllable is all this. Its explanation is: All that was, is, 
and shall be is simply AUM. And, moreover, that which transcends the 
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 MUBh 7. 
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 Clooney (1993), 44.  
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 MUBh 7. 
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three periods of time, that, too, is simply AUM. 
—0Ɨ۬ڲǌN\D Upani܈ad 1 
Even though the root text of MU 1 would not seem to occasion it, ĝDৄkara immediately 
shifts the discourse to a philosophy of language based in scriptural revelation and tradition. He 
frames this shift in focus in the form of a question: “How does arriving at a complete 
understanding of AUM serve as a means for the ascertainment of the true Self?”240 As Jacqueline 
Suthren Hirst has shown, ĝDৄkara employs questions such as these, not only “to help the pupil 
confront his [or her] doubts honestly,”241 but also, “to lead pupils out (the literal meaning of 
‘educate’) from their present learning to new perceptions, so that they make the changed 
understanding their own.242
Having posed the question above, ĝDৄkara then models upasaۨKƗUD. He coordinates the 
teachings on AUM (MU 1) with teachings on the four states of consciousness (MU 2-7). He 
provides a litany of quotations from the Upaniৢads that identify AUM as the basis, as higher and 
 Moreover, ĝDৄkara’s question compels the reader (or pupil) to slow 
down and consider the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D’s own methodology. The reader must pause to consider why 
the topic of AUM is discussed at all in this context. Why does the text begin the way it does? 
How does a complete understanding of AUM relate to the subsequent discussion of the catu܈SƗW? 
If the reader leaps to a discussion of the catu܈SƗW (MU 2-7), s/he may overlook the fact that the 
0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D text frames the catu܈SƗW doctrine between two discourses on AUM (MU 1 and MU 8-
12). ĝDৄkara’s question compels the reader to consider the methods of the text in addition to the 
content of the text. 
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lower Brahman, as the Self, and as “all this.”243
Since this collection of things, being a signified thing, is not other than its 
signifier, and since AUM is not other than a signifier, all this is simply AUM. 
And [since] the Supreme Brahman is known only [through] the antecedent 
means—signifier and signified—then that, too, is but AUM.
 While AUM is regarded as the name 
(DEKLGKƗQD) of ƖWPDQ-Brahman, it is not a “mere name,” but is “all this” and that which 
transcends “all this” (MU 1). This begs the question, though, “how does understanding a name 
serve as the means for understanding what is named?” To this, ĝDৄkara responds: 
244
ĝDৄkara LVGUDZLQJXSRQ3ǌUYDPƯPƗূVƗVǌWUD,ZKHUHLQ-DLPLQLDVVHUWVWKDWthe relationship 
between a word and its meaning is “original” (autpattika, i.e., “from the origin”),
 
245
 which 
ĝDEDUDJORVVHVDVnitya, “eternal.”246 That is to say that a word does not come to be associated 
with a meaning through convention or other human means$VƖQDQGDJLULH[SODLQV in his 13th 
century subcommentary on ĝDৄkara’s EKƗ܈ya, “The meaning of a name is fixed by that which is 
to be named; here, the cause is said to be just AUM.”247
Figure 1
 The relationship between a word and its 
artha is eternal; it is not a human creation (apauru܈eya). Rather, words, universals, and 
particulars are eternally connected to one another, as diagramed in . In addition to names 
(QƗPD), ĝDৄkara mentioned five other reasons for using words, to which he refers, collectively, 
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 Ka৬KD II.17, 3UDĞQD V.2, Maitri VI.3, and &KƗQGRJ\D II.2.33, respectively. 
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 MUBh 1. 
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 PMSBh I.1.5. In other words, the relationship between a word and its meaning exists from the origin and is, 
therefore, both “original” and “eternal.” 
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 PMS I.1.5. 
247
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as ĞDEGDprav܀ttihetu: Class (MƗWL), Quality (gu۬a), Relation (sambandhaۊ), Action (NUL\Ɨ), and 
Form (UǌSD).248 177 We will return to these later (p ). 
 
Figure 1: Eternal connection between word, universal, and particular 
From the very first verse of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad, ĝDৄkara’s commentary 
demonstrates how the text reflects 0ƯPƗীsaka doctrines and he explains the text in accordance 
with this exegetical tradition. Before one can grasp the meaning of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D’s apophasis, 
one must first have a firm grasp on Vedic kataphasis, which is properly understood, according to 
ĝDৄkara, through the doctrines of 0ƯPƗূVƗ. The answer to ĝDৄkara’s question,249
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 MUBh 7. ĝDৄNDUD does not enumerate these reasons in MUBh 7, but does so elsewhere. His terminology varies 
slightly from text to text. See GBh XIII.12, TUBh II.1, BUBh II.3.6, and Upad I.18. Mayeda summarizes these; see: 
ĝDৄNDUƗFƗU\D$7KRXVDQG7HDFKLQJV7KH8SDGHĞDVƗKDVUƯRIĝD k۪ara. Translated by Sengaku Mayeda. 197, 
note 20. 
 then, is that 
arriving at a complete understanding of AUM serves as a means for the ascertainment of the true 
Self because AUM is a signifier of the Supreme Brahman and the relationship between that 
signifier and signified is eternal. When one grasps the relationship between signifiers and 
signified together with the relationship of these to AUM, then one grasps the means by which the 
Supreme Brahman can be known. 
249
 I.e., “How does arriving at a complete understanding of AUM serve as a means for the ascertainment of the true 
Self?” MUBh 1. 
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Signifying Intentions 
Only by understanding the specific relationship between signifiers and that which they 
signify can one come to grasp what the text intends to indicate by negating signifiers.250 
$FFRUGLQJWRĝDEDUDsignifiers simultaneously signify universals (MƗWLƗN܀ti, etc.) and particulars 
(vyakti, vastu, etc.),251
Figure 2
 only one of which is primary in any given sentence, according to the 
speaker’s intention, as diagramed in .252
 
  
Figure 2: Double signification of words ĝDEDUD306%K, 
While the import of this double signification of words will become clearer later, at issue 
here is whether the negation of signifiers intends to negate universals, particulars, or both 
universals and particulars. That is to say: Does the negation of a word negate only the primary 
signification, or both the primary and secondary signification? If the former is the case, then it 
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 I do not intend to suggest that ĝDEDUDHPSOR\VWKHWHUPVMƗWLand ƗN܀WLsynonymously, nor that his use of vyakti 
and vastu are synonymous. While they seem to serve the similar purpose of distinguishing between universals and 
SDUWLFXODUVDGHWDLOHGSKLORORJLFDODQDO\VLVRIĝDEDUD¶VXVHRIWKHVHWHUPVLVRXWVLGHWKHVFRSH of this dissertation. 
252
 PMSBh I.3.33. 
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becomes necessary to determine which signification is primary in apophatic speech. Does the 
ĞUXWL intend to negate universals or particulars? 
Wakeful Attentiveness 
,QKLVFRPPHQWDU\RQ8WWDUDPƯPƗূVƗVǌWUD,,,ĝDৄkara poses this very question.253
146
 
He insists that the negation of signifiers intends to negate universals, not particulars. He rejects a 
SǌUYDSDN܈in’s suggestion that the repetition of neti, neti is intended to negate both universals and 
particulars. It is helpful to examine his explanation in context. He begins with an analogy, used 
several times in the MKBh, to which we will return (p ): 
Darkness is surely dissolved by one who desires to perceive 
(avabubhutVDPƗQHQD), for example, the truth of a pot fixed in darkness [since 
darkness] is an obstacle to [perceiving] that. In the same way, plurality is to 
be dissolved by one who desires to perceive (avabubhutVDPƗQHQD) the truth 
of Brahman, [since plurality] is opposed to [perceiving] that. Indeed, the 
inherent nature of plurality is Brahman, [but] the inherent nature of Brahman 
is not plurality. By the dissolution of the plurality of names and forms, there 
is wakefulness (avabodha) to the truth of Brahman.254
Here again, textual knowledge is functionally negative insofar as it removes obstacles to directly 
perceiving Brahman. The verb ¥DYDEXGK
 
255
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 UMSBh III.2.21. Shastri, 712-3. This is discussed further below. 
 in the passage above requires attention. Apte 
provides the following definitions: “(1) to awake, to recognize; (2) To become sensible or aware 
of, feel, perceive, know, understand.” Hence, it indicates an awareness of the true reality 
resulting from perception characterized by attentiveness or wakefulness. In the passage above, I 
254
 UMSBh III.2.21: ֑և֞ռ ֆ֐֚֟ ᳞֗֟᭭ևֆե պց֞ᳰֈֆᱬ֗֐֗֎֡֏֡᭜֚֐֞֊֧֊ ֆ᭜ᮧ᭜֑֊֠շ֏֢ֆե ֆ֐զ ᮧ֟֗֔֞᭡֑ֆ ձ ե֗ 
ᮩᳬֆᱬ֗֐֗֎֡֏֡᭜֚֐֞֊֧֊ ֆ᭜ᮧ᭜֑֊֠շ֏֢ֆզ ᮧ֌Ჱզ ᮧ֟֗֔֞֌֑֟ֆ᳞զ ֿ ᮩᳬ᭭֗֏֞֗֫ ֛֟ ᮧ֌Ჱ֫ ֊ ᮧ֌Ჱ᭭֗֏֞ ե֗ ᮩᳬ, ֆ֧֊ 
֊֞֐ᱨ֌ᮧ֌Ჱᮧ֟֗֔֞֌֊֧֊ ᮩᳬֆᱬ֗֞֗֎֫։֫ ֏֗ֆ֠֟ֆ ֿ Shastri, 712. 
255
 AvabubhutVDPƗQHQD is the present middle participle of the desiderative form of the verb ¥DYDEXGK in singular 
instrumental declension. The first syllable of the verbal root (budh) following the prefix (ava-) reduplicates as 
bubhutsa per Macdonell and Whitney, from which the present middle participle (DYDEXEKXWVDPƗQD) is formed and 
subsequently declined. 
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have translated DYDEXEKXWVDPƗQHQDas “by one who desires to perceive” and avabodha as 
“wakefulness” in order to emphasize that this awakening is not a physical awakening, but a 
mental, sensual awakening. It signifies wakeful attentiveness. Perception, according to ĝDৄkara’s 
tradition, requires not simply contact between the eye and a perceptible object, but also requires 
a fully alert, fully awake mind, which is the internal organ of perception (antaۊkara۬a), as 
Anantanand Rambachan explains.256
,QDOORIKLVPDQ\DQDORJLHVLQYROYLQJ³GDUNQHVV´ĝDৄkara understands darkness as an 
impediment, obstacle, or veil; darkness does not mean a simple absence of light. In the same way 
that darkness impedes the eye, preventing the eye from seeing a pot, the plurality of names and 
forms impede the internal organ from perceiving the Brahman which is perceptible and before 
one’s very eyes. In the same way that darkness must be removed so that one can see the pot, the 
plurality of names and forms must be removed so that one can see Brahman.  
  
This nuance is critically important. Although we tend to think of light as something 
enabling SHUFHSWLRQWKLVLVQRWWKHFDVHIRUĝDৄkara and his tradition. Because the seer’s sight is 
never lost, one is always already able to see, but one does not see due to an impediment, viz., 
darkness or plurality. By removing these impediments, there is wakefulness (avabodha). One 
becomes perceptually attentive. While the next chapter will examine what it means to see 
Brahman, at issue here is the impediment that is to be removed through apophatic discourse.  
Negating Universal Measures 
ĝDৄkara continues: 
                                                     
256
 Rambachan (1991), 23-25.  
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Here, we ask ourselves:  
What is meant by “the dissolution of plurality”?257
In his response to this question, ĝDৄkara explains that the dissolution of plurality cannot possibly 
mean the destruction of presently existing particular entities in the world. Were that the case, the 
instruction would be meaningless since it is impossible for any person to destroy the universe of 
manifestations characterized by one’s own body and the earth.
 
258
 Moreover, even if that was the 
case, then the world would be devoid (ĞǌQ\DP) of the earth, etc., having been already destroyed 
by the first person to attain liberation.259
The dissolution of plurality, ĝDৄkara explains, is simply the removal of misconceptions 
regarding what is actually seen. According to Richard King’s analysis of GauঌDSƗGD’s .ƗULND, 
“prapañca primarily denotes the idea of plurality (literally, “fiveness” or pañca)” and “is a 
common Buddhist technical term.”
  
260
 While it is an important term for both GauঌDSƗGDDQG
ĝDৄkara, it is understood rather differently by each. As King explains, GauঌDSƗGDXVHVWKHWHUP
to mean “the empty ‘conceptual proliferation’ characteristic of all (false) views.”261
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 While also a 
WHFKQLFDOWHUPIRUĝDৄkara, he consistently employs it to mean the conceptualization of what is 
seen by the five senses prior to realization of the non-dual Self. Although the world is seen, 
heard, smelled, touched, or tasted by the five senses, prapañca is not characterized as perception 
insofar as it does not involve a fully awake (prabuddha) internal organ of perception 
(antaۊkara۬a, manas). PrapañcaIRUĝDৄkara, is neither the external object nor the subjective 
258
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 King, 30. King also examines this technical term in 1ƗJƗUMXQD and other Buddhist writers and GauঌDSƗGD’s 
relationship to those. See King, 133ff. 
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perception of that object, but rather the phenomenal appearance of external objects to a mind that 
is not fully awakened. It signals a deficient orientation of the mind towards (pra-) what is “seen” 
by the five senses (pañca). His complicated epistemology requires clarification, especially the 
relationship between words, meanings, and sense perception. 
3HUFHSWLRQDQG&RJQLWLYH(UURUĝDEDUD 
In his commentary on PMS I.1.5, ĝDEDUD identifies four elements required for perception 
to occur: an external object to be perceived, a healthy sense organ, an alert mind, and an 
unobstructed connection of these three.262
Figure 3
 He further distinguishes between two moments of 
mental cognition involved in perception ( ). He refers to the first moment as buddhi, 
which is formless and takes the form of the external object which is its basis.263 However, this 
mental image (buddhi) does not constitute knowledge until it is grasped in a second moment of 
cognition, which is verbal.264
 
 When the mental image is grasped by means of the correct word 
(i.e., a word that is eternally connected to that particular object), then and only then does true 
knowledge arise. Only in that case, and none other, does perception occur. 
Figure 37ZRPRPHQWVRIFRJQLWLRQLQSHUFHSWLRQĝDEDUD306%K,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ĝDEDUD’s purpose for distinguishing between buddhi and antaۊkara۬a is to explain how 
cognitive errors arise, such as mistaking a shell for silver, while preserving the infallibility of 
perception. “That which is [called] perception´ĝDEDUDVWDWHV³LVQHYHUZURQJ7KDWZKLFKLV
wrong is not perception.”265
Figure 4
 When one mistakes a shell for silver, then, the error is not the result 
of perception, but due to some problem in the process of perception. Assuming there is no defect 
in the physical eye, the buddhi takes the form of the shell when the eye comes in “contact” with 
the particular shell. The internal organ of perception then cognizes this mental image verbally, as 
diagrammed in . Pratyak܈DSUDPƗ۬a entails linguistic cognition: 
 
Figure 43HUFHSWXDOFRJQLWLRQIRUĝDEDUD (PMSBh I.1.5) 
ĝDEDUDXVHVWKHWHUPpratyaya in a generic manner, signifying cognitions which may be 
either correct or incorrect, but uses forms of the verb upa¥ODEK exclusively to refer to the correct 
verbal grasping of the buddhi. Just as one may possibly have a defect with the physical eye, 
ĝDEDUDH[SODLQVRQHPD\KDYHDGHIHFWLQWKHLQWHUQDORUJDQRISHUFHSWLRQVXFKDVVOHHSLQHVVRU
inattentiveness. If the mind is sleepy, one may cognize the mental image of the shell by grasping 
the word “silver,” which is not eternally connected to that particular object. ,QWKDWFDVHĝDEDUD
asserts that perception has not taken place. Erroneous cognition is diagrammed in Figure 5:  
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Figure 5: Cognitive error in perceptual process ĝDEDUD306%K, 
When the sleepiness is removed, the shell will be grasped as shell, and the idea of “silver” will 
be sublated. Only perception can sublate the false cognition, and perception will only occur when 
the sleepiness is removed, which is to say, when the mind is fully alert.266
In Western thought, and in other schools of Indian thought, one might say that the shell is 
perceived but wrongly interpreted, or perhaps “mis-SHUFHLYHG´7KLVZLOOQRWVXIILFHIRU3ǌUYD- 
and Uttara 0ƯPƗূVƗ, however, since sense-perception is never wrong (p
  
104). Hence, 
0ƯPƗীsakas explain error in terms of an intervention/obstruction that impedes direct perception. 
Dissolving Superimposition 
/LNHĝDEDUDĝDৄkara uses the term upa¥ODEK to refer to correct cognitions of the buddhi. 
By using the word prapañca, though, he has given greater specificity to this second moment of 
perceptual cognition. Prapañca refers to cognitions of the buddhi which are superimposed by the 
mind on the buddhi and are sublated when the mind is fully awakened. It signals a deficient 
orientation of the mind towards (pra-) what is “seen” by the five senses (pañca). Rather than 
“seeing” the buddhi with the internal organ of perception, an inattentive, sleepy mind 
superimposes a universal upon the buddhi: 
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Figure 6: Prapañca as superimposition upon the buddhi (ĝD۪kara, UMSBh III.2.21) 
By building XSRQĝDEDUD¶VHSLVWHPRORJ\RISHUFHSWLRQ in this wayĝDৄkara thus explains how 
plurality is cognized even though non-dual reality is seen. Instead of perceiving a particular, one 
cognizes or “sees” prapañca, which impedes the connection between mind, sense organs, and 
sense object. To be clear, the point of the example is not, strictly speaking, to distinguish 
between an incorrect cognition (e.g., “silver”) and a correct cognition (e.g., “shell”), but to 
explain how signifiers and universals are superimposed upon the buddhi, which takes the form of 
particular objects sensed by the sense organs. 
Seeing and Perceiving 
7RGHPRQVWUDWHWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQSHUFHSWLRQDQGPHUHVLJKWHWFĝDৄkara offers as 
an analogy a person with an eye disease who sees many moons rather than one. This 
misconception is destroyed when knowledge of the one moon arises.267
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 As he explains, however, 
even though the misconception has been destroyed, knowledge of the one moon can only arise in 
accordance with a valid means of knowledge suitable to that purpose. If one is told that there is 
only one moon, this will not remove the impediment since verbal teaching is not suitable to 
correct the vision problem. The reason for this becomes obvious when we map the problem onto 
the process of perception: 
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Figure 7(UURULQWZRPRRQVDQDORJ\ĝD۪kara,UMSBh III.2.21) 
Even after hearing a trusted guru explain, “there is only one moon,” the student will still see 
many moons until the impediment is removed. Analogously, if a doctor tells a patient, “you have 
an eye disease,” this diagnosis does not heal the patient’s vision. As ĝDৄkara explains, even when 
guided by a teacher, knowledge of something unknown cannot arise without a valid means of 
knowledge suitable to that object, especially if it seems to contradict everyday experience.268 In 
other words, if one sees many moons, hearing that there is only one moon will not directly result 
in true knowledge since hearing is not a means to know an object that is visible. Having been 
guided by a teacher, however, one identifies the impediment, removes it, and becomes able to 
perceive on one’s own. Continuing the analogy, a doctor does not “see” for the patient. Having 
removed the eye disease, the doctor enables the patient to perceive for himself/herself. After a 
teacher has indicated the object to be known, knowledge then arises in accordance with the valid 
means of knowledge and the object to be known.269
Attending to the Teacher’s Intention 
  
Therefore, even a wise teacher can do no more than guide the disciple towards what is to 
be perceived. This is true for knowledge of Brahman just as it is true for everyday speech. As 
ĝDৄkara explains, when someone utters an instruction to “look at this” or “listen to that,” this is 
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done “merely to fix one’s attention to that,” it is not done to cause direct knowledge.270 A teacher 
or a text can only do so much. Even if a guru points directly at something, there is no guarantee 
that the student will perceive what the teacher intends. As ĝDৄkara explains, even though a 
person’s face may be turned directly toward a thing to be known, knowledge may arise at one 
time and not at another. Therefore, a teacher can only guide someone’s gaze towards what is to 
be shown.271
Although Brahman is perceptible and before one’s very eyes, Brahman is not perceived 
unless and until the cognitive impediments which are opposed to that perception are removed. 
Therefore, negation such as the dissolution of plurality (prapañcapravilayaۊ) does not remove 
the particulars which are intended to be signified through kataphatic description; rather, it 
negates universals which have been cognitively superimposed upon those particulars. Although 
particulars have been “seen” by the eye, they are not perceived by the mind (the internal organ of 
perception) due to sleepiness or inattention. Instead, the mind “sees” universals, which are 
linguistic measures of particulars. As emphasized above, perception of the object only arises 
when the mental image of that object is grasped by means of the correct word (i.e., a word that is 
eternally connected to that particular object).  
 In order to perceive, the student must attend to what the teacher intends. 
When one’s face is turned toward a thing that is to be known (jñeya-adhimukhya), the eye 
(and buddhi) sees the object even if there is no perception of the object.272 The internal organ 
imagines (i.e., sees with the mind)273
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 many moons prior to the perception of the one moon, 
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 I use the verb “imagine” in a technical, epistemological sense. To “imagine” is to “see an image in the mind.” 
What is imagined may be true or false insofar as it correlates truly or falsely to what is seen by the eye. For example, 
one may see a shell and imagine silver, or one may see a shell and imagine a shell. The former imagination is false 
109 
which arises only when the impediment is removed. In the same way, the internal organ of 
perception “sees” (i.e., cognitively imagines or superimposes) plurality prior to becoming 
wakefully attentive to the truth of Brahman. By removing conceptual measures superimposed 
upon particulars, one becomes attentive. To be clear, the particular object seen continues to be 
seen; the negation negates neither the particular entity nor its being seen (p 102). Rather, the 
negation dissolves the conceptual cognition (vikalpa) of that particular entity.274 When this 
phenomenal measure, which has been imagined/superimposed on the buddhi, has been dissolved, 
the thing itself is perceived. Apophasis is the negation of the measure, not of the measured.275
Unfolding AUM 
 
As noted above (p94)ĝDৄkara explains that Brahman becomes known through the 
negation of signifiers and signified. Having turned to his UMSBh in order to provisionally 
clarify what is meant by the negation of what is signified by signifiers, we return now to MUBh 
1 to clarify what is meant by the negation of signifiers themselves. Having understood the eternal 
relationship between words, signified universals, and signified particulars, it next becomes 
necessary to grasp the relationship between AUM and all (other) signifiers. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
whereas the latter imagination is true. Nevertheless, both are imaginations insofar as they are images seen with the 
internal organ of perception. Cf. MKBh II.32. 
274
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according to ĝDৄNDUD. If this were not the case, nothing would distinguish the SUƗMña from the WXUƯ\D. See p137 and 
p153 below. 
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A name (DEKLGKƗQD) is a means to express what one intends to name (abhidheya).276 As 
ĝDEDUDH[SODLQVnouns simultaneously signify universals and particulars, but the primary 
signification changes according to the intention of the speaker.277 For example, in the sentence, 
“bring me that cow right there,” the word “cow” names a particular animal, since that is clearly 
the speaker’s intention. In the sentence, “a cow is different than a horse,” however, the word 
“cow” names an idea, i.e., a class of animals to which many particular animals belong. In both 
cases, however, the noun is a means to express the speaker’s intention.278
 
 
Figure 83ULPDU\VLJQLILFDWLRQRIQRXQVĝDEDUD306%K,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In keeping with the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D, ĝDৄkara goes a step farther in his explanation of nouns 
WKDQGRHVĝDEDUD Since AUM signifies the Self, he explains, then AUM is of the “same nature” 
as the Self.279 AUM, like ƖWPDQ, is the non-dual ground (ƗVSDGDP) for all conceptions 
(vikalpa).280
74
 The word vikalpa is a critically important term in the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULNa and is key 
for understanding ĝDৄkara’s philosophy of language and apophatic method. If we are to 
understand how the negation of nouns serves as a means to indicate Brahman, we must first have 
a clear understanding of the relationship between nouns and ultimate reality. As mentioned 
earlier (p ), ĝDৄkara coordinates this teaching on AUM WR8GGƗODND¶V pedagogical discourse 
with his son, ĝYHWDNHWX, in CU VI.1, thereby compelling us to reread one in light of the other. 
Reading these together, comparatively, we develop a clearer picture of ĝDৄkara’s understanding 
of vikalpa which, in turn, deepens our understanding of kataphatic and apophatic speech. 
In light of CU VI.1, it is clear that a clay pot and a lump of clay are distinct, particular 
vyakti-s or manifestations of clay; and yet the pot and the lump are of the same nature (i.e., clay). 
Likewise, nouns are distinct from one another (e.g., “pot”³OXPS´DQG\HWĝDৄkara explains, 
all nouns are of the same nature (i.e., AUM). All speech, in other words, is a modification 
(vikalpa) of AUM in the same way that a clay pot is a modification (vikalpa) of clay. While each 
word remains distinct from every other word (e.g., “pot” is distinct from “lump”), just as a clay 
pot is distinct from a lump of clay, these words have AUM as their basis, just as the pot and lump 
have clay as their basis. Confusion arises, however, if the modification itself is mistakenly taken 
WREHWKHEDVLVĝDৄkara explains this through a familiar example: 
In the same way that a rope is the basis for a concept like a snake, the non-
dual Self, being the highest reality, is the basis for a concept like SUƗ۬a 
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(breath); in the very same way, the entire manifold of speech is just AUM, 
which is the field for conceptions of the self like SUƗ۬a.281
While a clay pot is ontically distinct from a lump of clay, their material cause or basis is not 
distinct. Similarly, while the word “cow” is ontically distinct from the word “horse,” their basis 
is simply AUM. They are distinct conceptual manifestations of AUM. If one mistakes the 
concept (vikalpa) for the basis (ƗVSDGDP), this does not change the fact that AUM is the basis, 
but merely constitutes a superimposition of the concept on the basis, just as the concept of a 
snake is superimposed on a rope, which is the basis for that conception.  
 
Reading these passages coordinately, we see that the word vikalpa, at least in this case, 
does not signify something false, illusory, or untrue. It simply means a modification, or a finite 
measure of something else. Nouns are modifications of AUM and, as such, are limited measures 
of that which is beyond measure. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute any value 
judgment here whatsoever. To say that a noun is a limited, measured, modification of AUM is 
not to suggest that a noun is somehow deficient, illusory, or unreal. ĝDৄkara’s meaning is far 
simpler and straightforward: Nouns are limited, measured modifications of AUM. By negating 
those nouns, one does not negate AUM, which is the basis (ƗVSDGDۨ) of all speech, but simply 
removes the limitation. Just as was concluded in the previous section on UMS III.2.21: 
Apophasis is the negation of the measure, not of the measured.  
As Jacqueline Suthren Hirst has shown, ĝDৄkara often coordinates the clay-pot example 
with the rope-snake analogy, as is observed here. She explains: 
[The examples] complement each other, at times reinforcing similar points, 
but, more importantly, helping to eliminate from one another the wrong 
inferences that might be made, were each example allowed to stand alone. 
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Each one functions properly, not merely by offering its own insights, but by 
excluding irrelevant features from the others.282
In MUBh 1, ĝDৄkara employs each of the two examples for different purposes, but by using the 
two together, he also eliminates wrong inferences that might be drawn from either in isolation. 
The rope-snake analogy is employed to highlight the error of superimposing an idea or concept 
upon a particular entity. The point here is not that a universal signified by a signifier is unreal or 
illusory in the way that the snake is illusory. Rather, the point is that the superimposition of a 
concept (vikalpa) upon a particular obscures and veils the object to be seen, just as the idea of the 
snake obscures and veils the perception of the rope. Unlike the snake, however, the concept 
(vikalpa) signified by the signifier is real; it is a modification (vikalpa) of AUM in the same way 
that a pot is a modification (vikalpa) of clay. 
 
ĝDৄkara H[SODLQV8GGƗODND¶VOHVVRQWRĝYHWDNHWX in &KƗQGRJ\D VI.1.4 as follows: “[B]y 
knowing the clay which is the material cause of the bowl, jar, etc., all else which is but a 
modification of clay shall become known.”283 Similarly, by knowing that the concepts 
(vikalpa-s) signified by signifiers are but modifications (vikalpa-s) of AUM, all other concepts 
become known as modifications of AUM, which is of the same nature as the Self.284
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 Stated 
plainly, the relationship between any given word and AUM is analogous to the relationship 
between any clay object and clay. Hence, kataphatic descriptions of Brahman are reliable and 
adequate since the concepts signified by these signifiers are modifications of AUM, like the clay-
pot example. These same positive descriptions of Brahman are unreliable and inadequate if the 
concepts signified by these signifiers are superimposed upon particulars, like the rope-snake 
283
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analogy. As previously cited, Clooney observes that “[Advaita] Texts serve their proper function 
when they call into question their own reliability and adequacy.”285
Analogously, suppose a teacher wanted to teach a student what “clay” is. To do so, the 
teacher may point to a clay pot and say “clay.” The teacher may then point to a lump of clay and 
say “clay.” In doing so, the teacher negates the concepts of “pot” and “lump.” The particular 
entities, which constitute the basis (ƗVSDGDۨ) of each concept, remain distinct and unchanged. 
The concepts of “pot” and “lump” also remain distinct and unchanged with respect to each other, 
even as the conception of each is dissolved by means of the teaching.  
 Hence, positive descriptions 
of Brahman are reliable, but only if the resulting conceptions of Brahman are not reified and 
superimposed on Brahman.  
As noted above (p110), signifiers always and simultaneously signify both universals and 
particulars, but only one of the two is primary, depending upon the speaker’s intention.286 In the 
statement, “this pot is clay,” the primary signification of the word “clay” is a particular (i.e., “this 
pot”). The statement is true because the word “clay” is a signifier that signifies each and every 
particular entity made of clay. (To be clear, there is no intermediate step. The word “clay” 
directly signifies that particular pot, which is the primary meaning of the word in that sentence. 
That is not to say that the word “clay” signifies a set, collection, or class of particulars, of which 
the pot is one, thereby indirectly signifying the particular pot.)287
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 However, the statement “clay is 
not this pot” is simultaneously true because the primary signification of the word “clay” in this 
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sentence is a universal.288
While the student may possibly grasp the meaning of the word “clay” merely from one 
hearing and example, it is more likely that multiple positive examples will be necessary. On the 
other hand, it is unlikely that a student will only grasp the meaning of the word “clay” after every 
particular instance of clay has been pointed out (were such a thing even possible!). The point is 
that once a student grasps the idea of “clay,” the student will be able to see other particular 
bodies and perceive them as clay. Hence, the buddhi, which has its basis in the particular 
external object, is grasped by means of the word “clay,” which is eternally connected to that 
particular object as well as to a transcendental meaning eternally connected to that word.
 The negation in the latter statement (“clay is not this pot”) does not 
negate the fact that this particular pot is clay, but merely negates the limitation (or measure) 
since the concept of clay is neither limited to that particular pot nor to the universal class/idea of 
“pot.” This shows, once again, that apophasis intends to negate the measure, not the measured. 
289
The pedagogical method demonstrated here is pertinent: various positive descriptions are 
followed by the negation thereof for the sake of removing the limitations imposed by the positive 
descriptions. The positive descriptions are measures of that which is to be shown, just as a clay 
pot and lump are measures of clay. To that extent, these measures are reliable and instructive. 
However, the extent to which they measure poses a limitation which must be dissolved.  
 
Like any analogy, the foregoing has limitations. Instructing a student as to the meaning of 
the word “clay” is not directly analogous to instructing a student as to the meaning of “AUM” 
because “clay” is a limited concept whereas AUM is not. AUM is of the same nature as the Self 
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because AUM signifies the Self.290 Any word that is not synonymous with AUM is only a partial 
measure of AUM, which is an infinite signifier of an infinite signified.291 ĝDৄkara explains that 
since all words are concepts that only partially represent AUM, which is “all this,” then they 
have no existence apart from their names.292 ,QRWKHUZRUGVDFFRUGLQJWRĝDৄkara, signifiers 
exist only insofar as they measure AUM. Because AUM signifies “all that was, is, and shall 
be,”293 and because there is an eternal connection between signifier and signified,294 then 
whatever signifies something less than “all that was, is, and shall be” exists only as a name that 
measures AUM (or appropriate synonyms for AUM such as ƗWPDQEUDKPDQ, etc.). “The entire 
manifold of speech is just AUM,”295
AUM as Apophatic Measure 
 ĝDৄkara explicates. All speech unfolds AUM. 
By tracing the foregoing, we are able to regard AUM as an apophatic measure. AUM 
disrupts attempts to posit binary opposition between the one and the many. Because “the entire 
manifold of speech is just AUM,” all words are measures of AUM. To de/fine any word is to 
measure its semantic limit,296
                                                     
290
 MUBh 1. 
 thereby measuring a finite portion of infinite AUM. Through an 
291
 MU 12. 
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 MU 1. 
294
 PMS I.1.5, discussed above. 
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apophasis of all linguistic-conceptual measures (mere modifications), one is prepared to hear 
AUM, which all speech unfolds.297
If one is to hear the ĞUXWL, coordinately and harmoniously, one must first grasp the eternal 
signifying relationship between words, universals, and particulars (p
  
97). Words simultaneously 
signify universals and particulars (p99). Only one of these significations is primary in any given 
sentence, based upon the speaker’s intention (p110). In kataphatic descriptions of AUM, words 
have different signifying intentions than do words in apophatic descriptions (p113).  
Kataphatic descriptions of AUM intend to signify particulars. A we will see later (p164), 
kataphatic descriptions truly and reliably measure AUM, which is the infinite measure beyond 
measure.298
348
 If this were not the case—if kataphatic descriptions failed to truly and reliably 
measure ultimate reality—then one would have no means whatsoever by which to know ultimate 
reality (p ).299
Apophatic descriptions of AUM, however, intend to signify universals. Apophasis 
negates universals which have been cognitively superimposed upon particulars (p
  
108). These 
two moments (kataphasis and apophasis) are inextricably linked and do not contradict one 
another, provided one understands their differing intentions. When awakened, one attends to 
these intentions and is thusly prepared to hear the ĞUXWL, coordinately and harmoniously. 
Through ĝDৄkara’s discussion of AUM, we begin to see that the methods of upasaۨKƗUD 
and samanvaya are more than exegetical strategies. Having cultivated these skills, one begins to 
hear the multiplicity of different ĞUXWL voices in harmony (p76). Similarly, when one grasps that 
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all words—and the universals they signify—are modifications of AUM, one begins to coordinate 
words. The one (AUM) is not opposed to the many; it unfolds as the manifold of speech in fugal 
variation. One learns to hear the multiplicity of words, harmoniously.  
Harmony is not unison. The particularity of distinct teachings matter. Echoing UMS 
III.3.58, Clooney explains that “the various texts really do count, and one cannot conflate them 
into a single theoretical account: one cannot simply compile all the qualities of Brahman, 
wherever mentioned, into a single whole.”300 Likewise, I argue, one cannot conflate all words, 
compiling them without distinction, in hope of amalgamating AUM. Harmonization 
(samanvaya) requires a diversity of voices.301 Realizing that a clay pot and a clay lump are both 
“clay” neither obviates the particular distinctions between the words “pot” and “lump,” nor does 
it obviate distinctions between the particular pot and the particular lump. Analogously, realizing 
that “the entire manifold of speech is just AUM,”302
111
 does not obviate distinctions between words. 
Apophasis is the negation of the measure, not of the measured. Words are ontically distinct—as 
are the universals and particulars they signify—but are not ontologically distinct, since the entire 
manifold of speech is just AUM. Words are AUM just as a clay pot is clay, but (unlike words) 
AUM is of the “same nature” as the Self; it is the non-dual ground for all dualistic conceptions 
(p ). By negating words (conceptual modifications of AUM), one negates neither their 
particularity nor multiplicity. Rather, one learns to hear the entire manifold of speech, 
harmoniously.  
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In this sense, AUM is an apophatic measure: AUM is devoid of all linguistic measures 
precisely because it unfolds all linguistic measures. One cannot come to know AUM without 
words. One learns to hear AUM kataphatically: word-by-word, measure-by-measure. This is 
possible because words (in ĞUXWL’s kataphatic speech) intend to signify particulars and AUM is all 
particulars (“all this”). And yet, precisely because words measure AUM, which is beyond 
measure, they must be negated. One learns to hear AUM apophatically. This is possible because 
words (in ĞUXWL’s apophatic speech) intend to signify—and thus negate—universals. Grasping the 
signifying relations and intentions as these are understood in 0ƯPƗূVƗ, one becomes prepared to 
hear 9HGƗQWD. As an apophatic measure, AUM unfolds all speech, negates all measures, and 
harmonizes all particulars without reducing them to unison.  
AUM is a (non)measure beyond cognitive grasp which cannot be known (since cognition 
requires language, p104), but can be heard. Just as upasaۨKƗUD enables us to hear diverse ĞUXWL 
teachings harmoniously without resolving difference to unison, ĝDৄkara’s reflection on AUM 
enables us to hear words—the entire manifold of speech—concordantly without obviating their 
irreducible particularity. One learns to hear in this way through a wakeful attentiveness to ĞUXWL’s 
differing intentions. Attentive to these differing intentions, one hears: 
“AUM”—that sacred syllable is all this. Its explanation is: All that was, is, 
and shall be is simply AUM. And, moreover, that which transcends the three 
periods of time, that, too, is simply AUM.303
Dissolving Measures (MUBh 2-7) 
 
Having examined the first of the MU’s three movements, my attention now turns to the 
second.304
                                                     
303
 MU 1. 
 Here, ĝDৄkara develops and applies the philosophy of language sketched in MUBh 1. 
304
 See p60 above. 
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He prompts the reader to consider the MU’s intention: How does the discussion of AUM shape 
how we read the text as a whole? He coordinates the teaching about AUM with subsequent 
divisions of the text, thereby modeling 9HGƗQWD’s tradition of upasaۨKƗUD (p72). Consistent with 
the conclusions drawn above, the first three SƗGDs (MU 3-5) are kataphatic descriptions of the 
Self, and thus intend to signify particular states of consciousness. The fourth SƗGD describes the 
Self apophatically, and thus intends to negate the universals measured by the previous three.  
Here again, apophasis negates the measures, not that which they measure. The four states 
depict four levels of attentiveness. Through negation, distractions are progressively dissolved, 
culminating in direct perception, beyond measure. The four states of attentiveness are ontically 
distinct, since one’s perceptual attention differs in each, but are not ontologically different from 
one another, since the perceiving witness (the seer of sight) is the same throughout. The Self is 
devoid of all measure precisely because the Self measures all measures. I begin with ĝDৄkara’s 
analysis of the word SƗGD in light of the foregoing philosophy of language, aided by 
ƖQDQGDJLUL¶VVXEFRPPHQWDU\I then turn to ĝDৄkara’s method of progressive dissolution. 
Quarter Measures 
All this is certainly Brahman. This Self is Brahman.  
That [Brahman] is this Self, possessed of four quarters (catu܈SƗW). 
—0Ɨ۬ڲǌN\D Upani܈ad 2  
The second verse of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad initiates the second division of the text. 
Echoing MU 1, which states that AUM is “all this,” MU 2 states that Brahman is “all this,” 
adding that the Self is Brahman. This is regarded as one of four PDKƗYƗN\Ds (great sentences) in 
9HGƗQWD.305
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 The other three are “Thou art that” (CU VI.8.7), “Awareness is Brahman” (Aitareya UpaniৢDG9DQG³I am 
Brahman” (BU I.4.10). Rambachan (2015), 65 and 201.  
 Although it describes the Self as possessing four quarters, subsequently called 
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“measures” (MU 8), ĝDৄkara immediately problematizes this. It is no simple matter to 
understand how the Self is—and is not—possessed of four quarters.  
The first three quarters (MU 3, 4, 5) are described positively and the fourth ( MU 7) is 
described negatively. In ĝDৄkara’s commentary on the latter, a SǌUYDSDN܈in objects to this 
method: by indicating that the Self is possessed of four quarters and subsequently describing the 
first three quarters, it logically follows that the fourth is different from these three. By simply 
negating these descriptions, the text accomplishes nothing, since it is obvious that the fourth 
must be different from these three if it is said to be the fourth.306 In other words: In what sense is 
the fourth the fourth? If the fourth is actually different from the previous three, then negating the 
attributes of the previous three is merely repetitive. Alternatively, if the fourth is not actually 
different from these, then in what sense is it a quarter at all? Perhaps it is a mere void (ĞǌQ\DP
eva).307
Though posed in MUBh 7, ĝDৄkara has already addressed the question in MUBh 2 
through his analysis of the word SƗGD. He tells us that “The Self… is possessed of four quarters 
OLNHD.ƗUৢƗSD৆a
 
308
 coin, but not like a cow.”309
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 MUBh 7. 
 Since the word SƗGD can mean either “quarter” 
RU³IRRW´WKHQĝDৄkara’s meaning here would seem somewhat straightforward: The MU is not 
claiming that the Self has four feet in the same way that a cow has four feet.  
307
 Ibid. 
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 The meaning of the NƗU܈ƗSD۬D DQDORJ\LVXQFOHDUƖQDQGDJLULH[SODLQVWKDWWKHZRUGNƗU܈ƗSD۬D means various 
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Shastri, 218, lines 29-33. 
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 MUBh 2. Shastri, 218, line 7.  
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ƖQDQGDJLUL¶VJORVVRQWKLVKRZHYHUUHYHDOVDPRUHSURIRXQGWKHRORJLFDOVLJQLILFDQFH310 
As he explains, the purpose of a cow’s four feet is walking. In order to walk, the cow 
successively shifts its weight from one foot to the other. With each step, the cow’s foundation 
(ƗĞUD\D) changes. With one step, this foot is the cow’s foundation; with another step, that foot is 
the cow’s foundation. The Self, however, is the foundation of all. It is unchanging and steadfast 
whereas a cow’s foundation shifts in order to walk.311
Nevertheless, granting that the Self does not have four SƗGDs in the way that a cow has 
four feet, the SǌUYDSDN܈in’s objection stands: Is the fourth SƗGD actually different from the other 
three or not? If it is different, then the text should describe it. If it is not different, or is a mere 
void, then the Self is not possessed of four SƗGDs, but only three.
  
312
ĝDৄkara’s explanation mimics the structure and patterns of the MU itself, consistent with 
the conclusions drawn in the previous section. Words in kataphatic descriptions have different 
signifying intentions than do words in apophatic descriptions (p
  
113). Accordingly, the word 
SƗGD signifies something qualitatively different with respect to the first three quarters (positively 
described) than it does with respect to the fourth (negatively described). It denotes an 
“instrumental means” with respect to the first three quarters, but denotes “the thing attained” 
with respect to the fourth.313
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308 above. 
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 ৙J9HGD X.90 describes the primordial Puru܈D as possessed of four SƗGD-s with one quarter “below” and three 
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first three quarters in the MU would seem to correspond to the one quarter below rather than the three quarters 
above. ĝDৄNDUD does not make any reference to the hymn and thus further consideration is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
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ĝDৄkara’s analysis of the word SƗGD calls into question the very means by which words 
signify meanings.314 By insisting that the fourth “quarter” is qualitatively but not quantitatively 
distinct from the first three “quarters,” he problematizes the word “quarter.”315
Moreover, the SǌUYDSDN܈in’s objection leads us to consider that the apophatic speech in 
MU 7 tells us something new, rather than simply negating the qualities positively described in 
the first three SƗGDs. Having asserted that the Self is possessed of four quarters (MU 2), it 
logically follows that the fourth is different from the other three. What is negated in MU 7, 
therefore, must be different from what is posited in MU 3, 4, and 5. As we saw above with AUM 
(p
 He compels his 
reader to consider how the four “quarters” are related while resisting facile interpretations that 
would apply the word to the fourth in the same respect as to the other three. 
117), words in kataphatic speech intend to signify particulars whereas words in apophatic 
speech intend to signify (and negate) universals. While the words posited in MU 3, 4, and 5 may 
be largely the same as the words negated in MU 7, the signifying intentions differ. Only by 
attending to these differing intentions does one grasp the text’s meaning. 
As concluded above (p118), words are ontically distinct but are not ontologically distinct 
since the entire manifold of speech is just AUM. Likewise, the four SƗGDs are ontically distinct 
                                                                                                                                                                           
ĝDৄNDUD’s BGBh VIII.3 for a similar explanation. ƖQDQGDJLri explains that if the word SƗGD in all four cases were to 
indicate a means to accomplish something, then what is to be learned would not be accomplished since the process 
would terminate with a means, not an end. Likewise, if the word SƗGD in every case were to signify what is to be 
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shown that by dividing (vibhajya) the signification of the word SƗGD, there is both the means to know what is to be 
known and a statement of what is to be known. MUBhT 2, Shastri, 218, lines 33-35. Francis Clooney also drew my 
attention to a parallel with TUBh 2, wherein ĝDৄNDUD comments that maya (“made of”) has one meaning four times 
over, but a different meaning on the fifth (ƗQDQGD-maya) usage. 
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 See above (p109) and Clooney (1993), 44.  
315
 That is to say that if the fourth “quarter” is not a “quarter” at all, then neither can the first three “quarters,” since 
SƗGD implies four quarters. 
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but are not ontologically distinct since the Self is possessed of four quarters.316 In the same way 
that words measure AUM, which is “all this,” but must be negated insofar as they measure, the 
three SƗGDs measure the Self, but must be negated insofar as they measure.317 Accordingly, 
ƖQDQGDJLULemphasizes that the highest reality is only provisionally described as possessing four 
quarters, for the sake of instruction.318
The SƗGDs remain ontically distinct from one another in the same way that a clay pot is 
ontically distinct from a lump of clay. Just as a teacher may provisionally indicate a pot and a 
lump in order to teach a student about clay, the first three SƗGDV are described and distinguished 
provisionally as a means to disclose that which persists in all three: the Self, or Seer, who sees 
external things in the waking state, internal things in the dream state, and no thing at all in the 
dreamless state.
  
319
 Even when the three states described in MU 3-5 are realized to be 
ontologically non-different from one another, ontic distinctions persist. One who is fully 
awakened in the WXUƯ\D state continues to perceive and discriminate one thing from another.320
118
 
Particular distinctions remain distinct. As stated earlier with respect to upasaۨKƗUD (p ), the 
kataphatic descriptions in the first three SƗGDs cannot simply be compiled or conflated into a 
single whole, as if the distinctions cease to matter, nor can their particular differences be 
dissolved, reduced to monotonous unison.321
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 Rather, by coordinating that which they measure, 
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progressively dissolving superimposed conceptions, the particular descriptions described in the 
first three SƗGDs are heard, harmoniously, in the fourth. 
Progressive Dissolution (pǌUYDSǌUYDSUDYLOƗSDQD) 
At the conclusion of his commentary on MU2, ĝDৄkara states: 
Since the WXUƯ\D is attained by dissolving (SUDYLOƗSDQD) the first three 
EHJLQQLQJZLWK9LĞYDLQGXHVXFFHVVLRQSǌUYDSǌUYD), the term SƗGD is used 
here as ‘instrumental means.’ In the case of the WXUƯ\D, the word SƗGD is used 
as ‘the thing attained.’322
The term SUDYLOƗSDQDdeserves careful consideration since it might easily be misconstrued. 
Although Panoli and Nikhilananda each translate it as “merging,” this should not suggest that the 
WXUƯ\D is an amalgamation of the first three.
 
323
126
 Andrew Fort translates it as “absorbing,” but here 
again the term should be understood in an epistemological sense, not in an ontological sense. 
ĝDৄkara uses the same term regarding the dissolution of signifier-and-signified (p ), and also 
in UMSBh III.2.21 (p108). In each case, the term SUDYLOƗSDQD must refer to signified universals, 
not to signified particulars, since the latter would entail the destruction of the universe at the 
moment the first person realizes Brahman (p101). Apophasis is the negation of universal 
measures, not the particulars measured. 
The word derives from the verbal root ¥OƯ, meaning “to melt, dissolve, absorb, etc.,”324
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 MUBh 2, Shastri, 218, lines 7-8. 
 
and the prefixes pra- and vi-, meaning “progressively” and “completely.” The term certainly has 
cosmological implications, which are pertinent here. In MK 2.32, ĝDৄkara uses a variant of the 
word (pralaya) to mean “death,” or dissolution of the individual ego at the end of the cycle of 
323
 In MUBh 1, Panoli translates the same term as “eliminate,” which significantly diverges from ĝDৄNDUD’s 
meaning. Panoli, 305. 
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birth and death, and the same term in opposition to utpatti (cosmological origin), all of which are 
said to be nonexistent from the perspective of the highest truth.325 Similarly, in %KDJDYDGJƯWƗ 
VII.6, the Omniscient Lord is identified as the source and dissolution (prabhavaۊ pralayaۊ) of 
the universe, which ĝDৄkara glosses as “origin” and “destruction.”326 In MKBh 3.19, the 
Supreme Non-dual Reality is said to be “cleaved” only by measuring, because it is, in fact, 
partless.327
In his discussion of AUM in MUBh 1, ĝDৄkara states:  
 In this sense, then, the origin of duality is the cleaving of the non-dual Self and 
pralaya is the reversal thereof. Although the parts themselves are not destroyed by virtue of the 
fact that they are unborn (DMƗWL), the fourth state is attained by progressively and completely 
dissolving (pra-vi-OƗSDQD) the measures that partition the non-dual Self.  
The purpose of apprehending the unity of signifier and signified is the 
attainment of the Brahman by dissolving distinctions simultaneously by 
means of just a single effort.328
Signifiers simultaneously signify universals and particulars (p
  
110), but SUDYLOƗSDQD cannot 
possibly entail dissolving particulars, since this is empirically and logically absurd (p101). 
Hence, the negation of nouns simultaneously dissolves signified universals. Unlike particulars, 
universals are conceptual modifications of AUM; they do not exist apart from their names 
(p113).329 104 Ontic distinctions persist. Words remain useful and necessary for cognition (p ), 
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even for one who is wakefully attentive to the truth of Brahman.330
106
 Having dissolved signifiers 
and universals, however, one no longer superimposes conceptions upon particulars (p ). One 
perceives particulars as they show themselves to be, without reducing particulars to verbal 
conception. 
The method of progressive dissolution is a theological apophasis inextricably linked to 
kataphasis. Signifiers simultaneously signify universals and particulars (p110). Since words in 
kataphatic speech intend to signify particulars (p117), the first three states signify the Self as the 
Seer who sees in the waking state, in the dream state, and in the state of deep sleep. In this way, 
the three states measure the Self, reliably and truly. One must first come to understand the 
measuring (PƗ\Ɨ) of the infinite Self qua measures. Only thereafter is one able to progressively 
dissolve these measures, thereby removing all measuring to reveal the Self beyond measure, 
which measures “all this.”331 Progressive dissolution is an epistemic unsaying, or unknowing, of 
the three states qua measures. Realizing the Self is, as Anantanand Rambachan puts it, 
“accomplishing the accomplished.”332
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 If this were not so, ĝDৄNDUD would not be able to write commentaries. 
 It is not the result of any cause. Progressive dissolution is 
not a method by which to know something unknown. It is a method by which one unknows that 
which obstructs the direct perception of the Brahman that is before one’s very eyes and 
perceptible. One always already sees Brahman, but fails to perceive Brahman due to a 
superimposition of signified concepts upon signified particulars. Progressive dissolution is a 
theological method whereby ignorance of Brahman is removed by negating nouns and the 
universals they signify without negating the ontic distinctions between corresponding 
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particulars.333
124
 It does not negate, sublate, or subvert particularity. To the contrary, it is an 
apophasis of all measuring (PƗ\Ɨ) which enables the direct perception of particulars. One sees 
particulars, distinctly and discriminately (p ), and one cognizes particulars by means of words 
which are eternally connected to universals (p104), but one no longer superimposes universals 
upon particulars, reducing particulars to cognitive measures (p106).  
Learning to See beyond Measure  
As the foregoing demonstrates, apophasis, for ĝDৄkara, is the negation of measures, not 
of the measured. There are no shortcuts to this method, as emphasized below. ĝDৄkara’s teaching 
cannot be abstracted from its textual context. To know Brahman, which is measured by the three 
SƗGDs, one must understand each of the measures, SƗGD-by-SƗGD, before progressively dissolving 
these measures. In so doing, one observes that the method of progressive dissolution leads to 
direct perception. It is a method by which one learns to see, without reducing particulars to 
cognitive measures. 
Near the end of the MKBh, ĝDৄkara succinctly describes the method again, step-by-step. 
In his commentary on MK IV.89, he explains that one must first know the sphere of ordinary 
material experience, which is to say Brahman in its ordinary gross form, and then subsequently 
know the simple world by the absence of the material world, and successively know only the 
extraordinary by the absence of that. Finally, one realizes the highest truth, the WXUƯ\D, by the 
absence of the three states.334
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 Analogously, realizing clay as the material cause of clay pot and clay lump does not negate the ontic distinctions 
between “pot” and “lump.” 
 Employing words such as “subsequently” and “by step,” he 
emphasizes procedural chronology. Subsequent states are distinguished by an absence of 
something found in the previous state. Though he does not use the word SUDYLOƗSDQD in this 
334
 MKBh 4.89. 
129 
passage, he depicts each stage as a removal. What is important, according to ĝDৄkara, is not 
simply the positive differences between the states, but what is absent (DEKƗYD) in a later state in 
juxtaposition to an earlier state. Through progressive apophasis of all measures, the method 
culminates in direct perception of particularity.  
As previously discussed (p63), MU 1 is paradigmatic in form: three positive descriptions 
followed by a negative description. Its description of AUM as “All that was, is, and shall be” 
easily maps to the first three states: present (MU 3, perception of what is presently seen in the 
waking state), past (MU 4, perception of memories/impressions that were seen in the waking 
state), and potency (MU 5, potential perception). Subsequent states are distinguished by what 
they lack in comparison to the preceding state. Thus, the vDLĞYƗQDUD state includes cognition of 
both material and immaterial things (i.e., particulars and universals); the taijasa state lacks 
cognition of material things (i.e., particulars); the pUƗMña state lacks cognition of material things 
and immaterial things.  
The verses indicate a progressive removal of what is seen in order to indicate the non-
dual seer, whose sight is never lost.335 In MU 1, AUM is described as what is, what was but is no 
more, and what neither is nor was but has the potential to be; likewise, Brahman is described in 
MU 3-5 as cognition of what is, cognition of what was but is no more,336
Each state lacks an attribute of the previous state. In MKBh 1.2, ĝDৄkara describes the 
three states in terms of what the active mind sees with open eyes, what the active mind sees with 
 and cognition of no-
thing. The method, however, compels the attentive reader to ponder how the pUƗMña state differs 
from the WXUƯ\D. 
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 MUBh7: ֊֛֟ᮤ᳥֡ֈ֣ᭅ᳥ ᳶ֧֗֌ᳯ֒֔֫֌֫֟֗᳒ֆ֧ֿPanoli 335 (ĝDৄNDUD is quoting BU 4.3.23). 
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 That is to say, what is no longer directly perceived. 
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closed eyes, and the inactivity of the mind. Here again, there is a progressive removal: active 
mind and active sense organs (MU 3), active mind and inactive sense organs (MU 4), and 
inactive mind and inactive sense organs (MU 5). Due to this inactivity of the mind and sense 
organs, however, the SUƗMña is characterized by darkness, which is absent in the WXUƯ\D, which is 
ever the all seer (sarvad܀NVDGƗ).337
As shown above, progressive dissolution is epistemological, not ontological. What is 
progressively dissolved is the conceptual content of perception, not the objects of perception. If 
this were not the case, then one would awaken from deep sleep to discover that the world was no 
longer there! The cognition of what is seen in the waking state is cognition of actually existing 
particulars in the world. Cognition, though, is not perception, which is a valid means of 
knowledge (SUDPƗ۬a) because it measures (SUDPƯ\DWH) truly.
 This, however, begs the question as to the distinction 
between the WXUƯ\D and the waking state, where mind and sense organs are active. Only by 
carefully adhering to ĝDৄkara’s method does one arrive at a realization of how the WXUƯ\D is 
distinct from both the YDLĞYƗQDUD and the SUƗMña.  
338
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 MK 1.12. 
 In the waking state, the seer 
cognitively measures an object that is actually seen. In the dream state, the seer cognitively 
measures an object that is not actually seen at present. In the state of deep sleep, the seer has no 
cognition at all. Hence, what is progressively dissolved is cognition in order to reveal the seer. It 
is an apophasis that leads to seeing, as it were, the seer. Subsequent to this realization, one has a 
strikingly different apprehension of reality.  
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For ĝDৄkara and GauঌDSƗGD alike, the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep 
occur in the waking state itself (p155).339
104
 The taijasa and the SUƗMña are not descriptions of 
actual dreaming and dreamless sleep, but signify degrees of cognitive attentiveness or 
awakening. As mentioned earlier (p )ĝDEDUDKDVXVHGWKHVDPHWULIROGDQDORJ\LQKLV
explanation of cognitive error associated with the process of sense perception. While a detailed 
H[DPLQDWLRQRIĝDEDUD¶Vdiscussion of perception is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is 
nevertheless helpful to return to it briefly as a means to clarify ĝDৄkara’s method.  
3HUFHSWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRĝDEDUDUHTXLUHVIRXUHOHPHQWVDQH[WHUQDOREMHFWWREH
perceived, a healthy sense organ, an alert mind, and an unobstructed connection of these three 
(Figure 4, p104).340 In order to explain the occurrence of cognitive error, such as cognizing silver 
when one sees a shell, he turns to analogies of waking, dream, and deep sleep. Actual dream and 
actual deep sleep are irrelevant to a discussion of perceptual error, he explains, because they 
arise in the absence of the elements necessary for perception, such as active sense organs and an 
alert mind. ,QIDFWĝDEDUDDUJXHVWKDW visions seen in a dream are not sublated by perception, but 
by inference. Upon waking, he explains, the unreality of dream is inferred simply because one 
becomes aware that one was sleeping and, therefore, not perceiving.341
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 Cognitive errors which 
are sublated by perception occur only in the waking state, when there is a union of sense object, 
sense organs, and the mind. If there is a defect in any of these four elements, cognitive error 
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 PMSBh I.1.5: թ֟᭠ᮤ֑֐֊֫ևᭅ ե֚֟֊շ֚ᲃ ֛֟ ᭄֞֊֑᭭ ֛ֆ֧֡զ ֿ է֚֟ֆ ֆ֟᭭֐֊֭ է᭄֞֊֞ֆ֭ ֿ  
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 PMSBh I.1.5. 
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results. For example, if the mind is sleepy, it is inattentive, resulting in a deficient union between 
mind and sense organs, which further results in cognitive error (p104).342
ĝDEDUDHPSKDVL]HVWKDWWKHVWDWHVRIZDNLQJGUHDPDQGGHHSVOHHSDUHWREHXQGHUVWRRG
as useful analogies, signifying degrees of attentiveness. Perception only occurs when the mind, 
which is the internal organ of perception, is fully awake and alert, whereas errors arise when the 
mind is not fully awake. One who is awake but whose mind is sleepy is prone to cognize 
erroneously because the mind is weak.
  
343
/LNHĝDEDUDĝDৄkara and GauঌDSƗGD interpret the states of dream and deep sleep 
analogously to explain cognitive error in the waking state itself (p
 Moreover, even though one may be awake and one’s 
eyes may be in contact with a sensible object, that object is not cognized at all when the mind is 
distracted or absent, as if in a daze, analogous to deep sleep.  
155). The four SƗGDV described 
in MU 2-7 can be distinguished from one another based on the presence/absence of the four 
elements of perception discussed above.344 The pUƗMña state lacks all four. The taijasa state is 
characterized by an active mind, but an absence of functioning sense organs.345
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 Similarly, if the eye is afflicted with a disease, such as timira, there is a deficient union of the sense organ with 
the sense object, resulting in cognitive errors such as cognizing two moons.  
 In the vDLĞYƗQDUD 
state, all three elements are present, but the connection between these three is obstructed, 
according to ĝDৄkara, by a veil which is superimposed by the mind onto the buddhi, just as 
darkness enshrouds a pot, preventing it from being perceived. In the tXUƯ\D, this veil is removed 
343
 PMSBh I.1.5. 
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 Namely: (1) An external object to be perceived, (2) A healthy sense organ, (3) An alert mind, and (4) an 
unobstructed connection of these three (Figure 4, p99). 
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 Or, more accurately, the absence of an unimpeded connection between the antaۊNDUD۬Dand the buddhi. See 
Figure 5 (p100). 
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by one who knows the meaning of the 9HGƗQWD scriptures, hence, the highest Self is able to be 
seen (p171).346
Only by analyzing the four states in terms of perception is one able to clearly distinguish 
between the WXUƯ\D and the SUƗMña states and between the WXUƯ\D and the YDLĞYƗQDUD states. While 
both the SUƗMña and the WXUƯ\D states are characterized by the non-cognition of duality,
  
347
 only the 
SUƗMña is characterized by the non-perception of true reality.348
104
 In other words, although the 
obstacle preventing one from perceiving Brahman is not present in the SUƗMña, Brahman is still 
not perceived in this state due to the absence of perception. Similarly, even though the three 
elements of perception are present in the YDLĞYƗQDUD, the Brahman that is before one’s very eyes 
and perceptible is not perceived due to superimposition of signified concepts which obstruct the 
connection between mind, sense organs, and object. Perception only occurs when all four 
elements are present (p , p131). Even though the ĞUXWL and a qualified teacher may turn a 
student’s face towards what is to be known, knowledge of what is to be shown cannot arise 
without a valid means of knowledge suitable to that object, viz., perception (p107).349
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 MKBh 2.35. 
 Knowing 
Brahman, SƗGD-by-SƗGD and measure-by-measure, and progressively dissolving these measures, 
one removes conceptual impediments, and thus becomes wakefully attentive: able to perceive 
what the ĞUXWL intends. 
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 UMSBh III.2.21. Shastri, 714-5. See p103 above. 
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Conclusions 
“The ‘system’ of Advaita is a well-planned event, not a theory.”350
63
 Despite (or perhaps 
because of) the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad’s brevity, it demands much planning, copious preparation, 
and coordinated readings and re-readings by those who wish to hear its harmony. Its rhythmic 
patterns unfold AUM in three movements (p ) which individually and collectively coordinate 
diverse ĞUXWL teachings with one another. When one is adequately prepared to hear its apophatic 
performance (p83), the MU removes our ignorance of Brahman, which is variously and 
metaphorically described as darkness, conception, or a veil (p93). By reading and rereading, all 
the while cultivating the skill of upasaۨKƗUD, one learns to hear multiple ĞUXWL teachings 
concordantly, without reducing their particular voices to unison (p118).  
ĝDৄkara equips his reader with the linguistic tools necessary to hear the MU’s teaching on 
AUM, which constitutes the first of its three movements. To grasp the intentions behind its three 
positive descriptions and subsequent negation, one must understand the relationship between 
signifiers and signified (p97). Because his linguistic philosophy is consistent with his 
0ƯPƗীsaka predecessors, I KDYHGUDZQXSRQĝDEDUD¶VDUWLFXODWLRQVRIKRZWKHODQJXDJHRIĞUXWL 
conveys meaning. Words are eternally connected with and simultaneously signify universals and 
particulars. Since Vedic sentences do not equivocate, only one of these two significations can be 
primary in any given sentence, according to the speaker’s intention (p110). In kataphatic 
descriptions, words intend to signify particulars; in apophatic descriptions, words intend to 
signify (and negate) universals (p113). Through wakeful attention to these differing intentions 
(p100), one becomes prepared to hear the ĞUXWL, concordantly. As an apophatic measure, AUM 
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unfolds all speech, negates all measures, and harmonizes all particulars without reducing them to 
unison (p119). 
Turning to the second movement (MU 2-7), ĝDৄkara prepares his reader to hear the MU’s 
teaching on the fourfold Self. He coordinates the catu܈SƗW teaching with the teaching on AUM, 
harmonizing them without obviating their distinct particularity. As above, his analysis of the 
word SƗGD demonstrates that words have different signifying intentions in kataphatic and 
apophatic speech.351
123
 While the words found in MU 3-5 are negated in MU 7, these descriptions 
are neither contradictory nor superfluous, provided that one attends to their differing intentions 
(p ). The positive descriptions in MU 3-5 signify (and thus measure) particular states of 
attentiveness. Though ontically distinct, these are not ontologically other than the Self, which is 
the Seer in each of these states of attentiveness (p126). Though the fourth SƗGD progressively 
dissolves signifiers together with signified universals in a single effort (p126), words and ideas 
nevertheless remain useful and necessary for perceptual cognition (p104).352
106
 Even after ĞUXWL has 
dissolved signifiers and the universals they measure, one continues to verbally grasp what is 
perceived, but one ceases to superimpose conceptions upon particulars (p ). One learns to 
perceive, beyond measure.  
Treading the path of progressive dissolution, SƗGD-by-SƗGD, measure-by-measure, one 
takes notice of what is absent in each of the SƗGDs. The verses indicate a progressive removal of 
what is seen in order to indicate the non-dual seer, whose sight is never lost (p129)RUĝDEDUD
ĝDৄkara, and GauঌDSƗGD alike, the states of waking, dream, and deep sleep are to be understood 
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 If this were not the case, then pratyak܈D would cease to be a SUDPƗ۬D when one realizes nonduality, since 
pratyak܈D entails cognizing particulars by means of words that are eternally connected with those particulars. The 
same is not necessarily true for ĞUXWL, however, since it ceases to be a valid means of knowledge once the knowledge 
for which it is a means has been realized. See MKBh 2.32 and BUBh II.1.20. 
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as useful analogies, signifying degrees of attentiveness (p132). The four SƗGDV described in MU 
2-7 can be distinguished from one another based on the presence/absence of four necessary 
elements of perception (p132). Only the WXUƯ\D state includes all four. By progressively 
dissolving conceptual measures superimposed upon the buddhi by the internal organ of 
perception, one becomes wakefully attentive: able to perceive.  
Both AUM and the WXUƯ\D state are apophatic measures, but in distinct ways. AUM is “the 
entire manifold of speech.” While words are ontically distinct from one another, they are not 
ontologically different than AUM. By learning to hear AUM, one learns to hear words 
harmoniously, without reducing their particularity to unison. The WXUƯ\D indicates the Self who is 
the seer in the four states of attentiveness. While these states are ontically distinct from one 
another, they are not ontologically other than the Self, possessed of four quarters. By attending to 
what is absent in the three states, one traces the path of perception, from particulars to the non-
dual Seer of sight. Without compiling or conflating these distinct teachings on AUM and the 
catu܈SƗW, ĝDৄkara prepares his reader to hear them, coordinately and harmoniously. As an 
apophatic measure, AUM leads us to an awakened, attentive sensuality: diverse words are heard 
concordantly without resolving to unison. Words unfold AUM (“the entire manifold of speech”), 
retaining ontic distinction while negating ontological alterity. As an apophatic measure, the 
WXUƯ\D also leads us to an awakened, attentive sensuality: diverse particulars are perceived in 
fractal variation, retaining ontic distinction while asserting ontological nonduality. Resisting 
dualistic conceptions that would oppose the one and the many, these apophatic measures 
cultivate a sensuality beyond measure, where the manifold is seen/heard simply and the simple is 
seen/heard multiply.  
 Three: Apophatic Measures in ĝDৄkara  
The trifold structure of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad was introduced in chapter one (p63). 
Like three movements in a symphony, its divisions call and respond to one another in fugal and 
rhythmic variation. By teaching us to read its three portions, coordinately, ĝDৄkara prepares us 
for the event of hearing them, harmoniously. As I have argued (p71), ĝDৄkara does not consider 
any part of the MK to be ĞUXWL. Its import is that it models the scriptural-spiritual methods of 
coordination and harmonization, which are hermeneutical strategies important to his theological 
tradition. By coordinating particular scriptural teachings, one learns to hear the ĞUXWL 
harmoniously, without reducing diverse scriptural teachings to unison.  
ĝDৄkara’s commentary prepares us to read by equipping us with the tools necessary to 
understand the text, on its own terms, as demonstrated in chapter two. By sketching a philosophy 
of language, he draws from the resources of his theological tradition. Only after grasping 
0ƯPƗূVƗ’s understanding of kataphasis is one prepared to hear 9HGƗQWD’s apophasis (p116). 
Thus prepared, one begins to hear all words—the entire manifold of speech—as AUM, without 
reducing harmony to unison. Likewise, by grasping 0ƯPƗূVƗ’s understanding of perception and 
its analogies to sleep as states of attentiveness, one becomes prepared to see the WXUƯ\D as a state 
of wakeful attentiveness (p134). When adequately prepared, the MU enables us to hear and see 
differently such that the many are not conflated, reduced to a homogenous monism, even as their 
ontological nonduality is affirmed. In the succinct words of Anantanand Rambachan: Not-two is 
not one.353
Much of my analysis in the previous two chapters has remained necessarily theoretical 
and abstract. In this chapter, the methods described above are examined in their practical 
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application. It is one thing to assert, as I have, that the MU exemplifies the praxis of 
upasaۨKƗUD, but quite another to demonstrate this to be the case. Likewise, having asserted that 
the four SƗGDV can be distinguished from one another based on the presence/absence of four 
necessary elements of perception (p132), I model this below. 
The chapter is divided into three sections, clarifying the terms “apophasis,” “measuring,” 
and the “apophatic measure,” thus adhering to the heuristic outlined in my introduction (p3). The 
first section examines the methods of progressive dissolution and upasaۨKƗUD as these are 
practically applied by ĝDৄkara in the second portion of the MU. These methods enable his reader 
to distinguish between the SUƗMña and the WXUƯ\D. In order to grasp the significance of 
coordination, it is necessary to understand each of these teachings in their original context. 
Accordingly, I first turn my attention to the text of MU 2-7 itself in light of its scriptural source, 
the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad. As I demonstrate, even this portion models scriptural coordination 
and harmonization.354
3
 I then turn my attention to ĝDৄkara’s commentary on these verses. As we 
will see, ĝDৄkara is not only concerned with distinguishing the WXUƯ\D from the SUƗMña, but also in 
distinguishing the WXUƯ\D from ĞǌQ\DP, or ‘the void’. I conclude this section by reflecting on ĞUXWL 
as an apophatic measure1 (p ). 
In the second section, I focus on the third unit of the MU for the purpose of clarifying 
what is meant by the term “measure.” I begin with an examination of the MU verses in light of 
GauঌDSƗGD¶V.ƗULND DQGĝDৄkara’s commentary with particular focus on the terms PƗWUD, 
DPƗWUD and DQDQWDPƗWUD.355
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 I draw primarily from the later prakara۬as RIWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D.ƗULND 
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 Additionally, I analyze ĝDৄNDUD’s use of the term PƗ\Ɨ in the Appendix (p335) 
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for reasons discussed earlier (p68). I conclude this section by reflecting on Brahman as an 
apophatic measure2 (p4). 
In the third section, I examine the role of perception in light of the apophasis and 
measuring discussed in the first two sections. Employing the heuristic of the apophatic measure,  
introduced at the start of this thesis (p3), I draw WRJHWKHUĝDৄkara’s comments on apophasis in 
MUBh 7 and embodied particularity in MU 2 especially in light of his teachings on the great 
saying “Thou art That,” IURP&KƗQGRJ\D8SDQLৢad VI. I reflect on ĝDৄkara’s responses to three 
objections raised by his SǌUYDSDN܈in in MUBh 7 in terms of the trifold meanings of the phrase 
“apophatic measure.” I return to this again in chapter six (p319) to consider the significance of 
the sensual, embodied encounter between student and a teacher who gives voice to the ĞUXWL, so 
that it may be heard, particularly and harmoniously. 
Apophasis in the 3UƗMña and the 7XUƯ\D 
Negation in the 3UƗMña  
PrajñƗQDJKDQDLQ08 
Where the sleeper does not desire any desirable thing [and] does not see 
DQ\GUHDPWKDWLVGHHSVOHHS3UƗMña (The Wise One), who is fixed in the 
state of deep sleep, who is unified, who is a mass of consciousness, who 
consists of bliss, who is certainly an enjoyer of bliss, [and] who is the 
entrance to the mind, is the third quarter. 
—0Ɨ۬ڲǌN\D Upani܈ad 5 
PrajñƗQDJKDQD is a centrally important term in ĝDৄkara’s commentary on the MU. As 
Haesook Ra shows, it is highly significant in his commentary on the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad, as 
well.356
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 From ĝDৄkara’s perspective, prajñƗQDJKDQD signifies a causal state; it is the source of 
darkness and duality and is absent in the WXUƯ\D. Hence, one must clearly grasp the meaning of 
the term in order to distinguish between the SUƗMña, where this cause is present, and the WXUƯ\D, 
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where this cause is absent. Intending to clarify this term, I argue the following points: First, 
MU 5 coordinates two important teachings on prajñƗQDJKDQD from the BU, which should be 
understood in light of one another. Second, prajñƗQDJKDQD constitutes a negation, despite the 
fact that the word itself is not privative in form. Third, prajñƗQDJKDQD negates cognition, but 
does so in a very particular way. Fourth, prajñƗQDJKDQDnegates all effects of duality by 
absorbing them into itself as a potency. It is the cause of ignorance and duality, analogous to a 
spider absorbing its web.357
According to MU 5, one is not conscious of anything at all in the SUƗMña, which is 
described simply as a mass or lump (ghana) of consciousness (prajñƗQD). The etymological 
word-play between “SUƗMña” and “prajñƗQD” is insightful3UƗMñaۊ,
 
358
PrajñƗQDJKDQDLQWKHB܀KDGƗUD۬yaka Upani܈ad 
 the one who is wise, is 
described as a lump of prajñƗQD. The word prajñƗQD derives from the root ¥jñƗ (“to know”) 
prefixed with the upasarga pra-, which generally connotes “towards, before, commencement.” 
Etymologically, the compound word prajñƗQDJKDQD suggests a mass of potential knowledge. In 
the SUƗjña, one does not know any thing, but one has the potential to know. The pUƗMña state, 
wherein there is a mass of consciousness, stands in contrast to the YDLĞYƗQDUD state, wherein 
there is a consciousness of external things, and the taijasa state, wherein there is a consciousness 
of internal things. Each of these is specifically negated in MU 7.  
The term prajñƗQDJKDQD in MU 5 (and negated in MU 7) is unique. It occurs only one 
other time in the principal upaniৢads (BU IV.5.13), wherein it occurs in the context of a 
discussion between <ƗMñavalkya and his wife 0DLWUH\Ư. <ƗMñavalkya is about to renounce the 
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world and depart for mendicancy. Before he leaves, 0DLWUH\Ư asks him to tell her the secret of 
immortality.359 He offers several analogies to explain. Among these, he says that the Self is 
comparable to a lump of salt which is a whole without inside or outside, a single lump of 
flavor.360 “Even so,” he continues, “this Self is a whole without inside or outside, just a mass of 
consciousness.”361
BU IV.5 is a near-verbatim repetition of BU II.4. In the earlier account, we find a similar 
analogy. Olivelle translates BU II.4.12 as follows:  
 In this context, the term ghana indicates a negation: something lacking 
externality and internality. MU 3 and MU 4 echo these terms, suggesting that MU 5 employs the 
term prajñƗQDJKDQDin a manner closely related to its explanation in BU IV.5.13.  
It is like this. When a chunk of salt is thrown into water, it dissolves into that 
very water, and it cannot be picked up in any way. Yet, from whichever place 
one may take a sip, the salt is there! In the same way, this Immense Being has 
no limit or boundary and is a single mass of perception (vijñƗQD-ghana). It 
arises out of and together with these beings and disappears after them—so I 
say, after death there is no awareness.362
Though there are several pertinent differences between BU II.4 and BU IV.5, two are especially 
noteworthy here. First, in place of the term prajñƗQDJKDQD (BU IV.5.13), we find the term 
vijñƗQDJKDQD. Second, the lump of salt in BU II.4.12 is dissolved into water, unlike the later 
passage. ĝDৄkara coordinates and harmonizes these differences. 
 
Cosmological Coordination and Harmonization 
In KLVFRPPHQWDU\RQ%8,,ĝDৄkara glosses vijñƗQDJKDQD as prajñƗQDJKDQD. As 
Haesook Ra H[SODLQVĝDৄkara gradually shifts the meaning of prajñƗQDJKDQDover the course of 
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his commentary from a more metaphysical sense to a “more psychological and epistemological 
sense.”363 In the earlier passage, wherein salt is dissolved in water, ĝDৄkara interprets 
prajñƗQDJKDQD as the return of an effect to its cause in the same way that a river is absorbed into 
the ocean.364 In the later passage, wherein “the one Self remains as a lump of salt,” the 
knowledge of difference born from worldly experience is dissolved by knowledge of the Self.365
Rather than privilege the psychological/epistemological example over the metaphysical 
example, I argue that one does well to apply the method of upasaۨKƗUD. The two examples 
should be coordinated and thus heard harmoniously, without reducing particularity to unison.
  
366
125
 
PrajñƗQDJKDQDthen, is a return of an effect to its cause, like a river absorbed (SUDYLOƗSLWD) into 
the ocean, but this return should be understood in an epistemological sense, like dissolving 
(SUDYLOƗSLWD) the dualistic distinction of Self and non-Self by knowledge. As we have seen 
(p ), the term pravilaya (in its various forms) has cosmological implications. ĝDৄkara 
gradually translates cosmological issues into epistemic terms. 
Sensual Potential 
Similarly, ĝDৄkara’s epistemology should be understood in relation to scripture and 
perception, insofar as these are valid means of knowing Brahman. In the passage above, Olivelle 
has translated the term vijñƗQDJKDQD as a “mass of perception,” which seems to be consistent 
wLWKĝDৄkara’s interpretation of the term. Although he simply glosses vijñƗQDJKDQDas 
prajñƗQDJKDQD in this context, some understanding of the former can be gleaned from his 
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commentary on %KDJDYDGJƯWƗ VI.8. Therein, he distinguishes between jñƗQD which he glosses 
as “knowledge of the meanings of the words uttered in the scripture” and vijñƗQD, which he 
glosses as “complete knowledge acquired by means of one’s own direct perception of what is 
learned from the scripture.”367
Practically applying the method discussed earlier (p
  
107), “knowledge of the meanings of 
the words uttered in the scripture,”368 even when aided by a qualified teacher, merely serves to 
fix one’s attention on what is to be shown; it does not cause direct knowledge since knowledge 
can only arise in accordance with a valid means of knowledge suitable to that purpose.369
Therefore, “the Wise One” in the SUƗMña state has sensual potential, yet fails to perceive 
the truth of Brahman due to inattentiveness. Such a person is like a lump of potential 
consciousness (prajñƗQDJKDQD) and a lump of potential perception (vijñƗQDJKDQD) because all 
obstacles preventing one from realizing Brahman have been dissolved. And yet, one fails to 
perceive due to inattention. The sensual potential of the SUƗMña state is only actualized in the 
WXUƯ\D state, wherein one is wakefully attentive and thus able to perceive ĞUXWL’s intention.
 By 
knowing the meanings of ĞUXWi’s words, one has the potential to perceive, but may fail to 
perceive due to inattention. Truly hearing (ĞUDYD۬a) ĞUXWL requires wakeful attention.  
370
Liminal Door 
 
While one does not perceive anything in the SUƗMña state, one has sensual potential. As 
ĝDৄkara explains, however, this means that one has both the sensual potential to awaken to the 
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truth of nonduality and the sensual potential to “awaken” to duality. Hence, it represents a 
liminal state, a turning point, or a “door” through which one can metaphorically “enter” the Self 
or “enter” the world of duality.371 Because all unreal effects are absorbed into it, it constitutes the 
cause or “seed” of ignorance.372 And yet, because it is dense with consciousness and identified 
with the sole witness (adhyak܈a) in the three states, it is also characterized as the seed that is the 
source of beings.373
The 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad describes the SUƗMña as cetomukha, the “entrance to the mind,” 
which ĝDৄkara glosses “door” and explains in two different ways. Plainly stated, a door is a 
passageway through which one can walk in either direction. Or, to preserve the spatial analogy, 
we might imagine two doors: a door to the mind from duality, or a door to the mind from the 
Self, as depicted below:  
 Hence, it is the source of unreal effects, like the superimposition of a snake 
on a rope, but also the source of real effects, just as clay is the material cause of a clay pot or 
lump of clay. From this liminal state, one can either proceed back to the world of ignorance and 
duality or proceed to realize non-dual Brahman. 
 
Figure 9: Liminality of prajñƗQDJKDQDDVcetomukha 
From one vantage point, the SUƗMña is the “entrance to the mind” from states of ignorance and 
duality. From another vantage point, it is also the entrance to the mind from the perspective of 
the sole Witness; it is the epistemic door by means of which the seer of sight has “entered” into 
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the body up to the tip of the fingernail.374 Due to the perception of the Self in the effect (i.e., the 
manifest world), it is said to have “entered.”375
Aviveka: Failure to discriminate between particulars 
 Therefore, the SUƗMña state is the liminal state 
between dualistic discrimination and non-dual realization. It is a crossroads, devoid of duality, 
from which one either returns to duality or proceeds to realize nonduality. 
The liminality and sensual potential that characterize the SUƗMña state are highly pertinent 
to my thesis. The SUƗMña state lacks perception and discrimination. It neither sees particulars nor 
distinguishes between them. One does not see duality in the SUƗMña, yet fails to perceive the non-
dual Brahman.  
To illustrate this, ĝDৄkara analogously compares the SUƗMña to the darkness of night. In 
this congealed state,376 everything becomes indistinguishable. Similarly, material things become 
indistinguishable when the earth is swallowed by the darkness of night, even though the earth 
does not lose its form during the night. The pUƗMña is called prajñƗQDJKDQD, he explains, because 
it is characterized by an absence of discrimination (aviveka).377
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fails to perceive due to the absence of discrimination, as if the internal organ of perception were 
enshrouded in darkness. 
Removing Darkness 
The illustration above is striking when juxtaposed to the analogy of a pot enshrouded in 
darkness, discussed earlier (p100). ĝDৄkara employs this example often, such as in UMSBh 
III.2.21, MUBh 7, and MKBh 2.32 (p171), to illustrate the distinct authoritative domains of 
direct sense perception (pratyak܈a SUDPƗ۬a) and scripture (ĞDEGD SUDPƗ۬a). Scripture removes 
false notions superimposed on the Self in the same way that darkness is removed in order to 
perceive a pot enshrouded in darkness. As he explains, the experiential knowledge of the pot is 
not the result of the SUDPƗ۬a that removes darkness.378 Removing obstacles that impede 
perception prepare one to perceive.379
107
 Apophasis does not yield knowledge of what is before 
one’s very eyes since knowledge only arises in accordance with a valid means of knowledge 
suitable to that purpose (p ).380 This experiential knowledge is subsequent to the removal of 
the obstacle, but is not a result of it. ĝruti does not reveal knowledge of Brahman because 
Brahman is unable to be described with words.381 Rather, ĞUXWL removes ignorance, thereby 
preparing one for “complete knowledge acquired by means of one’s own direct perception of 
what is learned from the scripture.”382
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be perceived, ĝUXWL removes the veil of ignorance such that the Self is able to be seen.383
Juxtaposing the two analogies, it becomes clear that even when all false notions 
superimposed on the Self are removed, this does not ensure that the Self will be realized. Like 
the shell-silver (
 This 
final step is absent from the SUƗMña, thereby distinguishing it from the WXUƯ\D. 
Figure 5, p105) and two moons (Figure 7, p107) examples, the two darkness 
analogies highlight two distinct sources of error in the process of perception, as diagrammed 
below. In the earth-darkness analogy, perception does not occur because the internal organ of 
perception is inactive or “congealed” as a “lump of consciousness.”  
As previously explained (p103), the buddhi is formless and takes the form of the external 
object which is its basis. It is only truly grasped by the internal organ of perception when the 
mind is wakefully attentive (p104). In the pot-darkness example, perception does not occur 
because the internal organ of perception is not fully “awake,” resulting in the superimposition of 
concepts upon the buddhi. In Figure 10, the “arrow,” so to speak, is pointing in the wrong 
direction; the mental image (buddhi) of the pot is not seen by the internal organ of perception 
because the latter “enshrouds” the former in a concept, super/imposing a universal upon what is 
to be seen. 
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Figure 10: Epistemic darkness in MUBh 5 and MUBh 7 
In the pot-darkness illustration, the pot is not seen, as if enshrouded in darkness. In the 
SUƗMña, the world is not seen, as if devoured by the darkness of the night. Though the buddhi 
takes the form of what is seen with the eye, the internal organ of perception sees nothing 
whatsoever because it is inattentive, as if in deep sleep.384 ĝDৄkara employs the pot-darkness 
analogy to make the point that scripture removes conceptual measures (whether true or false) 
superimposed on the Self. ĝUXWL removes ignorance so that the Self can be been just as one 
removes darkness so that the pot may be seen. In the earth-darkness analogy, however, there are 
no false notions, no superimposition, and no cognition of duality.385
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Similarly, when the “lump of consciousness” arouses, the problem of superimposition arises 
again since prajñƗQDJKDQDis the cause of ignorance. Hence, even though the non-cognition of 
duality is common to both SUƗMña and WXUƯ\D, only SUƗMña is considered to be the “seed” of 
ignorance and the cause of the superimposition of duality, whereas WXUƯ\D is neither of these.386
ĝUXWL as Apophatic Measure 
  
Several conclusions can be drawn from this juxtaposition. First, it is clear that the 
realization of nonduality depends upon more than simply the absence of duality. The removal of 
duality prepares one to perceive. Apophasis cultivates sensuality. Second, duality is an epistemic 
condition, since duality is absent when the mind is inattentive. Apophasis removes epistemic 
measures. Third, realization of nonduality must also be something epistemic, since nonduality is 
not realized when the mind is inattentive. Apophasis results in wakeful attentiveness. Fourth, one 
cannot realize Brahman without ĞUXWL7RLQVLVWDVĝDৄkara does, that 9HGƗQWD scriptures 
accomplish nothing more removing dualistic notions superimposed on the Self is not to say that 
the Self can be realized merely by removing dualistic notions.387
As framed in the opening pages of this thesis, the phrase “apophatic measure” is an idiom 
that turns upon itself, yielding a triad of meanings. ĝUXWL is an apophatic measure primarily in the 
first sense (p
 7KH³WUXWK´RIĝDৄkara’s 
advaita cannot be grasped without ĞUXWLĝDৄkara’s commentaries do not seek to replace the texts 
upon which he comments, but rather to prepare his reader for the event of hearing the ĞUXWL.  
3).388
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removed. It cultivates an attentive sensuality in order that one might perceive. Hearing ĞUXWL, 
superimposed measures are removed; the internal organ of perception awakens. Wakefully 
attending to ĞUXWL’s intentions, one begins to perceive.  
Double Negation in 7XUƯ\D  
They consider the fourth [to be]: Not conscious of internal things, not 
conscious of external things, not conscious of both (internal and external 
things), not a mass of consciousness, not conscious, not unconscious. 
Unseen, beyond the ordinary, ungrasped, undefined, unthought, not to be 
defined, whose essence is certainty of the one Self, tranquility of the 
manifold, pacified, auspicious, [and] non-dual.  
That is the Self; that is to be known. 
 –0Ɨ۬ڲǌN\D Upani܈ad 7 
The seventh verse of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad employs overwhelmingly negative 
language. With the exception of three words,389
113
 the entire verse describes the tXUƯ\D 
apophatically. As previously discussed (p ), words in kataphatic speech have different 
signifying intentions than do words in apophatic speech. To hear the text coordinately and 
harmoniously, without unison, dissonance, or contradiction, one must be wakefully attentive to 
these differing intentions. To demonstrate this, I focus on the word prajñƗQDJKDQD which, I 
argue, has a different signifying intention in MU 7 than it does in MU 5, discussed above. 
Devoid but not a Void 
Prima facie, na prajñƗQDJKDQD in MU 7 appears to simply negate the description of 
SUƗMña in MU 5. However, prajñƗQDJKDQD itself is a negation, as discussed above (p141). Na 
prajñƗQDJKDQD, therefore, is a negation of a negation. Understood as such, the pattern of the first 
sentence of MU 7 becomes clear: every possibility is negated. The tXUƯ\D is not conscious of the 
external world, not conscious of the internal world, not conscious of both the external world and 
the internal world, not conscious of neither the external world nor the internal world, not 
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consciousness itself, and not not consciousness itself. Whereas SUƗMña is described through 
simple negation, the most distinguishing aspect of 7XUƯ\D is double negation. 
ĝDৄkara introduces MU 7 as follows: 
Because it is devoid (ĞǌQ\DWYƗW) of (any) cause (governing) the introduction 
of any word, it cannot be signified by words. The tXUƯ\D desires to indicate it 
exclusively by means of the negation of distinctions.390
This statement is immediately followed by a SǌUYDSDN܈a, playing on the word ĞǌQ\D: If it is 
devoid (ĞǌQ\DP) of any cause governing the use of words, then it is merely a void (Ğǌnyam).
 
391
It is tempting to turn directly to ĝDৄkara’s response to this SǌUYDSDN܈in. To do so now, 
however, would risk missing the point altogether by allowing ĝDৄkara’s commentary to eclipse 
the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D text itself. Though I will return to his response later (p
 It 
cannot be named, suggests the SǌUYDSDN܈in, because it does not exist; it is an emptiness, an 
absence, a nil. If every possibility is negated, then “nothing” is left. 
175), it is nevertheless 
important to introduce the SǌUYDSDN܈in here.392
Not-Three Measures 
 ĝDৄkara wants his reader to reflect on the 
question. If all possibilities are negated in MU 7, with what is one left? Why is the tXUƯ\D not 
simply a nihilistic void? 
As we have seen (p140), there are considerable philological and conceptual similarities 
between MU 5 and BU 4.5. Likewise, there are also important parallels between MU 7 and BU 
                                                     
390
 MUBh 7: ֚ ᭅ֗֘᭣ֈᮧ֣֗֟ᱫ֟֊֟֐ᱫ֢֘᭠֑᭜֗֞ᱫ֑᭭ ֘᭣ֈ֞֊֟֏։֧֑᭜ ե֗ թ֟ֆ ֧֟֗֘֙ᮧ֟ֆ֧֙։֧֊ ձ֗ ռ ֆ֑֡֒֠ե ֟֊᳸ֈᳰֈᭃ֟ֆ ֿ 
Panoli, 327. 
391
 MUBh 7: ֢֘᭠֑֐֧֗ֆᳶ֛ֆֆ֭ֿ Panoli, 327.
392
 Like others in his tradition, ĝDৄNDUDprimarily employs the SǌUYDSDN܈Das a device to teach the reader how to 
think through hermeneutic issues. As is nearly always the case in ĝDৄNDUD’s writing, the SǌUYDSDN܈D, which might be 
translated “preliminary thesis,” is the superficial or prima facie viewpoint. Only very rarely does ĝDৄNDUD’s 
SǌUYDSDN܈LQ represent a real or imagined opponent. Far more often, the SǌUYDSDN܈LQ stands in place of ĝDৄNDUD’s 
reader, or perhaps in place of his student. 
152 
4.3. Taken together, I argue, the MU models the 9HGƗQWD practice of coordination. As such, each 
of the teachings must be understood in its original context. By coordinating these teachings, 
however, one removes misunderstandings, learning to hear the ĞUXWL teachings concordantly.  
In BU 4.3, King Janaka asks <ƗMñavalkya about the Self. <ƗMñavalkya explains that this 
person has just two states, plus a third, the state of sleep, which is a point of junction.393
It is like this. As a large fish moves between both banks, the nearer and the 
farther, so this person moves between both realms, the realm of dream and 
the realm where one is awake.
 His 
analogies portray the states as a steady continuum with two poles, rather than ontologically 
distinct states. For example, he likens the Self in its three states to a fish in a river:  
394
One moves back and forth between the waking and dream states just as a fish moves from one 
bank of a river to the other. The third state is not so much a state at all as it is a liminal boundary 
that measures dream and waking; it is a “place” (VWKƗQDP) that is neither this bank of the river 
nor that bank of the river.
 
395
 In isolation, MU 3-5 would appear to describe the YDLĞYƗQDUD
taijasa, and the SUƗMña as if they were three distinct states, the example of a fish in a river 
removes this misconception. Although they are distinct from one another from one perspective, 
the distinctions are merely provisional, for the sake of instruction.396
The pUƗMña is a non-state distinguished from the waking and dream states by its very 
liminality. It is an in-between state, like a fish between two banks. Defined by simple negation, it 
is neither pole: neither the waking nor the dream state. It is the fine line that delimits one pole 
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from the other, measuring both. By asserting the liminality of the SUƗMña as a fluid boundary 
which is neither pole, it becomes clear that the three states constitute three possible modes of 
being. By its very nature, the fish must be in one of the three places: near this bank, near that 
bank, or in the liminal middle. The analogy effectively shifts the focus away from the states 
themselves (which are now described as a single continuum) to the river, which represents the 
underlying unity and unchanging basis. Insofar as one exists as a fish in water, so-to-speak, one 
necessarily exists in one of these three states while nevertheless remaining distinct from those 
states.  
The analogy underscores my assertion that apophasis negates measures, not the measured 
(p118). Brahman-ƗWPDQ is “all this” (MU 1): not this bank, not that bank, and not the liminal 
middle that divides these two. While any given part of the river must fall under one of the three 
descriptions, the river itself is not any one of these three and, arguably, more than the sum of 
these taken together. By negating all three, one negates only the measures of the river, leaving 
one with an understanding of the river itself, distinct from these measures. Hence, the negation of 
the three measures does not leave one with a void. 
“I am that” 
ĝDৄkara draws upon this passage in his commentary on the first verse of GauঌDSƗGD’s 
.ƗULND. GauঌDSƗGD states: 
9LĞYD, who is conscious of external things, is all pervading. 
But Taijasa is conscious (only) of internal things, 
and 3UƗMña, likewise, is dense with consciousness. 
The One, alone, is remembered in (these) three ways.397
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ĝDৄkara explains that since the One Self dwells in succession in the three states, then its unity is 
distinguished from these states by remembering it as “I am that.”398
“This is seen in the ĞUXWL,” ĝDৄkara continues, “by the example of the great fish.”
 In other words, when a 
person is awake, he/she recognizes that the one who was dreaming, the one who was in deep 
sleep, and the one who is now awake is one and the same person. By remembering “I am that 
one” who was awake, dreaming, and sleeping, the unity of these three states is recognized.  
399
As above (p
 
Obviously, this is a reference to the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka passage discussed above. Hence, the 
negation of the three states in MU 7 serves the purpose of indicating that which is distinct from 
these states. The negation draws our attention to the fish in <ƗMñavalkya’s example. The negation 
of all three possible states does not leave us with a void, but instead draws our attention to 
something that is distinct from these.  
107), the ĞUXWL and guru can do nothing more than draw one’s attention 
towards what is to be seen. By negating the three states, one’s attention is drawn to the unity, 
distinct from those states, which is only realized when one remembers “I am that.” The objective 
knowledge, which can only be acquired by ĞUXWL, must be subjectively intuited (p143).400
326
 It arises 
when the student hears the ĞUXWL uttered by a teacher directly and particularly: “Thou art that” 
(p ). 
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Incarnate Witness 
ĝDৄkara, following GauঌDSƗGD, emphasizes that all three states of consciousness are 
actually experienced in the waking state itself.401
9LĞYD is in the opening of the right eye, 
but Taijasa is inside the mind, 
and 3UƗMña is in the cave of the heart. 
He dwells in the body in these three ways.
 Instead of the word “YDLĞYƗQDUD,” ĝDৄkara uses 
the word “MƗJDULWD,” implying one who is not only awake, but is especially attentive and 
watchful. Moreover, the One Self is experienced by one who is fully awake because the Self 
dwells in these three ways in the body: 
402
In his lengthy commentary on this verse, ĝDৄkara draws from a wide range of scriptural sources, 
including *ƯWƗ XIII.2 (“And know Me as the Kৢetrajña in all bodies”), *ƯWƗ XIII.16 (“Undivided, 
yet remaining as though divided among beings”), and &KƗQGRJ\D IV.3.3 (“Breath indeed absorbs 
all these.”) GauঌDSƗGD’s text becomes a model of upasaۨKƗUD. The four SƗGDs of the ĞORND 
concisely map the four SƗGDV of the Self described in 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D 2-7. Each of the four quarters of 
the verse carries with it a wide range of scriptural teachings, coordinating them in a new context. 
It does not synthesize them or reduce them to a unison; it enfolds diverse teachings, coordinately, 
so that they might be heard, concordantly. 
 
Likewise, because ĝDৄkara introduces this ĞORND by drawing from <ƗMñavalkya’s analogy 
of the river, we gain another insight into the methods and purpose of negation. In BU 4.3.18, the 
Self is compared to a fish swimming across three portions of a river. Here, too, the Self is said to 
dwell in three locations in the body. Negating the three portions of a river does not negate the 
river but instead draws our attention to the river as a whole. In the same way, negating the three 
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locations in the body does not negate the body, but instead draws our attention to the body as a 
whole—which is more than the sum of its parts. The fish can live in any of the three portions of 
the river or can swim back and forth across them, but the inherent nature of the fish is such that it 
must live in the river. Likewise, the Seer of Sight can see with the eye, see with the mind, or 
withdraw into the breath without sight, but the very nature of the Self is such that it dwells in the 
body in these three ways.  
The negation of the three states leads one to see that the Self is distinct from these, but it 
does so in a manner that does not negate the necessary conditions for the manifestation of the 
Self. Just as the fish is distinct from the river, the Self is distinct from the body. And yet, in order 
to know the Self, one must become a knower of the field (k܈etrajña) by which the Self is 
conditioned. Thus, ĝDৄkara quotes Lord K৚ৢ৆a: “Know Me as the “field-knower” in all 
bodies.”403
Not-two is not one.
 
404
 The fish and river are distinct from one another; they are not one. 
But due to the inherent nature of the fish with respect to the river, neither are they two. Likewise, 
the Witness is not the body; the VƗN܈in and the body are not one. However, due to the inherent 
nature of the Self which is “the field-knower in all bodies” and is “Undivided, yet remaining as 
though divided among beings,” neither are they two.405
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 MUBh 1.2, Panoli 317, quoting BG XIII.2. 
 Therefore, the negations in MU 7 do not 
leave one with a void, nor do they leave one with a monistic, disembodied, idealistic “self.” 
Rather, the negations intend to indicate that which is non-dual: the incarnate Witness, the 
enfleshed Self.  
404
 Rambachan (2015). 
405
 MKBh 1.2, Panoli 317, quoting BG XIII.2 and BG XIII.16, respectively. 
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Ecstatic Bodies 
Similarly, by applying the method of coordination, we arrive at a different understanding 
of na prajñƗQDJKDQD. Earlier (p140), the notion of prajñƗQDJKDQD in MU 5 was coordinated 
with BU IV.5.13 and BU II.4.12. Here, however, na prajñƗQDJKDQDin MU 7 is coordinated with 
<ƗMñavalkya’s teachings in BU IV.3.21, leading to a very different interpretation of the 
description “not conscious of inside or outside.”406
113
 Prima facie, the phrase stands in opposition 
to the YDLĞYƗQDUD which is conscious of external things and the taijasa, which is conscious of 
internal things. However, words in kataphatic speech have different signifying intentions than do 
words in apophatic speech, as we have seen (p ).407
In fact, the same negation implies something quite different in the context of BU IV.3.21 
than it does in either BU IV.5.13 or BU II.4.12. In BU IV.5.13, for example, it referred to a lump 
of salt as a lump of flavor “without inside or outside” (p
 
141). Here, however, <ƗMñavalkya 
compares the Self to a man embraced by a woman he loves such that “he knows neither inside 
nor outside.”408
Na prajñƗQDJKDQD in MU 7 constitutes a negation of negation. It does not simply “undo” 
the previous negation; it points to something beyond the simple negation. In the SUƗMña and 
WXUƯ\D states alike, one knows “neither inside nor outside,” and yet these words intend a very 
different meaning in the WXUƯ\D. One is not merely a “lump of consciousness.” One is in ecstasy.  
 Rather than a cognitive negation prompted by an inattentive mind, as in the 
SUƗMña, the absence of particularized cognition in this case is due to ecstasy.  
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 If this were not the case, then the initial SǌUYDSDN܈D in MUBh 7 would be upheld. As previously discussed 
(p115), if the negation in MU 7 merely differentiates it from the other three SƗGDs, then the negation would be 
pointless, since the fourth would be deemed different that the other three simply by virtue of being the fourth.  
408
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The 7XUƯ\D as Apophatic Measure 
For the man embraced by the woman he loves, “inside” and “outside” have not been 
dissolved (pravilaya). Rather, the distinctions between inside and outside have been dissolved. 
The signified referents remain, but the measures no longer entail. In this powerfully embodied 
and even erotic analogy, the man and the woman do not become “one,” but they cease to be 
“two.” They are experienced as not-two (advaita). Hence, as a double negation, na 
prajñƗQDJKDQD does not result in a nihilistic void, but points towards a new and different 
experience which, insofar as it is ecstatic, cannot be expressed by words. 
ĝUXWL is an apophatic measure primarily in the first sense intended by that phrase, as 
discussed above (p149). ĝUXWL is a measure by which cognitive/linguistic measures are removed, 
thereby enabling one to perceive. The WXUƯ\D is an apophatic measure primarily in the second 
sense (p4). It is, as ĝDৄkara describes it (p122), “the thing attained” rather than an “instrumental 
means.”409
Measuring Brahman  
 It is an attentive—or even ecstatic—sensuality that cannot be expressed by words. To 
perceive Brahman is not to perceive something “other worldly,” but rather to perceive “all this,” 
coordinately and concordantly, beyond linguistic measure: an inexpressible sensuality. 
Apophasis and Sensuality: Vision of Brahman  
The SUƗMña state lacks perception and thus lacks discernment (aviveka) between 
particular phenomena, as the previous section has demonstrated (p145). The WXUƯ\D, however, is 
“always the all-seer” (sarvad܀NVDGƗ),410
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 the incarnate Witness who is fully awake, watchful, and 
410
 MKBh 1.12: “Because of the nonexistence of that which is other than 7XUƯ\D, 7XUƯ\D is always the seer of all that 
which exists eternally. “All-seer” means seer of that which is everything (that exists eternally). For that very reason, 
the seed characterized by the non-apprehension of truth is not there (in 7XUƯ\D). Also, for this very reason, there is 
the nonexistence of apprehending wrongly which is born from that [i.e., nonapprehension of the truth]; [similarly,] 
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attentive (p155). If the WXUƯ\D is a state of awakened and attentive sensuality, how does it differ 
from everyday perception? How does vision in the WXUƯ\D differ from vision in the YDLĞYƗQDUD? If 
it is a vision devoid of particularity and distinction, wherein everything is seen to be Brahman 
but no-thing is seen in particular, then the foregoing conclusions regarding the difference 
between SUƗMña and WXUƯ\D crumble. If it is a vision of particular entities characterized by 
discrimination (viveka) of one thing from another, then the differences between SUƗMña and WXUƯ\D 
are maintained, but the differences between WXUƯ\D and YDLĞYƗQDUD require clarification.  
In fact, ĝDৄkara devotes most of his commentary on the latter three prakara۬as of the 
.ƗULND to the distinctions between the WXUƯ\D and the YDLĞYƗQDUD states, whereas the first 
prakara۬a is primarily devoted to distinguishing the WXUƯ\D from the SUƗMña states (p77). If the 
“vision of Brahman” (subjective genitive) is characterized by discrimination (viveka) and 
perception of particular phenomena, then the negation of measures must also culminate in a 
“vision of Brahman” (objective genitive). As discussed later (p171), the highest Self is able to be 
seen by one who has heard the meaning of 9HGƗQWD ĞUXWL; only such a ĞURWUL\Dcan truly give 
voice to the ĞUXWL and utter to a student, tattvamasi, “Thou art that.”411
                                                                                                                                                                           
the sun, which is ever luminous by nature, certainly does not become nonluminous or luminous in some other way 
which is contrary to that (nature). Thus it is said in the ĞUXWL: ‘The seer’s sight is never lost.’” 
 That is not to say, of 
course, that one sees Brahman in the way that one sees things in YDLĞYƗQDUD. If that were the 
case, then Advaita 9HGƗQWD would lose all purpose. Nevertheless, even in everyday speech, one 
is able to say, for example, “I have seen the Periyar River,” even without having seen every inch 
and every drop of it in all of its various states of change. One who has seen a small measure of its 
multiplicity at one moment in time is able to say, “I have seen something, and what I have seen 
is the Periyar.” With the aim of distinguishing “vision” in the YDLĞYƗQDUDfrom “vision” in the 
411
 MKBh 2.35. 
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WXUƯ\D, the next section clarifies the notion of “measuring” in the MKBh, focused especially on 
the third unit of the MU (MU 8-12). 
0ƗWUƗ0HDVXULQJWKH Infinite Cosmos (MUBh 8-12) 
Coordinating Measures 
With respect to the syllables, AUM is this Self. With respect to the 
measures, the quarters are the measures and the measures are the quarters:  
“A”, “U”, [and] “M”. 
–0Ɨ۬ڲǌN\D Upani܈ad 8 
As discussed earlier (p63), the MU’s three movements model upasaۨKƗUD on both the 
micro and macro levels. The first movement coordinates teachings on AUM, drawn especially 
from the &KƗQGRJ\D Upaniৢad. The second movement coordinates teachings on the Self, draws 
from the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad. As evident in the epigraph above, the third movement 
coordinates the first two, enabling one to hear diverse ĞUXWL teachings harmoniously, without 
reducing particularity to unison.412
The subsequent three verses model upasaۨKƗUD by mapping the letters “A”, “U”, and 
“M” to the three states of experience, the 9DLĞYƗQDUDthe Taijasa, and the 3UƗMña.
 
413
 Through 
coordination, the catu܈SƗWteachings are (re)interpreted cosmologically. Recall that MU 1 
describes AUM cosmologically as “all that was, is, and shall be.”414 The creation of the universe 
is associated with “A” and the YDLĞYƗQDUD (MU 9) and the destruction or absorption of the 
universe is associated with “M” and the SUƗMña (MU 11).415
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 Cf. Clooney (1993), 65, previously cited (p
  
113): “[T]he various texts really do count, and one cannot conflate 
them into a single theoretical account: one cannot simply compile all the qualities of Brahman, wherever mentioned, 
into a single whole.” 
413
 See the full text on p59. 
414
 See the full text on p59. 
415
 This reading is consistent with ĝDৄNDUD’s comments in MUBh 11. 
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Here again, by associating these with measures and measuring, the MU interprets 
cosmology epistemologically. While the measures remain ontically distinct from one another, 
their ontological alterity is reduced to epistemic measures. As we have seen with 
SǌUYDSǌUYDSUDYLOƗSDQD(p125) and also with prajñƗQDJKDQD (p141), cosmological multiplicity 
is translated into epistemic terms. The universe is not an infinite plurality of ontologically 
distinct entities or atoms, but only appears as such to one who has not heard the ĞUXWL. For one 
who is wakefully attentive, pluralistic measures are dissolved (prapañcapravilaya, p107), but not 
that which they measure. Ontic distinctions are perceived as cosmic multiplicity: the unfolding of 
AUM (p109) is heard, harmoniously, by the incarnate Witness (p155). 
Apophatic Measurer 
According to MU 11, the one who knows the SUƗMña “truly measures all this.” 
3UƗMña, whose place is the state of deep sleep, is the third measure, “m”, [so 
named] because of measuring (miti) or merging (DSƯWL). One who knows this 
verily measures (minoti) all this and becomes its mergence. (MU 11) 
As ĝDৄkara explains, the cosmological cycle of origin and destruction begins and ends in 
SUƗMña.416
143
 Since one who knows the SUƗMña is simultaneously the “mergence” and the “one who 
measures,” then it is understood to be both the seed of all ignorance and the liminal “door” to 
realizing the Self, as discussed earlier (p ). The illusion of cosmological plurality is 
interpreted epistemologically in terms of measuring. Ignorance is the superimposition of 
measures upon the measured (p105). By removing the veil of ignorance, what was seen as 
plurality is perceived as non-dual multiplicity. 
By removing this veil of ignorance, the cosmo-epistemological cycles of creation and 
dissolution, of birth and death, and of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep are broken. Removing 
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all superimposed measures, one realizes oneself to be the “one who truly measures all this.” 
Hearing ĞUXWL as an apophatic measure, one awakens to “the Fourth” and realizes oneself to be 
the measurer without measure: 
The Fourth is without measure, beyond the ordinary, the tranquility of the 
manifold, auspicious, [and] non-dual. Thus, AUM is indeed the Self. One 
who knows this enters the Self by the Self. (MU 12) 
In MU 9-11, the three periods of time are described as measures. In MU 12 that which 
transcends these three periods of time is said to be devoid of measure (DPƗWUD). The non-dual 
Self is devoid of measure because it is the Measurer, but is known by its measures for that very 
reason. To realize one’s very Self as the Measurer, one must first understand each of the 
measures in their own right. One must know the measures kataphatically, distinguishing one 
measure from another, one quarter from another. Each quarter marks a limitation or delineation 
of the non-dual Self. Having understood these delineations, one is gradually able to understand 
that which they delineate without obviating their particular distinctions. Harmony is not unison 
(p118). One learns to hear, concordantly, without reducing multiplicity to oneness. Analogously, 
one learns “clay” to be distinct from its measures (pot, lump, etc.) by negating its measures (not a 
pot, not a lump, etc.) without obviating those distinctions (e.g., a pot is not a lump, a lump is not 
a pot). One hears AUM unfold as “the entire manifold of speech” (p109). “AUM is indeed the 
Self” (MU 12). 
Through progressive dissolution, one becomes wakefully attentive to the non-dual Self 
which is the foundation of all measures. The non-dual Self is that which is measured by these 
measures because, explains ĝDৄkara, the non-dual Self is the knower who measures all that is 
known and, thus, measures the true nature of all things in the world.417
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cycle is broken when one realizes that the true nature of the non-dual Self is measured by the 
three states because it is the Measurer thereof. The non-dual Fourth, the “tranquility of the 
manifold,” is without measure (DPƗWUD) because it exists nondually as both the Measurer and the 
measured. Thus, the MU concludes: “One who knows this enters the Self by the Self.” 
Infinite Measure without Measure 
What does it mean to “enter the Self by the Self”? If the Self is the Measurer devoid of 
measure, then in what sense are the measures “its” measures?418
AUM is to be known quarter-by-quarter. The quarters are the measures, no 
doubt. Knowing AUM quarter-by-quarter, one should not think of anything 
else.
 Unlike the MU, both ĝDৄkara 
and GauঌDSƗGD distinguish between the “Higher Brahman” and the “Lower Brahman.” In doing 
so, they assert that from one perspective, Brahman is beyond measure (DPƗWUD), but from another 
perspective Brahman is possessed of infinite measure (DQDQWDPƗWUD). Reflecting upon MU 12, 
GauঌDSƗGD explains:  
419
GauঌDSƗGD explains that AUM is regarded/remembered (sm܀taۊ) as both the higher Brahman 
and the lower Brahman, the beginning, middle, and end of everything that exists, and the Lord 
established in hearts of all.
 
420
 According to Richard King, GauঌDSƗGD only considers something 
to be “real” if it exists in the beginning, middle, and end. Anything transitory is considered to be 
unreal or “false.”421
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 Credit goes to Francis Clooney for posing this Sǌrvapak܈LQ. 
 While this is clearly the case for the author of prakara۬as 2-4, I argue that it 
is not the case for the author of the first prakara۬a. Regardless, it is certainly not true for 
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 MK 1.26-28. 
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 King, 147. Citing MK 2.6: “That which does not exist in the beginning and end is also likewise in the present. 
Being accompanied by false things, they are regarding as if not-false.” 
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ĝDৄkara, as discussed below. Having distinguished between the higher and lower Brahman, the 
author of the first prakara۬a explains that one comes to know the transcendent by knowing the 
immanent or “non-transcendent” quarter-by-quarter, measure-by-measure.  
GauঌDSƗGD then concludes the first prakara৆a: 
Only that person is a sage by whom AUM is known as auspicious, the 
quelling of duality, and the infinite measure without measure.422
AUM, having been known by its measures of “A”, “U”, and “M”, is heard as both the infinite or 
endless measure (DQDQWDPƗWUD) and that without measure (DPƗWUD). GauঌDSƗGD thus equates the 
transcendent Brahman with the measureless AUM/ƖWPDQ; conversely, he equates the immanent 
Brahman with AUM/ƖWPDQ possessing infinite measure. The kataphatic descriptions in MU 3-5 
and MU 9-11 apply to the immanent Brahman. These words intend to signify the immanent 
Brahman in its infinite particularity. Brahman is “all this” (MU 2), all particulars.  
 
This is possible because words are not “made up.” Language is not a human technology 
(apauru܈eya). Words are eternally connected to universals and particulars. They simultaneously 
signify both universals and particulars, according to the speaker’s intention (p110). Hence, Vedic 
words truly and reliably measure Brahman through kataphatic speech because words signify 
(i.e., are eternally connected with) particular phenomena and Brahman is “all this.” 
The words of apophatic speech, however, have different signifying intentions, as we have 
seen (p113). When these measures are negated, one comes to understand the immanent Brahman 
as that which is measured by these measures because Brahman is possessed of infinite measure. 
Likewise, a river is known by its measures and their subsequent negation (p151). Apophasis 
negates measures, not that which is measured (p118). Measure-by-measure, one comes to know 
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the immanent Brahman, “all this,” possessed of infinite measure (DQDQWDPƗWUD). Subsequently, 
one comes to know the transcendent Brahman, the highest Self that is beyond measure (DPƗWUD) 
because it measures “all this.” The transcendent Brahman is devoid of measure simply because 
this one is the non-dual knower who measures (minoti) all measures—which measure Brahman 
as “all this,” the multiplicity of particular phenomena sensually perceived.  
Brahman as Apophatic Measure 
Brahman is an apophatic measure. This idiom, as I have introduced it (p3), yields a triad 
of meanings which fold into and out of one another. As an “infinite measure without measure” 
that is known “measure-by-measure,” Brahman—as signifier and signified—performs this triadic 
unfolding. Because Brahman is known kataphatically (measure-by-measure) and apophatically 
(through progressive dissolution), it is an apophatic measure in the first sense that I have used 
this phrase. It is a theological method of inquiry which must be practiced. One must prepare for 
the event of hearing Brahman, harmoniously, by first learning how to read, coordinately. 
Brahman qua word has different signifying intentions in kataphatic speech than in apophatic 
speech (p113). Practicing upasaۨKƗUD, one gradually awakens, growing ever attentive to 
Brahman’s signifying intentions. One thus measures the immanent Brahman, possessed of 
infinite measure. 
The great saying (PDKƗYƗN\D) in MU 2 is not tautological: “This Self is Brahman.” 
Learning Brahman, (measure-by-measure and through progressive dissolution), one awakens to 
realize “I am that” (p153), the incarnate Witness (p155) who “measures all this” (MU 11). One 
awakens to a sensuality that is beyond measure precisely because it is a sensuality that measures. 
Realizing “I am that,” one awakens to sensuality as an apophatic measure in the second sense of 
the phrase: an unspeakable measure. Like a man embraced by the woman he loves, ecstatic 
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bodies experience a sensuality that knows neither inside nor outside (p157). In this sensual 
ecstasy beyond words, two persons do not become one, but neither are they two. They are not-
two (advaita). 
In this sensuality, which should not be reduced to “only” ecstatic experience, one 
perceives particular phenomena and discriminates one thing from another (viveka). “All this” 
does not become “one.” Pratyak܈a SUDPƗ۬a requires words for linguistic cognition (p104). This 
must be true for the true Self (the incarnate Witness, the Seer of sight), just as it is for everyday 
perception in the YDLĞYƗQDUD state. And yet, there is certainly a difference between these modes 
of being sensually. One ceases to superimpose universals (mere conceptual modifications of 
AUM, p113) upon particulars (p105). Learning that one is the Measure who measures Brahman 
measure-by-measure, one does not cease to perceive. If one ceased measuring upon learning that 
one is the Measurer, then one would, obviously, no longer be the Measurer. The difference in 
this awakened, attentive sensuality, therefore, is this: While measuring (sensually, perceptually), 
one is attentive to the fact that what one measures is Brahman. One still cognizes particulars 
linguistically and conceptually, but one ceases to superimpose mere concepts upon the 
multiplicity of particulars. To do so would reduce the irreducible particularity of “All This” to a 
mere “All.”  
This mode of being sensually leads us, then, to the third interconnected meaning of the 
phrase “apophatic measure.” Brahman is not merely “All.” Like AUM, Brahman is “All This” 
(sarvam idam). The twelve verses of the MU see fit to repeat the phrase thrice: “AUM is all this” 
(MU 1), “All this is certainly Brahman” (MU 2), “One who knows this verily measures all this” 
(MU 11). Awakening to this attentive sensuality leads us, finally, to an indexical that points, 
inexorably, towards particularity: this. Attending to the indexical intentions of this “this” (which, 
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for ĝDৄkara, points to a thou and should be accompanied by a gesture), we turn next to perceive 
through the apophatic measure, towards this theology of irreducible particularity. 
Apophatic Measure  
The previous sections of this chapter have examined the relationship between perception 
and scriptural apophasis and the relationship between perception and measuring. As I have 
shown, even though the SUƗMña knows all and is characterized by an absence of duality, it is 
distinguished from the WXUƯ\D on the grounds that it lacks perception and lacks discrimination 
between particulars (aviveka, p145). However, one certainly sees, hears, tastes, smells, and 
touches in the YDLĞYƗQDUDstate, and one discriminates between particulars and, thus, is skilled in 
discrimination (viveka). If sense-perception is never wrong (p104), then how ought one to 
distinguish between sensuality in the YDLĞYƗQDUD state and sensuality in the WXUƯ\D state? What 
might it mean to perceive particulars and discriminate between them in a manner that neither 
measures nor conceptualizes? In other words, what is the nature of perceiving by means of the 
apophatic measure? What does one perceive and how? 
I examine these questions below in light of ĝDৄkara’s commentary on the MKBh. I begin 
with his assertion that the highest Self is able to be seen by one who has grasped the supreme 
meaning of the 9HGƗQWD scriptures. ĝUXWL enables perception. One “measures” (linguistically and 
cognitively) in both the YDLĞYƗQDUDstate and the WXUƯ\D state, but in the latter, one is aware that 
one is measuring and thus does not superimpose cognitive-linguistic measures upon the 
measured. One perceives particular phenomena as ontically distinct visible effects of the Self, 
which is the unseen, transcendental cause, ontologically non-different than those effects. In light 
of this, I then return to ĝDৄkara’s statement that the WXUƯ\D is devoid of any basis governing the 
usage of any word, introduced earlier (p150).  
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Concluding Part One of the dissertation, I then contextualize these assertions, situating 
them within the conclusions established earlier. By learning to read the MU coordinately, one 
hears the ĞUXWL harmoniously (p75): In the wakeful attentiveness of the WXUƯ\D state, one realizes 
“I am that” Self (the Measurer, p161) who perceives particular phenomena as unique measures 
of Brahman (Infinite Measure, p163), linguistically cognizing these with words that are 
understood to be measures of AUM (the entire manifold of speech, p116). Hearing the three 
movements of the MU, concordantly, one grasps the apophatic measure in its trifold meaning: It 
is (1) a method of progressively dissolving universal measures in order to (2) perceive particular 
phenomena as (3) distinct, immanent manifestations of ultimate, transcendent reality. One 
perceives Brahman, indexically, as “All This.” In the last chapter (p321), I return to this topic, 
comparatively, to illustrate the embodied, pedagogical significance of perception in ĝDৄkara’s 
apophatic theological method.  
ĝUXWL enables Perception 
GauঌDSƗGD states: 
There is no cessation and no beginning,  
none bound and no means [to unbind], 
none desirous of liberation and certainly none liberated. 
This is the ultimate truth.423
In his commentary on this striking verse, ĝDৄkara states that duality is nothing more than a 
mental conception and is, therefore, nonexistent.
 
424
                                                     
423
 MK 2.32. 
 A SǌUYDSDN܈in then objects: if duality is 
nonexistent, then the scriptures must also be nonexistent since the “operations of scripture” 
424
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belong to the sphere of duality and not to nonduality.425 Furthermore, the SǌUYDSDN܈in continues, 
if the scriptures are nonexistent, then there are no valid means by which to know the quiddity of 
nonduality. If that is the case, then the nihilist position is proven.426
ĝDৄkara responds at length to this important objection. He begins by repeating an 
argument employed several times in the EKƗ܈ya.
 
427
… as an unimagined thing, even before the dawn of knowledge of the non-
existence of the snake… Further, the existence of the agent of imagination 
should be admitted to be antecedent to the imagination. Hence, it is 
unreasonable to hold that the agent (of imagination) is unreal.
 Even though a snake, which does not exist, 
may be superimposed upon a rope, this is only possible because the rope actually exists: 
428
ĝDৄkara explains duality by drawing upon ĝDEDUD¶Vepistemology of perception. Since the buddhi 
takes the form the external object, which is its basis (p
 
103), then the even the mistaken cognition 
of a snake has a real object as its substratum. Neither the reality of perceived particulars, nor the 
reality of the perceiver is to be doubted. Rather, the obstruction of the perceiver’s perception due 
to linguistic conceptualization is to be removed (p105). When the dualistic conception of the 
rope is removed, that does not mean that the rope itself, which is the very basis of the false 
cognition ceases to exist. If it did not ontically exist, then perception itself would cease to be a 
SUDPƗ۬a. Perception, however, is never wrong (p104). This point is not even open for debate, as 
far as ĝDৄkara is concerned. At issue is the second moment of perception: the manner in which 
the buddhi is grasped by the internal organ of perception (p103). When the idea of the snake, 
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which is superimposed upon the buddhi, is removed, the buddhi, which has taken the form of the 
rope, is truly grasped (p106). Although the rope was “seen” by the eye, it was not perceived until 
the superimposition of the “snake” upon the buddhi was removed.  
Hence, the rope actually exists and is never sublated. The perceiver exists and is never 
disproven. Only the cognition of the nonexistent snake is sublated. The technical mechanics of 
the analogy are highly pertinent: Knowledge of the non-existence of the snake dissolves the 
conception of the snake, thereby enabling the perception of the rope. Hence, knowledge 
functions apophatically, enabling perception.  
As we saw earlier with the pot-darkness analogy (p146), knowledge of the pot is not the 
result of the SUDPƗ۬a that removes darkness. It is critical to distinguish between knowledge from 
two different valid sources. ĝUXWL is an apophatic measure: scriptural knowledge removes 
ignorance, thereby enabling perception. Both ĞUXWL and pratyak܈a yield true and reliable 
knowledge, but they having different roles and yield different kinds of knowledge. 
The role of scripture, ĝDৄkara explains, is not to reveal the Self because the Self is self-
evident. ĝUXWL enlightens us as to what is not already known and cannot be known by any other 
means of knowledge.429 Although the Self is seen, it is not perceived due to conceptions which 
are superimposed upon it.430 Since the goal of scripture is the realization of the non-dual Self, 
then it serves its purpose by removing conceptions superimposed on the Self.431 Although these 
conceptions are unreal, the non-dual Self is the substratum of those conceptions.432
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the rope has been seen all along by the eye and buddhi, it is not perceived by the antaۊkara۬a 
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due to superimposition of the snake upon the buddhi. When this erroneous cognition is removed, 
the rope is perceived. Analogously, even though the non-dual Self is seen all along, universals 
are superimposed upon the buddhi which takes the form of particulars. When this erroneous 
cognition is removed, the non-dual Self is perceived. 
Self is Able to be Perceived 
A few verses later, GauঌDSƗGD states: 
By the wise ones who know the Veda thoroughly, who are free from desire, 
fear, and anger, this one which is non-dual is perceived, devoid of all 
conception (nirvikalpa), having quelled all plurality.433
ĝDৄkara comments that the Supreme Self is able to be perceived only by those wise renunciates 
who are completely devoted to the meaning of 9HGƗQWD, not by logicians or others.
 
434
 The 
transcendent Brahman, he explains, is the non-dual Self that is unborn, perceptible, and before 
one’s very eyes.435
113
 When one is completely devoted to the 9HGƗQWD scriptures, having heard the 
ĞUXWL harmoniously, then all obstacles impeding perception of the Self will be progressively 
dissolved. Only from scripture does one learn the measures of Brahman (kataphasis) and only 
through scripture are these measures removed (apophasis), provided one attends to ĞUXWL’s 
differing intentions in kataphatic and apophatic speech (p ). When these measures have been 
known and dissolved, scripture has fulfilled its purpose. The highest Self, which is non-dual, 
unborn, perceptible, and before one’s very eyes is able to be perceived.  
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By responding in this way to the SǌUYDSDN܈in’s objection that the “operations of 
scripture” belong to the sphere of duality and not to nonduality, ĝDৄkara demonstrates what he 
later states directly: The means do not have the same reality as the end itself.436 While the 
scripture is utterly indispensable, it remains, nevertheless, a means to an end. Scripture removes 
all conceptions superimposed on the Self, but the reality of the Self shows itself by itself.437 As 
GauঌDSƗGD states in the passage above: “this one which is non-dual is seen, devoid of all 
conception (nirvikalpa).”438
All conceptions of reality are approximations in that they attempt to define 
the infinite in terms of finite categories. For the advaitin, then, all views are 
partial apprehensions of Brahman… Dualistic experience is an inevitable 
result of any attempt to conceptualize (vikalpa) reality.
 As Richard King explains well: 
439
The means and the end do not have the same reality.
  
440
 Apophasis negates all measures (all 
conceptions), not that which they measured, in order that the measured can be perceived as it is. 
“All this is certainly Brahman” (MU 2). By one who has heard the ĞUXWL, coordinately and 
harmoniously, “the Supreme Self is able to be seen.”441
Phenomenology of Cause and Effect  
 
ĝUXWL enables us to perceive that “all this” is Brahman. But what does it mean to perceive 
“this” or “that” particular phenomena as Brahman? In the third prakara۬a, ĝDৄkara distinguishes 
                                                     
436
 MKBh 3.26. See also BUBh II.1.20. 
437
 Ibid. See also MU 12, “one enters the Self by the Self” (p156). Likewise, this might be compared to Heidegger’s 
definition of phenomenology. See p266 below. 
438
 MK 2.35. 
439
 King, 300, note 140.  
440
 As John Taber explains: “It is a basic tenet of 0ƯPƗূVƗ (and all other realist schools of Indian philosophy) that 
means and end must always be distinct—an axe used to fell a tree is one thing, the felling of the tree another; to 
VXJJHVWWKDWWKH\FRXOGEHLGHQWLFDO>DV'LJQƗJDDQGRWKHU0ƗGK\DPDND Buddhists do] is absurd.” Taber (2005), 79. 
441
 MKBh 2.35. 
173 
between the Self as cause and the Self as effect. Even though the Self qua cause is not perceived, 
it is perceived qua effect.442 While his argument is lengthy and technical, it is consistent with 
views held by others in the 0ƯPƗূVƗ tradition. To understanding the important relationship 
between cause and effect as these directly relate to the SUDPƗ۬a of perception, it is helpful to 
consider a far simpler analogy offered by .XPƗULOD Bha৬৬a in his ĝORNDYƗUWWLND 443 His argument 
is thoroughly and compellingly phenomenological.444
How does one know that milk is the cause of curd? .XPƗULOD explains that when one 
perceives milk, one does not perceive curd. Later, one perceives curd and perceives the 
nonexistence of the milk, concluding that milk is the material cause of curd. Especially pertinent 
to my argument is the epistemic basis for this conclusion which, .XPƗULOD insists, is not rooted in 
inductive reasoning but in perception itself. At the time milk is perceived, it is not the cause of 
curd, since the curd does not exist at that time. The milk only becomes the cause of the curd at 
the time that the milk ceases to ontically exist qua milk. However, .XPƗULOD reasons, even 
though the milk is perceived to be “nonexistent” when the curd is perceived, it would be absurd 
to consider the milk to be a nonentity since something existent cannot be caused by something 
nonexistent. Something cannot emerge from nothing.
 
445
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 And yet, in order for the effect to 
ontically come into being, the material cause must ontically cease to be. Hence, the milk 
ontologically exists as “cause” only at that time when it is ontically nonexistent. .XPƗULOD 
443
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concludes, “Therefore Negation must be an entity. For what is the negation of an effect, other 
than the existence (continuance) of the cause?”446
Self as Apophatic Measure 
 
Similarly, ĝDৄkara insists that particular phenomena are grasped as effects of the Self. In 
doing so, he underscores the ontological nonduality of all particulars (“All This”) without 
undermining, in any way, the ontic distinctions between particulars. In fact, by emphasizing that 
the WXUƯ\D perceives and discriminates between particular phenomena whereas the SUƗMña does 
not, he accentuates the fact that perceiving irreducible particularity is intrinsic to perceiving “all 
this” as effects of the Self. Because we see that milk and curd are ontically distinct from one 
another, we perceive curd to be an ontologically non-different effect of milk at the very moment 
that we perceive milk to be ontically nonexistent. Moreover, by emphasizing that one fails to 
perceive particulars in the YDLĞYƗQDUD (due to the superimposition of universals) but one 
perceives particular phenomena discriminately in the WXUƯ\D state (due to apophasis), ĝDৄkara 
demonstrates that an awakened soul is one who perceives particular entities just as they are, 
without reducing phenomena to any of the six universals signified by words (p98, p177).447 By 
negating all measures, ĞUXWL awakens its hearer to perceive each and every particular as a real 
effect of the Self, ontologically nondifferent from their transcendental, but unseen, cause. 
Therefore, “by the wise ones who know the Veda thoroughly,” having progressively dissolved 
all taxonomic measures, the highest Self is able to be seen qua cause manifested in and as 
effect.448
                                                     
446
 .XPƗULOD, ĝORNDYƗUWLND, 244. 
  
447
 Name (QƗPD), form (UǌSD), class (MƗWL), quality (gu۬D), relation (sambandhaۊ), and action (NUL\Ɨ). 
448
 MK and MKBh 2.35. 
175 
Therefore, the Self is an apophatic measure in the third sense of this phrase (p4). The Self 
is not simply “all this” but also every “this.” Like .XPƗULOD’s milk-curd analogy, the Self 
ontologically exists as transcendental cause only and precisely because it ontically exists as 
particular phenomena, each of which is its effect. The Self qua cause is perceptibly manifest as 
each and every phenomena (each and every “this”), which are ontically distinct effects 
ontologically indistinct from their transcendent cause.  
Unable to be named (anabhidheyatvaۨ)  
If the highest Self is able to be seen, why is it that it cannot be named? As cited earlier 
(p150), ĝDৄkara introduces MU 7 as follows: 
Because it is devoid (ĞǌQ\DWYƗW) of (any) cause (governing) the introduction 
of any word, it cannot be signified by words (ĞDEGƗnabhidheyatvaۨ). The 
tXUƯya desires to indicate it exclusively by means of the negation of 
distinctions.449
As also noted, this statement is immediately followed by a SǌUYDSDN܈a, playing on the word 
ĞǌQ\D: If it is devoid (ĞǌQ\DP) of any cause/basis governing the use of words, then it is merely a 
void (ĞǌQ\DP).
 
450
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 I cited this passage earlier to distinguish, as ĝDৄkara does, between nihilism 
and apophasis. I did not, at that time, discuss his response to the SǌUYDSDN܈a. I do so now in 
order to clarify, from ĝDৄkara’s perspective, how it can be that the highest Self is able to be seen, 
and yet unable to be named. This is pertinent to my thesis for two interrelated reasons. First, it 
enables us to clearly distinguish between everyday sensuality in the vaisavanara state and 
wakeful, attentive sensuality in the WXUƯ\D. Second, it explains why I refer to irreducibly 
particular phenomena with the phrase “apophatic measures.” Brahman—“all this”—is not the 
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universal of all universals, but the particularity of all particulars. For that very reason, each and 
every “this” measures Brahman in such a way that is inexpressible by linguistic measures. 
Analyzing ĝDৄkara’s discourse closely, one notices a more subtle and meaningful back-
and-forth exchange between the SǌUYDSDN܈a and VDPƗGKƗQD, organized around the compound: 
ĞDEGD-prav܀tti-nimitta-ĞǌQ\D (“devoid of any basis for introducing any word”). The first 
objection pertains to the word ĞǌQ\D (“devoid”), the second objection pertains to the word 
nimitta (“basis”), and the third pertains to the word prav܀tti (“introduction”). The responses to 
these three objections unfold the trifold meanings of what I am calling the “apophatic measure.” 
Apophatic Measure as Sensuality 
The objector reasons that if the WXUƯ\D is devoid of any basis for the introduction of any 
word, then it is a mere void (ĞǌQ\D). ĝDৄkara first responds by clarifying the negation. The tXUƯ\D 
lacks a basis for introducing words, but that does not mean that it lacks a basis altogether. It is 
not possible, he explains, to conceive a conception of which the basis is nonexistent. The false 
cognitions of “silver” or “snake” cannot be thought to exist without actually existing substrata 
such as shell and rope, for example. Hence, “empty basis” does not imply “baseless.”451
ĝDৄkara’s argument is nearly identical to one made by ĝDEDUD500 years earlier, 
employing similar terminology.
 
452
103
 ĝDEDUD¶VSǌUYDSDN܈in argues that perceptual cognition is 
“empty” (ĞǌQ\D) because there is no difference between cognitive knowledge, which is transient, 
DQGWKHH[WHUQDOREMHFWĝDEDUDUHVSRQGVWKDWWKHbuddhi (mental image) is not empty, but is 
formless. As we have seen (p ), the buddhi takes the form of the particular external object, 
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which is its basis, and which is actually apprehended in external space. Like ĝDৄkaraĝDEDUD
points out that there is no cognition whatsoever in the absence of a real, external particular. This 
is the case in both true cognitions (like the rope) and false cognitions (like the rope-snake). 
Verbal cognition does not occur without representation of the object in the buddhi.453
104
 The buddhi 
is verbally cognized by a word that is eternally connected to that particular entity and a 
corresponding universal (p )³7KHUHIRUH´ĝDEDUDFRQFOXGHV³buddhi is not unable to be 
named, and, for us, perception is unable to be named. Therefore, buddhi is not perception.”454
Sensuality is an apophatic measure: perception is indescribable (DY\DSDGHĞyaۨ). Means 
do not have the same reality as the end (p
  
172). Knowledge resulting from perception is verbal, 
but perception, which is the means thereof, is not verbal. Hence, there is no contradiction 
whatsoever in suggesting that the highest Self is able to be seen and yet also unable to be named. 
The tXUƯ\D is unable to be named because it is devoid of any basis for employing words, but it is 
neither baseless nor imperceptible. It is an apophatic measure: wakefully attentive sensuality. 
Apophatic Measure as Particularity 
The objector then argues that if WXUƯ\D is not baseless, it should be describable by words 
and not merely by negation, since it must be the basis for all conceptions, whether true or 
false.455
Figure 1
 ĝDৄkara responds by listing various bases for signification. There are typically six 
justifications (relation, name, form, category, action, and quality; see , p98), but here 
ĝDৄkara combines name and form under the category “limiting attribute.” He rejects each in turn. 
There can be no relation between what exists and what does not exist, such as an existent shell 
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and nonexistent silver. The tXUƯ\D cannot be set apart in terms of name and form as one would 
designate a cow, as distinct from a horse, etc. Since it is one without a second, it cannot belong 
to any class or category. It cannot be distinguished by any particular activity, such as cooking. It 
is not limited to any particular quality, such as blueness. Since words are only suitable to signify 
one of these six universals, and since the WXUƯ\D cannot be described in any of these six ways, 
then it is devoid of any basis for employing words.  
Taken on its own, this passage does not show definitively that the WXUƯ\D is the 
particularity of all particulars. The apophatic measure as irreducible particularity is more clearly 
seen in ĝDৄkara’s discussion of the Self as both cause-and-effect, discussed above (p174), and 
his commentary “This Self is Brahman,” discussed in chapter six (p326). Nevertheless, when the 
passage is understood in a manner consistent with its 0ƯPƗূVƗ tradition, it certainly moves 
towards a theology of irreducible particularity. Since the SUƗMña lacks discrimination (a-viveka) 
between particular phenomena (p145) whereas the WXUƯ\D does not (p158), and since no universal 
is suitable to signify the WXUƯ\D, it follows that one who is wakefully attentive perceives “all this” 
in and as each and every particular “this.” 
Apophatic Measure as Method 
The SǌUYDSDN܈in then objects a third time, now to the word prav܀tti in the compound 
sarvaĞDEGDprav܀ttinimitta. Conceding that WXUƯ\D is not baseless and is not describable by words, 
the SǌUYDSDN܈in argues that all words become pointless. If Brahman exists but cannot be 
described through words, reasons the objector, then discussion of Brahman is useless.456
The VDPƗGKƗQDresponds, insisting that the 9HGƗQWD scriptures indicate Brahman through 
negation, thereby removing all ignorance. Though indescribable, Brahman can be known through 
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scriptural teachings, such as “Thou art that,” “This Self is Brahman,” “Brahman that is 
perceptible and before one’s very eyes,” and other such teachings.457
ĝUXWL is an apophatic measure. Learning to read, concordantly, one learns to hear, 
harmoniously, without reducing multiplicity to unison (p
 Though indescribable, 
Brahman can be known through the words of scripture.  
75). Words in kataphatic speech intend 
to signify particulars whereas words in apophatic speech intend to signify (and negate) universals 
(p117). Wakefully attending to these differing intentions, one practices a theological method 
whereby one learns to perceive the indescribable Brahman through words: measure-by-measure 
and through progressive dissolution (p128). Hence, the trifold meaning of the phrase “apophatic 
measure” is unfolded: It is a method by which one cultivates an attentive sensuality which 
perceives irreducibly particular phenomena as the manifestation of ultimate reality. One learns to 
perceive “All this” in and as each and every “this.” Advaita is not-two, not one.458
Perceiving through the Apophatic Measure 
 
In the WXUƯ\D state, sensuality ceases to be a means of consumption. When one awakens to 
the attentive sensuality of the WXUƯ\D, perception persists, but it ceases to be a means to some 
other end. When subject-object duality have been dissolved, one realizes “I am that” (p153). One 
realizes oneself to be ƖWPDQ, the non-dual seer (dra܈ܒƗGYDLWDۊ),459 the Seer of sight (d܀܈ܒer 
dra܈ܒƗ).460
161
 In this wakeful attentiveness, one becomes the Apophatic Measurer of Brahman, 
possessed of infinite measure (p ). The Self measures Brahman in and as all this. When read 
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coordinately and heard harmoniously, the great saying in MU 2 is not tautological. Self and 
Brahman, this and that, are not reduced to monism or unison, but are heard concordantly:  
All this is certainly Brahman. This Self is Brahman. That [Brahman] is this 
Self, possessed of four quarters. This Self is Brahman. (MU 2) 
One perceives (distinctly) and measures (verbally), but one no longer consumes sense objects, 
reducing particular phenomena to abstract universals. One perceives each and every this as a 
measure beyond measure. As an apophatic measure, sense-perception becomes an end unto 
itself. 
ĝDৄkara explains that the Seer has two kinds of sight: one transitory and invisible and the 
other transitory and visible.461
106
 These two kinds of sight correspond to the distinctions I have 
made between “seeing” and “perceiving” (p ), and correspond also to the differing modes of 
sensuality in the YDLĞYƗQDUDstate and the WXUƯ\D state. 6DWFKLGƗQDQGHQGUDGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQ
these two kinds of sight in terms of “act” and “nature.”462
Seeing as Act of Consumption WKHYDLĞYƗQDUD) 
 By differentiating between these, we 
likewise discern the relationship between the apophatic measure as attentive sensuality and the 
apophatic measure as irreducible particularity. 
In the YDLĞYƗQDUD state, seeing is means which yields a result. Seeing is an act of 
consumption. $V6DWFKLGƗQDQGHQGUDH[SODLQVWKLVVHHLQJLVD³IXQFWLRQRIWKHLQQHURUJDQ
[antaۊkara۬a]… It is an act, and hence it begins and ends.”463
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As we have seen (p104), perceptual cognition occurs when the buddhi is grasped by the 
internal organ of perception by means of words. These verbal cognitions measure the buddhi, 
which takes the form of real, external particulars sensed by the physical sense organs. Hence, the 
knowledge derived from perception measures particulars, consuming phenomena by reducing 
particulars to any of the six universal measures (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Perception as a valid means of knowledge 
Perception as Nature WKH7XUƯ\D 
6DWFKLGƗQDQGHQGUDH[SODLQV that the second kind of seeing (corresponding to the WXUƯ\D 
state of wakeful attentiveness) “is (not an act but) the very nature of the Seer.”464
172
 End and means 
do not have the same reality (p ). For non-dual Seer (dra܈ܒƗGYDLWDۊ),465
145
 seeing is not a means 
of consumption but an end unto itself. One no longer sees and cognizes objects, but rather 
perceives this and that particular phenomena in and as Brahman. Discrimination (viveka) 
between this and that persists in the WXUƯ\D, since this is the very nature of perception, which is 
absent in the SUƗMña (p ). One measures particular phenomena linguistically (p104), but no 
longer superimposes measures on the measured (p 106); one no longer reduces particulars to 
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signified universals, which are mere modifications of AUM (p112). One perceives the 
irreducible particularity of this and that. 
As in everyday sight (the YDLĞYƗQDUD), one sees and discerns particulars in the WXUƯ\D state 
of wakeful attention. As in the YDLĞYƗQDUD, the buddhi is grasped by a verbal measure. However, 
one who is fully awakened understands this cognition to be merely a verbal measure. One knows 
that one is measuring, and thus does not reduced the measured to that measure. One attends to 
measuring’s intention. Knowledge is known to be transient. It does not exist for another moment 
after the cessation of duality.466 172 While end and means do not have the same reality (p ), our 
understanding of this suddenly reverses when contrasted to the YDLĞYƗQDUDstate. Cognitive 
knowledge is merely transient whereas perception itself is not. In the YDLĞYƗQDUD, therefore, 
perception is a means of valid knowledge, which is the fruit of perception. In WXUƯ\D, however, 
since the fruit of perception is realized to be transient, whereas perception persists, then 
perception is recognized to be an end unto itself, and not merely a means. This brings us, 
therefore, back to the assertion made earlier (p93): Knowledge is functionally negative. 
Knowledge is not an end unto itself, but is a means by which to remove all conceptions (whether 
true or false). The knowledge acquired by ĞUXWL is a means to an end: Wakefully attentive sense 
perception. By bracketing or removing all verbal (pre)conceptions, the internal organ of 
perception apprehends the buddhi, which takes the form of particular phenomena, and therefore 
wakefully attends to what this or that particular intends. Since perception entails verbally 
grasping the buddhi by means of words eternally connected to universals and all particulars 
(p104), one still discriminates between this and that, verbally, but no longer reduces particular 
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phenomena to universals by superimposing the latter on the former (p 106). Juxtaposed with 
seeing as an act of consumption in the YDLĞYƗQDUDstate (Figure 11), the “arrows,” so to speak, 
are reversed (Figure 12). The non-dual Seer of sight wakefully attends to the buddhi whereas 
particulars intend to the buddhi.  
 
Figure 12: Perception as an end unto itself 
Though verbally grasped (upalabhyate) as this and that, verbal cognition is no longer an 
end, but a means to perceive irreducible particularity. As the apophatic Measurer, one perceives 
this and that in and as measures of Brahman, which is “All This.” As cited in the epigraph on the 
first page of this thesis:  
The Self of all beings is seen as one, and all beings [are seen] in the Self. 
Then alone is the meaning of the ĝUXWL conclusively proved: “One who sees 
all beings in the Self alone and [sees] the Self in all beings, because of that, 
harbors no ill will.”467
Attentive sensuality, as an apophatic measure, sees the Self in and as each and every 
being. This and that particular being are perceived as apophatic measures of Brahman, 
coordinately and harmoniously, without reducing the multiplicity of “All This” to a mere 
monistic “All.” Perceiving particulars by means of the apophatic measure, one perceives each 
and every individual as an utterly unique, irreducibly particular revelation of Brahman. 
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Conclusions 
ĝDৄkara’s apophatic theological method, as observed in the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND %KƗৢya, 
entails progressively dissolving signifiers corresponding to the three states of consciousness: the 
waking state, the dream state, and the state of deep, dreamless sleep. Like ĝDEDUDDQGGauঌDSƗGD 
before him, ĝDৄkara interprets these states analogously. They do not refer to actually dreaming or 
sleeping, but indicate varying degrees of attentiveness (p132). All three states are experienced in 
the waking state itself, by an Incarnate Witness, the non-dual Seer of sight (p155).  
In ĝDৄkara’s theological tradition, perception is held to be infaOOLEOH$VĝDEDUDSXWVLW 
“sense-perception is never wrong” (p104). Direct perception and scriptural revelation are each 
valid means of knowledge, but they have different purposes and differing spheres of authority 
(p56). Perception is authoritative with respect to all presently existing perceptible entities 
whereas scripture reveals that which does not exist at the time it is to be known.468 Since 
Brahman presently exists and is perceptible and before one’s very eyes, then knowledge of 
Brahman is within the authoritative domain of perception, not scripture.469
69
 However, the non-
dual truth of Brahman cannot be known without the 9HGƗQWD scriptures (p ) because ĞUXWL 
enables perception (p168). 
Two significant problems arise in light of these doctrines. First, since we experience 
reality as if it were ontologically dual (i.e., Self and non-self, subject and object, perceiver and 
perceived), then it becomes necessary to explain this experience without contradicting the 
assertion that perception is never wrong (p104). Second, since scripture is not needed to tell us 
about things which are presently existing and perceptible, then it becomes necessary to explain 
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the specific role of scripture as a means to realize Brahman. As the foregoing has shown, these 
two problems are, so-to-speak, two sides of the same coin. Scripture does not reveal to us what 
Brahman is, since Brahman is self-evident, presently existing, and perceptible.470
In ĝDৄkara’s tradition, perception entails verbal cognition of a mental image which takes 
the form of particulars to be seen. Knowledge results when the internal organ of perception 
grasps the mental image by means of a word which is eternally connected with that particular 
entity and a universal. Error arises when the internal organ grasps the mental image by means of 
a word that is not connected to that particular entity, such as cognizing a snake even though a 
rope is seen by the eye with the form of the rope.
 Rather, 
scripture reveals to us what Brahman is not. Through apophasis, scripture removes conceptions, 
which are superimposed upon Brahman through the everyday process of perception. Hence, by 
coming to a clearer understanding of the process of perception, one comes to realize what, 
precisely, is being negated in scriptural apophasis. ĝDৄkara’s Uttara 0ƯPƗূVƗ prepares one for 
the event of hearing scriptural apophasis, whereupon the highest Self is able to be seen. 
471
 Even in the absence of such error, however, 
knowing entails measuring particulars by means of words and universals. Words and their 
corresponding universals, though, are mere modifications of AUM, which is both the 
transcendent and immanent Brahman.472
Words are modifications of AUM in the same way that pot and lump are modifications of 
clay. When one grasps that pot, lump, and clay are ontologically non-different from one another, 
one is able to perceive clay as both pot and lump. As material cause, “clay” is realized by 
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removing the ideas of “pot” and “lump” superimposed upon those particular entities. This 
removal, however, in no way obviates or sublates the fact that the particular pot and particular 
lump are still perceived to be ontically distinct from one another. Neither does it suggest that 
cognizing a clay pot as “pot” is either erroneous or illusory. It simply means that the particular 
pot seen by the eye is no longer reduced to a single idea or universal. 
Taken in isolation, one could get the mistaken impression from this analogy that 
apophasis reduces all specification in favor of more broadly encompassing universals. One 
realizes, however, that the opposite is the case when one understands how ĝDৄkara distinguishes 
between the SUƗMña and the WXUƯ\D. The pUƗMña is said to have knowledge of all things, past 
present and future.473 This is because one in the state of SUƗMña measures all and absorbs all.474 
Unlike the nonduality of the WXUƯ\D, the SUƗMña is monistic. Since all has become one in the 
SUƗMña, there is no duality and no ignorance. But the SUƗMña is not the awakened state, since one 
perceives neither oneself nor others, neither truth nor untruth, in the SUƗMña, whereas the WXUƯ\D is 
the “all-seer.”475 The pUƗMña knows all things as universals, monistically reducing reality to 
knowledge. It fails to perceive particulars and cannot discern one thing from another.476 In the 
WXUƯ\D, however, knowledge is recognized to be ephemeral. Knowledge, which entails the 
measuring of particularity, is a transient pedagogical device.477
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moment after the cessation of duality, since the means does not possess the same reality as the 
end itself.478
In the YDLĞYƗQDUD, one perceives particulars discriminately, cognizing them verbally. The 
same is true for the WXUƯ\D. In the WXUƯ\D, though, the Self dwelling in all beings is seen as One, 
and all beings are seen to be existing in and as the Self.
 
479
In this panentheistic vision, once certainly perceives particulars and discerns between 
them, as in the YDLĞYƗQDUD. In this wakefully attentive state, however, perception is no longer 
regarded as merely a means to some other end (p
  
181). Knowledge is seen to be transient whereas 
perception is not. ĝUXWL removes all (pre)conceptions superimposed upon the buddhi, thereby 
enabling the Self to be perceived by the Self.480 Having known the Self, measure-by-measure, 
and subsequently dissolving these measures, one is thus prepared for the event of hearing the 
scripture, embodied by a gracious guru.481
Thusly, one becomes able to perceive the truth, which is the immanent Brahman, 
possessed of infinite measure.
  
482
 While the transcendent Brahman, beyond measure, remains 
ever imperceptible, Its effect is perceived.483
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to be the cause, perceptible as this unique manifestation. By such a sage, the highest Self is able 
to be seen in and as this and that particular. As we will see in chapter six (p321), because one 
who has heard the ĞUXWL harmoniously is able to perceive in this way, a gracious teacher is able to 
gesture to a student’s heart and reveal, directly and particularly, “This Self is Brahman.”484
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 Part Two: The Apophatic Measure in Nicholas of Cusa 
Part One of the dissertation began with an examination of ĝDৄkara’s apophatic 
theological method, writ large. Next came a more focused analysis of his commentary on the 
first unit of the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad %KƗৢya, yielding a more nuanced assessment of ĝDৄkara’s 
philosophy of language in light of 0ƯPƗূVƗ’s kataphasis. His method was then examined in 
practical application, including his interpretations of apophatic and kataphatic measuring in the 
second and third units of the MU. Part One then concluded with an analysis of sensuality and the 
apophatic measure. The first part, in other words, progresses through four organizational 
moments: (1) apophatic theological method, broadly formulated, followed by an analysis of the 
practical application of that method in terms of (2) apophasis, (3) measuring (i.e., kataphasis), 
and (4) perception through the apophatic measure. 
Part Two of the dissertation also includes these four organizational moments, but in a 
different (and somewhat reverse) sequence. Chapter four reads Cusa’s theology, after 9HGƗQWD, 
in comparative discourse with ĝDৄkara. I begin by examining Nicholas of Cusa’s apophatic 
epistemology of “learned ignorance,” subsequently allowing it to coincide with ĝDৄkara’s 
markedly different epistemology. I then analyze perception through the apophatic measure from 
Cusa’s perspective, which is also considered comparatively. In this way, chapter four considers 
some of the ways in which ĝDৄkara’s thought opens new possibilities for reading Cusa. Building 
upon his ontology of sensuality, chapter five analyzes Cusa’s understanding of creativity, thereby 
significantly reconceptualizing the notion of “measure” and its ethical/vocational implications 
for Cusa’s Trinitarian understanding of imago Dei. This, in turn, sets the stage for Part Three, 
which constitutes a turn towards a constructive theology of diversity and irreducible particularity 
comparatively grounded in the intimate, embodied encounter of human persons. 
 Four: Apophatic Measures in Cusa, After 9HGƗQWD:  
Conjecture, Coincidence, and the Ontology of Perception 
Outline and goals 
Through an examination of Nicholas of Cusa’s early writings, this chapter highlights 
themes central to his apophatic theological method. I begin with a brief analysis of his 
epistemology of “learned ignorance.” For Cusa, nearly all human knowledge is mere 
conjecture,485
The second section allows Cusa’s epistemology of conjectural measuring to coincide 
with ĝDৄkara’s understanding of language as a valid measure (SUDPƗ۬a). Learning our 
ignorance—after 9HGƗQWD—opens avenues for reading both Cusa and ĝDৄkara differently. 
Building upon comparative insights regarding epistemology, language, and pedagogy, I reflect 
on the implications this specific comparison suggests for comparative theology.  
 rooted in an epistemic disjuncture between the world-as-it-is and the world-as-we-
“measure”-it. I focus especially on his epistemic method of comparative relation as presented in 
the opening pages of De docta ignorantia (1440) and its companion text De coniecturis (1443). 
Calling into question the precision of nearly all positive (kataphatic) speech, Cusa thus sets the 
stage for his apophatic performance.  
In the third section, my attention turns to Cusa’s phenomenological analysis of the 
ontology of perception in De quaerendo Deum (1445). As Cusa advises, I interpret this text 
through the hermeneutic lens of his final text, De apice theoriae (1464). His hermeneutic lens of 
the coincidence of opposites guides his reader up the “ladder of ascent,” tracing vision’s pathway 
from sensible objects to God, the Beholder of all sight. His analysis of vision, moreover, 
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discloses his cosmological ontology of being enfoldedly (complicite) and being unfoldedly 
(explicate).486
In the fourth section, I consider, as Cusa does, vision’s pathway a second time, tracing 
the graceful descent of the divine light. Through the sensual interplay of subjective intention and 
attention, Cusa disrupts facile understandings of perception in terms of consumption. My 
analysis narrows to his analogy of failing to recognize a passerby. This bodily objectification of 
one’s neighbor constitutes a failure to perceive through the apophatic measure. Since he employs 
this illustration in nearly all of his theological treatises, I draw from an array of his texts to 
highlight the analogy’s significance to his apophatic theological method.  
  
As was the case in my examination of ĝDৄkara’s writings, my aim is to clarify the role of 
sensuality in Cusa’s apophatic theological method. Hence, I conclude this chapter by considering 
how comparative, back-and-forth reading fosters new insights regarding perception and 
apophasis. I reflect on comparative theology as a quest of faith seeking liberated understanding. 
Faithfully cultivating sensuality as an apophatic measure, I analyze two liminal analogies 
wherein Cusa and ĝDৄkara teach us to see through doors. 
Learned Ignorance: Comparative Relation and Conjecture  
Comparativa Proportio 
In the opening pages of DDI, Cusa introduces several themes which he continues to 
develop throughout his oeuvre. While these evolve in later writings, the underlying principles 
remain the foundation of his thought. Among the most central is his observation that “every 
inquiry is comparative and uses the means of comparative relation (comparativa proportio).”487
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As he explains, when we perceive something unknown, we judge that unknown thing in 
proportion to what is already known.488 While we can see that two things differ from one 
another, we only come to know things through their similarities to other things. To the extent that 
a given, unknown particular is utterly different than any other, its difference can be seen but not 
known. In this sense, Cusa does not differ from Aristotle: Particulars are subjects of propositions, 
of which universals are predicated, but particulars cannot be predicated of anything other than 
themselves.489 For Cusa, however, since knowledge is grounded in the comparative relation of a 
known thing and an unknown thing which is uniquely unknowable, “it follows that precise truth 
is unattainable; every human affirmation about what is true is a conjecture.”490
For example, in order to prove a difficult mathematical principle, a mathematician traces 
the principle she seeks to prove back to “the first and most evident principles.”
 If the word 
“knowledge” signifies something known precisely and certainly, then Cusa forthrightly denies 
that such a thing is possible. By learning that one does not “know” but, instead, provisionally and 
subjectively conjectures, one learns one’s own ignorance (hence the titles of Cusa’s treatise, On 
Learned Ignorance, and its companion, On Conjectures).  
491
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ratio). In fact, the Latin word ratio signifies proportion (as does the English cognate, “ratio”), but 
also signifies “that faculty of the mind which forms the basis of computation and calculation, and 
hence of mental action in general,” which is to say “rationality.”492
He continues: 
 Cusa exploits this 
equivocation often, and to great effect. 
[S]ince comparative relation indicates an agreement in some one respect and, 
at the same time, indicates an otherness, it cannot be understood 
independently of number. Accordingly, number encompasses all things 
related comparatively. Therefore, number… is a necessary condition of 
comparative relation. 493
To assert that number is a necessary condition of comparative relation is simply to insist that in 
order for a rational judgment to be made, it must be made regarding some finite thing in 
proportion to some other finite thing. For Cusa, this is a fundamental epistemological principle. 
The human capacity to reason (ratio) functions according to comparative ratio. 
  
Pauline Watts clarifies: 
The mind’s use of number is not confined simply to mathematical 
calculation. Without number, it is impossible to make any kind of comparison 
between the known and the unknown. This is true not only for comparisons 
involving quantity but for all proportionabilia—all things that the mind 
chooses to contemplate.494
Cusa does not claim that all things are reducible to number for the sake of comparative relation, 
but, in fact, just the opposite. A wise person is one who knows that he/she does not know.
 
495
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“know” the unknown by means of a comparative proportion that necessarily reduces entities to 
finite proportions or measures. As he explains, these measures always fall infinitely short of the 
truth of beings: 
Both the precise combinations in corporeal things and the congruent relating 
of known to unknown surpass human reason to such an extent that Socrates 
seemed himself to know nothing except that he did not know.496
He later elaborates that Socrates: 
 
… excelled the Athenians… in that he knew that he was ignorant, whereas 
the others (who were boasting that they knew something important, though 
being ignorant of many things) did not know that they were ignorant. 
Accordingly, Socrates obtained from the Delphic Oracle the attestation of his 
wisdom.497
No Proportion between Finite and Infinite 
 
In the foundational chapter I.3 of DDI, Cusa demonstrates that “the precise truth is 
incomprehensible.” He begins with what he calls a “self-evident” principle: “there is no 
proportion between the finite and the infinite.”498
In these two simple but profound principles, Catherine Keller explains, Cusa subtly but 
importantly departs from the Thomistic tradition of “analogia entis, by which we are enabled to 
know God not univocally but proportionally.”
 All knowledge is known through comparative 
relation of one finite entity to another. It is critical to notice that Cusa is not asserting that the 
entities which are known are actually finite, but simply that what is known by the rational mind 
is known qua finite.  
499
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that God is, but we cannot know what God is. Aquinas posits a third path of theology, the via 
eminentia, which is founded upon the via positiva and the via negativa, but beyond both. From 
this perspective, we cannot know what God is, but we can know something about God through 
proportional analogies to the world we know. For Cusa, however, since we cannot know the 
world around us with precision, any analogical comparison to God infinitely compounds this 
imprecision. Moreover, even if we could know the world around us precisely, there is no 
proportion between the finite and the infinite.  
Keller explicates: 
For Cusa the boundless excess of the infinite at once exposes the finitude of 
our perspectives—which are always comparative relations—and enflames 
our relation to that very infinity. Perspective escapes both the univocity and 
equivocity that worry Aquinas, without resolving itself in the eminent way of 
analogy. More simply, it can be said to open a third way, that of a 
participatory ontology endebted to Thomas but radicalized, open-ended, and 
so precisely infinite, a way between relativism and certainty into a modernity 
that never quite was.500
Keller’s assessment is consistent with Johannes Hoff’s. Like Keller, Hoff points to Cusa’s 
departure from (and indebtedness to) Aquinas in what he calls a “radicalization of the non-
representationalist tradition.”
 
501
 As Hoff shows, Cusa undermines “analytic attempts to dissect 
the symbolically saturated language of our everyday life into ‘merely metaphorical’ and 
allegedly more elementary ‘physical’ truths.”502 207 As I demonstrate below (page ), Cusa’s 
phenomenological analysis of perception “exposes the finitude of our perspectives”503
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celebrates the “symbolically saturated language of our everyday life”504 without relativizing 
subjective experience or reducing it to analogy.505
Non-proportionality of Singularity 
  
As stated above (p192), comparative relation coincidentally indicates equality and 
otherness, in differing respects. To say that one thing is equal to another is always to say that the 
two entities are more similar to each other in some one respect (i.e., genus, species, spatial, 
causal, temporal, etc.) than they are to a third entity. He adds, however:  
[W]e cannot find two or more things which are so similar and equal that they 
could not be progressively more similar ad infinitum. Hence, the measure and 
the measured—however equal they are—will always remain different.506
Because of this, he reasons that “there is nothing in the universe which does not enjoy a certain 
singularity that cannot be found in any other thing.”
 
507
 Since human knowledge is attained only 
through comparative relation, “we cannot know even one [particular entity in the world] 
perfectly.”508 Cusa echoes and radicalizes the Thomistic assertion that we can know that God is 
but cannot know what God is.509
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 Building upon his epistemology of comparative relation, Cusa 
asserts that when we sensually perceive a particular entity in the world, “we apprehend that it is, 
505
 Hoff, it should be noted, employs the term “analogy” more capaciously, expanding it beyond Thomistic 
definitions. This is a welcome move and my intention is not to differ from him, though I use the term more narrowly 
in this particular context. 
506
 DDI I.3.9, Hopkins trans. 8. 
507
 DDI III.1.188, Hopkins 114. 
508
 DDI III.1.189, Hopkins 115. 
509
 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.3. 
197 
rather than apprehending what it is.”510
In order to cognitively apprehend what it is, however, we compare that unknown thing 
(given to the senses) to things that are already known. To the extent that we cognize what it is, 
we do so through comparative relation to what is already known. Because we are able to 
cognitively grasp similarities but have no epistemic means to cognize singularity, we thereby 
reduce unique particulars to universals. We can apprehend that it is unique, since its uniqueness 
is perceived, but we cannot apprehend its unique quiddity, since its uniqueness eschews any 
possibility of abstraction or comparison. 
 We can see, touch, or otherwise perceive a particular 
entity, knowing it to be different from other things. We sensually apprehend that it is. We 
perceive both its singularity and its similarity to other things. Hence, Cusa radicalizes Aquinas 
by extending God’s unknowability to all particular entities.  
Even if we imagine, for example, two entities which are identical in every other respect, 
they are necessarily different with respect to spatiality to the extent that they are two entities.511 
However closely together they move, they could always be infinitely closer.512 Moreover, the 
very fact that they are two entities logically entails that they are not identical, according to 
Aristotle’s laws of identity and non-contradiction.513
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 Because knowledge is apprehended by 
means of comparative relation, it is a measure of similarity proportional to irreducible 
particularity or difference.  
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Figure 13: Conjectural Universals as abstracted 
rational entities 
What is known through comparative relation is a 
universal, which is to say a measure which 
simultaneously reveals and conceals the particularity of 
the measured. Carefully distinguishing between 
potentiality and actuality, Cusa asserts that “universals 
do not actually exist independently of things. For only 
what is particular exists actually.”514 He eschews 
nominalism by clarifying that universals are “not mere rational entities.”515 They exist 
potentially in themselves and actually in particulars.516 Nevertheless, when we cognize a 
particular, what is known is not that particular, but a universal which is an abstraction therefrom. 
Since the abstraction exists actually as a rational entity, it is neither identical with any true 
universal, which exists potentially in itself, nor with the particular in which that universal exists 
actually. The rational entity (i.e., cognized universal) is not an “un-forgetting” (anamnesis) as 
Neoplatonism claims, but is a human creation, representative of human creativity, which Cusa 
calls an “artificial form.”517
Figure 13
 As such, rational entities are epistemologically disjoined from both 
transcendental universals, which exist in potentia, and particulars, wherein universals exist 
contractedly, in actualitas, and therefore deemed to be conjectural, as diagrammed in . 
This stands in sharp contrast to ĝDৄkara’s view, wherein universals are eternally 
connected with particulars and with words, by which they are cognitively grasped.518
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cognition, according to Cusa, does not measure the world, as is the case for ĝDৄkara, but merely 
measures phenomena: things as they appear to us. Hence, as stated in the passage above, “the 
measure and the measured—however equal they are—will always remain different.”519
For Cusa, while a given measure may be accurate and true to some extent, it can always 
be infinitely more so. To the extent that it is accurate and true, it only measures likeness, not 
difference. Knowledge reduces particulars to their likenesses, divorcing them from their 
particularity. Therefore, knowledge cannot precisely attain truth since truth, according to Cusa, is 
indivisible.
  
520
Therefore, the intellect, which is not the truth, never grasps the truth so 
precisely that it could not be grasped infinitely more precisely, having a 
relationship to the truth which is like that of a polygon to a circle. Although a 
polygon would become more similar to a circle to the extent that it was 
inscribed with more angles, nevertheless, unless it is released into identity 
with the circle, it is never made equivalent, even if one multiplies its angles 
to infinity.
 Here, he introduces an analogy discussed further throughout this dissertation: 
521
It is both striking and significant to observe, with Pauline Watts, that Cusa’s theology “begins at 
that very point at which the usual modes of philosophizing collapse.”
 
522
 Cusa’s doctrine of 
learned ignorance is not a final assertion of the utter ineffability of God. It is not a final unsaying 
of kataphatic theology. Where some others conclude that the finite human intellect cannot 
possibly know infinite reality or absolute truth, Cusa adopts this “self-evident principle” as his 
starting point, adding, also, that we cannot know the world around us as it is.523
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Conjectural Epistemology, after 9HGƗQWD  
Having only begun to sow the seeds of Cusa’s theology, after 9HGƗQWD, we glimpse fruits 
to be harvested later. Already, though, insightful similarities and differences in epistemology and 
language can be observed. As discussed above (p191), “every inquiry is comparative and uses 
the means of comparative relation.”524 From Cusa’s perspective, the same must be true of the 
inquiry pursued in this dissertation. While it would certainly be anachronistic to label Cusa a 
comparative theologian in the sense that Clooney and others employ this term today, his methods 
nevertheless foreshadow the methods of comparative theology to some extent. Even setting 
aside, for the moment, his imaginative vision of an ecumenical council of sage representatives 
from the world’s religions525 and his lengthy treatise on the Koran,526
Polygonous Knowledge and Truth 
 I argue that Cusa’s 
epistemology of comparative relation bears implications for the contemporary experiments in 
comparative theology, as does his methodological lens of coincidentia oppositorum. Below, I 
highlight three insights that arise from reading ĝDৄkara and Cusa together, comparatively. I then 
consider some emergent implications for the methods of comparative theology. 
First, the comparison suggests that while the accumulation of knowledge may draw one 
nearer to truth, truth is qualitatively different than knowledge. Cusa asserts that knowledge 
constitutes a finite measure of indivisible truth, respectively analogous to a polygon and circle. 
This bears striking similarity to ĝDৄkara’s analysis of the relationship between words and AUM. 
As we have seen, all words are a modification of AUM, just as “pot” and “lump” are 
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modifications of clay (p109). Even if all such modifications were amalgamated, their “sum,” 
would not be AUM, since their relationship is that of cause and effect, not part and whole.  
Likewise, Cusa’s analogy of polygon and circle demonstrates that even if all 
“knowledge” was added together, the result would not be “truth” since truth is indivisible. If, for 
example, one were to compile an extensive list of true propositions about Socrates, one would 
still only know those things which Socrates shares in common with other entities. One would not 
“know” Socrates truly since his particularity “enjoy[s] a certain singularity” which can neither be 
reduced nor abstracted such that “Socrates” could be predicated of any well-formed 
proposition.527
Reading ĝDৄkara, after Cusa, one can say that AUM is the subject of all true propositions, 
which is to say that AUM is the particularity of all particulars as well as the universal of all 
universals. Because AUM is all that was, is, and shall be—and also that which transcends 
these—AUM is the actuality of all actuals and the possibility of all possibles. Words unfold 
AUM, “the entire manifold of speech” (p
  
112). Despite their differing epistemologies, then, we 
can see that knowledge constitutes a measure of truth for both ĝDৄkara and Cusa, but both deny 
that knowledge and truth are related in terms of part and whole. The whole is qualitatively more 
than the sum of its parts, but each “part” (each “particular”) is also qualitatively more than just a 
part.528
116
 Adhering to the (ana)logic of polygon and circle, one must escape from the logic of part-
and-whole altogether. As an apophatic measure, AUM disrupts attempts to posit binary 
opposition between the one and the many (p ). Coordinating (not conflating) words, one 
learns to hear AUM harmoniously, as the manifold (not the plurality) of all speech. Regardless of 
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whether knowledge does (ĝDৄkara) or does not (Cusa) measure Truth, the relationship between 
these cannot be articulated in terms of part-and-whole. Like polygonal chords inscribed in a 
circle, one can coordinate ĝDৄkara’s theology with Cusa’s theology, without synthetically 
reducing difference to unison and without relativizing difference to plurality. Practicing 
upasaۨKƗUD, we begin to hear their theologies concordantly because of (and not despite) their 
differences. Harmony is not unison (p118). 
Linguistic Points and Concord 
Second, reading the two together leads us to deeper understandings of their philosophies 
of language because of (not despite) considerable differences. As we have seen, ĝDৄkara asserts 
that even though words are mere modifications of AUM, they nevertheless reliably measure 
Brahman, possessed of infinite measure (p160). In contrast, Cusa insists that words fail to 
reliably measure reality since measure and measured can never be equal (p196). However, 
Cusa’s illustration of the polygon inscribed in a circle can be applied to each of these 
perspectives, thereby highlighting a subtle but important distinction between them.  
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As depicted in Figure 14, the polygon coincides with the circle at points A and B despite 
the fact that line AB does not coincide. Since words reliably measure Brahman possessed of 
infinite measure, we can understand ĝDৄkara’s epistemology, to some extent, by allowing words 
(and corresponding verbal cognitions) to be analogous to points A and B on the circle. Like 
AUM, the circle is endless, composed of infinitely many 
dimensionless points, which are mere modifications of the circle. 
For Cusa, however, language and rational knowledge are analogous 
not to the points on the circle, but to the inscribed chords, such as 
line AB. The illustration enables us to see how closely related their 
epistemologies are. Attending to their differing intentions, we begin 
to read each differently, in light of the other. By distinguishing 
between the points on the circle of truth and the inscribed chords, we better understand why 
words truly and reliably measure Brahman, from ĝDৄkara’s perspective, and why they fail to do 
so from Cusa’s perspective. Moreover, by coordinating their points and chords, we begin to hear 
their calls for apophasis, concordantly. Whether one understands words to be analogous to points 
or chords on the circle of truth, the goal, nevertheless, is to glimpse the circle. Because words 
draw us nearer to the truth, kataphatically, their negation enables us to see beyond what points 
and chords can measure. 
Aporetic Pedagogy 
Third, by maintaining comparative focus on theological method rather than doctrinal or 
philosophical differences, an important insight arises with respect to their pedagogical strategies. 
Confronted with different epistemic problems, neither ĝDৄkara nor Cusa attempt to explain away 
or avoid these problems. Instead, each accentuates the aporia, underscoring it by articulating it 
Figure 140HDVXULQJLQĝD۪kara 
and Cusa in light of Polygon-
Circle analogy 
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clearly. Through what might be called “aporetic pedagogies,” each masterfully converts an 
epistemic problem into a means by which to transcend that very problem. 
For ĝDৄkara, a problem arises concerning the distinct roles and scopes of scripture and 
direct perception as valid means of knowledge. Given that Brahman is something presently 
existing (unlike dharma, p86), knowledge of Brahman falls under the authoritative domain of 
perception, not scripture.529 However, it is also asserted that Brahman cannot be known without 
scriptural revelation.530 Rather than omit or “explain away” the tension between these views, 
ĝDৄkara accentuates the 0ƯPƗীsaka boundary between the authoritative scopes of perception 
and scripture. Stretching the aporia to its limits, he finds a way through it, rendering it porous.531 
Scripture is indispensable because only it reveals to us what Brahman is not. While scripture 
cannot describe Brahman, which is anabhidheyatva, it “desires to indicate” Brahman, which is 
perceptible and before our very eyes, by progressively dissolving the measures of that which is 
beyond measure.532 By accentuating the “problem,” ĝDৄkara’s apophatic measure becomes a 
means to perceive particulars non-dually by progressively dissolving dualistic measures, which 
cannot be accomplished without the 9HGƗQWD scriptures.533
Similarly, Cusa’s learned ignorance begins by placing an impassable, infinite abyss, so-
to-speak, between the world-as-it-is and the world-as-we-know-it in order that we might learn to 
see beyond the duality of comparative proportion. Accentuating the epistemic disjunction in the 
 In the hands of the ƗFƗU\D, this 
pedagogical problem becomes a teaching strategy. 
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opening pages of DDI, and elaborating thereupon at length in DC, Cusa masterfully transforms 
an epistemic conundrum into a sublime way of knowing. Like ĝDৄkara, he stretches the aporia to 
its limits, rendering it porous. Moreover, as discussed later (p262), he finds human freedom and 
creativity within this very epistemic disjunction, transfiguring binding into liberation. That we 
are ignorant of the world in which we live is a problem, but by learning our ignorance more 
profoundly, we approach truth more nearly. 
ĝDৄkara accentuates and exploits the inherently necessary duality of perception (i.e., ontic 
perceiver and ontic perceived) in order to transcend this duality (ontologically).534 He repeatedly 
pauses, though, to assert the reality of externally perceived things.535
Beyond simply observing these similarities, reading ĝDৄkara and Cusa together enable us 
to consider the fundamental relationships between apophasis, pedagogy, and phenomenology. 
Underscoring epistemic contradiction can be a pedagogical strategy that leads students or readers 
to question the underlying structures of knowledge from which such aporia arise. Laying aporia 
bare compels students to question what, precisely, is perceived and how those perceptions are 
cognized, thereby disclosing and removing (pre)conceptions in order to perceive particular 
 Similarly, Cusa accentuates 
and exploits the inherent, necessary duality of rational epistemology (i.e., Aristotle’s laws of 
identity and non-contradiction) in order to transcend it. He regularly reminds his reader of this 
epistemological disjuncture, transcending it without losing sight of it. Rather than dismissing, 
overlooking, or explaining away the epistemic problems with which they are most concerned, 
Cusa and ĝDৄkara emphasize and accentuate these aporiae as a pedagogical means to transcend 
those problems, ultimately privileging sensuality. 
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phenomena more clearly. Moreover, the comparison invites us to perform precisely the same 
strategy within comparative reading itself. What aporiae do we perceive when juxtaposing 
ĝDৄkara’s theology with Cusa’s and what are the structures of knowledge from which those 
aporiae arise? By accentuating aporia, such as their doctrines on language, we learn far more 
about each and, in the process, learn more about ourselves. Confronted with differing 
possibilities regarding how to think about signification, negation, and epistemology, one 
becomes wakefully attentive, dis/covering judgments one had made without consideration.  
Comparative Relation and Comparative Theology 
These three cases bear implications for comparative theology as a method of inquiry. 
“[E]very inquiry is comparative and uses the means of comparative relation.”536
196
 As I have 
emphasized (p ff.), Cusa’s point is that the unique singularity of particulars is inescapably 
beyond compare. Rather than obviating inquiries such as comparative theology, it foreshadows 
them, rendering them all the more necessary. We only come to know the unknown in 
comparative relation to what is known. And yet one must not overlook Cusa’s essential corollary 
to this: We can sensually apprehend that something is unique, but have no epistemic means to 
know its unique quiddity (p197). Learning our ignorance in this way, we draw nearer to truth in 
and through comparison. Comparative theology, like Cusa’s notion of comparative relation, is 
less about accumulating knowledge and more about learning our ignorance in order that we 
might cultivate a better appreciation of uniqueness. While this apprehension of singularity 
remains beyond compare, it nevertheless arises after and through comparison. Comparative 
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theology, as a genre of writing, then becomes “a kind of biblio/biography,” as Clooney describes 
it, “of what I came to see through these texts.”537
Reading ĝDৄkara and Cusa together, comparatively, we are confronted with no shortage 
of irreconcilable differences, some of which have already been discussed. Observing their 
common pedagogical strategy of accentuating paradox as a means to overcome it, one wonders 
whether comparative theology might do the same. Rather than overemphasizing points of 
commonality while tallying distinctions in the margins, I wager that accentuating alterity might 
be seen as a comparative theological strategy to allow opposites to coincide. Rather than 
constituting a means toward some other end, this method constitutes its own worthwhile way of 
knowing, a way theologically consistent with the creatively diverse multiplicity into which we 
find ourselves thrown. If apophatic theology does not shy away from comparative unsayings, 
then we learn our ignorance all the better from the wisdom of our theological neighbors. Perhaps 
the grace-full gift we unknowingly receive is the blessing of alterity itself. As discussed in the 
next section, perception proceeds where contradictions coincide. 
 
Being Enfoldedly: Coincidence and the Sensual “Ladder of Ascent” 
Vision as a Pathway for Seeking God  
As previously noted (p190), Cusa consigns nearly all human knowing to mere conjecture, 
observing that “the precise truth is ungraspable.”538
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 If one forgets that Cusa embraces this 
premise as his starting point rather than his final conclusion, one may hear in it whispers of 
nihilism or relativism. Far from either standpoint, however, Cusa embraces unknowability as the 
groundless ground for a profound theological method by which to draw nearer to truth and God: 
538
 The exceptions, which are of great importance, are discussed in chapter five. They include our knowledge of 
mathematics and other human technologies, such as spoons and houses. 
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… the quiddity of things, which is the truth of beings and which has been 
sought by all philosophers and has been discovered by none of them is 
unattainable in its purity; and the more profoundly we become learned in this 
ignorance, the more closely we approach the truth.539
As conjecture, what we call “knowledge” is the fruit of comparative proportion. As we have seen 
(p
 
196), this way of knowing is distinguished by an irreconcilable, infinite disjuncture between 
measure and measured. Since there is no proportion between the infinite and the finite, 
knowledge cannot be a means to know truth. In the citation above, however, Cusa claims that by 
learning our ignorance more profoundly, we approach the truth more closely. Rather than ignore 
or downplay the disjuncture between the world and our knowledge thereof, he accentuates it, 
thereby rendering the aporia porous, to borrow Catherine Keller’s phrase (p46).540
In contemporary theology, Cusa’s name is most commonly associated with a hermeneutic 
lens he refers to as the coincidence of opposites. He employs this method often, and in a variety 
of philosophical/theological circumstances. Since my central focus in this dissertation is on the 
role of perception in apophatic theology, I examine Cusa’s method of the coincidence of 
opposites insofar as it directly relates to perception and apophatic method. 
  
In De apice theoriae (On the Summit of Contemplation, 1464, DAT), written in his final 
days, Cusa encourages his reader to return to three of his earlier works which contain insights he 
himself did not fully appreciate until then.541
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 Sitting atop the summit of contemplation, in other 
words, he sees some of his earlier texts from a new perspective. Among these is a brief text 
540
 Keller (2010), 25–44. 
541
 DAT 16, Hopkins 1430. The three texts mentioned are De dato patris luminum (On the Gift of the Father of 
Lights, 1446), De icona Dei (a.k.a., De visione Dei, On the Icon of God or On the Vision of God, 1453), and De 
Quaerendo Deum (On seeking God, 1445). 
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entitled De quaerendo Deum (On Seeking God, 1445, DQD), which elaborates a sermon he 
preached on Acts 17. Therein, he reflects on several scriptural titles, including the title “King of 
kings.” Although this title seems to apply to the eschatological Christ in 1 Timothy and 
Revelation, Cusa ascribes it to the “Lord of lords, who is Beholding itself and Theos itself, or 
God, who has all other kings in [God’s] power.”542
72
 His lengthy explanation of this title begins 
with sensible things and progresses through the stages of perceptual cognition by means of the 
coincidence of opposites. Heeding the elder Cusa’s advice, I interpret DQD through the 
hermeneutic lens of his discussion of possibility and actuality in DAT. Adapting and applying 
the 9HGƗQWD method of upasaۨKƗUD (p ), I coordinate Cusa’s two teachings, discerning a 
meaning which is present in each, but difficult to discern without exegetical coordination. 
Since “vision bears a likeness to the pathway by means of which a seeker [of God] ought 
to advance,” Cusa reasons, an analysis of perception provides a useful analogy for theological 
inquiry.543 Vision, he states, requires three things: (1) an internal light which descends from the 
intellect, (2) a colored object which the eye reproduces as a mental image, and (3) an external 
light.544 For sight to apprehend, these “two paths of light must meet.”545
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 This simple point, to 
which I return later, is central to Cusa’s theo-ethics and likewise to this dissertation. My 
argument, in brief, is that apophasis enables perception by removing linguistic-conceptual 
obstacles, thereby enabling these two paths of light to meet through the intimate, embodied, 
sensual encounter of persons. 
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Being Sensually: In Living Color 
In the first chapter of DQD, Cusa traces vision’s path from visible objects to the intellect, 
climbing a sensual “ladder of ascent.”546
Figure 15
 In the second chapter, he explains the process again in 
the reverse direction, tracking the “descent” of the intellectual spirit to visible particulars. Since 
Cusa’s cosmology is inextricable from his analysis of perception, it is necessary to pause along 
the path to expound his adverbial ontology of being “enfoldedly” (complicite). Intending to 
simplify and clarify, I have diagrammed Cusa’s ontology of perception in  (p223), to 
which I periodically refer below. 
Though I first trace Cusa’s “ladder of ascent,” the descent is most pertinent to my thesis. 
As in Part One of this dissertation, this phenomenological analysis of perception (focused on but 
not limited to vision) enables us to discern where and how obstacles arise which impede 
perception. Learning these hindrances, a 9HGƗQWLQ following ĝDৄkara’s method progressively 
dissolves them. Following Cusa, however, one cannot remove these obstacles, but learns to see 
through them by means of the coincidence of opposites. In either case, the first step is to analyze 
perception, learning how and why obstacles arise which impede it. 
Towards that end, Cusa begins: 
In the realm of visible things, only color is found. However, sight is not of 
the realm of visible things but is established above all visible things. 
Accordingly, sight has no color, for it is not of the realm of colored things. So 
that it can see every color, sight is not contracted to any color.547
Although this seems quite obvious and elementary, it is nevertheless emblematic of Cusa’s 
method of comparative relation. True to his mathematic tendencies, he begins his “proof” with a 
premise that is both simple and certain, steadily progressing in small steps. It is significant and 
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meaningful, from Cusa’s perspective, that in order for sight to see color, it must be colorless. 
Sight is described apophatically: It sees color because it is devoid of color. He 
anthropomorphizes sight as an impartial judge and equitable ruler. 
In the realm of visible things, possible colors exist actually. For example, “blue” as a 
possible color, exists as an actual color in blue objects; “blue” exists in potentia in itself, but 
exists in actualitas in visible objects. In the entire kingdom of visible objects, however, one can 
find nothing analogous to sight. Anthropomorphizing once again, Cusa asks his reader to 
suppose that someone spoke to visible objects, asking them to identify the “ruler who named 
them.”548 Since there is nothing analogous to sight in that kingdom, these living colors may 
suppose that whatever is the “best and most beautiful” among them must be their superlative 
king. “And when they attempt to fashion a concept of this best and most beautiful thing, they 
resort to color, without which they cannot construct a concept.”549
Four points may be drawn from this analogy. First and most obvious, it illustrates the 
limitations of our own theological understanding. Like Cusa’s anthropomorphized colors, we are 
unable to fashion a concept of God without resorting to that which we know cannot be God. We 
resort first to superlative language, and then to apophatic speech. These learnedly ignorant colors 
know that the ruler who named them is not a color such as themselves. Nevertheless, they have 
no means to attain a concept such as “sight,” since there is nothing in the visible realm analogous 
thereto. Learning their ignorance, these wise colors mimic Anselmian maximality. 
 Learning their ignorance, 
these living colors reason that their ruler is a resplendent color such that it cannot be brighter.  
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Secondly, Cusa asserts that universals (“natural forms”) are unfolded as particulars, as 
depicted in Figure 15 [A]. What exists enfoldedly as “Blue” (in potentia) exists unfoldedly as 
particular blue entities (in actualitas). Blue qua form “exists otherwise” in blue things than it 
does in itself.550 To be sure, blue is this or that particular blue entity. “[U]niversals exist actually 
only in a contracted manner… universals do not actually exist independently of things.”551
In DB, Cusa provides a geometrical example which may be helpfully coordinated with 
the former.
 
Hence, what is seen with the eye actually is blue, according to Cusa; it is not a mere likeness, 
image, or shadow of a transcendental form of blue, as some Neoplatonists might suggest. The 
distinction between blue as such and blue things is not ontological, but adverbial. As a universal, 
blue exists potentially, and thus invisibly, in itself, but only exists actually, and thus visibly, in 
blue particulars. As a universal, blue things exist enfoldedly and coincidentally in blue qua 
universal, which exists unfoldedly as all blue things, diversely. Hence, blue is in all blue things 
(actually), and all blue things are in blue (potentially).  
552
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 An angle, he explains, can be larger or smaller than it is, but angularity cannot. For 
any angle to exist, angularity must first exist as a possibility. For angularity to exist actually, 
however, it must exist as an angle which can be larger or smaller than it is, which it not 
angularity qua form. All angles exist enfoldedly in angularity, which only exists possibly, and 
thus invisibly. However, angularity exists unfoldedly as particular angles, which exist actually 
and thus visibly. Therefore, when one sees an angle with one’s eye, what one sees is not other 
than angularity itself, despite the fact that angularity itself is other than that angle. 
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To be clear, to say that a thing exists potentially is neither merely nor necessarily to say 
that it has the potential to exist, but rather to say that it does exist as a possibility. Unlike 
classical theism, Cusa refuses to acquiesce to an equivocation of being. All things which actually 
exist must possibly exist, but not all things which exist possibly exist actually.553
Third, it should be noticed that Cusa’s analysis of vision’s pathway is 
phenomenological.
 For example, a 
hare exists actually and possibly; a hare’s horns exist possibly, but not actually; a square circle 
neither possibly nor actually exists. Nevertheless, a square circle must exist as a rational entity. If 
this were not the case, then the statement, “a square circle neither possibly nor actually exists,” 
would neither be true nor false, but would be utterly meaningless. Hence, we can ontologically 
distinguish between possible entities, actual entities, and rational entities, but Cusa’s cosmology 
requires that we do so adverbially: Entities exist possibly, actually, and rationally. Cusa’s 
cosmology safeguards being’s temporal gerund without disregarding ontological difference. 
Possibilities, actualities, and rationalities do not “have” being, but rather are possibly, actually, 
and rationally. Moreover, Cusa’s list of ontological adverbs is not limited to these three. Entities 
exist sensually, intellectually, creatively, incomprehensibly, etc. Hence, colors exist actually in 
particular visible objects, but exist sensually in vision. Despite the epistemic disjunction between 
the world-as-it-is and the world-as-we-know-it, there is no corresponding ontological 
disjunction. Instead, Cusa’s cosmology entails a (non-dual) continuum of being demarcated 
adverbially: being enfoldedly and unfoldedly. 
554
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 He is not analyzing particular objects which exist in the world in the 
manner in which they exist (i.e., actually). Such an approach, for Cusa, is outside the scope of 
554
 Cusa’s phenomenological method is discussed in more detail below. Also, see Harries (2001), 69. 
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human pursuit, which is precisely why a phenomenology of sensuality is necessary for one who 
seeks God. Rather, his analysis is grounded in the specific manner by which sensible objects are 
sensible.  
For example, since his phenomenology is exclusively limited to visual perception, he 
attends exclusively to color rather than to shape, behavior, or motion. Only differences in color 
are given to vision. Based upon these differences, one conjectures differences in shape, motion, 
etc. While Cusa encourages his reader to expand one’s phenomenological analysis to the sense of 
touch, smell, taste, and hearing, his own analysis stops short of this broader sensuality.555 His 
intention is not to privilege vision, as if this pathway for seeking God was uniquely available to 
the sighted, but instead to underscore a phenomenological method that necessarily differs 
according to sensual phenomena.556 Unlike particular colored things, color “does not have life 
and vital movement.”557 Though we see living things, we do not see life.558
Fourth, it has been stated that all visible things have color while sight is colorless (p
 
211). 
It follows, then, that sight is not visible. Visible things lack sight, but sight lacks visibility.559
Now, all that which exists unfoldedly (explicate) in the sensible kingdom, 
exists enfoldedly (complicite) in the kingdom of the senses more vigorously 
and, moreover, [exists] vitally in a way that is more complete.
 
Color lacks life, but color lives in sight. He elaborates: 
560
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 In this regard, Rene Descartes’ Meditations may be seen as an enormous philosophical step backwards, from 
which the retrieval of Cusan thought marks a recovery. As Johannes Hoff explains, scientific realism did not begin 
with Descartes; it ended in the Renaissance with Leon Alberti, Cusa, et. al. See Hoff (2013), 72-73. 
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 In this instance (at least), “life” should not be read as a universal classification. “Being alive” is not analogous to 
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Sensuality is complicated: Sight enfolds all color, which exists enfoldedly and vitally in living 
color, which is sight. Opposites cannot coincide in sensible objects (e.g., a particular cannot be 
both white and not-white in the same respect at the same time), since that is contrary to being 
actually, which is being unfoldedly (explicate). However, opposites necessarily coincide in sight, 
since that is essential to being sensually, which is being enfoldedly (complicite) and vitally.  
For example, white and not-white must coincide—potentially—in sight. If that were not 
the case, then sight would not have the potential to see either white or non-white. Hence, sight is 
the coincidence of opposites with respect to color. Because of this, sight sees color through the 
coincidence of opposites, enfolding it and giving it life. Though sight cannot see life, it brings to 
life that which it sees, sensually.561
Sight’s enfolding, however, is not to be confused with the enfolding inherent to 
universals, discussed above (p
 Sight neither objectifies nor consumes; it animates, vitally.  
212, see also Figure 15 [A, B]). As a universal, blue enfolds all 
blue things, which exist potentially in blue in se. In sight, however, opposites actually coincide, 
since sight exists actually. Through this simple analogy, it becomes clear that universals are 
directly perceptible (since they actually exist unfoldedly as particular entities which are visible), 
but are not knowable (since they exist potentially in an enfolded manner, invisibly). While we 
cannot know universals as they exist in themselves, we are able to conjecture as to their nature 
since we directly perceive them and can thus abstract from our perception rational entities which 
exist as our own creations.  
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 DQD I.30, my translation: Sed id omne, quod est in regno sensibilium explicate, est vigorosiori modo complicite 
et vitaliter atque perfectiori modo in regno sensuum. 
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Accordingly, Cusa clarifies his terminology by distinguishing between two distinct kinds 
of universals, thereby avoiding the extremes of nominalism and idealism.562
Figure 15
 He uses the term 
“natural forms” to refer to universals which exist in themselves (in potentia) and the term 
“artificial forms” to refer to universals which exist as rational entities in the human mind (in 
actualitas). As illustrated in , natural forms are not unfolded as artificial forms, but as 
actual, particular objects in the world. For Cusa, this is not a speculative philosophical 
stipulation, but a logical necessity since anything which exists actually must exist possibly. 
Nevertheless, there is an epistemic disjuncture or “cut” between natural forms and artificial 
forms. As will be discussed in more detail later (p256), Cusa maintains that natural forms exist 
enfoldedly in the Divine Intellect, which is their Source and Creator, and unfoldedly as the 
natural, created world around us. Artificial forms exist enfoldedly in the human intellect, which 
is their source and creator, and unfoldedly as human technologies, be they doctoral dissertations 
or spoons, which do not necessarily coordinate with any natural form.563
Being Rationally: Measuring Binaries 
  
Continuing the “ladder of ascent” from visible things to sight, one next comes to 
reason.564
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 Though all colors exist enfoldedly in sight such that it is the coincidence of all colors, 
sight is unable to differentiate between one thing and another. Sight sees but does not discern. 
Just as sight was determined to be the “king” presiding over the kingdom of visible things, 
reason is determined to be the “king” presiding over sight.  
563
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Rationality proceeds by means of comparative relation (p191), such that what is 
perceived is abstracted, thus marking the “cut” or moment of epistemic disjunction (See Figure 
15 [C]). Reason measures by differentiating one thing from another in the form of rational 
entities and in terms of number.565 Insofar as they are rational entities, they must conform to the 
basic principles of logic, such as Aristotle’s laws of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded 
middle. That is to say that “white” must mean the same thing at all times and in all contexts 
(identity); “white” must be opposed to “not-white” (excluded middle); and no entity can be 
logically conceived that is both “white” and “not-white” at the same time in the same respect 
(non-contradiction).566
Being Intellectually: Learned Ignorance 
 Reason’s binary does not permit the coincidence of contradictories, but 
instead measures particulars numerically, discerning them as either white or non-white, 1 or 0, 
etc. Unknown things become rationally known through comparative proportion to what is 
“known,” which is to say abstracted and conjectured. Reason multiplies, with logical certainty 
and mathematical precision, rational universals which are directly proportional to unknown (but 
seen) variables. Realizing this, one learns one’s ignorance. 
Just as there are manifold colors, Cusa explains, so too are there manifold rational 
entities. Just as there is a “king” presiding over colored things and a “king” presiding over sight, 
there is likewise a “king” presiding over reason, viz., intellect, as depicted in Figure 15 [D]. All 
that has been said above regarding the relationship between sight and visible things is 
analogously true of the relationship between reason and intellect. Colored objects are visible but 
cannot see; sight sees but is not visible; reason differentiates but does not see/apprehend. As 
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Cusa explains, reason is “seen” or apprehended by the intellect, (much as the buddhi is “seen” by 
the antaۊkara۬a, p103): 
Rational things are apprehended by the intellect, but the intellect is not found 
in the realm of rational things, for the intellect is as the eye, and rational 
things are as colors… For example, the intellect judges this to be a necessary 
reason, that to be a possible reason, a contingent reason, an impossible 
reason, a demonstrative reason, a sophistical and pseudo-reason, or a 
probable reason, and so on—even as sight judges this color to be white and 
that color not to be white… and so on.567
Sight sees because it is devoid of all actual color, yet all colors exist enfoldedly in sight, which is 
the coincidence of opposites with respect to color. Likewise, the intellect apprehends reason 
because it is devoid of all actual reason, yet all reasons exist enfoldedly in the intellect, which is 
the coincidence of opposites with respect to rational entities.  
 
For example, suppose one sees a blue object with the eye. Sight perceives the color of the 
object; it sees it, but does not know its quiddity.568
However, if the intellect has learned its ignorance, then it understands the following: That 
which was seen by the eye differs, ontologically, from that which was discerned by reason. That 
is not to say that the object is ontologically other than its rational expression; reason is not-other 
 Reason discerns between white and non-
white, blue and non-blue, etc.; reason discerns, but does not apprehend. Since “white” and “not-
white,” “blue” and “not-blue” all coincide in the intellect, the intellect is able to judge what is 
rationally discerned and seen with the eye and thus apprehend that the object is blue. Hence, one 
sees, intellectually (and sensually), through the coincidence of opposites. 
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than that which it discerns. Nevertheless, they differ ontologically because one exists rationally 
and “the other” exists actually.569
What specifically, then, is the ignorance that is to be learned here? That the object has 
been seen and that the object is blue are not in question. What stands in doubt (and is, in fact, 
known to be unknown) is the quiddity of the thing. Learning one’s ignorance through a careful 
phenomenology of perception, one realizes that even though a particular entity’s quiddity may be 
seen, it cannot be discerned since comparative proportion is unsuitable to discern it. As noted 
(p
  
196), “there is nothing in the universe which does not enjoy a certain singularity that cannot be 
found in any other thing.”570 Since what is seen by the eye enjoys a certain singularity, it cannot 
be discerned in proportion to any other thing with respect to that singularity. Since reason 
discerns through comparative proportion, then reason is powerless to discern that which is 
singular, unique, and uncategorical. To the extent that any given particular is unique, it is beyond 
compare. “Hence, the measure and the measured—however equal they are—will always remain 
different.”571 Nevertheless, by learning our ignorance more profoundly, we approach the truth 
more closely.572 Though the quiddity of that which is irreducibly particular cannot be 
apprehended in its purity, it can, nevertheless, be sensually perceived.573
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Beyond Coincidence: Being Seen and Being Known 
Tracing the pathway of vision in order to construct his “ladder of ascent,” Cusa ventures 
to take one final step: 
Now, intellectual natures likewise cannot deny that a king is appointed over 
them. And as visible natures maintain that the king appointed over them is 
the ultimate end of all visible perfection, so intellectual natures, which are 
natures that intuit truth, state that their king is the ultimate end of all the 
perfection that is intuitive of all things. And they name this king Theos, or 
God—on the ground that in being the completeness-of-perfection of seeing-
all-things, [God] is Beholding itself, or Intuiting itself.574
Cusa’s anthropomorphized colors found nothing in their visible “kingdom” suitably analogous to 
sight, and yet could not formulate any conception without reference to color (p
 
211 above). 
Likewise, we are unable to find anything in the intellectual “kingdom” suitably analogous to 
God, and yet cannot formulate any conception without reference to intellect. As Cusa has done 
(in living color), we resort to the language of superlativity and apophasis and thus refer to God as 
King of kings, Queen of queens, Lord of lords, etc.  
More importantly, though, Cusa describes God in terms of intellectual activity: 
“Beholding Itself, or Intuiting itself.”575 As I have discussed elsewhere, Cusa’s DQD masterfully 
turns on a certain equivocation he ascribes to the name Theos.576 “Theos,” he states, “is derived 
from ‘theoro,’ which means ‘I see’ and ‘I hasten.’”577
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 Having traced the path of vision as a 
pathway for seeking God, Cusa arrives, finally, at a vision beyond the intellect, which is the 
coincidence of opposites. Looking “upstream,” so-to-speak, from intellect to God rather than 
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“downstream” from intellect to rationality, Cusa beholds a Beholder (Figure 15 [E]). Just as 
intellect was seen to behold rational entities and sight was seen to behold visible things, God is 
now seen to behold the intellect. Having climbed vision’s “ladder of ascent,” the pathway folds 
back on itself. The agent of Cusa’s verbal etymology radically shifts. No longer does Theos refer 
to God as the One Whom we hasten to see. Gazing beyond the intellect through the coincidence 
of opposites, one sees God to be “Theos, God, Beholding, and Hastening, Who sees all things, 
Who is present in all things, and Who traverses all things.”578
Cusa first led us to believe that his phenomenology of vision was simply an analogy: “a 
likeness to the pathway by means of which the seeker ought to advance.”
  
579
 In the end, however, 
one realizes that this pathway is far more than an analogy. Hastening along the path, as if 
walking to Emmaus, one beholds the Beholder through the coincidence of opposites. Faithfully 
seeking understanding, one finds oneself seen. God remains inconceivable because, Cusa 
explains, “in [God’s] light all our knowledge is present, so that we are not the ones who know 
but rather God [knows] in us.”580
Theos—Who is the Beginning from which all things flow forth, the Middle in 
which we are moved, and the End unto which things flow back—is 
everything.”
 As mentioned earlier, DQD is an elaboration of a sermon Cusa 
preached on Acts 17. Paraphrasing verse 28, he states: 
581
Cusa’s (ana)logic of being enfoldedly and unfoldedly flows back to its scriptural 
foundation: Paul’s sermon on the Unknown God. Turning, perichoretically, atop his “ladder of 
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ascent,” Cusa finds the Seeking God on his pathway for seeking God. Pausing at this liminal 
apex, he concludes: “just as being depends on [God], so too does being known.”582
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 As Beholder, 
Theos neither objectifies nor consumes. Rather, God attends to one’s intentions.  
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Figure 15: Cusa's Ontology of Perception 
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Attention: Graceful Descent of the Divine Light 
Coincidence of Orientation: Attention and Intention 
In the second chapter of DQD, Cusa performs a textual metanoia. He turns around to 
trace vision’s pathway in its graceful descent. Having dis/covered the divine light to be the Seer 
of sight, Cusa seeks a second light. The reason for this quickly becomes apparent when we recall 
that “in order that sight may apprehend distinctly that which is visible, two paths of light [must] 
meet.”583 In DQD 1, he began with the external light, which shines on visible things and ascends 
upwards through sight, reason, and intellect, and then beyond the intellect to Theos, the 
Beholder, who sees all things. In DQD 2, however, he highlights the descent of the higher light, 
“for it is not the spirit of vision that imposes a name on colors but it is rather its [Parent’s] spirit, 
which is in it.”584
His intention here is to draw attention to that which impedes vision: If it is not we who 
see, but rather the Beholder who sees all things, and if “we are not the ones who know but rather 
God [knows] in us,”
  
585
As he explains, the internal light is analogous in many ways to the external light. Though 
color may be present before one’s eyes, and though one may be intent upon seeing it, the color 
 then how can it be that we fail to perceive, fail to know, or see 
erroneously? This question is hardly far from one of ĝDৄkara’s guiding question: If Brahman is 
non-dual, perceptible, and before our very eyes, and if perception never goes astray, then how 
can it be that we do not see Brahman, but see duality? Here, Cusa’s focus is not on the pathway 
of vision, but on the light which descends along this pathway. 
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“must be made visible by another light, from a source that illumines the visible, for in a shadow 
and in darkness, what is visible is not apt to be seen.”586
More subtly, his point is that we see what we willfully intend to see. When we intend to 
see something, we intentionally shine a light upon it. As discussed below, however, Cusa upends 
this understanding of intention. If we aspire to see what God intends for us to see, then we must 
quiet our own intentions and allow the divine light to draw our attention to what God intends. In 
order to quiet our intentions, however, we must consider how volition captures—and 
consumes—our attention. Only by progressively dissolving distraction does one become 
wakefully attentive
 As before, Cusa begins from a simple 
premise, which is obvious, verging on trite: though something may be before our eyes, available 
to be seen, it can only be seen if a light is shone upon it.  
587
As the ruler of reason and sight, the intellect guides vision. When the eye is stimulated by 
a sensation: 
 to the divine light’s graceful anointing.  
The power of the sensitive nature takes interest in the sensation and pays 
attention to it in order to discriminate. Accordingly, the spirit in the eye does 
not discriminate but rather in that spirit a higher spirit accomplishes the 
discriminating.588
In DAT, he emphasizes that this discriminating power is not other than free will: 
 
For example, when the eyes are directed toward an object, the free will does 
not always allow the eyes to observe that object but turns them away, in order 
that they not view what is worthless or shameful.589
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Just as one intentionally shines an external light upon what is to be seen, free will directs our 
attention towards (or away from) that which we wish (or do not wish) to perceive. The internal 
light that descends, in other words, is synonymous with attentiveness.  
As Johannes Hoff points out, though:  
In his late Compendium (1463), Cusa deepens this approach through his use 
of the terminological distinction between ‘attention’ (attentio) and ‘intention’ 
(intentio), in which the ‘in” indicates the inward[ly] orientated aspect of 
perception as distinct from the ‘at’ which indicates its outward orientation. 
Consequently, the phenomenon of visual perception is the outcome of the 
intepenetration between the intention of the illuminated object that 
‘addresses’ the viewer, and the attention of the viewer who responds to this 
address.590
By placing intention in opposition to attention, Cusa compels his reader to radically rethink, 
reconsider, and revise what is usually signified by the word “intention.” Though attention and 
intention coincide in sensual perception, they coincide as opposites: an address from the 
“outside,” so-to-speak, and a response from “within.” If we long to see what God intends, our 
attention must be a response; it cannot be motivated by our own intentions. 
 
This coincidental interpenetration disrupts, if not reverses, any facile understanding of 
perception in terms of consumption. Perceiving the world cannot, from this vantage, be 
understood as merely “taking in” or “consuming” the world according to our own whims and 
desires. The world has other intentions. Perception, as Hoff eloquently states, is the outcome of 
an interpenetration: An attentive response to an intentional address.  
Reading Cusa’s theology, after 9HGƗQWD, ĝDৄkara’s distinction between perception in the 
YDLĞYƗQDUDand the WXUƯ\D proves helpful here. As was shown, perception in the YDLĞYƗQDUD is 
understood as a means to some other end: a means of valid knowledge. In the WXUƯ\D, however, 
knowledge is seen to be ephemeral, a transient measuring of true reality which does not exist for 
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another moment after the truth of nonduality is known. While perception persists in the WXUƯ\D, it 
ceases to be a means to an end but is realized to be an end unto itself. Similarly, by opposing 
intention to attention and positioning intention such that it addresses the perceiver, perception 
ceases to be a means of consumption, producing sense data as intellectual fodder. Instead, 
perception becomes a vocational response: attending to an intentional address. 
Sense perception, then, cannot simply be the action of a “subject” which grasps and 
consumes “objects.” Rather, perception is a re/action, where attentive response coincides with 
intentional address. But an intentional address from whom? Do we glimpse in Cusa’s 
coincidence of intention and attention hints of a Levinasian Other, who beckons us into being 
from indiscriminate infinitude? Or has Cusa simply “personified” objects as he 
anthropomorphized colors in DQD 1? Whence comes intention? 
As before, it becomes clear that any discussion of Cusa’s analysis of perception is 
inextricable from his cosmological ontology. We misread Cusa’s analysis—and certainly miss 
his point—if we conceive of sense perception as the action of a “subject” who perceives 
“objects” which are “outside” of that subject. Likewise, even though intention and attention 
having differing orientations, it would be a mistake to think that either comes from the “inside” 
or “outside” of a perceiving “subject.” Though Cusa uses the terms “subject” and “object,” it 
would be anachronistic to read these in a modernist, Cartesian sense. To do so, in fact, would 
obviate most of what he has to teach us. The same, of course, should be said of ĝDৄkara’s 
understanding of ƗWPDQ.  
As already emphasized (p218), perceived entities are not ontologically other than our 
vision of them, from Cusa’s perspective. That which exists actually as a particular entity exists 
sensually in sight, exists rationally in the ratio, exists intellectually in the intellect, and exists 
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divinely in Theos, the Beholder Who hastens to see all things. Perception, then, is neither a 
reproduction nor a consumption of “objects outside” by an inner “subject,” but is, instead, an 
existential enfolding. Sensuality, as we have seen, is complicated: that which exists unfoldedly 
(explicate) as particular entities exists enfoldedly (complicite) in the senses.591
Catherine Keller warns of another possible misreading of Cusa’s cosmology which is 
highly pertinent here. Her reading of an important passage from Cusa’s DDI aids our attempt to 
understand his distinction between intention and attention by shedding light on what he does—
and does not—say about the ontological relationship between God and particulars. In Book II of 
DDI, Cusa writes: 
 
In the First Book it was shown that God is in all things in such a way that all 
things are in God, and now it is evident that God is in all things as if by 
mediation of the universe. It follows, then, that all are in all and each is in 
each.592
Keller explains:  
 
If God is unfolded in everything and everything enfolded in God, then the 
‘everything’ of the universe as a whole is the way God is in everything. This 
is important: there is no chance here of a standard pious interiority of ‘God 
within’… That would be a misreading… If God is in me, it is me-with-the-
whole-universe attached.593
While there is much in these two rich passages upon which to reflect, my focus here is 
necessarily narrow. As Keller demonstrates, one misreads Cusa’s panentheistic cosmology if one 
conceives of God as a “pious interiority.” God is not (merely) a still small voice dwelling in the 
depths of one’s heart and soul. Rather, God exists unfoldedly as all in all. Because God is 
infinite, our reason runs amiss if we bind God by denying God’s being in any part of any being. 
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Quoting Cusa, Keller states: “‘Infinite unity, therefore, is the enfolding of all things,’ for nothing 
can be outside of what is infinite. It has no boundaries to be outside of.”594 Cusa’s theological 
cosmology, Keller continues, “yields a world in which God cannot be separated from anything 
anywhere.”595
Cusa’s cosmology, then, does not permit of ontological alterity between subject and 
object. To say that God is infinite is to say that God is all in all, which bears radical implications 
with respect to one’s ontological relationship with other beings in the world. He explains: 
  
In each creature, the universe is the creature, and each receives all things in 
such a way that in each thing all are contractedly this thing. Since each thing 
cannot be actually all things, for it is contracted, it contracts all things, so that 
they are it… All things, therefore, are not many things… therefore many 
things are not actually in each thing, but rather all things are, without 
plurality, each thing.596
Returning, then, to Cusa’s distinction between intention and attention, we can venture an answer 
to the question posed above. As Hoff has stated, visual perception is the outcome of the 
interpenetration between an intention, which ‘addresses’ the viewer, and the attention of the 
viewer who responds to this address.
 
597
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 From whom does this address come? Clearly, we would 
not be mistaken to say that the address comes from God, but only provided that we grasp the 
weight of Keller’s warning together with its logical corollary: God is not merely or simply some 
hidden potentiality within that which is to be seen any more than God is some “standard pious 
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interiority of ‘God within’” oneself.598
Suppose someone sees—beyond all knowledge… all things apart from 
measure… Then, assuredly, [one] sees all things in terms of a most simple 
oneness. And to see God in this manner is to see all things as God and God as 
all things.
 Rather, God exists unfoldedly as that very thing which 
intends perception coincidental with the perceiver’s attention. Cusa invites us to suppose: 
599
As concluded earlier, the internal light that descends from God is synonymous with 
attentiveness. We can now conclude that the external light, which intends, is also divine in 
origin. True perception occurs when these two paths of light meet, which is to say when we 
attend to that which is intended by removing distractions that capture our attention, thereby 
seeing “beyond all knowledge” and “apart from measure.”
 
600
Suppose, however, that someone does not see “beyond all knowledge” and “apart from 
measure.” Though attentiveness is guided by free will, it nevertheless happens that we fail to 
perceive that which the eye sees even if we freely will to see it. Just as our sensual spirit may be 
seductively attracted towards sensual objects that consume our attention, our intellectual spirit 
may be seductively attracted towards intellectual matters that capture our attention. We are prone 
to intellectual distraction just as we are prone to distraction by sensual things. In either case, our 
attention is “captured,” meaning it is drawn away from that which intends to be seen. In the same 
way that we better understand perception in the wakefully attentive state of WXUƯ\D when this is 
contrasted with inattentive “seeing” in the YDLĞYƗQDUD, we better understand Cusa’s attentive 
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sensuality by contrasting it to inattentive “seeing.” In other words, sensuality as an apophatic 
measure is best grasped in contrast to everyday seeing. 
Failing to Recognize the Passerby 
To illustrate this, Cusa employs an analogy which he uses in nearly all of his theological 
texts. The analogy is clearly significant to him, and likewise to my thesis. He uses the same 
analogy twice in DVD, as we shall see later (p297), to distinguish everyday vision from Christ’s 
vision. It is, moreover, relevant to Cusa’s understanding of theosis (p329). That the analogy is 
brief and simple, then, should not distort its importance. To provide context and clarity, I recite 
and extend the passage cited earlier from DQD. He writes: 
The power of the sensitive nature takes interest in the sensation and pays 
attention to it in order to discriminate. Accordingly, the spirit in the eye does 
not discriminate but rather in that spirit a higher spirit accomplishes the 
discriminating. Indeed, by our everyday experience we ascertain, in our own 
cases, this to be true. For sometimes we do not recognize passers-by, whose 
images are reproduced in the eye; paying attention to other things, we do not 
attend to them. 601
Two years earlier, Cusa used the same analogy in much the same way. In DC II.16, he analyzed 
vision’s pathway much as he later does in DQD, but includes “imagination” as an element in his 
analysis. Therein, the higher, spiritual light of attentiveness descends from the intellect, to 
rationality, to the imagination, and finally to the senses. When one fails to recognize a passerby, 
Cusa explains, the passerby is “seen” by the eye and an image of the person is reproduced in the 
imagination. The passerby is discerned, also, by rationality, else one would neither know that one 
had failed to recognize the passerby, nor would one avoid colliding with that body.  
 
                                                     
601
 DQD 33, Hopkins 321. 
232 
In the earlier account, Cusa describes “attentiveness” in terms of wakefulness. When the 
intellect is distracted, the other elements of perception are sleepy. When the intellect turns its 
attention towards what is to be seen, however: 
… somnolent reason is awakened through wondering, so that it hastens 
toward that which is a likeness of the true object. Next, intelligence is 
stimulated, so that it is raised up more alertly and more abstractly from a 
slumbering power to a knowledge of the true object. For the intelligence… 
unites—in the imagination—the differences of the things perceived. It 
unites—in reason—the variety of differences among images. It unites—in its 
own simple intellectual oneness—the various differences of forms.602
In DC, the analogy of the passerby is employed to illustrate an epistemic distinction between 
multiplicity and oneness within Cusa’s cosmology of enfoldedness.
  
603
 The analogy supposes that 
one does not see, beyond all knowledge and apart from measure.604 When one fails to recognize 
the passerby, one “sees” the other “objectively.” That is, one sees the other as a material object 
impeding one’s path. The other is measured as some-thing to be avoided: an “object” over and 
against one’s own subjectivity.605
But “suppose someone sees—beyond all knowledge… all things apart from measure,” as 
Cusa has supposed in the passage cited above.
  
606
The oneness of the intellect descends unto the otherness of reason; the 
oneness of reason descends unto the otherness of imagination; the oneness of 
 When the intellect is awakened from its 
distracted slumber such that one sees “apart from measure,” the passerby is no longer measured 
as merely an “other,” but is enfolded into a oneness that descends unto a multiplying otherness: 
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imagination descends unto the otherness of the senses. Therefore, enfold 
intellectually the ascent together with the descent, in order that you may 
apprehend.607
Cusa variously employs the analogy of the passerby to illustrate epistemic failures related to 
cosmology, ontology, theology, and ethics. One fails to see an/other subject, but objectifies the 
other as one might a stone, a chair, or some other obstacle to be navigated.  
 
Opening oneself to the divine light, the intellect awakens the perceptual faculties from 
their objectifying trance. No longer consuming and objectifying, the awakened intellect enfolds 
and enlivens. Cusa equates the descending light of attentiveness with the soul, which gives life 
and motion to body and senses alike. Just as the soul enlivens one’s foot in order to walk, the 
soul enlivens the senses so they might see. Stirred from the dualistic dream of subjects and 
objects, the soul animates the senses to a state of wonder: one attends to an/other subject who 
intends, uniquely, to be seen. Aroused from a sensory plurality of “mere others” or “wholly 
others,” one is alerted to the divine multiplicity and its singular unfolding: a messianic passerby 
who is to-come.  
As noted previously (p214), sight cannot see life, but it “brings to life” that which it sees, 
sensually. Sight enfolds all color, which exists enfoldedly (complicite) and vitally (vitaliter) in 
sensuality.608 In failing to recognize the passerby, the intellect fails to awaken the senses, and 
thus fails to enfold and enliven the other. By turning one’s attention to the other, “somnolent 
reason is awakened through wondering, so that it hastens” to see the other.609 God is named 
Theos, says Cusa, because we hasten to see God and because God hastens to see us.610
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persons created in the image of Theos, we likewise hasten to see our neighbor, awakened through 
wondering. Thus intellectually awakened, we no longer see the other objectively. The other is not 
objectified. Rather, the passerby exists enfoldedly and vitally in sensuality, in living color.  
That is not to say, of course, that we animate the other, bringing the inanimate to life. 
Though the passerby was not recognized, seen as a mere object, the passerby was (obviously) 
alive. Nevertheless, in failing to recognize the passerby, it is as if the other were not alive. The 
passerby is seen as mere matter, an object for visual consumption. But suppose one sees, beyond 
all knowledge and apart from measure.611
Awakened to Perceive the Quiddity of Beings 
 Turning one’s attention to one’s neighbor, one is 
awakened, in a state of wonder, to see one’s neighbor, bringing him/her to life, as it were, insofar 
as he/she exists enfoldedly and vitally in sensuality. In wonder, my neighbor matters. 
In Part One (p347), I distinguished between YDLĞYƗQDUD and WXUƯ\D by distinguishing 
between “seeing” and “perceiving.” Though one sees and discriminates in YDLĞYƗQDUD, it is only 
in WXUƯ\a that one is fully awakened to the truth of nonduality and thus able to see the Self in all 
beings and all beings in the Self.612
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 Similarly, the analogy of the passerby enables us to 
distinguish between “seeing” and “perceiving” from Cusa’s perspective. Though one sees the 
passerby with the eye, “reproduces” this other in the imagination, and discriminates this other 
qua other in the mind (ratio) through comparative proportion, one only perceives one’s neighbor 
when one’s attention is no longer captured by intellectual distractions but is awakened to a state 
of wonder, shining an intellectual light upon the senses, gazing upon his/her face so that this 
passerby might be re/cognized as he/she intends. The other is no longer seen objectively, but 
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exists enfoldedly (complicite), vitally, and wonder-fully, in sensual complicity. Just as Theos 
hastens to see the seeker, the awakened intellect hastens to see the passerby. 
In DQD 3, Cusa ascends the ladder of vision once more. Just as an external light must 
have some source, so also the internal light must have a source. He continues: 
And just as sight itself does not discriminate but in it a discriminating spirit 
discriminates, so too in the case of our intellect, illuminated by the divine 
light of its own Beginning, in accordance with its aptitude for [that light] to 
enter: in and of ourselves, we will neither understand nor live by means of 
our intellectual life; rather, God, who is Infinite Life, will live in us.613
In re/cognizing the passerby, the seer (epistemically) gives life to the other, as it were, in living 
color. The seer gives life in this way because the Source of intellectual attentiveness is the divine 
light which descends. When I recognize my neighbor, passing by, it is not “I” who gives life to 
my neighbor, but Theos, the Beholder, who is the Seer of my sight. Earlier, it was stated that 
intellectual attention is guided by free will which guides one’s attention towards or away from 
things seen.
 
614
 The intellectual light descends, in other words, in accordance with our agential 
direction. In the passage cited above, though, Cusa writes not of the intellectual light in its 
descent, but in its Source. The divine light descends, anointing the intellect, in accordance with 
its aptitude for that light to enter. The divine light descends gracefully, provided that we are apt 
to receive its christening. God manifests Godself, Cusa explains, to “[one]-who-is-hastening-
onward unto the quiescence of motion.”615
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 Having removed intellectual distractions, one 
removes, also, agential direction. One does not will to see, but rather removes selfish will, in a 
“quiescence of motion,” in order to perceive. Sensuality qua apophatic measure entails shedding 
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distractions which capture our attention, shedding our willful intentions to sensually consume, 
and awakening to see in a state of wonder beyond measure. 
According to Cusa, in other words, there are competing wills to see. God wills me to 
perceive my neighbor (passing by), but my own will moves my attention in another direction. 
Empowered with “free will,” I move my attention towards that which captures it: that which I 
intend to see. Objects consume my attention. I measure the world—objectively—according to 
my subjective intentions. But suppose I see—beyond all knowledge and apart from all 
measure.616
For vision to occur, two paths of light must meet, not simply pass-by, unrecognized. 
Since the divine light is the Source of life and light, then it is this divine light which enlivens my 
senses. When I gaze upon the face of the passerby, into the eyes of my neighbor, what I see is the 
divine light that has descended “in” this other seer. If I fail to re/cognize this passerby, I fail to 
see this divine light which intends to be seen as it attends to me. Though our lights crossed paths, 
they failed to meet. Awakened to perceive, though, I perceive my neighbor in a state of wonder. 
“[H]astening onward unto a quiescence of motion,” the seeker of God finds God revealing 
 In that case, I quiet my own intention in a “quiescence of motion.” In this quiescence 
of willful (selfish) intention, I attend to divine intention. Having awakened the intellect by 
removing distractions, I cultivate an aptitude to receive the divine light. This light descends unto 
the intellect, the rational mind, the imagination, the senses, and finally to sensible things which 
intend my attention. Thusly, God manifests Godself. Cusa’s phenomenology of vision constitutes 
an apophasis of distraction and will such that one cultivates an aptitude to receive the graceful 
descent of God’s divine light.  
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Godself in, through, and as the divine light that has descended unto the other, anointing one’s 
neighbor. 
Attending to the passerby, I see God-who-intends-to-be-seen-by-attending-to-me. Having 
traced the descent of the divine light, one finds oneself seen, as was the case when climbing the 
“ladder of ascent.” The path folds back upon itself. Ascending, hastening to see Theos, one finds 
oneself seen by Theos. Descending, attending to one’s neighbor, one also finds oneself seen: By 
the passerby, of course, but by the passerby-who-is-an-utterly-unique-revelation-of-God. Again, 
that is not to say that one is seen by a “pious interiority of ‘God within’” one’s neighbor.617
“The quiddity of things, which is the truth of beings,” cannot be known but can be 
seen.
 
Rather, it is to insist that being seen by one’s neighbor (passing by), in his/her “quiddity” or 
irreducible particularity is synonymous with being seen by God, since God exists unfoldedly as 
and in this unique passerby. 
618
 Since all knowledge, at least from Cusa’s perspective, is attained through comparative 
proportion of the known to the unknown, then the quiddity of any particular thing is unknowable 
since every particular entity “enjoy[s] a certain singularity that cannot be found in any other 
thing.”619
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 Perceiving through the apophatic measure, one removes all conjectures about any 
particular entity. In a gesture of hospitality that seems (lamentably) radical, one attends to one’s 
neighbor, without expectation. In wondrous attention, one awakens to discover an/other’s 
irreducible particularity: a unique quiddity that can be seen but not known.  
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Seeing through Cusa’s Wall and ĝDৄkara’s Liminal Darkness 
Comparative Theology as Faith Seeking Liberated Understanding 
In the two previous sections, I have examined Cusa’s ontological analysis of vision as a 
pathway for seeking God, first through the “ladder of ascent” and then through the graceful 
descent of the divine light. As we have seen, vision turns out to be far more than a simple 
analogy for theological inquiry, but is a path wherein seeking for God coincides with being 
sought by God and where seeing God coincides with being seen. Sight, for Cusa, is complicated. 
It cannot be examined in anything less than a systematic way, incorporating cosmology, 
ontology, epistemology, theology, and even ethics. Reading Cusa after 9HGƗQWD complicates 
matters all the more. Since ĝDৄkara and Cusa each offer rather systematic and “complete” 
analyses of perception, what value can there be in comparison? Doesn’t comparison simply make 
already complicated matters more complicated? 
If one defines theology, as Anselm did, as faith seeking understanding, then we might 
define comparison as understanding seeking freedom. Comparison disrupts systematic coherence 
by presenting systematically coherent alternatives. It frees us to consider unforeseen possibilities. 
Matters that seem settled and closed are opened up again. Comparative theology, then, faithfully 
seeks understanding while simultaneously resisting systematization and rigidity. It liberates 
theological systems from reified structures of thought. My goal in comparing ĝDৄkara’s sensual 
epistemology with Cusa’s is neither to determine which one is “correct,” nor is it to stitch them 
together to animate a Frankenstein-like amalgamation. Rather, the goal is to faithfully seek an 
understanding of our own ignorance of perception. Refusing to decide between one or the other 
perspective, then, becomes a sign of faith, not a marker of its absence. Faith seeks understanding. 
As Augustine cautioned: If one has understood, then that which one has understood is not 
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God.620
For example, the internal, systematic coherence of ĝDৄkara’s analysis of perception 
forecloses other possible avenues for thinking about perception. Doubts and questions are 
faithfully raised, but are systematically considered and coherently decided. This results in an 
analysis of perception clear enough to be mapped out and diagrammed, as depicted in various 
images throughout Part One. Reading Cusa’s analysis of perception after ĝDৄkara, however , one 
is confronted with a system that is similar enough to be recognizable and comparable, but 
different enough to liberate previously decided matters from settled determinacy. Understandings 
faithfully sought in theology are faithfully liberated (deconstructed) through comparison. 
 Faith neither seeks nor finds certainty. Comparative theology liberates faith so that one 
might faithfully seek all the more truly and unknowingly. 
Juxtaposing Cusa’s ontology of perception with ĝDৄkara’s, noteworthy similarities arise, 
as do significant differences. Comparing and contrasting is of limited value if the result is a 
merely descriptive tallying of agreements and disagreements. Rather, the similarities give us an 
entrée for rethinking each theologian, thereby opening each of them up for reconsideration. What 
seem, prima facie, to be significant differences prompt contemplation. Alterity presents 
opportunity for imaginative subjectivity. To posit a musical analogy: Can we transpose Cusa into 
the key of ĝDৄkara and ĝDৄkara into the key of Cusa, not because one or the other key is “better,” 
but because theological truth is an aesthetic measured by harmony, not unison? Comparative 
theology frees faith from monotonous understanding, unfolding unison into concordant 
polyphonies.  
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Seeing through Doors 
As discussed in Part One (pp93, 100, etc.), knowledge is functionally negative in 
ĝDৄkara’s method. Just as antibiotics are a means to remove illness, knowledge is a means to 
remove ignorance.621 It does not possess the same reality as the end itself.622 MƗ\Ɨ, as we have 
seen, indicates knowledge as well as illusion.623 As measuring, knowledge is merely for the sake 
of instruction.624 Just as a teacher may point, by the gesture of a finger, to that which is to be 
seen, the finger is merely a means of indication which is no longer needed once it has fulfilled its 
purpose.625 Likewise, knowledge does not exist for another moment once the truth of nonduality 
has been perceived.626 Apophasis, for ĝDৄkara, is the negation of the measure, enabling us to 
perceive that which is measured. Sense perception is a way of knowing that is irreducible to 
knowledge.627
For the doctor of learned ignorance, however, ignorance must be learned (docta) but 
cannot be removed. In the opening chapters of De docta ignorantia, he diagnoses the epistemic 
dis/ease: Our knowledge of the world in which we live is mere conjecture. Cusa suggests a 
“treatment” for this condition: the coincidence of opposites as a way of knowing. It does not 
“cure” the ailment since the condition is intrinsic to our knowing. Instead, by examining the 
specific epistemic causes of the disjunction (viz., comparative relation of similarities and 
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differences), the coincidence of opposites finds a way through the condition. Thus, by learning 
our ignorance, we learn to see through the coincidence of opposites.  
The coincidence of opposites leads us to a super-rational or hyper-rational intellectual 
intuition beyond rational comprehension. As Cusa explains, there are various ways of knowing, 
each of which is best suited to know reality differently. Thus, we “know” sensible things 
sensibly (i.e., by means of sense organs), rational things rationally (i.e., by means of comparative 
relation), and intellectual things intellectually (i.e., by means of the coincidence of opposites). 
Accordingly, we come to know incomprehensible things (i.e., infinite things) incomprehensibly, 
which is to say, by contemplatively removing epistemic measures so that we might see through 
the coincidence of opposites. 
Although the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad describes the SUƗMña as the “entrance to the mind,” 
ĝDৄkara explains that it is a door through which one can enter or exit, so-to-speak.628 The SUƗMña 
is the “entrance to the mind” from states of ignorance and duality, but also the “entrance to the 
mind” from the perspective of the sole Witness, the seer of sight who “enters” the body up to the 
tip of the fingernail.629 Due to the perception of the Self in the effect (i.e., the manifest world), it 
is said to have “entered.”630
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 Therefore, the SUƗMña is the liminal state between dualistic 
discrimination and non-dual realization. It is a crossroads or turning point from which one either 
returns to the states of ignorance, or proceeds to a realization of the Self. Despite his assertion 
that one in this state is a “wise one” who knows all things (past, present, and future), ĝDৄkara 
regards this state as merely a door: a liminal threshold between duality and nonduality. 
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Reading back-and-forth, ĝDৄkara’s discussion of the SUƗMña as the liminal “door” 
between ignorance and realization invites juxtaposition to one of Cusa’s most celebrated and 
discussed illustrations of seeing through the coincidence of opposites. In De visione Dei, we find: 
And I have found the abode wherein You dwell unveiledly—an abode 
surrounded by the coincidence of contradictories. And [this coincidence] is 
the wall of Paradise, wherein You dwell. The gate of this wall is guarded by a 
most lofty rational spirit; unless this spirit is vanquished the entrance will not 
be accessible. Therefore, on the other side of the coincidence of 
contradictories You can be seen—but not at all on this side. If, then, O Lord, 
in Your sight impossibility is necessity, then there is nothing which Your 
sight does not see.631
Like the SUƗMña, one who “knows” fails to see. For ĝDৄkara, one perceives by removing 
ignorance. For Cusa, one perceives by “vanquishing” rationality and, along with it, all knowing. 
From one vantage, these may seem to be opposing views. Prodding deeper, though, it is clear 
that knowledge ceases, according to ĝDৄkara, when ignorance ceases.
 
632
Standing at the door (ǀVWLXP) of the coincidence of opposites, Cusa again links perception 
with being, as discussed earlier in DQD: 
 Moreover, the ignorance 
which scriptural knowledge removes is not other than duality inherent to language and reason. 
Opposites do not coincide, for ĝDৄkara, because opposites were never truly opposed to one 
another; in truth, opposites are non-dual. 
You are seeable by all creatures, and You see all creatures. For in that You 
see all creatures You are seen by all creatures. For otherwise creatures could 
not exist, since they exist by means of Your seeing. But if they were not to 
see You, who see [them], they would not receive being from You. The being 
of a creature is, alike, Your seeing and Your being seen.633
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Seeing, whether divine or human, is enfolding. As we have seen in DQD, colors exist enfoldedly 
and vitally in sight. Likewise, all creatures exist enfoldedly in God through God’s vision such 
that “the being of a creature is, alike, [God’s] seeing and [God’s] being seen.”634 For ĝDৄkara, 
the sole Witness is the seer of sight who is said to have “entered” the body up to the tip of the 
fingernail because the Self is perceived in the effect (i.e., the manifest world).635 As non-dual 
cause and effect, the being of the Self is its seeing and being seen. While the Self as supreme 
cause remains beyond our grasp, Its effect, which is ontologically non-different from that cause, 
is perceived in the form of the visible world (as in the milk-curd analogy).636
Like the liminal darkness of the SUƗMña in ĝDৄkara, the coincidence of opposites is, for 
Cusa, a liminal passageway where seeing coincides with entering and being seen coincides with 
exiting: 
 Transposing Cusa’s 
melody into a ĝDৄkaran key, we might say that ĝDৄkara’s Witness, the seer of sight, sees its own 
unfolding. Modulating again to a Cusan mode, we might say that God, as supreme cause, 
remains beyond our grasp, but God’s “effect,” which is ontologically non-different from God, is 
perceived in God’s unfolding. Harmonizing Cusa’s adverbial ontology with ĝDৄkara, one might 
say that the cause exists effectively (enfoldedly) in the effect and the effect exists causally 
(unfoldedly) in the cause.  
How is it that from the one Concept there are so many different things? You 
enlighten me, who am situated at the threshold of the door [in limine ostii]; 
for Your Concept is most simple eternity itself.637
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Just as the SUƗMña is the liminal door between the non-dual Self and duality, the coincidence of 
opposites is a liminal door between unity and multiplicity. Unsaying his own sayings, Cusa 
proceeds to find God “beyond the wall of the coincidence of enfolding and unfolding.”638
When I find You to be a power that enfolds all things, I go in. When I find 
You to be a power that unfolds, I go out. When I find You to be a power that 
both enfolds and unfolds, I both go in and go out.
 Not 
unlike ĝDৄkara’s liminal darkness, Cusa transgresses liminality by entering and exiting: 
639
Entering and exiting, folding and unfolding, Cusa then turns to the language of cause and 
effect. Like ĝDৄkara’s interpretation of clay, pot, and lump in the &KƗQGRJ\D Upaniৢad, 
frequently cited in his MKBh, one misreads Cusa if effect is thought to be ontologically other 
than cause. Like milk and curd, cause is not identical with effect, but exists otherwise: possibly 
and actually. Standing upon the groundless ground of the liminal threshold, peering through the 
coincidence of opposites, Cusa continues: 
  
From creatures I go in unto You, who are Creator—go in from the effects 
unto the Cause. I go out from You, who are Creator—go out from the Cause 
unto the effects. I both go in and go out when I see that going out is going in 
and that, likewise, going in is going out.640
Creation, in ĝDৄkara’s non-dual cosmology, is to be understood allegorically.
 
641
 Though 
Indra is ever unborn (DMƗWL), the unmanifest Indra unfolds (Y\ƗNUL\D) Itself as the manifest for the 
purpose of making itself seen and thus known, lest it remain a mere “lump of cognition.”642
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Creation, insists ĝDৄkara, cannot occur in any real sense, since something cannot come from 
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nothing. Indra is neither creature nor Creator. Rather, what is allegorically called “creation” is 
the manifest unfolding of the Unmanifest, for the sake of making Itself known: 
If name and form were not manifested, the Self’s unconditioned state called 
prajñƗQDJKDQDwould not be known. But when name and form become 
manifested as the body and senses, then its nature becomes known.643
Hence, the unborn Self unfolds by measurings (PƗ\ƗEKLۊ) so that it might be known, measure-
by-measure.
 
644
Modulating once again into a Cusan key, we find that unfolding and enfolding resist 
dualistic conception. Like the four states of the catu܈SƗW doctrine, the Creator’s enfolding and 
creation’s unfolding are epistemic measures which aid our understanding but must, ultimately, be 
transcended: 
 
For creation’s going out from You is creation’s going in unto You; and 
unfolding is enfolding. And when I see You-who-are-God in Paradise, which 
this wall of the coincidence of opposites surrounds, I see that You neither 
enfold nor unfold— whether separately or collectively. For both separating 
and conjoining are the wall of coincidence, beyond which You dwell, free 
from whatever can be either spoken of or thought of.645
In this passage, Cusa is not, I argue, throwing his theological hands in the air in mystical homage 
to that from which words turn away.
 
646
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 He is not simply reaching the limits of what can be said 
and signaling “all that and more!” He is, I argue, shifting away from language of theological 
description towards a language of perspective and modality. Rather than elaborate such an 
argument here, I state it now as a hypothesis, to be supported in the next chapter.  
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To say that God neither enfolds nor unfolds is not to unsay what Cusa has previously 
said. Rather, it marks a shift towards an adverbial ontology consistent with what has been shown 
earlier in this chapter. To say that God enfolds and unfolds would be to bind God to temporal 
and ontological modalities or activities in a manner inconsistent with God’s infinity. 
Alternatively, to say that God exists enfoldedly as well as unfoldedly signals an ontological unity 
which is not opposed to multiplicity, since the adverbial distinction is neither rooted nor 
dependent upon ontological alterity, but, instead, in perspective. In other words, God is seen in 
the manner in which God is sought. Just as one and the same particular thing exists potentially in 
its form, actually in materiality, sensually in the senses, rationally in ratio, intellectually in the 
intellect, and divinely in God, so also God exists enfoldedly in unity and unfoldedly in 
multiplicity.  
Conclusions 
All human knowledge arises through comparative relation, insists Cusa. When we 
perceive the world around us, we observe unique particulars, each of which enjoy a certain 
singularity that cannot be found in any other thing. Though we see that each is unique, we cannot 
know them in their uniqueness, but only in comparative proportion to what is known. Each 
creature we see is beyond compare. Learning that we do not and cannot know the quiddity of 
these creatures, we learn that they escape our reductive measures. Because we see that they are 
and that they are unique, we cannot but stand in wonder at this unique, unprecedented creature.  
We cannot know God, Cusa explains, because there is no proportion between the finite 
and the infinite. More profoundly, though, we cannot know our neighbor because singularity 
escapes all proportion, as well. While each of these notions is insightfully provocative on their 
own, their entanglement with one another must not be overlooked. The first enfolds the second; 
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the second unfolds the first. God unfolds Godself in and as the multiplicity of creatures, each of 
which is unique, and (for that very reason) unknowable. Cusa radicalizes—and democratizes—
Thomistic apophasis. We can know that God is, but cannot know what God is. Because we 
sensually perceive particular creatures, we know that they are and we see that they are unique, 
but we cannot know what any particular creature is, in its quiddity. Cusa extends the Creator’s 
unknowability to each and every creature. The Creator’s infinite creativity is such that each and 
every creature reveals God uniquely, beyond knowledge and beyond compare. A significant 
theological implication follows from this, which is discussed in the next chapter: each creature is 
an unprecedented—and creative—image of the Creator. 
Learning this ignorance in the opening pages of this chapter, some other implications 
began to unfold. Since singularity can be sensually perceived, a phenomenology of perception 
becomes a pathway for seeking God. While Cusa first led us to believe his ontology of 
perception was merely a “likeness” of a pathway for seeking God, he led us up his “ladder of 
ascent” only to find Theos, the Beholder of vision, the Seer of sight, looking back at us. Seeking 
to behold God, we found ourselves beheld by God.  
Cusa’s path then folded back on itself, tracing the graceful descent of God’s anointing 
light. Faithfully seeking the point at which two paths of light meet, Cusa revealed his other 
intentions through his othering of intentionality. If we long to see what God intends, we must 
shed our own willful intent. By tracing vision’s pathway in its graceful descent, we cultivate a 
sensuality beyond all knowledge and apart from all measure. We awaken to a quiescence of 
motion, renounce agential intent, and remove distractions which capture our attention. At this 
moment, when sensuality becomes an apophatic measure, perception becomes a vocational 
response: attending to an intentional address.  
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Two paths of light then meet. The divine light that gracefully descends through the 
attentive, undistracted intellect, rationality, and the senses meets another light. Having anointed 
my neighbor, I find myself seen by God once again, at the other end of vision’s pathway. Gazing 
hospitably, without expectation, beyond knowledge, and apart from measure, I attend to my 
neighbor, whose gaze intends—uniquely—to be seen. I re/cognize my neighbor, passing by, as 
irreducibly particular creature, a singular imago Dei, an unspeakable measure of the Creator’s 
creativity. Having shed my willful intention, I attend, in wonder, to this other’s intention. 
Apophatic Measure 
This spiritual praxis unfolds the trifold meaning of what I have called the “apophatic 
measure.” First, we come to know what is unknown through comparative relation to what is 
known. Though we see the irreducible particularity of creatures, we only come to know creatures 
through comparative relation. We abstract universals, thereby reducing particulars to cognitive 
measures, as if measuring a circle with an inscribed polygon. Though we can see their quiddity, 
we cannot know it. Learning this ignorance, we unsay—and unknow—these measures. Learned 
ignorance is an apophasis of measuring. 
Second, this learned ignorance leads us to examine sensuality more closely. How are 
phenomena given to the senses? How do our intentions capture our attention? How might we 
eschew objectification? How might we receive phenomena hospitably, in living color, 
renouncing the logic of consumption? Cusa’s phenomenology of perception cultivates sensuality 
as an apophatic measure. Having learned our ignorance, we learn to see, beyond all knowledge 
and apart from measure. Significantly, we cultivate this vision at the very moment when we find 
ourselves seen: at the apex of Cusa’s “ladder of ascent” where Theos is found to be the Seer of 
sight, the Beholder of beholding, the “King of kings,” in whom all is enfolded. 
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Third, sensuality as an apophatic measure leads us to trace the graceful descent of the 
divine light. Folding back on itself, Cusa’s pathway for seeking God leads us to the multiplicity 
of creatures. Having learned our ignorance and having learned to perceive without measure, we 
gaze, in wonder, at our neighbor passing by. No longer consumed with distractions, our attention 
awakens to an/other’s intention. We perceive our neighbor as a unique—and thus unspeakable—
measure of divine creativity.  
Enfolding Touch 
While similar—but qualitatively different—insights may have emerged from a less 
complicated exegesis, these constitute “a kind of biblio/biography—of what I came to see 
through these texts.”647 Francis Clooney describes comparative theology as a praxis through 
which “the engaged reader is ‘inscribed’ into an ever more complexly composed context, in 
order to write after and out of it.”648
ĝDৄkara and Cusa are irreducibly unique. It would be altogether contrary to my thesis 
reduce their singularity through an abstraction won through comparative relation. Points at which 
their theologies seem to touch draw attention, if only to again accentuate their unique intentions. 
If they were saying the same thing, one could simply leave one or the other aside. If they were 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to capture some degree of 
the complexly composed context into which I have inscribed myself and from which I write. I 
compose this biblio/biography conscious of the fact that my reader will, on occasion, regard 
connections I draw between the two to be somewhat tangential. While I hope these occasions are 
rare, I nevertheless appeal to the reader to consider the sensual etymology of “tangential,” from 
the Latin tangere, “to touch.”  
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saying something altogether different, there could be no basis for comparison whatsoever. 
Neither is the case. Each, in his own way, disrupts any facile duality between unity and 
multiplicity. In so doing, each frustrates monism and subject-object dualism. Each cultivates a 
sensuality whereby the One and the Many are seen, without opposition. 
As I have argued (200ff.), their epistemologies and theologies of language are not merely 
different, but are at opposite ends of a continuum. Only by reading them together can one 
glimpse this continuum. Their articulations of linguistic measures unfold in near opposite 
directions. For ĝDৄkara, (Sanskrit) language has no temporal/historical origin… human, divine, 
or otherwise. For this reason, linguistic cognition resulting from direct perception reliably and 
truly measures reality. Perception is a valid means of knowledge. For Cusa, language is a human 
creation: a rational measure that forever falls infinitely shy of measuring truth, as a polygon fails 
to measure a circle. Perception is not a valid means of knowledge; it is a prelude to conjecture. 
Learning our ignorance, we learn to see—beyond all knowledge and apart from all measure. In 
the next chapter, I accentuate this opposition649
Standing at the threshold of Cusa’s door in the wall of paradise where opposites coincide, 
one stands at a crossroads. One is able to see multiple possibilities from this liminal vantage. 
Depending which way one turns, everything changes. Looking in, one enters, enfolded into the 
oneness of God. Looking out, one exits, unfolded into the divine multiplicity of the Creator’s 
creation. Is God one or multiple? For Cusa, the answer must be “yes.” God’s unity and 
multiplicity are not opposed to one another. Both possibilities are actualized, simultaneously, 
without contradiction. As one’s perspective changes, one’s view of God changes. Regardless of 
 all the more strongly. For Cusa, language is no 
mere human creation; it exemplifies creativity and is, thus, a way of knowing the Creator. 
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 That is, the opposition between ĝDৄNDUD’s view that perception is a valid means of knowledge and Cusa’s 
assertion that perception is not a valid means of knowledge.  
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whether one looks “in” to unity or “out” to multiplicity, one peers beyond contradictories. One 
finds oneself seen, anointed by the divine light that gracefully descends. Attending to the 
intentional gaze of one’s neighbor, two paths of light meet.  
In the liminal state of SUƗMña, analogous to deep sleep, one stands at the threshold 
between the nonduality of the WXUƯ\D and the duality of the YDLĞYƗQDUDand taijasa, analogous to 
everyday waking and dream. Though all dualistic measures have been absorbed into this “lump 
of consciousness,” one is certainly not awakened to the truth of Brahman. Only when one’s eyes 
are opened to the multiplicity does one realize Brahman’s simplicity. Only after all measures 
have been progressively dissolved is one awakened to see beyond the liminal door between 
monism and dualism.  
Reading back and forth between Cusa and ĝDৄkara, we see that they are different. Each is 
unique. And yet, reading them together discloses a liminal space where the two seem to touch, 
tangentially. If we are to apprehend the relationship between unity and multiplicity, we must 
learn to see differently. Regardless of whether linguistic knowledge reliably measures reality or 
is inescapably conjectural, it is nevertheless true, for both ĝDৄkara and Cusa, that these measures 
obscure our perception. Removing all measures, we cultivate a sensuality without measure, 
enabling us to see the inherent divinity of creatures, in, through, and as a multiplicity that is not 
opposed to unity. 
 Five: Creative Measuring in Nicholas of Cusa: 
Math, Maps, and the Trinitarian Imago Dei  
Outline and Goals 
I previously noted (p190) that nearly all human knowledge is mere conjecture, from 
Cusa’s perspective. Due to the nature of human epistemology, we fail to know the world-as-it-is, 
but instead conjecture the world-as-we-“measure”-it. Not all human knowledge, however, is 
knowledge of the world, so not all human knowing is conjectural. While the human mind cannot 
precisely measure the world in which we live, it can precisely measure that which it creates. In 
sharp contrast to 0ƯPƗীsaka doctrine regarding the eternal, unauthored connection between 
particulars, words, and universals (p97), Cusa understands human language, especially the 
language of mathematics, to be a human creation par excellence. To be created in the image of 
the Creator, from Cusa’s perspective, means to be creative.  
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between creativity, measuring, and sensuality 
from Cusa’s Trinitarian perspective. I begin with a brief historical sketch to introduce and 
contextualize three texts Cusa either completed or began in the world-changing year of 1453. I 
then outline Cusa’s four premises as articulated in the third of these texts, De Beryllo, especially 
his notions of measuring and creativity. In the second section, my focus narrows to analyze three 
creative measures of key importance to Cusa’s apophatic theology, viz., mathematics, 
cartography, and perspective. Because mathematical certainty plays a role in Cusa’s theology 
similar to that played by pratyak܈a SUDPƗ۬a in ĝDৄkara’s theology, I briefly compare and 
contrast their views (p263). Unlike the world in which we live, we know mathematics precisely 
and certainly because it is a human creation. Given that we do not know the world-as-it-is but 
only the world-as-we-measure-it, Cusa employs cartographical analogies to make profound 
theological and ethical points about human creativity. Combining the methods of mathematics 
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and cartography, I illustrate Cusa’s theory of perspective, which grounds his theo-ethics of 
intersubjectivity 
How do our creative measures shape the world in which we live? How might we create in 
the Spirit of God? How might the trifold meaning of “apophatic measure” foster a creative 
(re)measuring of ourselves, our neighbors, and our ecologies? In the third section, I explore these 
questions through a constructive theological formulation of Cusa’s Trinitarian imago Dei. 
Reading Cusa’s De visione Dei, De beryllo, and De pace fidei synoptically, I again examine the 
role of perception in his apophatic theology, this time taking into account his understanding of 
measuring as creativity. In De visione Dei, Cusa encourages his reader to learn to see other 
persons as Christ saw them. Gradually learning to see others in this way, one learns, also, to see 
the Creator’s harmonious intention in and through natural ecologies, as considered in De beryllo. 
Learning to see in this way constitutes a theosis, filiation, or christiformitas which promotes 
human creativity in the concordant Spirit of God. Cusa offers a vision of this concordant creative 
Spirit in De pace fidei. By cultivating this sensual theosis, we begin to actualize the possibility of 
a Trinitarian imago Dei through an eco-Spiritual vocation of creativity. 
Historical and Theoretical Context 
1453 
It is difficult to overstate the distress experienced by Western society resulting from the 
siege and destruction of Constantinople by Sultan Mehmet II and his Ottoman troops in May 
1453. The destruction was so dire that even the Sultan is said to have been moved to tears.650
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 In a 
letter conveying the news to Cusa, Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II) wrote:  
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Who of sound mind will not mourn?... The river of all doctrines is cut off; the 
mount of the Muses is dried up. Where now is poetry to be sought? Where 
now philosophy?651
The trauma struck Cusa personally. He had visited the city fifteen years earlier, returning 
with the Byzantine Emperor, Patriarch, and Greek Bishops to attend the Union Council of 
Ferrara. In Constantinople, he was exposed to a wealth of Eastern Orthodox theological ideas 
which significantly shaped his thought. On the return sea voyage in 1438, he had an epiphany, 
which inspired his De docta ignorantia. Upon hearing the news of Constantinople’s fall, he 
records a second vision in his De pace Fidei (On the Peace of Faiths, 1453, DPF).  
 
Mirroring, in many ways, the pneumatological conciliar theology expressed in his first 
major text, De concordantia catholica (On Universal Concord, 1433, DCC), DPF envisions a 
heavenly ecclesiastical council attended by theologians representing all of the world religious 
traditions known to him at the time. According to his vision, the council was summoned after the 
devastation of Constantinople because, “The Lord… has heard the moaning of those… who 
suffer on account of the diversity of the religions.”652 Cusa writes this dialogue in the voice of 
religious others, calling for the peaceful coexistence of faiths. In fact, his assertion that “there is 
only one religion in a variety of rites” echoes an utterance by the Prophet Muhammad from a text 
Cusa had in his possession.653 The differences between religious traditions should not be 
eliminated, he argues, “in order that the diversity may make for an increase of devotion.”654
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While it would certainly be anachronistic to categorize DPF as comparative theology, it 
foreshadows this inclination in compelling ways. In this interreligious dialogue, Cusa attributes 
theological value to religious diversity. As in DCC, he argues that the truth of spiritual thought 
does not manifest as a unison, but as a harmony of sundry voices, speaking from diverse 
perspectives.655
The goal of interreligious theological discourse in DPF is not to synthetically fabricate a 
universal religion or perennial philosophy. To do so would abstract universals from unique 
particulars through comparative relation, thereby reducing singularity to similarity. Cusa has 
learned this ignorance already and certainly avoids cognitive dissonance here. This cardinal has 
social and political intentions, of course, as he did when he composed DCC.
 Perhaps more clearly than any of his other writings, DCC and DPF articulate the 
in-breaking movement of the Holy Spirit, whose presence is discerned through concord.  
656
Just weeks later, Cusa completes his theological masterpiece, De visione Dei (On the 
vision of God, 1453, DVD). On behalf of the Benedictine monks at Tegernsee Abbey, Abbot 
Kaspar Ayndorffer asked Cusa, “whether the devout soul can attain to God without intellectual 
knowledge… and [thus] only by means of affection.”
 And yet, his 
motivation is clearly pneumatological, as well. The Spirit of God is discerned neither through 
unison nor discord, but concordantly. 
657
 In one of more than 450 letters 
exchanged with Tegernsee Abbey, Cusa insists that both are necessary, and subsequently 
composes DVD as a robust response.658
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peculiar painting,” which I discuss later (p328). My focus on this text is primarily limited to 
Cusa’s articulation of Christology in that text and a related sermon. 
In December of the same year, Cusa began composing a companion text to DVD, also 
addressed to the monks at Tegernsee. He completed the text five years later, while effectively 
imprisoned in Castle Andraz following the final of several assassination attempts and having 
been taken hostage.659
305
 De Beryllo (On the Beryl Stone, 1453-8, DB) sketches and unfolds four 
philosophical/theological premises that encapsulate Cusa’s understanding of God as Creator 
together with his Renaissance humanism. Hence, when read synoptically with DPF and DVD, 
one gleans unique insights into Cusa’s humanist anthropology and his theology of the economic 
Trinity, as demonstrated below (p ). 
Four Premises 
Cusa begins De beryllo by identifying the text as a work which reveals a method of 
inquiry which exemplifies the coincidence of opposites. Through this method, “the indivisible 
Beginning of all things would be attained.”660
First Premise 
 This method is aided by four philosophical-
theological premises which are subsequently expounded in the rest of the text.  
Cusa’s first premise asserts that God is a divine intellect. “From Intellect all things come 
into existence in order for the Intellect to manifest Itself.”661
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 Creation, then, is not an accident, it 
is not the result of logical necessity, and it is not an epiphenomenon that proceeds from an 
Aristotelian prime mover. Creation is an intentional, manifest revealing of the Creator-Intellect. 
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If that Creator-Intellect is to be manifest, then it follows that it must create beings, “that are 
capable of beholding Its Reality/Truth [veritas].”662
For Cusa, the first premise states nothing different than what Paul has stated in his 
Roman Epistle: “Ever since the creation of the world, God’s invisible nature, namely, God’s 
eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made.”
 Hence, “the Creator offers Itself to these 
substances in the manner in which they are able to apprehend It as visible.”  
663
So visible things exist in order that the Divine Intellect—the Maker of all 
things—may be known in and through them… For perceptible objects are the 
senses’ books; in these books the intention of the Divine Intellect is described 
in perceptible figures. And the intention is the manifestation of God the 
Creator.
 Citing 
this verse, he adds: 
664
 
 
Figure 16: First Premise in DB 
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Natural forms exist enfoldedly in the Divine Intellect, which is their Source and Creator, and 
unfoldedly as the visible, natural, created world around us “in order that the Divine Intellect… 
may be known in and through them.” In this first premise, Cusa concludes, “all that remains to 
be said is contained enfoldedly [complicite].”665
Second Premise 
 
He articulates the second premise as follows:  
Whatever exists exists otherwise in something else than it exists in itself. For 
in itself it exists as in its own true being; but in something other [than itself] it 
exists as in its own truthlike being.666
Though stated more concisely here, this premise has already been expounded in the previous 
chapter (p
 
212). Turning again to his ontology of perception, Cusa explains that that which exists 
actually in perceptible things exists sensually in the senses, rationally in the ratio, and 
intellectually in the intellect. Importantly, however, the second premise only captures one aspect 
of his ontology of perception, viz., intentionality. As cited above, “perceptible objects are the 
senses’ books,” which manifestly reveal the Creator’s intention. As discussed earlier (p226), 
intention indicates the inwardly orientated aspect of perception whereas attention indicates the 
outwardly oriented aspect of perception.667
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Figure 17: Second Premise in DB 
Moreover, natural forms exist potentially in themselves but actually in perceptible objects. 
Hence, “whatever exists exists otherwise in something else than it exists in itself.” As discussed 
in section three below (p300), this subtle but important point grounds Cusa’s theology of the 
body.  
The language of the second premise is thoroughly ontological. No ontological alterity is 
implied in either the first or the second premise, but only in the third. Ontological distinctions in 
the first and second premises are best expressed adverbially: That which exists actually in 
perceptible things exists sensually in sensuality, rationally in ratio, intellectually in intellect and 
potentially in itself (in se). Notice that the previous sentence has but one subject (i.e., “that which 
exists actually in perceptible things”) and one verb (i.e., “exists”), but various modes of being 
which are in no way mutually exclusive. The Divine Intellect exists unfoldedly as natural forms, 
which exist unfoldedly as perceptible objects. These are the “senses’ books; in these books the 
intention of the Divine Intellect is described in perceptible figures.”668
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Third Premise 
Cusa’s third premise is as follows: 
Thirdly, note the saying of Protagoras that [the human person] is the measure 
of things. With the senses one measures perceptible things, with the intellect 
one measures intelligible things, and one attains unto supra-intelligible things 
transcendently. One does this measuring in accordance with the 
aforementioned [premise]. For when one knows that the cognizing soul is the 
goal of things knowable, one knows on the basis of the perceptive power that 
perceptible things are supposed to be such as can be perceived. And, 
likewise, regarding intelligible things… and transcendent things. Hence, one 
finds in oneself, as in a measuring scale, all created things.669
Prima facie, the third premise may seem to rephrase the second premise. Though it does follow 
from and depend upon the second, closer inspection reveals a significant ontological difference. 
The human intellect is the measure of things. “With the senses one measures perceptible things, 
with the intellect one measures intelligible things.” The perspectival direction reverses from 
premise two to three. It does not speak of perceptible objects as manifestations of divine 
intention, but rather of the human mind and its measuring attention. [refer to Figure] 
 
Because one measures the unfamiliar through comparative relation to the unfamiliar, and 
because each and every particular entity enjoys “a certain singularity that cannot be found in any 
other thing,”670 196 as discussed previously (p ), it follows that “the measure and the measured—
however equal they are—will always remain different.671
196
 I have previously described this as an 
epistemic disjuncture between the world-as-it-is and the world-as-we-measure-it (p ). But if 
there is an ontological—and not merely ontic—difference between measure and measured, one 
must ask: Whence come these measures?  
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Fourth Premise 
Fourthly, note that Hermes Trismegistus states that [the human person] is a 
second god. For just as God is the Creator of real beings and of natural forms, 
so [the human person] is the creator of conceptual beings and of artificial 
forms that are only likenesses of one’s intellect, even as God’s creatures are 
likenesses of the Divine Intellect. And so, one has an intellect that is a 
likeness of the Divine Intellect with respect to creating.672
What the second premise expresses ontologically, the third expresses epistemologically. Hence, 
Cusa states, “one does this measuring in accordance with the aforementioned [premise.]” In 
other words, one should measure sensual things sensually, rational things rationally, etc., rather 
than reducing particular entities to any one of these various ways of knowing. However, the 
fourth premise makes explicit what the third premise implies: the disjuncture between measure 
and measured is not merely epistemic, but ontological. The human mind measures using 
measures it creates. For Cusa, this does not represent human falleness; his purpose is not to 
highlight the insufficiency of human language to describe the divine (though his purpose follows 
from that belief). Rather, his purpose is to emphasize that we create the measures by which we 
measure the Creator’s creation. As free beings, we can choose to create in the Spirit of God 
(attending to the Creator’s intentions), or create selfishly, intending to consume. As I argue later 
(p
 
309), this insight is central to grasping Cusa’s humanistic imago Dei. If one is to know the 
Creator qua Creator, one must know creative things creatively.  
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Figure 18: Third and Fourth Premises in DB 
Here again, Cusa stresses an epistemic problem as a means to transcend that very 
problem. While it remains the case that we do not know the world- as-it-is but only as-we-
measure-it, Cusa has transfigured our ignorance into a likeness of Divine Creativity! Because 
there is an ontological difference between measure and measured, it follows that these measures 
are human creations. As a “second god,” we do not create in the same manner that God creates. 
Nevertheless, the human intellect “is a likeness of the Divine Intellect with respect to creating.” 
Cusa then comes full circle, relating the fourth premise to the first: 
Therefore, one measures one’s own intellect in terms of the power of its 
works; and thereby one measures the Divine Intellect, even as an original is 
measured by means of its image.673
The first (theological) premise is rearticulated in terms of (theological) humanism. The Divine 
Intellect creates in order to manifestly reveal Itself. Likewise, the human intellect creates in order 
to manifestly reveal itself. In other words, God reveals Godself in, through, and as God’s 
creative work in the world, as Paul states in Romans 1:20. Likewise, we reveal ourselves in, 
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through, and as our creative works. Or, in the words of Matthew’s Jesus: “Thus you will know 
them by their fruits.”674
Creative Measures 
 We create faithfully when our creative measures are attentive to the 
Creator’s harmonious intention. 
Through the foregoing sketch of Cusa’s four premises introduced his notion of creative 
measures. As stated above (p256), Cusa describes De beryllo as a method of inquiry. As such, 
this method can be applied in various ways and contexts. In this section, I examine two creative 
measures of particular import within Cusa’s oeuvre: mathematics and cartography. Subsequently 
comparing these two, I distinguish between two distinct but interrelated apophatic methods they 
exemplify: epistemic and perspectival apophasis. Taken together, these methods reveal Cusa’s 
theory of perspective and, simultaneously, the relationship between perception, apophasis, and 
theological ethics. In differing ways, each cultivates sensuality as an apophatic measure. They 
train us to perceive beyond the measures we have created, so that we might attend to the 
Creator’s intention. They call us (vocationally) to create measures more in tune with those 
harmonious intentions.  
Mathematics as Theological Method 
Incorruptible Certainty 
ĝDৄkaraOLNHĝDbara before him, grounded his theology in direct perception because of 
the certainty and reliability of perception. Cognitive errors, such as mistaking a rope for a snake, 
do occur, but can be explained by identifying a discernable problem in the mechanism of 
perception which can be remedied. If someone sees two moons, this may be the result of a 
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disease on the physical eye, such as timira.675 If someone sees a shell but cognizes silver, it may 
be because the internal organ of perception is sleepy or distracted.676 Though reality is non-dual, 
things are seen, dualistically, due to the superimposition of conceptions upon the buddhi, which 
can be removed through scriptural understanding.677 In each case, however, perception is 
XQGHUVWRRGWREHFHUWDLQDQGUHOLDEOH7KHUHLVQRQHHGVD\VĝDEDUDWRHLWKHULQYHVWLJDWHRU
question the verity of perception. Through a clear understanding of the process through which 
perception yields knowledge, one is able to identify the various defects that result in error. “If we 
do not ascertain a defect, having sought assiduously for one, then we should think ‘there is no 
defect,’ due to the absence of proof.”678
104
 In that case, the resulting knowledge must be true and 
FHUWDLQVLQFHVHQVHSHUFHSWLRQLVQHYHUZURQJDFFRUGLQJWRĝDEDUD (p ). 
Cusa’s view of perception is quite the opposite of this. Since there is an insurmountable 
disjuncture between the world-as-it-is and our rational cognition of it, “the measure and the 
measured—however equal they are—will always remain different.679
Proceeding on this pathway of the ancients, I concur with them and say that 
since the pathway for approaching divine matters is opened to us only 
through symbols, we can make quite suitable use of mathematical signs 
because of their incorruptible certainty.
 However, the role of 
mathematics in Cusa’s methodology is quite similar to that of perception in ĝDৄkara’s method, 
though for strikingly different reasons. He states:  
680
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To say that mathematics is incorruptibly certain is not to say that mathematical errors do not 
occur. Mathematical certainty is only as good as the data involved in the calculations, and only 
as reliable as the mathematician performing the calculations. Nevertheless, Cusa would very 
OLNHO\HFKRZLWKUHVSHFWWRPDWKHPDWLFVZKDWĝDEDUDVWDWHVZLWKUHVSHFWWRSHUFHSWLRn: “If we do 
not ascertain a defect, having sought assiduously for one, then we should think ‘there is no 
defect,’ due to the absence of proof.”681
Cusa regards mathematics to be incorruptibly certain because it is entirely a human 
creation. In his trialogue De possest (On Actualized Possibility, 1460, DP), Cusa explains: 
 
[R]egarding mathematical [entities], which proceed from our reason and 
which we experience to be in us as in their source: they are known by us as 
our entities and as rational entities; [and they are known] precisely, by our 
reason’s precision, from which they proceed.682
Real entities in the world, however: 
 
… remain unknown to us precisely as they are. If we know something about 
them, we surmise it by likening a figure to a form… If we have any 
knowledge of them, we derive it from the symbolism and the mirror of [our] 
mathematical knowledge.683
Mathematics is certain, then, because it begins and ends in the rational mind. Our knowledge of 
mathematics is certain, in other words, because mathematics is knowledge, from Cusa’s 
perspective. There is no difference between mathematics qua measure and mathematics qua 
measured. Real entities in the world, however, are obviously not “knowledge,” and hence there is 
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a disjuncture between things-as-they-are and things-as-they-are-known. “[T]he measure and the 
measured—however equal they are—will always remain different.684
&RPSOHPHQWDU\3UDPƗ۬as  
  
Likewise, the intellect does not operate in this way. The intellect constitutes a different 
way of knowing than does the rational mind. Somewhat ironically, this is proved by the fact that 
humans can make mathematical mistakes. A computer, for example, is incapable of 
miscalculating. Because the intellect is something other than or beyond reason, it bears the 
capacity to judge incorrectly as well as correctly, with respect to rationality. It is for this reason 
that Cusa has stated, “we can make quite suitable use of mathematical signs” when approaching 
divine matters.685
Hence, Cusa regarded the relationship between the mathematical sciences and 
philosophical theology to be complementary. Like complementary angles on an infinite line, the 
two ways of knowing represent two very different conceptual domains, each of which must be 
distinguished from direct perception and its precision. In 1453, he composed a pair of texts, De 
mathematicis complementis and De theologicis complementis (DTC), both addressed to Pope 
Nicholas V, who commissioned a translation of Archimedes’ geometrical works as a gift for 
Cusa.
 Mathematics may not yield to us any actual knowledge of real entities in the 
world and may not yield to us any knowledge of divine matters, but mathematics is 
indispensable, from Cusa’s perspective, as a tool to determine whether or not our knowledge of 
the world and knowledge of the divine is rational or not.  
686
                                                     
684
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 In his introduction to the latter, he explains: “If what I here say is to be understood, then 
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this present book must be appended to that [De mathematicis complementis]; for these present 
complementary considerations are drawn from mathematics.” He adds, however, that one should 
attend to his intent rather than to his words because, “these theological matters are better seen 
with the mind’s eye that they can be expressed in words.”687
Like the circle and the polygon, philosophy/theology is qualitatively different from 
mathematics. Regarding ĝDৄkara, it was shown that scripture and perception operate in differing 
domains, yielding different kinds of knowing.
 
688
 Scripture does not reveal knowledge of 
Brahman, but instead reveals knowledge of what Brahman is not, thereby removing conceptual 
impediments to perceiving that which is perceptible and before one’s very eyes.689
Squaring Circles 
 Similarly, 
mathematics does not reveal knowledge of God, but instead reveals to us errors in our 
theological reasoning and the limitations of what can be known rationally. Like squaring the 
sides of a polygon, reason brings us ever nearer to the truth of things, while ever remaining 
infinitely far from truth. Learning this ignorance is paramount in Cusa’s theological method.  
While Cusa consumed and composed mathematical texts throughout his life, he becomes 
especially fascinated with mathematics in the years immediately following the fall of 
Constantinople (1453), for reasons we can only speculate. He composed at least fifteen 
mathematical treatises. As Tamara Albertini points out: “[W]hen Nicholas of Cusa was 
rediscovered by German historians in the nineteenth century, their attention was all on his 
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mathematics. It is only twentieth-century scholarship that revealed what a towering figure of 
Renaissance thought he was.”690
Many of his mathematical texts discuss a problem known as the quadrature of the circle, 
which is closely related to the polygon-circle analogy discussed previously. Stated briefly, the 
ancient Greek mathematician Archimedes (3rd century BCE) postulated that “if there exists a 
square inferior in surface to a given circle, and if there exists a square superior to the same circle, 
[then] there exists a square equal to it.”
  
691
As depicted in 
  
Figure 19, the perimeter of the 
square inscribed in the circle is clearly less than the 
circumference of the circle. The perimeter of the 
square inscribing the circle is clearly greater than the 
circumference of the circle. Since there are an infinite 
number of squares with perimeters between these two 
extremes, Archimedes postulated that a square must 
exist of which the perimeter is equal to the 
circumference of the circle.  
Prima facie, Archimedes’ logic seems sound. However, the circumference of a circle is 
actually 2ʌr where r is the distance between the center of the circle and its circumference. 
$QRWKHUZD\RIVD\LQJWKLVLVWKDWʌLVWKHUDWLRRIWKHFLUFXPIHUHQFHRIWKHFLUFOHWRits diameter. 
%HFDXVHRIWKHQDWXUHRIʌLWLVDQLUUDWLRQDOQXPEHUPHDQLQJWKDWWKHQXPEHUQHYHUHQGV,Q
contrast, the perimeter of a square is simply four times the length of one of its sides. Regardless 
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of the size of the square, then, its perimeter will also be equal to a rational number.692
Cusa argued that if one squares the number of sides of a square (42) (increasing the 
perimeter of the inscribed polygon proportionally), and repeats this (162, 2562, etc.), then the 
perimeter of the resulting polygon will approach the circumference of the inscribing circle, but it 
will never be equal to it. However close the chord comes to its inscribing arc, the two will never 
be equal, even if the difference between them becomes infinitesimal. As depicted in 
 While 
there obviously exists a square the perimeter of which is nearly equal to the circumference of the 
circle, the two will never be equal insofar as the circumference must either be expressed as an 
LUUDWLRQDOQXPEHUVRPHYDOXHWLPHVʌRUURXQGHGWRDQDSSUR[LPDWLRQRIʌ6WULFWO\VSHDNLQJ
then, the two can never be equal. 
Figure 19, 
the distance between a point on the circle (A) and a point bifurcating a side of the inscribed 
square (B) becomes proportionally smaller when the number of angles of the inscribed polygon 
are increased. Hence, line CD is shorter than line AB and, therefore, the perimeter of inscribed 
polygon more closely approaches the circumference of the circle. While our practical efforts to 
measure the circle will become ever more accurate as the difference between the two approaches 
the infinitely small, the measures will never be equal. Regardless of the number of chords 
inscribed in the circle, each chord will always be bifurcated by a radius of the circle and, 
therefore, the measurement can be more accurate.  
Analogously, because of the “cut” between mental cognition and sense perception, 
whatever we “know” will never be equal to what we perceive. “The measure and the measured—
                                                     
692
 In theoretical mathematics, one could conceive of a sqXDUHZLWKDVLGHHTXDOWRʌWKHUHE\H[SUHVVLQJWKH
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however equal they are—will always remain different” (p196).693
Learning that we cannot know precisely, but can perceive precisely, one learns to see 
beyond discursive reasoning, aided by the coincidence of opposites. This critically important 
insight foreshadows (or, arguably initiates) the phenomenological method, as I discuss later 
(p
 We perceive precisely 
(prae/cisio, before the cut), but we know conceptually (concipio, to take in) and rationally 
(rationaliter, by comparative ratio). Hence, true knowledge is to truth as a polygon is to a circle. 
While true knowledge, whether it is scientific knowledge of the world around us or theological 
knowledge through divine revelation, can bring us infinitesimally closer to truth, it will always 
remain beyond our grasp. However, because rational opposites coincide in the intellect, this 
epistemic disjuncture is not altogether insurmountable.  
284). Moreover, it exemplifies a sensuality I am calling the apophatic measure. By learning to 
perceive particular phenomena beyond discursive reasoning, one learns to perceive the Creator’s 
intention ever more pre/cisely (but never cognitively or discursively). Cultivating this ontological 
mode of being sensually, one becomes ever more attentive to these intentions and one creates 
measures in harmony with those intentions. One creates in the Spirit of the God (p305), and 
thusly begins to know the Creator creatively (p309).  
But how does one cultivate this mode of being sensually? How do we learn to perceive in 
this way? The coincidence of opposites is a lens through which we learn to perceive particular 
phenomena, beyond discursive measures. We observe this in Cusa’s Apologia Doctae 
Ignorantiae (Defense of Learned Ignorance, 1449, ADI).  
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Circles under our Eyes 
In his sharp critique of Cusa’s DDI, John Wenck quotes Psalm 46:10 as somewhat of a 
refrain throughout his text: “Be still and see that I am God.” Wenck claims that Cusa’s 
“coincidence of opposites” is a “stratagem” with which Cusa “destroys the fundamental principle 
of all knowledge,” citing Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction.694
He regards the coincidence of opposites as a strategy by which one is able to be faithful 
to the Psalmists command to “Be still and see that I am God.” It is an effective strategy not 
because it “destroys the fundamental principle of all knowledge,” as Wenck charges, but because 
it enables one to overcome the inherent limitations of this fundamental epistemic principle. “To 
see God in this manner,” Cusa explains, “is to see all things as God and God as all things.”
 In response, Cusa 
essentially agrees with Wenck, refuting only the word “destroys” through clarification. 
695
 He 
elaborates, “… learned ignorance is concerned with the mind’s eye and with apprehension-by-
the-intellect—so that whoever is led to the point of seeing ceases from all discursive 
reasoning.”696
Although it is an intellectual seeing, “concerned with the mind’s eye,” that in no way 
denies that it is also sensual vision. Charles Carman argues that the liminality of Cusa’s 
coincidence of opposites maintains “a certain dialectical indistinctiveness between physical and 
intellectual vision.”
 
697
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 Cusa’s ontology of perception never permits complete distinction between 
intellect and sensuality, since they are enfolded and unfolded as each other. In seeing all things 
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with one’s physical eye, “one sees all things as God” with the mind’s eye. What rational 
conception cuts by de/fining entities in terms of contradictories, the intellect mends, so to speak, 
by enfolding contradictories. The coincidence of opposites does not destroy the fundamental 
principle of all knowledge, as Wenck claims, but rather emphasizes it, accentuates it, and 
transforms it into a method to transcend it. Because Wenck’s critique has, perhaps, motivated 
Cusa to write more plainly and directly than he typically does, a lengthy citation is especially 
warranted, with Hopkins’ parentheticals: 
Rational animals reason discursively. Discursive reason investigates and 
makes inferences. Inference is, necessarily, bounded by a terminus a quo and 
a terminus ad quem. And things which are opposed to each other we call 
contradictories. Hence, opposing and separate boundaries belong to 
inferential reasoning. Therefore, in the domain of reason [ratio] the extremes 
are separate; for example, with regard to a circle’s definition [ratio] (viz., that 
the lines from the center to the circumference be equal): the center cannot 
coincide with the circumference. But in the domain of the intellect 
[intellectus]—which has seen that number is enfolded in oneness, that a line 
is enfolded in a point, that a circle is enfolded in a center—the coincidence of 
oneness and plurality, of point and line, of center and circle is attained by 
mental sight apart from inference.698
When one sees a circle with one’s eye, one sees the whole circle, sensually. Rationally, the 
center of the circle and the circumference of the circle cannot coincide. The two must be 
different and distinct from one another and, moreover, must, by definition, be opposed to one 
another. To know a circle rationally is to distinguish between these contradictories: 2ʌr. To make 
a judgment as to whether what-is-seen is or is not a circle, however, center and circumference 
must coincide, intellectually. What is seen precisely with the eye is unfolded rationally through 
contradictories, but enfolded intellectually, and hence “seen” with the mind’s eye.  
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Mathematics plays an important role in Cusa’s apophatic theological method not only 
because it is “incorruptible certainty,”699
Cosmography as Theological Method 
 but also, and especially, because it reveals human 
creativity. For Cusa and contemporaries such as Leon Battista Alberti, mathematics highlights 
ingegno, the human capacity for insight and creative meaning. For Cusa, to be created in the 
image of the Creator entails being creative, and mathematics stands at the zenith of human 
creativity: a lens through which we map our world. 
During Cusa’s near constant travel in and around the German territories, he created a map 
of Germany believed to be the first map of central Europe.700 Cartography was a passion he 
shared with his lifelong friend, Paolo dal Pozza Toscanelli, who cared for Cusa on his deathbed 
ten years before he created the map Christopher Columbus would use on his first voyage to the 
new world.701 While a consideration of his cartographical skill is outside of the purview of our 
concern, his cosmographical intuitions are foundational thereto.702 Like his political, scientific, 
and mathematical contributions, his cosmography also influenced his theology considerably, and 
vice versa. As Pauline Watts explains in her discussion of Cusa’s Idiota de Mente (IDM), “man 
creates both his own interior mental world and his external world through the various arts and 
crafts.”703
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On the one hand, these analogies seek to demonstrate the same thing, viz., the conjectural nature 
of knowledge exemplified in Cusa’s doctrine of learned ignorance. On the other hand, these 
analogies shift the focus from the transcendent to the immanent, which is to say the natural 
geography and landscape in which we live. The cartographer’s map, produced from direct 
perception and measuring, is always a mere likeness or image of the natural world. Like the 
polygon, it always falls shy of the reality it measures. Our maps can always be more accurate 
insofar as they are an image of the world.  
Creative Disjunction 
Here, as with Cusa’s notion of comparative relation, the disjunction between the 
representation and the represented is not Cusa’s final point, but rather his starting point. Despite 
the conjectural nature of cartography, the map represents our actual experience and 
understanding of the world around us. When one creates a map, one produces a likeness of the 
world from one’s own perspective. When I use a map someone else has created, I locate myself 
on their map, thereby locating my own perspective of the landscape within the other’s 
perspective.  
An inherent purpose of a map is its usability. It is a technology: A human creation 
manifesting the human creator’s will and purpose. It is a likeness of the natural world in which 
we live, move, and have our being, which is a likeness of the Creator’s divine will and purpose. 
Each entity in this infinite manifold manifestly and visibly reveals to us the Creator’s invisible 
divinity and power (Romans 1:20). The natural world, then, is a creation freely and willfully 
created by the Divine Creator for some purpose.704
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 Similarly, the map of that world is a creation 
freely and willfully created by the human creator for some purpose which simultaneously 
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represents the human conjectural understanding of the Divine will and purpose. While the divine 
will and purpose is perfectly and completely revealed in the Creator’s creation, which is directly 
and precisely perceived by the cartographer, our “knowledge” of what is perceived is always 
conjectural, measured and perceived from some vantage.  
The map is created by one person for the sake of another. It graphs on paper (carto-
graphy) one’s perspective of the natural world; it is a graphic journal of one’s journey through 
the cosmos. Locating oneself on another person’s map, then, is to see the world, albeit in a 
limited way, from the perspective of another. This second person, from a second vantage, is able 
to build upon the creation of the first, thereby refining the map and improving it. One discovers 
more than one’s predecessor because one benefits not only from one’s own perspective, but from 
the cartographer’s perspective.  
Being Other-wisely 
In a very real way, then, the map is analogous to the metaphor of the squaring of the 
circle. When one locates oneself on another’s map, the proliferation of perspectives is 
comparable to increasing the number of points on the circle coinciding with angles of the 
polygon. The more perspectives we have, the closer the polygon comes to measuring the circle, 
while always remaining infinitely far. The goal, then, is never to see precisely (prae/cisio) as 
another sees. To do so is obviously impossible since we are all unique individuals standing in 
some place at some time, which differs from others.  
More importantly, though, it is also undesirable, from Cusa’s perspective. Because each 
individual person is a unique creature, each person is an irreducibly particular manifestation of 
the free divine will and purpose.705
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 Each one of us stands at the center of the infinite universe, of 
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which the circumference is nowhere and center everywhere.706 The perspective of the other 
(subjective genitive) is a perspective of the cosmos from another center of the universe. Locating 
oneself on another’s map enables me to stand, imaginatively and partially, in the other’s place, a 
vantage which enables me to see myself as another “other,” but which also allows me to view the 
Creator’s infinite creation from another perspective. Though stated in a different context, 
Keller’s observation is pertinent here: “it is as if the universe is what it is only in the perspective 
of each and all of its creatures. But each creature is its perspective on its universe.707
Since each creature is its perspective on the universe and the universe is what it is only in 
the perspective of each creature, then another’s map enables me (to a limited extent) to be 
another. Here again, perception and perspective are linked to adverbial ontology: Perceiving the 
universe from an/other’s cartographical perspective enables one to be other-wisely. In Cusa’s 
ontology of perception, cartography becomes ethics. 
  
Cartography as Cosmography 
Mapmaking, for Cusa, is not simply cartography (graphing on paper) but also 
cosmography (graphing the cosmos). As discussed above, the cartographer’s map, produced 
from the cartographer’s perception and measure, always falls infinitely shy708
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 of the reality it 
measures. For the very reason that the map fails to precisely represent the natural world, it also 
records and images what is meaningful to us in this world. A map of political boundaries reveals 
something meaningful only insofar as political boundaries are meaningful to us. A topographical 
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map depicting a diversity of landscapes and natural environs reveals something meaningful only 
insofar as these are meaningful. In other words, the map fails to precisely represent the natural 
world because it graphs the cosmos according to our measured perspective—including and 
especially that which we measure to be valuable or meaningful. As cosmography, mapmaking 
reveals more about ourselves and our understandings of our place in our ecology than it does 
about the world-as-it-is. The very realization of this cosmographic perspective leads us beyond 
the limitation of that perspective. It discloses the possibility of graphing our world otherwise and 
other-wisely, through other measures, other values, other meanings and perspectives. 
Cosmography is an apophatic measure. While mapmaking qua cartography fails to 
measure the world-as-it-is, mapmaking qua cosmography enables us to learn our ignorance and 
thus learn to perceive otherwise and other-wisely. For the very reason that cartography fails to 
measure nature precisely, cosmography measures our perspectives, our values, and our creative 
economies of meaning. Cosmography awakens us to attend to another’s intentions: an/other’s 
journey through the world. An/other’s image of the cosmos enables us to imagine the world as it 
might look from another center of the universe in comparative relation to our own learned 
ignorance. 
Theory of Perspective (Phenomenology) 
Epistemic Apophasis 
Cusa’s creative measures of mathematics and cartography direct us towards two distinct 
(but interrelated) methods of apophasis, which we might label cognitive or epistemic apophasis 
and perspectival apophasis. To learn our ignorance is to understand the infinite divide or “cut” 
between perception and its cognition. We do not know the world-as-it-is, but only the world-as-
we-measure-it. Like the polygon and circle, however near our measure draws to the measured, 
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the two will never be equal since each and every particular entity in the universe enjoys a certain 
singularity: Its quiddity is beyond compare and thus cannot be known through comparative 
proportion. In this sense, Cusa’s epistemic apophasis is not only an unsaying of our knowledge 
of God, but also an unsaying of our knowledge of the world.  
Cusa’s epistemic apophasis stands in sharp contrast to ĝDৄkara’s epistemology of 
language and perception. In the YDLĞYƗQDUD, one sees a particular pot with the eye, the buddhi 
assumes the form of that which is seen, and the internal organ of perception verbally grasps it by 
means of a word which is eternally connected to both the universal artha, “pot,” and also that 
particular pot. The truth of this perception is never doubted or denied by ĝDৄkara and is, in fact, 
repeatedly asserted throughout his MKBh. Measures are to be progressively dissolved only to the 
extent that they are measures of that which is possessed of infinite measure. If they were not 
reliable measures of Brahman, there would be no means by which to know Brahman at all. For 
Cusa, though, our measures fail to measure reality, as a polygon fails to measure a circle. 
Perspectival apophasis 
Perspectival apophasis, however, is rooted in Cusa’s ontology of perception. Though we 
cannot know the quiddity of a thing, it nevertheless can be seen. Though we cannot know natural 
forms, which exist potentially and enfoldedly, we nevertheless directly perceive these natural 
forms insofar as they exist actually and unfoldedly as particular entities. Although we directly 
perceive the quiddity of things, we necessarily perceive this quiddity from some perspective. 
Cusa’s perspectival apophasis does not negate or unsay the truth of what we see, but instead 
emphasizes the inherent perspectival limitations of vision.  
In this sense, Cusa’s position suddenly draws very near to ĝDৄkara’s. We perceive reality 
as it is, but only a small measure of that reality. Here, though, “measure” does not refer to 
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epistemology at all, but rather to the reality that is directly perceived. Consider, for example, 
Edmund Husserl’s illustration regarding the phenomenal appearance of a die.709
Cusa’s theory of perspective can be grasped, to some extent, by combining his creative 
measures of mathematics and cartography. By mapping, as it were, multiple perspectives onto a 
circle, we multiply the sides of the inscribed polygon. Attempting to harmoniously (not 
monotonously) perceive that towards which our attention is drawn, we draw nearer to the truth 
by removing the limitations of our perspective, which requires only that we listen faithfully to 
one another’s testimony. Much like the 9HGƗQWD method of upasaۨKƗUD, coordinating multiple 
perspectives neither alters nor undermines any one perspective, but instead constitutes a mutual 
 Though one 
knows that a die has six square sides with differing symbols on each, one can only ever see, at 
most, three sides at once, which appear as non-square polygons unless perceived directly from 
above. Due to the limitations of perspective, we perceive only a small measure of a particular 
entity at a time. Notwithstanding the epistemic disjunction between what is and what is known, 
the perception is true despite being partial. To see the quiddity of a thing more truly, we do not 
deny or negate the truth of what is seen from one perspective, according to Cusa, but multiply 
our perspectives, adding together partial truths which will never amount to truth, but draw ever 
nearer, as a polygon does towards a circle. Like ĝDৄkara’s method of knowing Brahman, 
measure-by-measure and then progressively dissolving the measures to perceive Brahman 
possessed of infinite measure, Cusa’s perspectival apophasis multiplies perspectives, thereby 
removing the limitations of those perspectives without denying the truth of any one perspective. 
For Cusa, this is true even if that perspective is not “mine,” but comes from another, provided 
that I attend to the other, having faith in the testimony of another’s witness. 
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corrective: an apophasis which unsays limitations and potential misinterpretations of vision so 
that particularity might be seen more truly. Like upasaۨKƗUD, Cusa’s perspectival apophasis is, 
effectively, an apophasis by means of kataphasis, and kataphasis by means of apophasis. These 
opposites creatively coincide in our perspectival dialogue with one another. 
Transcending perspective 
Regardless of how many perspectives we adopt on any given phenomenon, there remains 
an infinite number of perspectives, each of which holds the potential to radically shift our 
intellectual understanding of the phenomenon. For Cusa, objective knowledge is not only 
impossible, it is also undesirable. Learned ignorance is not a “cure” for our ignorance, but it is a 
“treatment.” By recognizing and multiplying our perspectives, we begin to transcend perspective. 
We do not transcend perspective by imagining an objective view from no-where, but by 
becoming other-wisely: listening to our neighbor’s witness, reading our neighbor’s maps, 
imagining ourselves to be at their center of the universe. 
Cusa asserts that, “we have mental sight that looks unto that which is prior to all 
cognition.”710 Similar to ĝDৄkara’s distinction between antaۊkara۬a and buddhi, Cusa 
distinguishes between the intellect and the mental image produced from sense-data. While we 
see precisely by means of a mental image “prior to all cognition,”711
[N]o sign designates the mode-of-being as fully as it can be designated. If we 
are to arrive at knowledge in the best way in which this can be done, then we 
must do so by means of a variety of signs in order that from them knowledge 
 we cognitively apprehend 
that vision through signs and comparison. A wider variety of signs and perspectives enables us to 
judge more confidently, but never certainly. He continues: 
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can better be had. [Similarly] from five perceptual signs, a perceptual object 
is better known than from one or two perceptual signs.712
As one learns that one can never “know” a given phenomenon precisely, one simultaneously 
learns how to know it more accurately: By perceiving it from multiple perspectives and 
cognizing those perceptions with multiple signs or concepts. Thus, learned ignorance compels us 
to move beyond our limited perspective without devaluing that perspective. Learned ignorance 
negates the limitations of perceptual signs by coordinating and harmonizing those inherently 
limited perceptual signs with a multiplicity of them.  
 
By simply recognizing the inherent limitations of perspective, one begins to transcend 
those limitations. Karsten Harries explains: 
Cusanus’ speculations presuppose an increased awareness of and interest in 
the phenomenon of perspective. To be aware of perspective is to be aware not 
only of what is seen, but also of the conditions imposed on the seen by our 
point of view. The space of perspective has its center in the perceiver; the 
objects which present themselves in that space are necessarily appearances. 
This awareness cannot be divorced from another: the awareness of what 
constitutes a particular point of view carries with it an awareness of other 
possible points of view; to recognize the limits imposed on my understanding 
by my location here and now I have to be, in some sense, already beyond 
these limits.713
While Harries has stated Cusa’s position well, there is a danger that his words may be misread. 
To rightly suggest, as Harries does, that recognizing the limitations of perspective signals that 
one has already moved “in some sense… beyond these limits,” is not to imply any modernist 
notion of objectivity. One can never have a view from nowhere. One’s view of reality is always 
already subjective and perspectival. My perspective is always, necessarily, my perspective and is, 
to that extent, relative to my facticity, my actuality, my spatial and temporal finitude, my 
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language and conceptual measure, my beliefs and personal history, etc. My perspective, in other 
words, is irreducibly particular.  
Elsewhere, Harries explains that objectivity and phenomenology are fundamentally 
incompatible notions:  
As old as philosophy is the thought that the search for the truth requires us to 
seek reality behind appearances. Inseparable from this thought is another—
that reason is not imprisoned in perspectives, that it can transcend its initial 
limitations and arrive at a more objective understanding of what is. The idea 
of objectivity, as I am here using it, is tied to the idea of a knowing that is 
free from perspectival distortion, an angelic, divine, or ideal knowing. It is 
thus linked to the idea of a knower not imprisoned in the body and not bound 
by the senses, a pure subject. The idea of such a knower and that of 
objectivity belong together. If the idea of such a knower is illegitimate, so is 
that of objectivity. And with these ideas, that of absolute truth also 
collapses.714
As Harries shows, Cusa unequivocally rejects objectivity as a possibility in human knowledge. 
This rejection is fundamental to his notion of learned ignorance, with respect to both 
divine/theological matters and natural/scientific matters.  
 
More importantly, though, Cusa eschews any notion of “objectivity” in the sense 
described above not merely because it is illusory, but also because it is undesirable. Objectivity 
devalues the particularity of perspective and, along with it, the very raison d’être of Creation. If 
objectivity is valued as a goal, then perspective is devalued; it becomes the primary obstacle in 
our pursuit of that goal. In its place is posited an idealized “knower not imprisoned in the body 
and not bound by the senses, a pure subject.”715
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 In one’s pursuit of the unachievable (i.e., the 
objective view from nowhere), one obviates the one indubitable certitude: namely, that one’s 
perspective of the world is true. In my irreducible particularity, I stand, as it were, on the infinite 
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circle, which is truth. The truth, as such, is inaccessible to us because truth is infinite, as 
discussed earlier.716
Moving beyond the limitations of perspective, in the sense that Harries intends, does not 
at all foreshadow modernist longings for objectivity. Rather, learning one’s ignorance means 
learning that one’s true perspective of Truth ignores every other true perspective of Truth. 
Transcending perspective, in this sense, entails the dis/closure of possibility. “My” finitude 
means that “I” will always ignore other true perspectives. Because Truth is infinite, it requires an 
infinity of perspectives. As Harries explicates, “the awareness of what constitutes a particular 
point of view carries with it an awareness of other possible points of view.”
 My perspective on truth, which is infinite, is nevertheless true for the very 
reason that it is my finite perspective of Truth. The fact that it is finite does not obviate the fact 
that it is true. To learn that it is finite is to learn my ignorance (docta ignorantia).  
717
While I can never grasp the Truth qua Truth,
 Learning that my 
perspective is both true and finite compels me to seek out other possible points of view, not 
because my perspective is untrue, but—to the contrary—because it is true.  
718
 I can approach it more truly by ceasing to 
ignore all other possible points of view.719
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my true perspective ignores other possible true perspectives, it is utterly useless if I then fail to 
seek out these other true perspectives, each of which is irreducibly particular. This point is 
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valuing “objectivity” necessarily and consequently devalues the divine will and purpose. 
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Mapping the Circle of Life 
Eschewing “objectivity,” Cusa’s perspectival apophasis is phenomenological. Harries 
explains:  
The theory of perspective teaches us about the logic of appearance, of 
phenomena. In this sense the theory of perspective is phenomenology. So 
understood, phenomenology lets us understand why [and how] things present 
themselves to us as they do.720
Each new perspective on a given reality grants us additional insight into that reality’s 
phenomenon, enabling us to know the phenomenon more truly. As Martin Heidegger argues in 
Being and Time: 
 
The expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily a methodological 
conception. This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of 
philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that 
research.721
As Heidegger avers, the goal of phenomenology is, “to let that which shows itself be seen from 
itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.”
 
722
 As Harries has shown in Infinity 
and Perspective, Heidegger’s turn to phenomenology is, in many ways, a return to theories of 
perspective found in pre-modernist thinkers such as Eckhart, Alberti, and Nicholas of Cusa.723
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Far from subjective relativism, and perhaps contrary to Heideggerian phenomenology, Cusa’s 
theory of perspective is grounded in the insistence that we do, in fact, see the truth we cannot 
possibly know.  
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Knowledge requires cognition. Given that one sees truly and cognizes truly, there is, 
nevertheless, an epistemic disjuncture between seeing pre/cisely (prae/cisio, before the cut), and 
knowing ratio/nally by comparative ratio. One who strives to “know precisely,” Cusa explains, 
“strives in vain, just as would someone who attempted to touch with his hand a color—
something which is only visible.724
In ĝDৄkara’s articulation of the WXUƯ\D, perception ceases to be a means to knowledge. For 
Cusa, perception does not “cease” to be a means of knowledge because it never was in the first 
place. Like perception in the WXUƯ\D, however, perception becomes an end unto itself when rooted 
in Cusa’s theory of perspective. Having become aware of other possible perspectives, 
philosophical and theological dialogue emerge as means for seeing, rather than means of 
knowing. Though their methods differ from one another, each method is an apophatic measure in 
the first sense of the word: A praxis of measuring the world without reducing particular 
phenomena to measures, thereby cultivating a wakefully attentive sensuality.  
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286 
Consider, for example, Figure 20. Standing at point C on 
the circle, I perceive the center of the circle precisely, from a 
limited perspective. When I share my perspective with another 
through dialogue, cartography, or by writing theoĸORJ\I 
effectively and analogously describe a chord on the circle, 
thereby adding an angle and two sides to the polygon inscribed 
in this circle. Through discourse, I lend a new perspective on 
phenomenal reality, thereby bifurcating chord AB and adding chords AC and CB in dialogue 
with my neighbors, standing at points A and C on the circle. My cognition of perceived reality 
creates a new measure of phenomenal reality which stands in comparative relation (ratio) with 
the true cognitions of others, mapped at points A and B. Through discourse, I map my 
perspective for others, enabling them to stand, as it were, where I stand. Though we cannot know 
the world-as-it-is, we can see it. Standing together on the circle of life, we map our world 
together by standing, as it were, where our neighbor stands. By rounding the edges of our square 
maps, not through a unison of perspectives sung by an angelic no-body, but by de/scribing 
harmonious chords in a polygon that draws nearer to truth when more voices join the choir. 
Knowing that our true perspectives ignore other true perspectives, we transcend perspectival 
limitation as we hear one another into speech.  
Negating one’s own perspective does not mean devaluing it. To the contrary, by 
recognizing the finitude of my perspective, I simultaneously recognize the value of my 
perspective for my neighbor, and the value of my neighbor’s perspective for me. Through this 
perspectival apophasis, I learn to listen. 
Figure 20: Mapping the Circle of Life 
287 
Just as perception ceases to be a means to know and becomes an end unto itself, so, too, 
does hearing one another. Knowing our ignorance, the emphasis refuses to shift, as it does in 
modernist “objectivity,” to objects. While the circle’s center provides a focal point, it does not 
intend to our attention as an object, but rather as a topic: a topos or place about which we map 
our world through speaking and hearing. Though hearing becomes a means to see, it is a means 
to see from the perspective of the other, and hence a graceful end unto itself. Far from a 
“cognitive mapping” intent upon “knowing things,” Cusa’s perspectival apophasis provokes an 
aesthetic education of imagined subjectivity wherein hearing becomes grace and grace entails 
being heard.725
Figure 20
 Reciting and re-siting Nelle Morton’s words into this quite different context, we 
might map her “great ear” to the center of the circle in : 
Hearing in this sense can break through political and social structures and 
image a new system. A great ear at the heart of the universe—at the heart of 
our common life—hearing human beings to speech—to our own speech.726
Hearing one another into speech, we chart chords in a polyphony that never speaks Truth, but 
sings ever more truly as others’ voices are added to the choir.  
 
Since my perspective is always irreducibly particular, it cannot possibly be in unison with 
my neighbor’s perspective, since my neighbor stands elsewhere, at another time and place. This 
does not mean that our relative perceptions are inaccurate, imprecise, or in any way untrue, but 
simply that each is incomplete (insofar as our perspectives ignore other possible perspectives) 
and conjectural (insofar as they are measured by comparative relation). While a conjecture may 
be true in the sense that it truly measures the phenomenon, it necessarily falls infinitely shy of 
truth, which is immeasurable. To the extent that each perspective is true, however, our chords 
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should be concordant. They should harmonize. Dissonance signals cognitive error, conceptual 
error, or both.  
Hence, Cusa’s analogies of cartography and squaring the circle ground phenomenology 
in perspective and dialogue. We stand together on the circle of life, seeking to understand what 
we see, and seeking to understand our faith. We do so by believing what we see (precisely) from 
our own irreducibly particular perspective. We seek to understand our perceptions more 
accurately (never precisely) through faith in our neighbor’s witness.727
Creative Spirit 
 Standing on but one of 
the infinite points on the circle, we map our perspectives by describing chords between our 
points of view, gradually coming to see our neighbors as other seers. This requires both trust in 
the other and understanding of the other’s words. Listening for the harmonious concord, we 
steadily shift, with Cusa’s help, to a different orientation of sight. Imaginatively locating 
ourselves on the other’s map, we begin to see that our neighbor’s perspective, while not in 
unison with our own, is in harmony with our own. We see in order to believe. For Cusa, though, 
this is but the first step. Faithfully listening to our neighbor, we believe in order to see. 
Apophatic Measure as Creative Remeasuring 
As introduced in the opening pages of this thesis, the phrase “apophatic measure” unfolds 
a triad of interrelated meanings. It signifies (1) methods by which conceptual measures are 
identified and removed with the aim of cultivating (2) attentive sensuality beyond words which 
perceives (3) particular entities as unique (unspeakable) measures of ultimate reality. Thus far in 
this chapter, we have seen how the created measures of mathematics and cosmography enable us 
to identify (pre)conceptions and help us to learn our ignorance of the world-as-it-is-measured. By 
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learning the limitations of our perspectives on reality, we begin to transcend those perspectives. 
We do so not by unsaying, per say, but hearing others into speech, attending to their witness, and 
thus multiplying perspectives.  
Thus, the trifold meanings of “apophatic measure” begin to fold back on themselves: 
sensuality becomes a method of negating limitations. When sensuality ceases to be a means of 
consumption, it becomes an end unto itself, as we saw earlier with the WXUƯ\D (p181). Attentive to 
the fact that one is measuring, one becomes free to measure creatively. As theology, this creative 
measuring bears vocational and ethical import. Our cosmographical measuring discloses the 
ways in which we assign value and meaning to the world, which are actions with theo-ethical 
significance. Aware that we are measuring value and meaning, we begin (hopefully) to do so 
apophatically. That is to say that every creative measure carries with it its own unsaying, or at 
least stands open to theological critique or deconstruction.  
While creative measuring like cartography are theological, these measures are human 
creations: artificial forms unfolded by “second gods.” They are, therefore theoĸORJ\ZKLFKLVWR
say human creations striving to create in the Spirit of the Creator. As kataphatic measures of 
divine intention, they stand open to theoĸORJLFDOFULWLTXH, which takes forms such as hearing 
others into speech, as discussed in the previous section. Our creative measures must also stand 
open to theoĺORJLFDOcritique. That is, our creative measures must strive to be in harmony with 
scriptural revelation, natural revelation, and the movement of the Holy Spirit.  
This section examines Cusa’s theology as an apophatic measure qua method which 
unsays (pre)conceptions about the imago Dei doctrine. By cultivating an attentive sensuality, one 
learns to see others and nature differently. Knowing that we measure (creatively), cognizant of 
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the theo-ethical import of the ways in which we measure value and meaning, we learn (or at least 
strive) to create measures that are more harmoniously attuned to the Creator’s Spirit.  
Unsaying Imago Dei 
The doctrine typically referred to as imago Dei derives from Genesis 1:26-27: 
Then Elohim said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our 
likeness…” So God created humankind in God’s image, in the image of God, 
God created them. Male and female, God created them.728
In what sense are humans the image of God? In what image is the “rest” of the universe 
created?
 
729
Kathryn Tanner points out a curious irony. On the one hand, we have a doctrine of God’s 
incomprehensibility, and on the other, we have a doctrine of imago Dei. “Putting the two ideas 
together,” she explains, one would expect the imago Dei to reflect divine incomprehensibility, 
but theology frequently moves in the opposite direction.
  
730
Elucidating Cusa’s position, Catherine Keller explains: “It is the whole universe, not the 
little human speck of it, that is made in imago Dei.”
 This approach is problematic, Tanner 
explains, because it abstracts human nature from relationality. It also neglects the Social Trinity. 
Faithfully seeking to understand this teaching, Cusa interrogates this image of God in light of the 
Trinitarian mystery and the facticity of our relational ontology. 
731
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The infinite form is received only in a finite way; consequently, every 
creature is, as it were, a finite infinity or a created god, so that it exists in the 
way in which this could best be.732
This foreshadows, of course, the fourth premise from DB (p
 
261 above), but with a considerable 
difference. It is not merely the human person that is a “second god,” but “every creature is… a 
created god.” Moreover, Cusa subsequently emphasizes in the same paragraph the inherent 
divine value of irreducible particularity: 
Therefore, God communicates without difference and envy, and what God 
communicates is received in such a way that contingency does not permit it 
to be received otherwise or to a higher degree. Therefore, every created being 
finds its rest in its own perfection, which it freely holds from the divine 
being. It desires to be no other created being, as if something else were more 
perfect, but rather it prefers that which it itself holds, as if a divine gift from 
the maximum and it wishes its own possession to be perfected and preserved 
incorruptibly.733
In other words, every created being is uniquely created in the image of God. “It desires to be no 
other created being” because that which makes it itself is a divine gift from God. As we have 
seen already in the previous chapter, because an entity’s quiddity is irreducibly particular such 
that it enjoys “a certain singularity that cannot be found in any other thing,” it is unknowable 
through comparative proportion even though it is inherently perceptible.
 
734
Mary-Jane Rubenstein observes: 
 Every creature, as a 
unique image of God, is perceptible, yet reflects divine incomprehensibility. Hence, Cusa’s 
articulation of imago Dei avoids the curious irony Tanner observes to be frequent in other 
theologies. 
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Cusa, in other words, is shattering the simple mirror-game between God and 
the universe by folding God into God’s own image, as its omnicentric center. 
The universe does not resemble a God who stands outside it; it resembles 
God only insofar as it embodies God, everywhere in the universe, equally.735
The universe embodies God everywhere. As discussed earlier, though, two important provisos 
must be added: God is not embodied as a “pious interiority” hidden within and God is not 
(simply) embodied by the universe as a whole. Rather, each created body embodies God, and 
does so uniquely as its very quiddity.  
 
In light of these points, we can add a corollary to Cusa’s statement above. Each created 
being “desires to be no other created being,” but it does desire to be seen. As a unique image of 
God, the quiddity of creatures intends to be seen; one need only attend to it through an 
intellectual awakening, lest one fail to recognize the passerby. As stated in DB’s first premise 
(p256 above), the Divine Intellect exists unfoldedly as creatures in order to manifestly reveal 
itself (Rom 1:20). It reveals itself as bodily creatures who incarnate unique images of God. They 
desire to be seen and desire to be themselves, not others, because each creature is needed by 
God. Without any given creature, God’s self-revelation would be incomplete. Here again, 
mathematics provides a guide: infinity plus one is infinity, but infinity minus one is not.736
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the infinite Divine Intellect to manifestly reveal itself, infinite images of God are required. 
Hence, each and every body is necessary; none are superfluous. Each and every body desires 
(and intends) to be seen because that is its very reason for being. The role and purpose of each 
creature is to be a unique image of God so that God may be seen. 
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In the statement cited above, however, Cusa has added another dimension of desire to 
these created gods. As observed, a creature “desires to be no other created being,” and desires to 
be seen, but it also “wishes its own possession to be perfected and preserved incorruptibly.”737
We stand in need, therefore, of an ethics of imago Dei. If the irreducibly particular 
quiddity of a creature manifestly reveals God by uniquely embodying God qua image, then how 
can it be “perfected”? If one is, by nature, an image of God, then how does one become that 
image more truly and completely? Moreover, if each creature is an image of the Trinity, how 
does one become one’s Trinitarian image more fully? In the following sections, I approach these 
questions by briefly analyzing the trio of texts from 1453 introduced earlier, De visione Dei, De 
Beryllo, and De pace Fidei, which respectively articulate a theophany of Christ as imago Dei, a 
theophany of Creation as imago Dei, and a Spiritual Theosis of Creative Harmony. 
 
Because each creature is a unique revelation of God, an unprecedented, unrepeatable, and 
un-representable imago Dei, it bears divine responsibility. It must perfect itself—not, of course, 
by becoming something other than what it is, but by becoming itself more truly and more 
completely. The “divine gift” does not require reciprocation or recompense, lest it cease to be 
graceful, but this gift does entail an ability to respond, and, hence, a response-ability. To be 
responsible, then, is to respond to this divine gift of uniqueness by receiving it as truly and 
completely as one is able. One is responsible for being oneself: becoming an image of God as 
truly and completely as one might. Theosis is inherent to imago Dei.  
Theophany and Christ: Learning to See 
De visione Dei is a remarkably rich text. Only scratching the surface of its depths, my 
focus here is narrowed to close readings of a handful of passages highlighting Cusa’s 
                                                     
737
 DDI III.1.188, Hopkins 114, my emphasis added. 
294 
Christology. I return to this topic again, from a different perspective and with a different purpose, 
in the next chapter (p328). 
A more anointed image 
In the passage from DDI analyzed above, Cusa has said “Every created being finds its 
rest in its own perfection, which it freely holds from the divine being.”738
O Lord God, without Your Son, Jesus—whom You anointed more than his 
fellow-persons and who is the Christ—You would not yet have brought about 
the completion of Your work. In His intellect the perfection of creatable 
nature finds rest. For He is the ultimate and most perfect unmultipliable 
Likeness of God. And there can be only one such supreme [Likeness]. Yet, 
all other intellectual spirits, by the mediation of this Spirit, are also 
likenesses. And the more perfect they are, the more like unto this Spirit they 
are. In this Spirit they all find rest, as in the ultimate perfection of the Image 
of God. And they have attained unto a likeness of this Image and unto a 
certain degree of its perfection.
 In Chapter 25 of DVD, 
this language emerges again. Addressing God, Cusa writes: 
739
A close reading of this passage brings several points to our attention.  
 
First, Cusa states that Jesus has been “anointed more than his fellow-persons” (prae 
consortibus suis unxisti) and therefore is the Christ (the anointed). This is consistent with Cusa’s 
reading of John’s Gospel, which states that to all who received the true light is given “the power 
to become children of God.”740
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 That is to say that the “true light” which anointed (christened) 
Jesus also anoints all creatures, but was received by Jesus more truly and completely than any 
other. As discussed earlier, the divine light gracefully descends unto the intellect, which is 
received in accordance with its wakeful attentiveness. When distracted by intellectual matters, 
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the descent of the divine light is not received in the manner in which it descends. Because Jesus 
was not distracted in this way, “in His intellect the perfection of creatable nature finds rest.”  
Second, Cusa states that Jesus “is the ultimate and most perfect unmultipliable likeness of 
God (dei similitudo).” In Paul’s epistle to the Colossians, he states that Jesus is the image of the 
invisible God (imago Dei invisibilis), the firstborn of all creation.”741 Thus, Jesus is a theophany: 
a visible image of the invisible God. However, Jesus’ uniqueness is not due to the fact that he is 
an image of the invisible God, since “all other intellectual spirits, by the mediation of this Spirit, 
are also likenesses.” Jesus’ uniqueness, from Cusa’s perspective, is one of magnitude. He is more 
anointed that his companions and thus the ultimate and most perfect (perfectissima). While all 
creatures are images of God, anointed by the graceful descent of the divine light, to whom are 
offered the power to become children of God,742
Third, the passage above leads us to a better understanding of what Cusa means by 
“perfection.” “Perfection” does not entail drawing nearer towards a transcendent, universal form. 
Rather, “perfection” means receiving the divine gift of what one is more truly, thereby 
“perfecting” or “making whole” one’s unique quiddity. “Therefore, every created being finds its 
rest in its own perfection… It desires to be no other created being, as if something else were 
more perfect.”
 Jesus stands apart as the exemplar of reception. 
Therefore—and this point is critical—we gaze upon Jesus not because he is an image of the 
invisible God (for this is true of all creatures), but because he is a perfected model of how to be 
an image.  
743
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 As unique images of God, our responsibility is not to perfect ourselves by 
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emulating Jesus in every possible respect (desiring to be another); rather, we perfect ourselves by 
receiving the divine gift of our irreducible particularity more truly and more fully, regarding 
Jesus as the model who received that gift most completely. 
The amazing grace of an amazing gaze 
As the “visible image of the invisible God,” Jesus is, of course, inaccessible to our sight 
as a visible object. The Greek Testament, though, offers to us a vision of Jesus. In DVD, Cusa 
approaches this vision of Jesus primarily as a subjective genitive. In Chapter 22, which is entitled 
“How Jesus Sees and Toiled,” Cusa “conjectures” about Jesus’ “exceedingly marvelous and 
amazing gaze.”744
For while You, Jesus, walked amid this sensible world, You used fleshly eyes 
that were like ours. For with these eyes You perceived in no other way than 
do we: viz., one thing and another.
 
745
Throughout his text, Cusa repeats the phrase “fleshly eye” (carnali oculo) as somewhat of a 
refrain. Echoing the “ladder of ascent” traced in DQD, Cusa makes clear that Jesus saw just as 
we do, in living color. Rationally discerning between one thing and another, Jesus “saw 
distinctly and discretely this object to be colored in this way and that object to be colored in 
another way.”
 
746
 Attending to “the poses of the face and eyes of those upon whom You looked, 
You were a true judge of the passions of the soul.”747
From merely a few signs, You comprehended that which lay hidden in a 
person’s mind. For whatever is conceived in the mind is signaled in some 
 Cusa continues: 
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way in the face (and especially in the eyes), since the face is the messenger of 
the heart.748
Here again we observe, more acutely, what Charles Carman describes as “a certain dialectical 
indistinctiveness between physical and intellectual vision.”
 
749
Due to this unimpeded, graceful descent of the divine light, Cusa sees, in the vision of 
Jesus, that divine sight, intellectual apprehension, rational discernment, and sensuality coincide. 
Jesus’ “seeing, which was not accomplished without fleshly eyes, was human.”
 Cusa underscores, time and again, 
the humanity of Jesus’ incarnate gaze because physical vision and intellectual vision are but 
aspects of a continuum inherent to Cusa’s ontology of vision. Jesus sees the way he does, with 
fleshly eyes, because his intellect is devoid of all distraction. In the more-anointed Jesus, the 
graceful descent of the divine light proceeds along vision’s pathway without interruption or 
impediment. It attends.  
750
 It was a 
“finite, human vision… contracted to a [bodily] organ,” and yet it was “perfect” because it was 
united to an “absolute and infinite Vision.”751
In this context, Cusa again turns to the analogy of failing to recognize a passerby. Though 
one sees the person with fleshly eyes, the passerby is not recognized when one’s intellectual 
vision is distracted. “From this example,” Cusa explains, “we ascertain that even though the 
natures of these powers are united in one human form, nevertheless they remain distinct and have 
 It was not united to a divine vision in a manner 
that is inaccessible to us. To the contrary, this vision of Jesus is revealed, in its perfection, so that 
we might learn to see as Jesus saw.  
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distinct functions.”752 Likewise, he continues, “I see that in You, Jesus, who are one, the human 
intellectual nature is united, in a certain similar way, to the divine nature.”753
A few pages later, however, Cusa either contradicts himself or, at least, dramatically 
clarifies what he meant by “united, in a certain similar way.” He states: 
 
Jesus, You cannot be said, either, to be the uniting medium between the 
divine nature and the human nature, since between the two natures there 
cannot be posited a middle nature that participates in both. For the divine 
nature cannot be participated in, because it is completely and absolutely most 
simple. Moreover, in such case, Blessed Jesus, You would not be either God 
or man.754
Human nature is finite while the divine nature is infinite and “there is no comparative proportion 
of the finite to the infinite.”
 
755
Here, Cusa turns yet again to the analogy of the passerby: 
 Were Jesus’ human nature to “pass over” into divine nature, it 
would become infinite, and thus no longer be human. (Clearly, Cusa is dissatisfied regarding the 
dual nature of Christ as mysterious.) 
By comparison, suppose one that a man were to seek intently to discern by 
means of sight someone approaching him. And suppose that he were seized 
by other thoughts and that his attention subsequently ceased with regard to 
his seeking, though his eyes were no less directed toward the on-comer. In 
this case his eye would not be separated from his soul, although it would be 
separated from the discerning attention of his soul. However, if when seized 
[by other thoughts] he not only ceased enlivening [the eye] with the power of 
discernment but also ceased enlivening [it] with the power of sensation, then 
the eye would be dead, because it would not be enlivened.756
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As was the case in DQD, Cusa links perception and enlivening. In the earlier text (p215), he 
states that, “all that which exists unfoldedly (explicate) in the sensible kingdom, exists 
enfoldedly (complicite) in the kingdom of the senses more vigorously and, moreover, [exists] 
vitally in a way that is more complete.”757
Analogously, the divine nature “enlivens” the intellectual nature. When the intellect is 
distracted, and thus “closed” to the divine light, it does not “die.” It still performs its intellectual 
activity, just as the eye sees the passerby. When awakened, or “opened” to the descent of the 
divine light, however, the intellect is enlivened by the divine nature just as the eye is enlivened 
by the intellect. Applying the analogy to Jesus, then, it is not that the divine and human natures 
are “united,” but rather that Jesus’ human intellect was fully awakened, fully opened, and thus 
fully receptive to the divine nature, such that it could not possibly be more open to it.  
 In the passage above, he has simply extended this 
notion of “vitality” farther up vision’s “ladder of ascent.” When one sees an inanimate color, one 
does not bring it to life in a literal sense, but that color exists vitally in sensuality. Likewise, the 
intellect does not “enliven” the eye in a literal sense, such that the eye “dies” when the intellect is 
distracted. The eye still sees the passerby. But the distracted intellect does “enliven” the eye in 
the sense of awakening, as discussed earlier, and so one fails to recognize the passerby. 
Following the graceful descent of the divine light, it follows that the divine nature 
awakens/enlivens the intellect, ratio, and senses such that they could not be more awakened or 
attentive. It is for this reason, then, Jesus sees, with fleshly eyes like our own, “that which lay 
hidden in a person’s mind. For whatever is conceived in the mind is signaled in some way in the 
face (and especially in the eyes), since the face is the messenger of the heart.”758
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was more anointed, he never failed to recognize the passerby. To say that he “recognized” them, 
of course, does not mean that he knew them by the name their parents gave them… it means that 
he re/cognized the passerby as an unprecedented, irreducibly particular image of God. 
Theophany and Creator: Double-Beryl Vision 
As a theophany of the invisible God, the vision of Jesus teaches us how to see as Jesus 
saw, with fleshly eyes like our own. As we learn to see in this way, how might this alter our 
vision of creation? Cusa grounds De beryllo in Romans 1:20, wherein Paul states that God’s 
invisible power and divinity are manifestly revealed through creation. Nature is a theophany: an 
image of the Creator. 
Intentional bodies 
In DB, Cusa argues, fervently and at length, against Aristotle and Plato. The details need 
not encumber us here, but only his central point: Because God creates freely and willfully, then 
every creature reveals some unique aspect of God’s will and purpose. He writes:  
Every creature is an intention of the Omnipotent Will. Neither Plato nor 
Aristotle knew the foregoing fact. For, clearly, both of them believed that the 
Creator-Intellect made all things because of a necessity of its nature. From 
this [belief] their every error followed.759
If creation is not an act of necessity, but a free and willful act, then it follows that “every creature 
has its reason-for-being only from the fact that it was created to be thus… [by] the will of the 
Creator.”
 
760
 Aristotle’s taxonomic distinction between essence and accident is faulty and 
misleading, in Cusa’s view.761
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not have created that creature. Creatures do not “participate” in universal forms to varying 
degrees, but are as they are because they were created to be thus.762 By its very existence, 
however, it follows that “the creature is the intention of the Creator.”763
Perceptible oikos 
 By attending to God’s 
creation, with fleshly eyes like Jesus’s, we are able to see the Creator’s intention. 
To illustrate this assertion that the creature is the visible intention of the Creator, Cusa 
offers a simple, but profound, analogy which recurs throughout DB. By observing a house, one is 
able to apprehend the architect’s intention, which was present in her intellect.764
For example, humankind knows the mechanical art. One has the forms of this 
art more truly in one’s mental concept than as they are formable outside one’s 
mind—just as a house, which is made by means of an art, has a truer form in 
the mind than in the pieces of wood… But it does not follow that the house 
which exists in terms of wood (i.e., the perceptible house) exists more truly in 
the mind—even though the form of the house is a truer form in the mind. For 
there is required—for the true being of the house and because of the end for 
the sake of which the house exists—that the house be perceptible.
 He then uses the 
analogy to contradict Plato and assert the significance of material bodies: 
765
Like Plato, Cusa acknowledges that the house has a more perfect form in the architect’s mind 
than it does in the wood and stone assembled by craftsmen. Against Plato, however, he points out 
that the will and purpose of the architect is only realized in the material image. In other words, 
the architect may imagine a house more perfect than what craftsmen create, but only the latter 
will keep you warm at night, sheltered from the storm. If this artificial form is to fulfil its 
intended purpose, it must be unfolded.  
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Though simple and straightforward, Cusa’s architectural analogy is profound. Elsewhere, 
he writes with equal philosophical depth about spoons.766 Unlike fire, water, and other natural 
forms, it is difficult to imagine a place for houses and spoons in Plato’s transcendental realm of 
Forms. For Cusa, the ontological source of these artificial forms is not the Divine Intellect, but 
the human intellect, as is the case for math and maps. Moreover, there is hardly any doubt that 
Plato’s Forms exist; Plato created them.767
Like “visions’ pathway” in DQD, the architectural analogy is more than an analogy. Far 
from Plotinian aphaíresis, one does not draw nearer to the Divine source through removal, but 
by creating.
  
768
If one is to grasp the architect’s intention, one must consider how the parts “fit together.” 
How do they relate and cooperate? How is this wall, that window, or that door incorporated into 
its ecology? Likewise, natural diversity manifests the Creator’s intention. This diverse oikos 
reveals the free will of its Architect. To grasp the intention behind this ecological imago Dei, it is 
necessary to consider how diverse creatures “fit together.” To see more clearly with our fleshly 
eyes, Cusa offers a method. 
 When the architect creates a house, it is not as if the architect is creating; the 
architect is actually creating—freely, intentionally, and with willful purpose. If the architect’s 
house remains immaterial, its purpose remains unfulfilled. Bodies are necessary. Diversity is 
necessary. Without diverse bodies, the architect’s (or Architect’s) will cannot materialize.  
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One and Many: Seeing through the Beryl Stone 
Cusa entitles his text: On the Beryl Stone. Anticipating that his reader will not know what 
a beryl stone is, he explains: 
Beryl stones are bright, white, and clear. To them are given both concave and 
convex forms. And someone who looks out through them apprehends that 
which was previously invisible.769
In Cusa’s native German, the word brille means “eyeglasses,” and etymologically derives from 
the Greek beryllos. What Cusa seems to have in mind is curved crystal, like the lens of an 
eyeglass. Gazing through it, tiny things are magnified. Turning the same lens over, large things 
are miniaturized. The beryl stone, then, represents a coincidence of opposites (micro and macro) 
that enables one to focus on particular entities (microscopically), but also see how these 
particular entities harmonize with their larger environment (macroscopically).  
  
Through the beryl stone, Cusa trains his reader to see the One in light of the Many. To 
see this theophany of the Creator, one must appreciate the uniqueness of each and every creature, 
microscopically, but also appreciate how these diverse creatures relate to one another, 
macroscopically. Through the beryl stone, each creature is regarded as a “locus of 
relationality.”770
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 One discovers the architect’s intention by gazing at the material oikos, first at 
each of its parts and their construction, and then taking note of its purpose and necessity as it 
relates to its environment. Likewise, one discovers the Creator’s intention through an ecological 
gaze, taking note of the unique quiddity of each imago Dei through the microscopic lens of the 
beryl stone, but also the relation of each creature to its environment through the macroscopic 
beryl.  
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Gazing by means of this double-beryl vision, the theophany of this ecological imago Dei 
reveals the Creator’s intentional harmony, “a concordance of differences.”771
For example, harmonic forms are varied. For the generic harmony is 
variously specified through various differences. And the union by which a 
difference (e.g., treble with base) is united… has within itself a proportionate 
harmony… For, indeed, a likeness of Eternal Reason, or of the divine 
Creator-Intellect, shines forth in harmonic or concordant proportion. And we 
experience this fact, since that proportion is delightful and pleasing to each of 
the senses whenever it is perceived.
 He explains: 
772
Beauty and harmony, he explains, are not to be found in monotony or unison, but in the 
harmonious proportion of difference. “A harmonious song contains many differences of 
voice.”
 
773
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 Through one side of the beryl, one perceives the unique quiddity of that which is 
irreducibly particular, and unprecedented imago Dei. Reversing the beryl, one perceives a map of 
relationships, an ecology of differences. When these opposites coincide intellectually, according 
to Cusa, one perceives harmony, and thus the Creator’s intention for each particular becomes 
manifest. Here again, we observe that Cusa refuses to separate physical sight of material bodies 
from intellectual/spiritual vision. The “intellectual beryl stone” mends, as it were, what 
rationality severs. It awakens our vision so that we might attend to what nature intends. Thus 
awakened, the imago Dei sheds its anthropocentrism. Through this double-beryl vision, one 
recognizes the passerby as a uniquely created image of the Creator, but also the flowers, trees, 
and rivers along the path. Standing on the circle of life, recognizing the Architect’s Dynamis and 
Theos manifestly revealed in harmonious diversity from a limited perspective, one maps the 
oikos. 
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Spiritual Theosis: Creative Harmony 
In the first of these three sections on Cusa’s Trinitarian imago Dei, I argued that the 
theophany of Christ in DVD teaches us how to receive the divine gift of our unique quiddity 
more truly and fully such that we learn to see one another as unprecedented images of God 
(p293ff). Learning to see in this way, the theophany of the Creator in DB reveals to us that every 
creature (whether animate or inanimate) is likewise a unique imago Dei which, when perceived 
ecologically, reveals the Creator’s harmonious, creative intention (p300ff). Unlike these, the 
pneumatological imago Dei is not a theophany, but a theosis. It is something futural which must 
be brought into being, like the dharma of 0ƯPƗূVƗ.774
I began this chapter by sketching the historical context in which Cusa composed DVD 
and DB. With the fall of Constantinople, the world had ended. New maps needed to be created. 
As he penned DB, barricaded within Castle Andraz, his lifelong friend Pope Pius II organized 
troops for a new Crusade, hoping to reclaim the old world hegemony, while Duke Sigismund and 
other German nationalists sought to assassinate Cusa, hoping for a new world division. In 
September of 1453, however, Cusa envisioned a new creation. 
 It is an imago Dei that we, as “second 
gods” must create, in the Spirit of the Creator.  
The end of the world, in other words, occasioned a new cosmography. Learning to see 
others and Nature through Jesus’s fleshly eyes and double-beryl vision, Cusa imagined creating a 
world in the harmonious Spirit of the Creator. Being a “second god” bears divine responsibility. 
Creativity is a spiritual vocation. 
De pace fidei, as the title makes clear, envisions the peace of religious faiths. Because 
there can only be one Creator of all, Cusa reasons, there can only be one religion. Because all 
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creatures are diverse, however, there must be a diversity of rites.775 What Cusa means by the 
word “religion” is clearly not what Wilfred Cantwell Smith refers to as “cumulative traditions,” 
but neither is it what Smith calls “personal faith,” either.776 Talal Asad points out, “that [Smith’s] 
text makes no mention of adverbs.”777 As I have noted, Cusa’s ontology is adverbial. Cusa does 
not reify religion as a Platonic Idea in which religious traditions “participate,” nor does he reduce 
religion to a variety of subjective experiences, as William James perhaps does.778
As already mentioned (p
 Rather, 
religion is an ontological mode: be-ing in the key of religion. To exist religiously is to exist 
enfoldedly: being oneself, not another, as one was created to be, harmoniously, ecologically. 
254), DPF mirrors and echoes, in countless ways, Cusa’s first 
major treatise, On Universal Concord, composed two decades prior. Therein, he argues that 
ecclesiastical councils, such as the Council of Basel (for which DCC was written), are more 
authoritative than the Pope because they receive their authority from the presence of the Holy 
Spirit. The issue of authority, then, is one of spiritual discernment. In other words, how does one 
discern whether or not the members of an ecclesiastical council are listening to the Holy Spirit?  
In Discerning the Spirit(s), Amos Yong argues that Christians must have some “criteria 
by which we can discern… the presence and activity” of the Holy Spirit.779
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 The Spirit blows 
where She wills, works in mysterious ways, and is perceived to be absent (or at least 
hidden/ignored) at times. By what criteria can one discern the Spirit’s presence and movement? 
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Cusa’s criterion is harmony. In the theophany of Christ, one observes harmony. In the 
theophany of Creation, one observes harmony. Beauty and melody are pleasing due to 
harmonious proportion. While the persons and activities of the Divine Trinity are diverse, there 
is harmony in their perichoretic dance. The authority of an ecclesiastical council, Cusa reasons, 
is not discerned by a unison of voices, but by diverse voices in harmony. Hence, it is incorrect to 
say, as historians are prone, that Cusa left or abandoned the Council of Basel. Observing the 
complete absence of harmony in Basel in 1437, he left because it was no longer a council. 
Likewise, “religion” in DPF is not a sociological, historical, or even personal category in which 
traditions or persons “participate.” Rather, persons are religiously when they are harmoniously.  
While the words “harmony” and “concord” are virtuously synonymous, it is far from 
insignificant that Cusa prefers the latter, often pairing the two. As cited above, for example, he 
observes that “the divine Creator-Intellect, shines forth in harmonic or concordant 
proportion.”780
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 Etymologically, concordance implies affection, and agreement with heart. In the 
final chapter of DCC, Cusa describes the interrelated functions of civil and sacred order (church 
and empire) through an analogy to the human body. While both Pope and Emperor receive their 
authority from God, they cannot function without the willful consent of the people. Just as the 
body cannot live without the heart, pumping life through one’s veins, neither can Pope and 
Emperor govern without concordantia, the heartfelt agreement and harmonious consent of the 
people. Political governance itself constitutes a coincidence of opposites: Hierarchical authority 
from above coincides with democratic concord from below. As Paul Sigmund describes, “the 
concordant mean position (medium concordantiae) is that ‘rulership is from God through 
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[persons] and councils, by elective consent.’”781
To create the world in the Spirit of the Creator, then, necessarily requires the heartfelt 
agreement (con-cord) of diverse persons in the world. As “second gods,” humans are gifted with 
the power and freedom to create whatever world we desire to create, be it divine or demonic. We 
are free to create in the Spirit of God, and free to create in a manner contrary to that Spirit. The 
criteria by which to discern the spirit of our creativity, insists Cusa, is concordance. The great 
diversity of persons, cultures, ideas, and even religious faith-traditions poses neither problem nor 
obstacle to harmony: It is the necessary prerequisite for it. “All being and living is constituted by 
concordance, and all concordance is a concordance of differences.”
 In the context of Cusa’s conciliarism, though, it 
is critical to note that whatever political “check-and-balance” may be implied in his concordant 
mean, it is thoroughly Trinitarian. Elective consent and heartfelt agreement are pneumatological 
criteria. They signify the presence and movement of the Holy Spirit. Since that Spirit cannot be 
in discord with the other persons of the Trinity, then the absence of elective agreement with 
hierarchical authority signals that those “at the top,” so-to-speak, are not attending to the divine 
light, whence their temporal authority derives.  
782
Reflecting at length on the “weights” that rest upon the “scales of Justice,” Cusa writes: 
 
Concordant harmonies are… investigated by means of weights. Indeed, the 
weight of a thing is, properly speaking, a harmonic proportion that has 
arisen from various combinations of different things. Even the friendships 
and the animosities of animals and of persons… as well as their customs… 
are weighed by harmonic concordances and opposing dissonances.783
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The world having ended in May 1453, Cusa recognized the need to (re)create the world in the 
Spirit of God. Social justice is not measured by a transcendental ideal in which we participate to 
varying degrees in a Platonic shadow-world. Rather, the scales of social justice are weighed from 
below: through the heartfelt harmonizing of irreducibly particular creatures.  
Hence, we regard this futural imago Dei, an adventive image of God that is to-come in 
and through our creativity, with a double-beryl vision. Seeing each and every creature as Jesus 
saw, with fleshly eyes that attended to every passerby, we recognize the value of each unique 
voice. Reversing the beryl, we hasten to see a harmonious proportion, waiting in potentia to be 
actualized. In his final text, when Cusa retreats from his understanding of God as Possest, 
“Actualized-Possibility,” in favor of Posse Ipsum, “Possibility Itself,” it was because he realized 
that the God Who May Be (as Richard Kearney paraphrases Posse Ipsum) has not yet been 
actualized.784
Conclusions 
 Like Derrida’s messianic, the divine Possest remains always to-come, an adventive 
imago Dei that requires both our individual (quidditive) and ecological theosis. Though created 
in the image of the Creator, we are yet in-process. If we are to “perfect” ourselves (one and 
many), we must attend to one another, seeking the heartfelt concord the Spirit intends. 
We do not know the world-as-it-is, insists Cusa. What we call knowledge is mere 
conjecture. However, as Cusa’s first premise states—paraphrasing Romans 1:20—the Divine 
Intellect exists unfoldedly as creation for the purpose of manifesting Itself. Hence, God shows 
Godself such that God can be seen, if only we learn to attend. As the measure of all things, the 
human mind knows the world-as-it-is-measured. Learning this ignorance, we discover our 
creativity. Though we only know measures we create, we bear a likeness to the Divine Intellect 
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in that very creativity. Just as we know sensual things sensually, rational things rationally, and 
intellectual things intellectually, we learn of the Creator creatively.  
As “second gods” we create measures by which to know ourselves, our world, and our 
Creator, while remaining infinitely far from the truth, as a polygon remains infinitely far from a 
circle. Though we do not know the world-as-it-is, we nevertheless map the world that we 
measure, thereby revealing to us the value we attribute to things. Our maps reveal less to us 
about the world than about our perspectives thereupon—and thereby reveal to us the possibilities 
of alternative perspectives. Standing on the circle of life, we share our limited perspectives, 
transcending those limitations by multiplying them, listening to our neighbors, having faith in 
their witness.  
As unique images of God, we do not desire to be others, but strive to perfect our unique 
quiddity by becoming ourselves more fully. We do so by learning to see as Jesus saw, since he 
was more anointed than we. But to us is given the power to become children of God,785
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 On Cusa’s reading of John 1:12, see De filiatione Dei and p
 if only 
we remove intellectual distractions, awakening and opening vision’s pathway to the graceful 
divine light that anoints, descending so that we might attend to the passerby. Gazing attentively 
to the Creator’s intention, we wonder at nature’s diversity, the manifold unfolding in an infinite 
image. With double-beryl vision, we see all-in-all and each-in-each, a divine revelation of 
harmonic proportion. Learning to see these theophanies of Christ and Creator, we seek to create 
in the Spirit of God. Actualizing possibility, we awaken to diverse voices, hearing one another 
into speech, attending to diverse intentions, and thus seek heartfelt concord. Seeing, listening, 
recognizing, and attending, we describe chords on the circle of life, mapping concordance in a 
web of relationships. Through an eco-spiritual creativity that begins, always, with sensuality—
286, above. 
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seeing bodies and hearing voices, with heart (con-cord)—we actualize the possibility of a 
Trinitarian imago Dei. 
 
 Part Three: Comparative Theology as Learning to See 
ĝDৄkara and Nicholas of Cusa are rich and profound theological thinkers. In order to 
write about them, coordinately, difficult decisions arise if they are to be heard, harmoniously. 
Though I have often turned from one to the other just as the work begins to bear fruit, I never 
turn my back on either. Hearing one, the other’s voice beckons. While sometimes dizzying and 
disorienting, this perichoretic dance between contexts spins webs of interrelations. By describing 
polygonal chords from ĝDৄkara’s perspective to Cusa’s and back again, these turns map a 
journey: a quest of faith seeking understanding and understanding seeking freedom. And yet 
every fork in this journey has left a path untread. While this is true of any comparative endeavor, 
it is nevertheless necessary to demonstrate that what is gained through comparison is worth 
foregoing what is left unwritten, unspoken, and unheard. That is not to suggest that academic 
theology is a zero-sum game, quantifiable in utilitarian measures, but simply to acknowledge that 
research methods deserve scrutiny and justification. 
Comparison yields far more than description. Mere tallying similarities and differences is 
of limited value, especially when the scope is limited to just two individuals without any 
discernable historical connection, exceptional though they may be. Comparison enables us to 
perceive something in each thinker that we might not otherwise have been able to perceive. It 
enriches our reading of each theologian in historical context, while also contributing 
meaningfully to contemporary concerns of our own. This comparison of ĝDৄkara and Nicholas of 
Cusa, therefore, intends to touch (tangere) theologians whose interest and exposure to one or the 
other thinker may only be tangential. 
Moreover, theology cannot—if it is theology—remain altogether descriptive, but must at 
least signal towards practical theology and ethics. This is all the more true with respect to 
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apophatic theology, since its purpose must be more than simply underscoring our ignorance 
regarding the topic about which we speak (and unspeak). It should direct us towards some new 
understanding of ourselves, our world, and our theo-ethical purpose therein. ĝDৄkara and 
Nicholas of Cusa, after all, did not toil over their texts motivated by the thought that they might 
one day become dissertation fodder. Reading their texts, it becomes readily apparent that they 
believed their insights meaningfully contribute to their worlds, prompting some changed 
orientation and comportment in their readers. Any worthwhile retrieval of their texts, therefore, 
must also retrieve some measure of their theo-ethical prompting, translated (temporally as well 
as linguistically) for the contemporary context.786
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 This criterion extends beyond the discipline of theology, as well.  
 Six: 7KHRVLVDQG3HUFHSWLRQLQĝDৄkara and Nicholas of Cusa 
Introduction 
Toward the end articulated above (p313), this final chapter aims to articulate the 
contemporary theological value of this comparative experiment. I begin by identifying two areas 
to which this comparison most directly contributes. The first, far briefer than the second, is more 
theoretical, pertaining to mysticism as a performative method. In other words: What does this 
particular comparative endeavor tell us about apophatic theology in general? Juxtaposing 
ĝDৄkara and Cusa, one sees that their respective justifications for negation appear to be markedly 
different, even opposed. Each is motivated by epistemic problems which, frankly, do not exist 
for the other. The comparison invites us (re)consider the nature of apophatic theology, which 
performs its own way of knowing.  
The second area pertains to our understanding of theosis and, consequently, theo-ethical 
responsibility. If theosis is understood as deification or sanctification, as is often the case, the 
notion appears somewhat alien to ĝDৄkara’s 9HGƗQWD. One does not become Ɩtman-Brahman 
because one always already is ƖWPDQ-Brahman. Reading Cusa after ĝDৄkara, learning to hear the 
two harmoniously, it becomes clear that Cusa understands theosis much as ĝDৄkara understands 
awakening to the truth of Brahman. Coordinating their theologies, reading one in light of the 
other without reducing difference to unison, one attends more alertly to the relationship between 
theosis and sensuality. Realizing one’s innate divinity (“I am Brahman”; “I am an unprecedented 
imago Dei”), one begins to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch otherwise and other-wisely. In this 
emergent sensuality, diversity and difference find an absolute—and concordant—worth. 
Irreducible particularity bears divine value as the unique revelation of ultimate reality, accessible 
only through embodied, relational encounter and awakened perception. While, as I have argued, 
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these insights are present and available in the writings of ĝDৄkara and Cusa in isolation, the 
comparison prompts us to consider the ubiquity of the human desire to be seen—just as one is—
and the theo-ethical responsibility to perceive our neighbors and ecologies as they uniquely 
reveal themselves to be.  
I demonstrate these points through close readings of two episodes. The first is the 
embodied encounter between spiritual guide and disciple (guru and ĞL܈ya) culminating in the 
direct, personal revelation: tat tvam asi, Thou art that. The second is the sensual encounter 
between Jesus and the Samaritan woman at Jacob’s well, wherein he sees her just as she is: an 
unprecedented imago Dei. Adapting and applying the methods of upasaۨKƗUD and samanvaya 
(p75), I coordinate these readings without obviating their particularity, hearing them 
harmoniously. Each, in its own way, models the apophatic measure as attentive sensuality. 
Seeing an/other through the apophatic measure, the guru and the rabbi awaken the ĞL܈ya and the 
Samaritan by perceiving them as a singularity: a unique manifestation of the One that unfolds in 
and as the manifold. Attentive sensuality—seeing another into being, hearing another into 
speech—performs an awakening to one’s inherent divinity. Being seen initiates theosis. 
Finally, I conclude by reflecting on comparative theology as a method by which one 
learns to see. Building upon the previous sections, I argue that Christian apophatic theology can 
claim neither to be systematic nor learnedly ignorant lest it venture beyond its historically 
defined religious boundaries. Comparative theology transgresses the historical boundaries 
between traditions of theoĸORJ\,QVRGRLQJLWGLVcloses previously unseen (pre)suppositions 
inherent to social, cultural, and traditional structures of knowledge. Before we can unsay, 
unknow, or deconstruct our (pre)suppositions, we must first identify them. While comparative 
theology is but one method among many others for identifying and naming our theological 
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(pre)suppositions, it is, nevertheless, an important if not indispensable task. As Catherine Keller 
has shown, the assumptions and presuppositions of Christian theology are poignantly revealed 
when one pauses to consider what Christian theologians deem worthy and unworthy of being 
unsaid. Guided by Dionysius the Areopagite, Emmanuel Levinas, Elizabeth Johnson, Mary Daly, 
and others, we have grown comfortable unsaying God’s goodness, being, and gender. Even the 
most faithful Christian mystics, however, shift uncomfortably in their chairs when God’s 
Christianity is proffered for apophatic consideration.787
Apophatic Measure as Theory and Theoro  
 Nevertheless, if God creates freely and 
intentionally, and if unique particulars reveal God uniquely, then our perception of the divine 
remains obscured, superimposed by measuring (PƗ\Ɨ), unless our apophasis roams beyond tribal 
borders, faithfully seeking understanding beyond traditional territories, aided by comparative 
theology as learning to see. 
In chapter I.26 of De docta ignorantia, Cusa offers a straightforward and simple 
articulation of apophatic theology and its necessity. As Keller notes, “it may offer the most lucid 
definition of negative theology within the Christian corpus.”788
The worshipping of God, who is to be worshiped in spirit and in truth, must 
be based upon affirmations about God. Accordingly, every religion, in its 
worshipping, must mount upward by means of affirmative theology… 
 Agreeing with Keller, I simply 
wish to emphasize the conditional nature of this “lucid definition… within the Christian corpus.” 
In other words: what limitations might this definition of negative theology have if we attempt to 
apply it to the body of texts beyond the Christian corpus? Cusa writes: 
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[However] the theology of negation is so necessary for the theology of 
affirmation that without it God would not be worshiped as the Infinite God 
but, rather, as a creature. And such worship is idolatry; it ascribes to the 
image that which befits only the reality itself.789
To worship God, one must affirm something about God. From Cusa’s Christian perspective, 
however, these affirmations are merely humanly created measures which necessarily fall 
infinitely shy of the Infinite God, and hence must be unsaid. As I have shown, the measures do 
not measure God, from Cusa’s perspective, but only measure our limited understanding of God, 
since the human person is the measure of all things. Like chords inscribed in a circle, they 
approach, but never resolve to truth. 
 
This definition of negative theology, however, cannot apply to ĝDৄkara. In ĝDৄkara’s 
theological tradition of (Uttara-) 0ƯPƗূVƗ, (Sanskrit) language is not a human creation. There is 
an eternal, unauthored connection between words, universal ideas, and particular entities (p97). 
Words are limited, finite790 measures of the infinite and therefore must be unsaid—but they are, 
nevertheless, true and reliable measures of the infinite.791
110
 Though finite in semantic scope, words 
are temporally infinite: eternally signifying each and every particular and simultaneously 
signifying universals, according to the speaker’s intention (p ). Like finite points on an 
infinite circle, words measure that which is possessed of infinite measure (p165).792
For both Cusa and ĝDৄkara alike, then, negative theology is necessary if one desires to 
know Ultimate Reality. For ĝDৄkara, though, worshipping the finite is not idolatry,
 
793
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the finite is not other than the infinite. The finite is a modification of the infinite. Words are 
modifications of AUM, just as a pot is a modification of clay (p111).794
256
 Notwithstanding 
fundamentally different understandings of language, Cusa’s position, in the end, comes quite 
near to this. Each and every creature, in its unique quiddity, reveals the intention of the Creator 
(p ). An infinite number of finite bodies manifest images of the Divine Intellect, which 
unfolds so that it might be seen. Consistencies (and inconsistencies) between ĝDৄkara’s view of 
particularity and Cusa’s view of the same invite us to hear their voices harmoniously, without 
reducing concordance to unison.795
Therefore, both ĝDৄkara and Cusa assert the need for apophasis to remove epistemic 
measures of reality, though their understandings of measuring are markedly different. Moreover, 
their understandings of ordinary, everyday perception are importantly distinct. For ĝDৄkara, 
pratyak܈a is a valid means of knowledge (SUDPƗ۬a). Perception is never wrong (p
 Finite particulars both are and are not the infinite. Apophasis 
unsays measuring in order that that-which-is-measured may be seen, without superimposing 
expectation or universal categories.  
105). Verbal 
cognition of the buddhi measures truth, truly (p165, p181). For Cusa, we cannot know the world 
we see (p196). We see it, truly and pre/cisely, but “knowledge” arises after the epistemic “cut,” 
and thus remains ever conjectural (p269). “The measure and the measured—however equal they 
are—will always remain different” (p196). Nevertheless, the effect of apophasis is similar for 
both: apophasis enables us to unknow so that we might see (p181, p278). For each, apophasis 
removes distractions, leading to a wakeful attentiveness (p100, p234). Learning to perceive 
through the apophatic measure, sensuality ceases to be a means to an end, an act of consumption. 
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It becomes an end unto itself: perceiving this and that as the visible manifestation of “All This” 
(p165), attending to the Creator’s intentional bodies (p300). 
This comparison compels us to reconsider the fundamental motivation behind apophasis. 
Without denying that apophasis negates or “unsays” as a means to unknowing, the comparison 
leads us to reconsider the end towards which apophasis is a means. Simply stated, my central 
argument throughout the foregoing chapters is as follows: Apophasis is a means to see the 
uniqueness of irreducible particulars as unprecedented disclosures of Ultimate Reality. Implicitly 
enfolded in this statement is the trifold meaning of “apophatic measure” as introduced in the 
opening pages of this thesis (p3): It is (1) a method of removing measures in order to cultivate an 
(2) attentive sensuality by which one can perceive (3) particulars as unique, unspeakable 
measures of transcendence. Apophasis yields unknowing, enabling us to see Reality in its sacred 
Ultimacy.  
Through the apophatic measure, one hastens to see Theos, the Beholder Who hastens to 
see. Negating measures of expectancy, one finds oneself to be radically hospitable, and, thus, 
finds oneself to be seen as unique, intentional imago Dei. Being seen, one attends to the 
passerby, who intends to be seen as the Creator’s actualized possibility. Through the apophatic 
measure, one prepares oneself for a graceful revelation: tat tvam asi. Negating entirely the very 
category of DQƗWPDQ (non-Self), one sees that one’s very Self is always already Brahman (aham 
EUDKPƗVPL); one “becomes” Brahman (theosis), as it were, and is thus able to utter: tat tvam asi. 
Becoming Oneself 
Theosis, as it is commonly conceived, is synonymous with deification, sanctification, or 
“Becoming God.” From a Christian Neoplatonist perspective, the many proceeds, exits, or even 
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“boils over” from the One. Theosis, then, is a turning back towards the One: A return to the 
Creator.  
For Cusa, however, theosis is synonymous with filiation, Christiformitas, or realizing 
one’s divine nature. He writes: “Therefore, this is the pathway of pursuit of those who strive 
toward theosis: To perceive the One in the diversity of any modes whatsoever… in this school of 
the sensible world, the One, which is all things, is sought diversely.”796
215
 From Cusa’s perspective, 
the many does not “proceed” (proodos) from the One; rather, the Simple (Ein-feld) exists 
unfoldedly as the manifold (p ). As a manifest unfolding of God, each creature is an image of 
God, imago Dei. Since God is without limitation, and so cannot be marked off from anything 
else,797 then God is not-Other (non-aliud).798 For Cusa, therefore, theosis is not a “return” to 
God, but is a realization that “I exist enfoldedly in God and God exists unfoldedly as me.”799
While no Sanskrit term directly correlates with the Greek notion of theosis, the term aptly 
applies to BrahmanjñƗQD anubhava, or the realization of the knowledge of ultimate reality. 
According to the B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad, the manifold exists as the One which is avyak܀tam: 
unmanifest or undifferentiated. This One is differentiated into diverse names and forms which 
are not-other (na anyat) than their material cause.
 
800
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Therefore, for ĝDৄkara and Cusa alike, theosis should not imply “becoming” or 
“returning” to God. Rather, theosis is a realization of one’s inherent divinity. It is a realization 
that the manifold is not-other than the One-fold (sim-pli-city).801
Awakened to Perceive 
 For each, our everyday manner 
of perceiving the world is the primary impediment to properly understanding our divine nature. 
Awakened to our nature, our perception of the world changes; we perceive the world—and one 
another—in a divine manner. In the following two examples, I examine the role of perception in 
the process of theosis, and the corresponding difference in everyday perception in contrast to 
perception after realization of one’s divine nature. Summarizing key points and themes from 
Parts One and Two, I draw together and build upon all I have written to this point. 
Scriptural apophasis 
According to ĝDৄkara and his interpretation of scripture, Supreme Reality is non-dual.802
165
 
Every-thing that exists is Brahman, which is identical with the Self (p ).803
171
 As shown earlier, 
Supreme Self is able to be perceived by those who have heard the meaning of ĞUXWL (p ). 
Although Brahman is before one’s very eyes and perceptible, it is expressed indirectly prior to 
being pointed out perceptibly and particularly by means of a teacher’s gesture to the non-dual 
Self dwelling in the heart of the student.804
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grasping one’s inherent divinity, but final realization of one’s divinity arises only in the 
embodied encounter of teacher and student.805
$FFRUGLQJWRWKH0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D8SDQLৢad, there are three modes of ordinary consciousness, 
plus a fourth state of realization. Although the MU distinguishes these modes as waking, dream, 
DQGGHHSVOHHSĝDৄkara and his predecessors insist that all three states analogously describe 
someone who is awake (p
  
155).806
132
 They indicate degrees of mental alertness or attentiveness 
(p ). For example, one can see a rope with one’s eyes and cognize it as a rope (analogous to 
waking); one can see a rope but mistakenly cognize it as a snake (analogous to dream); or one 
can see a rope but have no cognition of it at all, as if in a daze or consumed with other thoughts 
(analogous to deep sleep)ĝDৄkara likens these to darkness characterized by not being fully 
awakened to the truth (p146).807
165
 In the fourth state, then, one is fully awakened, perceiving a 
rope qua rope, but also understanding “rope” to be a partial measuring of Brahman possessed of 
infinite measure (p ). Hence, one perceives and discerns particulars in WXUƯ\D, but understands 
that which is measured to be ontologically non-different from the measurer, and thus knows (or 
“enters”) the Self by means of the Self (p163).808
106
 Prior to this awakening, one sees the non-dual 
Self which is all that was, is, or will be, but one fails to perceive because epistemic measuring  
(PƗ\Ɨ) impedes the pathway of true perception (p ).809
ĝDৄkara’s theology, I have argued, is best understood within the context of his 
theological tradition, which considers perception and scripture to be unfailing means to valid 
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knowledge with distinct authoritative domains and purposes (p56). As KLVSUHGHFHVVRUĝDEDUD, 
stated 500 years or so earlier, “sense-perception is never wrong” (p104). If perception is never 
wrong, then how can it be that one sometimes sees a shell but mistakes it for silver, or sees a 
URSHEXWPLVWDNHVLWIRUDVQDNH"ĝDEDUDDVVHUWVWKDWHUURUVXFKDVWKLVLVQRWWKHUHVXOWRI
perception, but is instead a marker of its absence. To explain, he turns to the analogies of 
waking, dream, and dreamless sleep (p132). For perception to occur, there must be a connection 
between the sense organs, the perceptible object, and an alert mind .810
104
 When one is sleepy, one’s 
mind is impotent. Erroneously cognizing a shell as silver is not due to any defect in perception, 
H[SODLQVĝDEDUD5DWKHUVOHHSLVWKHFDXVHRIIDOVHDSSHDUDQFH (p ).811
Therefore, perception depends not only on the connection between sense organs, object, 
and mind, but also on the quality of that connection. Although one’s body may be awake, 
perception only occurs when the mind is fully awake. If one’s mind is preoccupied or in a daze, 
then there is no cognition of the perceptible object; perception does not occur. When the mind is 
inattentive, false knowledge arises, but this does not constitutHSHUFHSWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRĝDEDUD
Perception only occurs when there is a connection between object, sense organ, and the alert 
mind (p
  
131). This perception never goes astray and is not subject to doubt or error (p105).812
104
 The 
wakefulness of the mind, however, is subject to doubt, since error arises when the mind is 
inattentive (p ). 
Likewise, ĝDৄkara explains that although one’s sense organs may be capable of 
perceiving, perception only occurs when the internal organ of perception, called the mind, is 
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joined to those sense organs.813
“I didn’t see it; my mind was elsewhere. I didn’t hear it; my mind was 
elsewhere.” For it is through the mind that one sees and hears.
 Here, ĝDৄkara is commenting on the following passage from the 
B৚KDGƗUD৆yaka Upaniৢad: 
814
The pUƗMña, then, is analogous to deep sleep due to an absence of the connection between 
attentive mind and sense organs. This is significant for ĝDৄkara for the following reason: When 
there is the absence of cognition, there is also the absence of duality (p
 
145). The cessation of 
duality, however, is not the same as being awakened to the truth of nonduality.815
179
 Apophasis 
alone, in other words, does not lead to theosis. At issue, for ĝDৄkara, is the distinction between 
perception in the waking state and perception in the enlightened state (p ). 
As we have seen, perception in the waking state is not subject to doubt. It is not 
unfaithful (na vyabhicarati). When one sees a rope with one’s eyes and cognizes it as a rope due 
to a connection between the rope, the eye, and an alert mind, this perception is never sublated, 
unlike a snake superimposed on the rope.816
8GGƗODNDH[SODLQVWRKLVVRQĝYHWDNHWX that although one sees a clay pot, one comes to 
know all things made of clay when one understands clay to be the material cause of the pot 
(p
 Although this perception of the rope qua rope is 
true, there is yet a higher truth. To explain, ĝDৄkara draws upon an episode from &KƗQGRJ\D 
Upaniৢad VI.1.4.  
111).817
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particular form. To the contrary, the particular form manifests the material cause. Manifestation 
(abhivyaktiۊ), ĝDৄkara explains, means coming before one’s very eyes (VƗN܈ƗW).818 The clay must 
exist in some particular form if it is to be perceived. That perceptible form (i.e., the pot) is a 
material effect which is non-different from its material cause (i.e., the clay).819 Likewise, 
although Brahman as supreme cause is beyond our grasp, its effect is perceived in the form of the 
visible world.820
172
 By perceiving the effect qua effect, one comes to know the cause in its absence. 
For example, by perceiving the absence of milk in curd, one knows the curd to be an effect 
which is ontologically nondifferent than its cause (milk) (p ).821 Although one perceives the 
pot, one is awakened to a higher truth, which is the clay. The tXUƯ\D then, is a higher state of 
wakefulness wherein one perceives a particular entity as it is, but also as a real effect of an 
unseen cause.822
In the same way that an external light must be present for the eye to see a jar, an internal 
light must be present for the mind to perceive what the eye sees. Just as the external light may be 
too dim to see clearly, one’s internal light may also be too dim to perceive clearly.
  
823
146
 ĝDৄkara 
describes this apophatically: Scripture removes the darkness, so that one’s internal light (the self-
luminous ƗWPDQ) is able to perceive the Brahman that is before one’s very eyes and perceptible 
(p ).824
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perception. Scripture intends to indicate what cannot be described (p175).825
107
 A teacher can point 
something out to a student, turning one’s face towards what is to be seen, but knowledge only 
arises when the student perceives it directly, since perception is the only valid means of 
knowledge suitable to that purpose (p ).826
Perception and theosis  
  
The foregoing summarizes key points established in Part One, thereby forming a basis for 
the central point I want to make here, grounded in ĝDৄkara’s comments on MU 2. According to 
ĝDৄkara, scripture describes Brahman indirectly (parok܈a abhihitam) by removing obstacles to 
direct perception. Scripture’s apophasis prepares one for direct perception (p149). Subsequently, 
ĝDৄkara explains, the Brahman that is immediate and direct is pointed out perceptibly and 
particularly (pratyak܈DWRYLĞH܈e۬DQLUGLĞDWL) by means of a teacher’s gesture (abhinayaۊ) to the 
non-dual Self dwelling in the heart of the student.827
171
 As a knower of Brahman, who is well 
versed in 9HGƗQWD scriptures, the highest Self is able to be seen by this sannyasin (p ).828 As 
ĝDৄkara depicts in MUBh 2, the teacher literally points at the student and gives voice to the 
scripture, uttering: D\DPƗWPƗEUDKPD, “This Self is Brahman.”829
Just as a pot is perceived to be a manifestation and effect of its unseen material cause 
(i.e., clay), the student is perceived to be a manifestation and effect of Brahman. The student is 
 At this moment, the student is 
seen to be Brahman.  
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awakened by this supremely compassionate teacher when the student is seen to be Brahman.830 
Only at this moment of hearing the scripture, uttered by the teacher, and being seen by the 
teacher as Brahman does the student then understand—and believe—sa ahaۨ, “I am that,” aham 
EUDKPƗVPL, “I am Brahman.”831
Before one can truly confess, “I am Brahman,” one must first hear, tat tvam asi, “Thou 
art that [Brahman].” Before one can see oneself as Brahman, one is first seen as Brahman and 
hears the teacher’s revealing witness. Hearing “thou art that,” in its intimate, embodied 
indexicality, the student is awakened and enters the state of WXUƯ\D, which is devoid of sleep and 
dream.
 Hence, the student realizes his/her innate divinity when he/she 
is directly perceived as divine by the teacher.  
832
 Having become a knower of Brahman, the highest Self is able to be seen by the 
awakened student, who can then reciprocate, saying “Thou art that.”833 Having been “awakened 
by a supremely compassionate teacher,” one then “perceives the unborn, sleepless, dreamless 
nonduality.”834
Here again, the trifold meanings of “apophatic measure” fold back on themselves. 
Because the teacher is one who has heard the ĞUXWL which removes measures (apophatic 
measure1), the teacher perceives, wakefully and attentively without superimposing measures on 
the measured (apophatic measure2), and thus perceives the disciple as a particular manifestation 
 Therefore, theosis, as a process of realizing one’s inherent identity with 
Brahman, culminates in a moment of being perceived as Brahman. Having been seen as 
Brahman, the student is awakened to his/her divine nature and thus able to perceive.  
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of Brahman possessed of infinite measure (apophatic measure3). Because the teacher sees in this 
way, the teacher is able to incarnate the scripture, giving it voice so that it might be heard. As a 
ĞURWUL\Dwho has heard ĞUXWL’s truth, the teacher embodies the method, which now includes not 
only hearing the ĞUXWL as an apophatic measure1, but also being seen as an apophatic measure3. In 
this moment of theosis, the student realizes that he/she is the non-dual Seer of sight and thus 
enters the state of wakefully attentive sensuality beyond words (apophatic measure2).  
Perceiving Imago Dei 
The vision of God 
As mentioned earlier (p256), when Cusa sent On the Vision of God to the Benedictine 
monks at Tegernsee Abbey, the text was accompanied by a painting. The portrait, which Cusa 
calls the “Icon of God,” was chosen because of a most peculiar feature: From whatever vantage 
one views the painting, the portrait’s eye appears to gaze directly at the viewer.835 He instructs 
the monks to hang the painting on the North wall of the common room.836 They should stand in a 
semi-circle around the painting and walk in opposite directions. The monks will marvel, writes 
Cusa, “how the icon’s gaze is moved immovably,” remaining fixed on each brother.837
                                                     
835
 DVD 2, Hopkins 680.  
 The point 
of this spiritual/liturgical exercise, he explains, is as follows: To have a vision of God (visione 
Dei) is to realize that God’s vision (visione Dei) is ever fixed on each and every one of us. If we 
should ever see God, we will see God seeing us. This echoes what we have seen in DQD: 
Hastening to behold Theos by ascending the ladder of vision’s pathway, one finds oneself seen 
by the Beholder, Theos, Who hastens to see the seeker of God.  
836
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 DVD 4, Hopkins 681. 
329 
Addressing the Lord in DVD, Cusa prays: 
You embrace me with a steadfast look, and when I turn my love only toward 
You, Who are Love, You are turned only toward me.838
The Lord’s gaze attends, as if only to “me.” And yet the Lord’s steadfast gaze simultaneously 
attends to all beings: 
 
For if You do not desert me, who am the least of all men, then You will never 
desert anyone. You are present to each and every thing.839
In the companion text (De beryllo), Cusa reflects on the imago Dei doctrine, as 
previously discussed. Realizing that one is created in the image of God, one realizes that one is 
divine by nature. Because God is the Creator, then to be created in the image of God means to be 
creative.
 
840
The vision of Jesus 
 Although one is inherently divine (in actualitas), this means, for Cusa, that one is 
also divine in potentia. So long as we live, our creation is in-process. Though unfolded as a 
unique image of God, we are free to become ourselves more truly and completely, thus 
“perfecting” our unique quiddity, or to create ourselves otherwise, desiring to become another. 
Through creative measures, we create the world-as-we-measure-it. Because we are free and 
creative, we have the power to be both divinely creative and sinfully creative. Thus, our divine 
creativity bears with it a divine responsibility.  
For Cusa, the exemplar for divine responsibility is, of course, Jesus of Nazareth. In the 
previous chapter, I examined Cusa’s Christology in DVD, wherein he writes: 
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For while You, Jesus, walked amid this sensible world, You used fleshly eyes 
that were like ours. For with these eyes, You perceived in no other way than 
do we.841
By observing “the poses of the face and eyes,” Cusa continues, Jesus “comprehended that which 
lay hidden… since the face is the messenger of the heart.”
 
842
To consider these questions, I draw upon a sermon Cusa preached during this period.
 His discussion of Jesus in DVD 
(and likewise my analysis) remains somewhat abstract, theoretical, and even speculative. Twice, 
as we have seen, he turns to the analogy of failing to recognize the passerby. Jesus, it was 
suggested, never failed to recognize the passerby. But what might this look like? How does this 
sensual attention play out in the intimacy of actual human encounter? 
843
 
Therein, he reflects upon the encounter between Jesus and the Samaritan woman at Jacob’s well, 
as recounted in John 4. Using naught but fleshly eyes like ours,844
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 DVD 95, Hopkins 725. 
 Jesus gazed upon the face of 
the Samaritan woman. He saw her just as she was. Peering into her eyes, Jesus regarded her as a 
unique, irreducibly particular imago Dei, an image of God unlike any before or after her. He 
recognized her inherent divinity. He did not see a “pious interiority” hidden within and common 
to all; rather, he attended to her quiddity, the unique particularity intended by her Creator, Who 
exists unfoldedly as all-in-all and each-in-each. By the poses of her face and eyes, Jesus saw that 
she was wounded: She was afflicted by her station, her biography, her social status and other 
cosmographical measures creatively valued by the map-makers of her day. Jesus healed her soul 
842
 Ibid. 
843
 Sermon 247, Loquimini ad Petram coram Eis, March 25, 1457, Brixen. Cusa, Nicholas of. Cusa’s Last Sermons 
1457-1463. Translated by Jasper Hopkins. Minneapolis: Jasper Hopkins, 2011. http://jasper-
hopkins.info/SermonsCCLX-CCLXXV.pdf. 
844
 DVD 95-99, Hopkins 725-728. 
331 
by doing nothing more—and nothing less—than seeing her. He did not pass by. He recognized 
her as a unique image of God, an unprecedented imago Dei.  
Throughout the sermon, as in DVD, Cusa emphasizes Jesus’ humanity. He vividly 
describes the scene for his Sunday morning congregation. Having carried his weary body 
through the arid landscape, Jesus was tired and thirsty, so he asked the woman for a drink.845 
Though his flesh was weary and he did need water—from Jacob’s well—to drink, his faithful 
quaerens sought understanding, as well. As Cusa explains, Jesus “asks in order to motivate [her] 
to receive” (ut excitet ad recipiendum).846 “Faith enters through hearing… [but] knowledge is 
face-to-face seeing.”847 Reversing the intellectual beryl, Cusa reminds his attentive listener of the 
contextual ecology for this intimate encounter. Under the midday sun, Jesus and the Samaritan 
woman sit at Jacob’s well.848 Giving voice to Jacob’s ghost, Cusa preaches: “I have seen the 
Lord face to Face and my soul has been saved.”849
Though we have fleshly eyes like his, we do not always see as Jesus saw.
  
850
 Like a 
somnolent student at the feet of ĝDৄkarƗFƗU\D, we fail to recognize what is before our very eyes 
and perceptible (VƗN܈ƗWDSDURN܈ƗW), even though our face may be turned towards what is to be 
shown. Intellectually distracted by theoĸORJ\ZHKDVWHQWRVHH*RGfailing to recognize our 
neighbors passing by.851
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attention to other things, we do not attend to them.”852 Jesus, who is “more anointed than his 
fellow-persons,” neither says nor unsays theoĸORJ\EXWLVLQWHOOHFWXDOO\DZDNHQHGWRUHFHLYHWKH
divine light that gracefully descends; thus, he sees, he attends, and he reveals God’s Word 
(theoĺORJ\853 His gaze, like his Word, excites, motivating to receive (ut excitet ad 
recipiendum) the divine gift of quiddity.854 Like the icon’s gaze, the gift of quiddity attends 
uniquely—a gift intended only for you, a creature who does not desire to be another, but only 
yourself. Receiving this gift—this theoĺORJ\—more truly, one discloses God’s power and 
divinity (dynamis, Theos), which is manifestly revealed through one’s very Self. Christ’s gaze 
and divine Word (theoĺORJ\SRLQWVOLNHWKHJHVWXUHabhinayaۊ) of a finger: D\DPƗWPƗ
brahma, “This Self is Brahman.”855
Perception and theosis 
 His gaze awakens. Being seen, one exists, enfoldedly, 
sensually, vigorously, and vitally, in living color. Recognized. 
Without overlooking or discounting the many differences between ĝDৄkara and Nicholas 
of Cusa, the similar role played by perception in the process of theosis is noteworthy, prompting 
us to read each in a new light. Before one can have a vision of God, one must first realize God’s 
gaze. In order to see, one must first be seen. Only then does one realize that one is inherently 
divine, created in the image of the Creator. To have a vision of God, therefore, one cultivates 
Jesus’s vision through attentiveness. Being seen, one’s mind is awakened such that one can begin 
to see the divinity that is before one’s very eyes and perceptible (VƗN܈ƗWDSDURN܈ƗW). Removing 
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mental distractions, progressively dissolving all epistemic measuring (PƗ\Ɨ), as if entering the 
cloud at Sinai where Moses sees YHVH pass by, I recognize that the one who passes before me is 
a unique revelation, a creative expression and visible manifestation of God’s dynamic divinity.856 
“The Divine Intellect,” Cusa explains, “willed to manifest itself to the perceptual cognition in 
order to be known perceptibly.”857 Whatever vocational purpose to which God has called me, 
that purpose is realized only after I begin to see my neighbor as an imago Dei, a particular image 
of God created without superfluity. Like the Samaritan woman at the well, God has freely and 
intentionally created my neighbor for some purpose.858 She is not an “extra” in this divine play, 
passing by to busy the stage. Realizing that I am seen by God, I realize that she is also seen by 
God. The monks at Tegernsee, walking in opposite directions, describing a semi-circle around 
the icon on the North Wall, realize that the brother who passes by is seen, uniquely and 
distinctly, by the omnivoyant icon of God.859
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 Exodus 33:22, Romans 1:20; DB 65, Hopkins 823-4. 
 God is looking at my neighbor, attending with 
interest, intention, and perhaps creative curiosity. Perhaps I should look, too, to see what God 
thinks is so interesting and worthy of divine attention. Realizing that I am a unique and creative 
expression of God’s creativity, I realize that she is, too. In what way is she unique? I don’t know. 
I must look, hospitably, without expectation, having dissolved all measures, attending to her 
intent in a state of wonder. For vision to occur (whether double-beryl or single-beryl), says Cusa, 
two paths of light must meet, entangle, and harmonize. In the after-math of apophasis, theosis 
begins with a vision of God (visione Dei), wherein one is seen and addressed (D\DPƗWPƗ
brahma, tat tvam asi). Being seen, one learns to see. Gazing through the apophatic measure, one 
857
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has a vision of God (visione Dei, non aliud). Only one by whom the highest Self is able to be 
seen is thus able to truly recognize the passerby and utter: tat tvam asi.  
Comparative Theology and Perception 
Comparative Theology, as an exercise of deep, back-and-forth reading, enables us to 
perceive what we might otherwise miss. Comparative Theology awakens us (prabudhyate) so 
that we might see what is before our very eyes (VƗN܈ƗW). Reading Cusa’s vision of God alongside 
ĝDৄkara’s 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND %KƗৢya, we can better observe the significant role that being seen 
plays in the process of theosis.  
As Cusa emphasizes, Jesus sees others more truly because the Spirit of Life, which 
enlivens the sensible organs, was fully awakened, fully attentive, and undistracted in him.860 By 
the poses of the face and eyes, which are messengers of the heart, Jesus perceived the Samaritan 
woman as a unique image of God. He sees her in a manner that others failed to recognize. 
Peering into her eyes, he sees her just as she is: divine in esse and divine in potentia, a potency 
that his gaze awakens, motivating her to receive.861 Catherine Keller observes: “As he has read 
her more correctly than she could have imagined, she reads him—reciprocally... ‘Sir, I see you 
are a prophet.’”862 She sees him because his vision opened her eyes. Receiving his gaze, she 
drinks from the eternal “Fount of Life.”863
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 She drinks the living water from Jacob’s well—the 
watery depths won from seeing (and wrestling with) God, face-to-face. His vision initiates her 
theosis. Having been seen as an imago Dei, she sees herself likewise. The divine spark he sees in 
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her is not a divinity or “pious interiority” common to all creatures, but a divine spark that is 
irreducibly particular and utterly unique to her; it is a divine spark manifestly revealed only in 
her face, her incarnate quiddity. It is her uniqueness that makes her divine because, Cusa repeats, 
God does not create without intent or purpose; each and every creature is a visible manifestation 
of the Creator’s will, and thus enjoys a certain singularity.864 Because Jesus sees her as she is, his 
vision heals and transforms her. Being seen, she learns to see. Significantly, she is the only 
person in John’s Gospel to whom Jesus professes himself to be the Messiah.865
Similarly, ĝDৄkara emphasizes over and again the necessity of learning 9HGƗQWD with a 
qualified guru, a knower of Brahman by whom the highest Self is able to be seen.
 
866
 This 
qualified teacher sees the Divine Self in all beings and all beings in the Self.867
As ĝDৄkara asserts, there must be a true connection between our eyes, our mind, and what 
we see. As Cusa asserts, when the mind is distracted, it is as if the eye is dead, disconnected from 
the enlivening attention of the soul.
 Before a student 
is able to confess, “I am Brahman,” he/she must first hear—and believe—the teacher’s 
revelation: tat tvam asi, “You are that.” In other words, before a student can realize his/her innate 
divinity, the student must be seen in this way. Much like the Samaritan woman at the well, the 
student of 9HGƗQWD is healed by the teacher’s vision. Reading the encounter of guru-ĞL܈ya 
together with the encounter of Rabbi-Samaritan in John 4, we recognize that the reciprocity of 
gazes is central to theosis, the awakening to one’s divine identity. 
868
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by notions of ego and alterity which impede and disrupt this connection, like darkness 
characterized by not being fully awakened to the truth.869 In order to realize one’s identity with 
WKH6XSUHPH6HOIĝDৄkara avers, one must “be awakened by a supremely compassionate teacher 
who knows the true meaning of the 9HGƗQWD scriptures.”870 Hearing the words “This Self is 
Brahman,” accompanied by a gesture to the non-dual Self dwelling in the heart, the student is 
awakened to her innate divinity.871
Comparative Theology enables us to focus on the intimate relationship between student 
and spiritual guide and the significance of seeing and being seen without the risk of conflating or 
syncretizing these two very different traditions. I have made no claim that the Christian doctrine 
of imago Dei, LHEHLQJFUHDWHGLQWKHLPDJHRI*RGLVLGHQWLFDOWRWKH9HGƗQWDGRFWULQHRIWKH
unity of Self and Brahman. I have made no explicit claim that Cusa’s emphasis on uniqueness 
and irreducible particXODULW\ILQGVDFRUROODU\LQĝDৄkara’s nonduality.  
 
I have argued, though, that each theologian regards ordinary, everyday perception to be 
an impediment to the realization of one’s innate divinity. I have argued that theosis, or the 
realization of one’s innate divinity and consequent ethical comportment, requires a dramatic shift 
LQSHUFHSWLRQ)RUERWKĝDৄkara and Cusa, this shift begins passively and compassionately when 
one is truly seen by another in a divine way. It begins when the Samaritan woman at the well is 
seen by Jesus as a unique imago Dei,WEHJLQVZKHQWKHVWXGHQWRI9HGƗQWDLVseen by the guru 
who professes, “Thou art that.” Having been seen in this divine way, one is healed and able to 
confess, “I am created in the image of God” or “I am Brahman.” For Cusa, “knowledge is face-
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to-face seeing.”872
Early in the morning, when He saw them, straining against the storm, He walked on the 
water. “He intended to pass them by.”
 Having been the object of the vision of God, one becomes the conduit of 
God’s vision. One becomes a Son/Daughter of God (Jn 1:12), more anointed than before, 
striving to be oneself, not another, as the Creator intended.  
873
We don’t expect our neighbor to walk on water. We don’t expect our neighbor to be an 
unprecedented image of God. We don’t expect our neighbor to be Brahman. Distracted by our 
desire to be seen, staring, like Narcissus, on the surface, we fail to recognize those who pass us 
by. We have an attention deficit problem. (This has caused cartographic problems.) 
Progressively dissolving expectations, perceiving through the apophatic measure, we attend to 
those who “intended to pass [us] by.”
 They failed to recognize Him.  
874
Toward 
 Unsaying the category of “profane,” we perceive the 
sacred. We see the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self. We begin to actualize the 
possibility of a Trinitarian imago Dei, creatively manifesting possibility itself, wherein unity is 
fulfilled in diversity. Learning to see through the apophatic measure, we proceed, concordantly, 
towards a theology of irreducible particularity.  
In the opening pages of this thesis, I introduced the heuristic I have called the apophatic 
measure. Therein, and at various points along the way, I have indicated that this phrase intends a 
triad of meanings that unfold from and fold back upon one another (p3). To be true to the forms 
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and methods I seek to advocate, at least some measure of what I have spoken must now be 
unsaid.  
While I have referred to the apophatic measure as “a” method, the phrase signals not a 
single method, but quite a variety of methods, each with similar intentions. To systematize the 
apophatic measure qua method with a certain form or procedural rigidity would be altogether 
counter to both my intentions and underlying rationale. It is, perhaps, more fitting to speak of a 
variety of methods which more or less proceed in the “spirit” of apophatic measures.  
What these methods share in common is an intention to cultivate a heightened state of 
sensual attentiveness. Predominately (I am reluctant to say exclusively), this heightened state of 
sensual attentiveness practiced through a perpetual progress of identifying and removing 
(pre)conceptions. The difficulty of this task looms most prominently in the fixity of the (pre)fix I 
have placed in parentheses. While removing conceptions imposed by cultural and linguistic 
structures of knowledge is daunting and arduous enough, far more difficult (and risky) is 
identifying pre-conceptions, which one must first dis/cover for oneself. Insofar as they are 
preconceptions, they are prior to conception, raising doubt as to how one might conceive of a 
method to discover them—and thus say them—much less unsay them. And so, no method which 
proceeds in the spirit of the apophatic measure can ever become a “proper” method, since that 
would entail definitively affixing the prefix to preconception, as if one had formulated an 
epistemic method whereby all structures of knowledge could be identified.  
In fact, I have only gradually—and with much assistance from my dissertation 
committee—become attentive to the similarities shared by “these” methods (i.e., ĝDৄkara’s, 
Cusa’s, and my own) and those that usually fall under the heading “phenomenology.” Nearly as 
often as I have written that word in these pages, I have deleted it, perhaps performing the praxis 
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of apophasis I otherwise seek to describe. My use of the word intends to recall Edmund 
Husserl’s vocational charge: To the things themselves! And yet, my confessional hesitancy here 
at the end intends to unsay my own use of the word (especially the occasions that have survived 
my delete button) along with a portion of Husserl’s dictum. Thus, these final words do not fall 
under the heading “to the things themselves,” but simply “Toward.” 
An impulse that ĝDৄkara, Cusa, and I seem to share is that “we” (you, I, and our passers-
by) are not “subjects” oriented towards “objects.” Husserl’s rallying call (if not Husserl himself) 
seems to presume more about the relationship between perceiver and phenomena than is 
consistent with the apophatic measure qua method. The non-dual Seer of sight in the wakefully 
attentive state of WXUƯ\D is an apophatic Measurer that measures Brahman, “All This.” It is not, 
therefore, an agent that performs an “act” of seeing, thereby consuming “the things themselves” 
as cognitive parts of a monistic (or atomistic) “all.” The Self attends to this and that effect of the 
Self, each of which intend to be seen as nothing (ontologically) other than the Self. The 
directionality of the “toward” remains undecided until it is measured. This wave function 
collapses only when measured, and thus awaits a measured unsaying. Likewise for Cusa, one 
awakens to attend to the gaze of the passerby, who intends to be seen. And yet, one intends to be 
seen—both by the passerby and by the Beholder, Theos, who hastens and attentively seeks for 
the seeker. It is not only our being that depends on God, says Cusa, but also our being known. 
And so, the apophatic measure is a method that moves toward, without predetermining who/what 
moves toward whom/what. It is theoĸORJ\WKDWVHHNVWRDZDNHQWRWKHRĺORJ\,QWKDWspirit, the 
methods of the apophatic measure intend to identify and remove epistemic measures as a means 
to the end of attentive sensuality. Attending and intending move toward one another. This 
phenomenology (if that word can measure it at all), does not hasten to the things themselves, but 
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attends toward particulars that intend toward attention. Two paths of light meet, tending toward 
one another and event-ually collide. (Sight happens.) 
A man embraced by the woman he loves knows neither inside nor outside (p157). The 
man and the woman do not become “one,” but they cease to be “two” (advaita). Learning to see 
as Jesus saw, with “fleshly eyes like our own,” one cultivates a double-beryl vision whereby the 
quiddity of irreducible particulars are perceived (but not known) as unique revelations of the 
Creator’s intent. They are seen/heard in harmony with their environment (or, at least, potentially, 
should our will attend to the creative Spirit). In wakefully attentive sensuality, “the divine 
Creator-Intellect shines forth in harmonic or concordant proportion” (p304). Attending to the 
differing intentions of ĞUXWL’s kataphasis and apophasis, one learns to hear words coordinately 
and harmoniously as AUM, “the entire manifold of speech” (p119). Mapping our respective 
perspectives on the circle of life, we begin to hear one another into speech, charting chords in a 
polyphony that never speaks Truth, but sings ever more truly as others’ voices are added to the 
choir (p287). Do these insights fit together? Do they belong together? Are they discordant or 
disconnected? Rehearsing the skill of upasaۨKƗUD by reading diverse texts coordinately, without 
synthesis or pluralistic dissonance, we learn to hear, concordantly. Through the tangential touch 
(tangere) that inscribes Cusa and ĝDৄkara into this complexly composed context, we begin to see 
this and that as “All This,” as singular dis/closures of the Creator’s image. Through these 
methods in the spirit of the apophatic measure, we awaken to an attentive sensuality that sees all 
beings in the Self and the Self in and as all beings. Thou art that [Brahman]. Thou art that 
[unprecedented imago Dei]. Thou art that: an apophatic measure of ultimate reality… irreducibly 
particular. Bracketing language in an epistemic epoché, we do not move towards the things 
themselves; seeing and being seen move toward one another. 
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Hospitable Wonder 
In the introduction, I claimed that this experiment in comparative theology could 
contribute toward a theological valuation of difference and diversity. I also claimed that the 
apophatic theological methods practiced by ĝDৄkara and Cusa differ from those examined by 
Michael Sells in his Mystical Languages of Unsaying insofar as their performances do not 
culminate in a “meaning event,” but instead in a sensual event (p13). In these closing words, I 
reflect (after Cusa and after 9HGƗQWD) on value of irreducible particularity in the apophatic 
measure’s sensual event. 
Apophatic measures1 are methods that must be practiced: they must be rehearsed if they 
are to perform. (Pre)suppositions should be measured and removed—with one exception. When 
we see an/other, intending to re/cognize this passerby, the only hospitable presupposition we 
should have about this other is that he/she is an irreducibly particular revelation of the divine. 
One thinks: “There is something about this person that I have never seen before because it can 
only be seen in/as this person. I wonder what it is.” 
In this awakened state of wonder,875
                                                     
875
 Not far, perhaps, from Heidegger’s attunement of awe (Scheu) and the Er/eignis of the beginning that must be 
begun again. 
 wherein expectations and presuppositions regarding 
this stranger passing-by have been removed, one is prepared to perceive this one who is to-come. 
Unlike the seeing in the everyday (YDLĞYƗQDUD) state, this seeing is not an act of consumption, a 
means of valid knowledge. In this wakefully attentive state (the WXUƯ\D), perceiving my (strange) 
neighbor is an end unto itself. Stretched open to the descent of the divine light, I attend to this 
other’s intentions to be seen beyond measure. Two paths of light meet, wonderfully anointing. 
This Self (the Incarnate Witness I perceive) is Brahman (MU 2).  
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One who perceives in this way does not regard the passerby intending to find common 
ground.876 I cannot attend to the other’s intentions lest my own are first removed (progressively 
dissolved volition, intentional epoché). My ignor/ance must be learned (docta ignorantia); the 
veil must be removed (DYLG\ƗPƗWUDPY\DYDGKƗQD). One regards the passerby attending to 
difference/uniqueness. One sees (but cannot cognize) this other’s singular quiddity in its 
actualized possibility.877 Hospitably removing expectations, one attentively senses this 
neighbor’s unprecedented revelation of infinite multiplicity. Seeing this imago Dei, one glances 
in awe and wonder, re/cognizing this passerby.878
Sensuality is a way of knowing that is necessarily embodied and relational. In the 
historicity of the sensual event, perceiver and perceived are ontologically connected (non-dual). 
One cannot be sensually in isolation. Two paths of light must meet, mapping polygonal chords in 
the circle of life. All concordance is a concordance of differences.
 This Self is Brahman. Although the infinite is 
not finished (infini), its unfolding would be incomplete if it did not include you, in particular. 
Thou art that. Rehearsing, practicing, and performing our fugal variations in the Spirit of 
apophatic measures, we learn to see one another in living color, hearing what is to be heard 
(ĞUXWL), tasting the living water at Jacob’s well—re/cognizing ourselves and those passing by.  
879
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 Mit-sein is sufficiently common ground for perception. 
 Cultivating this attentive 
sensuality, we awaken to an ecoSpiritual creativity of harmonic intentions. Seeing one another 
into being, hearing one another into the manifold of speech (AUM), we transgress the liminal 
doors (the SUƗMña, coincidentia oppositorum) and enter the sensuality of hospitable wonder, 
877
 This is not to say, of course, that similarity/commonality are suddenly devalued.  
878
 And how they find themselves (Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit). 
879
 DCC I.8, Weiler (2004), 77-90, (p79 above). 
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intending not to consume but to have a vision of God. We attentively re/cognize this Self 
(intending to passing us by)880
                                                     
880
 Exodus 32: 22; Mark 6:48. 
 as an apophatic measure of the immeasurable divine. 
 Appendix 
The 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D Upaniৢad (Sanskrit Text) 
֮թ᭜֑֧ֆֈᭃ ե֒թֈե֚ ᲈ֗ֆ֑᭭֫֌᳞֞᭎֑֞֊ե֏֢ֆե֏֗᳊᭬֑֟֗ᳰֈ֟ֆ֚ ᲈ֗֮շ֞֒ձ֗ֿ֑Წ֞᭠֑֟᭜ᮢշ֞֔֞ֆ֠ֆե
ֆֈ᭡֑ᲂշ֞֒ձ֗׀ׂ׀
֚ ᲈ֗᳭֧ֆ᭞ᮩᳬ֞ ե֑ը᭜֐֞ᮩᳬ֚֫֝ ե֑ը᭜֐֞ռֆ᭬֡֌֞ֆ֭׀׃׀
վ֞չᳯ֒ֆ᭭և֞֊֫֎֛֟զᮧ᭄զ᳙֚֞᭑չձշ֫֊ᳲ֗֘֟ֆ֐֡ոզ᭭և֢֔֏֡᭏֗֨᳡֞֊֒զᮧև֐զ֌֞ֈզ׀ׄ׀
᳘᭭֗᭭և֞֊֫֝᭠ֆզᮧ᭄զ᳙֚֞᭑չձշ֫֊ᳲ֗֘֟ֆ֐֡ոզᮧ֟֗֟֗Ღ֏֡Ღ֨վ֚֫֟᳇ֆ֑֠զ֌֞ֈզ׀ׅ׀
֑ᮢ᳙֚֡֫֊շᲱ֊շ֞֐եշ֞֐֑ֆ֧֊շᲱ֊᳘᭭֗ե֌֑᭫֟ֆֆ᭜᳙֚֡֙֡եֿ᳙֚֡֙֡᭭և֞֊ձշᳱ֏֢ֆզᮧ᭄֞֊պ֊ձ֗֞֊᭠ֈ֐֑֫
᳭֞֊᭠ֈ֏֡᭍ռ֧ֆ֫֐֡ոզᮧ᭄֞զֆ֣ֆ֑֠զ֌֞ֈզ׀׆׀
ձ֙զ֚ ᱷ֗᳡֒ձ֙֚ ᭅ᭄֗ձ֙֫֝᭠ֆ֑֞ᭅ᭥֑֧֙֑֫֟֊զ֚ ᭅ֑֗᭭ᮧ֏֗֞᭡֑֑֬֛֟֏֢ֆ֞֊֞ե׀ׇ׀
֊֞᭠ֆզᮧ᭄ե֊֎֛᭬֟ᮧ᭄ե֊֫֏֑ֆզᮧ᭄ե֊ᮧ᭄֞֊պ֊ե֊ᮧ᭄ե֊֞ᮧ᭄֐֭ֿէֈ᳥֣ եէ᳞֛֗֞ ᲈ֑էᮕ֞ ե᳭է֔ᭃօեէ֟ռ᭠᭜ ե֑
է᳞֌ֈ֧᭫ ե֑ձշ֞᭜֐ᮧ᭜֑֑֚֞ ե֒ᮧ֌Ჱ֫֌֘֐ե֘֞᭠ֆե֟֘ ե֗է᳇ֆ֨եռֆ֡ևᲈ֐᭠֑᭠ֆ֧ֿ֚ը᭜֐֞֚᭄֧֑֟֗զ׀׈׀
֚֫֝ ե֑ը᭜֐֞᭟֑ᭃ ե֒֮շ֞֒զֿէ֟։֐֞ᮢե֌֞ֈ֞֐֞ᮢ֞֐֞ᮢ᳟֞֌֞ֈ֞էշ֞֒իշ֞֒֫֐շ֞֒թ֟ֆ׀׉׀
վ֞չᳯ֒ֆ᭭և֞֊֫֗֨᳡֞֊֒զէշ֞֒զᮧև֐֞֐֞ᮢ᳙֧֞֒֞ᳰֈ֐ᱬ֗֞᳇֞ֿը᳘֫֟ֆ֛֗֨֚֗֞ᭅ᭠շ֞֐֞֊֞ᳰֈ᳟֏֗֟ֆ֑ձ ե֗
֧֗ֈ׀׊׀
᳘᭭֗᭭և֞֊᭭ֆ֨վ֚իշ֞֒֫֟᳇ֆ֑֠֞֐֞ᮢ֫᭜շ֙֞ᭅֈ֏֑֡᭜֗֞᳇֞ֿի᭜շ֙ᭅ֟ֆ֛֗֨᭄֞֊ ե֚ֆ֟ֆ֐֭ֿ֚֐֞֊᳟֏֗֟ֆֿ
֊֑֞᭭֞ᮩᳬ֟֗᭜շ֧֡֔֏֗֟ֆ֑ձ ե֗֧֗ֈ׀ׁׂ׀
᳙֚֡֙֡᭭և֞֊զᮧ᭄֞֫֐շ֞֒᭭ֆ֣ֆ֑֠֞֐֞ᮢ֞֟֐ֆ֧֒֌֠ֆ֧֗֞ᭅֿ֟֐֊֫֟ֆ֛֗֞թֈե֚ ᭅ֗֐֌֠֟ֆ᳟֏֗֟ֆ֑ձ ե֗֧֗ֈ׀ׂׂ׀
է֐֞ᮢ᳟ֆ֡ևᲃ᳞֛֝֗֞ ᭅ֑զᮧ֌Ჱ֫֌֘֐զ֟֘֗֫֝᳇ֆ֨զֿձ ե֗֮շ֞֒ը᭜֐֨֗ֿ ե֚֟֗֘᭜֑֞᭜֐֊֞᭜֐֞֊ե֑ձ ե֗֧֗ֈ׀ׂ׃׀
0Ɨ\Ɨ 
Perhaps no single term in Advaita 9HGƗQWD is as fraught with controversy as the term 
PƗ\Ɨ. Its meaning is fiercely debated among advaitins in the generations after ĝDৄkara, most of 
whom cite ĝDৄkara’s use of the term to defend their diverse interpretations. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that contemporary scholars also debate its meaning, accompanied by ample 
evidence to support a wide variety of meanings. One might conclude from this that ĝDৄkara is 
inconsistent in his use of the term, or perhaps conclude that his own understanding of it shifts 
over time, or at least shifts according to differing contexts. Conversely, though, one might 
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conclude that ĝDৄkara does not intend for the term to be imbued with significant technical 
weight. Limiting my focus to the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND%KƗৢya, I argue that the latter is the case.  
Similarly, Richard King argues: 
The authors of the MK do not develop the notion of PƗ\Ɨ to any great extent. 
This is probably because they had little interest in the idea, the primary focus 
of the MK being the truth of non-origination [i.e., DMƗWL].881
Since my purpose is to examine the role of perception in ĝDৄkara’s apophatic method, it is 
necessary to grasp how he uses the word PƗ\Ɨ. Any discussion of the term is useless, however, 
OHVWLWUHPDLQLQVHUYLFHWRĝDৄkara’s aim: Realization of Brahman. Thomas O’Neil explains: 
 
Much of modern scholarship has utilized the word PƗ\Ɨ to mean only 
illusion. But we must remember that the word PƗ\Ɨ is etymologically a word 
with means ‘to measure...’ Thus, we must begin to see PƗ\Ɨ within ĝDৄkara 
not only as it has been seen by his opponents or later critics, but within the 
context of ‘an inquiry into Brahman.’882
While O’Neil’s observation is grounded in ĝDৄkara’s UMSBh, it is nevertheless true for his 
MKBh, as well. Therein, he uses the term PƗ\Ɨ to mean “measuring,” consistent with O’Neil’s 
research. Even more narrowly, though, ĝDৄkara uses the term to refer to verbal cognitions of the 
buddhi, which is the mental image of sense data which takes the form of particular external 
objects. As ĝDৄkara emphasizes several times in his MKBh, particulars constitute the real basis 
or substratum (ƗVSDGDۨ) of mental images, even when the cognition is illusory.
 
883
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 King, 175. 
 Hence, PƗ\Ɨ 
refers to the measuring of particularity by means of signifiers within the process of perception, as 
illustrated below: 
882
 O’Neil, L. Thomas. 0Ɨ\ƗLQĝD۪NDUD0HDVXULQJWKH,PPHDVXUDEOH. 1st ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980. 
92, 93. 
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Figure 210Ɨ\ƗLQWKHSURFHVVRISHUFHSWLRQ 
As we have seen, signifiers are partial measures (PƗWUD-s) of the immanent Brahman, possessed 
of infinite measure,884 and are modifications (vikalpa-s) of AUM,885 which is both the 
transcendent and the immanent Brahman.886 Thus, the cognition of buddhi by means of signifiers 
is, quite simply, the act of conceptually measuring Brahman. When one sees a rope, the buddhi 
assumes the form of the rope, since that is its basis.887 This mental image can either be grasped 
correctly with the word “rope,” or cognized incorrectly as “snake.” In the latter case, ĝDৄkara 
explains, the rope is seen by the eye with the form of a rope; the snake exists only as a 
conception superimposed thereupon.888 In either case, however, there is an act of measuring the 
buddhi by means of a signifier which is nothing other than a modification or partial measure of 
AUM.889
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 MK 1.29. 
 As shown below, ĝDৄkara uses the term PƗ\Ɨregardless of whether this measuring of 
the buddhi constitutes an illusion, as in the case of the snake, or knowledge, as in the case of the 
rope. To understand PƗ\Ɨ, then, one must understand how and why it can mean both “illusion” 
885
 MUBh 1. 
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 MKBh 1.26: ֌֒֞֌֧֒ᮩᳬ֟֊ᮧօ֗զֿ Panoli 354. 
887
 MUBh 7, MKBh 2.32, and MKBh 3.29. Cf. ĝDEDUD306%K, 
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 MKBh 3.29. : ֑և֞ ֒Ჰ֗ ե֞ ֟֗շ֟᭨֌ֆզ ֚֌ᲃ ֒Ჯ֡ᱨ֌֧օ֧֑֞֗᭯֐֞օզ … ֿ  
889
 MUBh 1 and 8. 
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and “knowledge.” It is both an obstacle to realizing Brahman and a means to indicate Brahman. 
Building upon insights from O’Neil and King, I first explain PƗ\Ɨ as “measuring” and then 
analyze two examples of ĝDৄkara’s use of the term in the MKBh, as “illusion” and “knowledge.” 
0Ɨ\ƗDV³0HDVXULQJ´ 
As O’Neil explains, the word PƗ\Ɨ appears more than one hundred times in the ৙gVeda 
with a range of meanings.890 As Richard King points out, it is used cosmologically in ৙gVeda 
VI.47, which states that the Supreme Lord Indra was born through PƗ\Ɨ as referenced in MK 
III.24 and BU II.5.19.891 O’Neil clarifies that “while it is true that ĝDৄkara did utilize PƗ\Ɨ as 
“illusion” in certain instances, it was not used to explain away the world but rather to explain the 
world.”892
Prabhu D. Shastri’s etymological explanation is insightful, and largely consistent with my 
analysis of the word PƗWUD above: 
 More precisely, I argue, it is used in the MKBh primarily to differentiate between the 
everyday “seeing” of YDLĞYƗQDUD and “perception” in WXUƯ\D. While reality is “seen” in each case, 
“measuring” is superimposed upon particulars in YDLĞYƗQDUD, but reality qua particulars is 
perceived in WXUƯ\D, through the apophasis of measuring. 
The word PƗ\Ɨ is derived from ¥PƗWRPHDVXUH—PƯ\DWHDQD\ƗLWL, i.e., by 
which is measured, meaning thereby, as tradition has it, that illusive 
projection of the world by which the immeasurable Brahman appears as if 
measured.893
Because Brahman is devoid of measure (DPƗWUD), then PƗ\Ɨ can be understood as the illusory 
measuring of that which is beyond measure. However, Shastri’s description of Brahman as 
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 O’Neil, 0Ɨ\ƗLQĝD۪NDUD, 29ff. 
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 King, 175 and 297 (note 122). 
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 O’Neil, 0Ɨ\ƗLQĝD۪NDUD, 94. 
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“immeasurable” is misleading. If Brahman were not measurable, then we would be left without 
any means by which to know Brahman, as ĝDৄkara explains:  
The same Self belonging to the three states is intended to be arrived at by 
means of WXUƯ\D, as stated in the ĞUXWL, “Thou art that.” Moreover, if it were 
the case that WXUƯ\D was other than that which is characterized by the Self in 
the three states, then scriptural teachings would be pointless due to the 
nonexistence of a means to arrive at that, or it will lead to nihilism.894
The three states are measures of Brahman.
  
895
 From the vantage of the highest truth, these 
measures may rightly be understood as illusory, but that does not mean that they can be 
altogether dismissed as illusion since they are the very means by which one comes to know 
Brahman.896
King clarifies: 
 Although the three quarters/measures must be negated in order to realize the truth of 
Brahman, this method is only effective because these measures are, indeed, measures of 
Brahman. 0Ɨ\Ɨ, then, is both the means to realize Brahman and an obstacle to that realization.  
0Ɨ\Ɨ is the construction of boundaries and distinctions (vikalpa) in that 
which has none (nirvikalpa); it is a measuring (PƗ) of the immeasurable 
(DPƗWUD).897
All conceptions of reality are approximations in that they attempt to define 
the infinite in terms of finite categories. For the advaitin, then, all views are 
partial apprehensions of Brahman… Dualistic experience is an inevitable 
result of any attempt to conceptualize (vikalpa) reality.
 
898
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 MUBh 7: ᯦֑֗᭭և֑᭭ձ֗֞᭜֐֊᭭ֆ֑֡֒֠᭜֧֗֊ᮧ֟ֆ֟֌֌֞ֈ֑֟֟֙ֆ᭜֗֞ֆ֭ֿ ֆᱬ֗֐֚֟ թ֟ֆ֗ֆ֭ֿ ֑ᳰֈ֛֟᯦֑֗᭭և֞᭜֐֟֗֔ᭃօե
ֆ֑֡֒֠եէ᭠֑ᱫ᭜ᮧ֟ֆ֌֟ᱫ᳇֞֒֞֏֞֗֞᭒ս֞ᳫ֫֌ֈ֧֘ ֞֊ևᭅ᭍֑ե֢֘᭠֑ֆ֞֌֟ᱫ֗ ᭅ֞ֿ Panoli 330. 
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 MU 8. 
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 MKBh 1.24.  
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 King, 300, note 140.  
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Importantly, King connects PƗ\Ɨ as the construction of boundaries, and PƗ\Ɨ as the 
conceptualization of reality, placing the word vikalpa in brackets next to each of these. While 
vikalpa is often translated “false conception,” both GauঌDSƗGD and ĝDৄkara employ the term 
more broadly to mean any and all conceptions, as discussed earlier. Some conceptions may be 
“more false” than others, such as the conception of a snake superimposed on a rope, but the 
conception of a rope qua rope is false only insofar as it is a concept. “If it is said that the rope is 
nonexistent, like the snake, that is not the case,” says ĝDৄkara, because the rope existed as 
something that was not conceived even before the nonexistence of the snake became known.899 
The particular rope is neither unreal nor illusory, but the conception of the rope as something 
ontologically other than one’s Self entails “the construction of boundaries and distinctions 
(vikalpa) in that which has none (nirvikalpa).”900
ĝDৄkara glosses the term PƗWUƗ as “that by which something’s limit is measured,”
 
901
 
which is consistent with King’s explanation of PƗ\Ɨabove. As we have seen, all words are 
simply modifications of AUM just as the clay pot and lump of clay are modifications of clay.902
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 MKBh 3.29: ֒Ჯ֚֡֌ᭅ֗ֈ֚ᱬ֗֟֐֟ֆռ֧ֆֿ֭֊ձշ֞᭠ֆ֧֊֞֟֗շ֟᭨֌ֆ᭜֗֞ֈ֟֗շ֟᭨֌ֆ֒Ჰ֗ե֘֗᭜ᮧ֞᭍֚֌ ᭅ֞֏᭄֞֗֟֗֞֊֞ֆ֭ֿPanoli, 385. 
More literally: “If it is said that the rope is nonexistent, like the snake, that is not the case No, because it is 
necessarily/invariably the case that the rope-possessed-of-snake is not conceived since it was not conceived even 
before there was knowledge of the nonexistence of the snake.” 
 
To “define” a word means to “make finite” (de-fine) by constructing boundaries; to define is to 
identify the limits or scope of a particular word’s meaning, thereby setting it apart from the 
infinity of possible meanings. Sine AUM is infinite, then every word is a modification of AUM 
insofar as it measures a finite portion of AUM. The word mƗ\Ɨ indicates the process of 
900
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 MUBh 1. 
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constructing boundaries and measuring limits through the verbal cognition of reality. When a 
particular entity is perceived and verbally cognized, the particular entity is cognitively reduced to 
the limitations of a given linguistic measure. The particular becomes cognitively “de-fined” as 
this or that.  
Therefore, PƗ\Ɨmeans “measuring,” in an epistemic and linguistic sense. It refers to 
various acts of knowing Brahman wherein there is a conceptual cognition of Brahman, by means 
of which a limit of Brahman is measured. Since Brahman is limitless, then this measuring is 
illusory, but that which is measured is certainly not illusory. Hence, this measuring must not be 
taken as altogether illusory, since Brahman is to be known quarter-by-quarter and measure-by-
measure.903 Though illusory, these measures are nevertheless reliable. Were this not the case, 
“scriptural teachings would be pointless due to the nonexistence of a means to arrive at 
[realization of Brahman].”904
In the 0Ɨ৆ঌǌN\D .ƗULND%KƗৢya, ĝDৄkara employs the term PƗ\Ɨ with two distinct but 
interrelated meanings: PƗ\Ɨ as “illusion” and PƗ\Ɨ as “knowledge.” While both constitute a 
measuring of that which is beyond measure,
  
905
 PƗ\Ɨ is illusory insofar as the measure is 
mistaken to be the measured and PƗ\Ɨ is “knowledge” insofar as knowledge is understood to be 
a finite measure of that possessed of infinite measure.906 While there are numerous examples of 
each in the MKBh, it should suffice to examine one or two instances of each.907
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 MKBh 1.24. 
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 MUBh 7, cited above. 
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 Several factors have guided my decision to focus on these particular examples, leaving aside other equally 
compelling passages discussing PƗ\Ɨ. As discussed in Chapter One, the four prakara۬D-s of the .ƗULND are most 
likely composed by at least three different authors. I have selected examples from the third prakara۬D, which was 
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0Ɨ\Ɨ as “Illusion” 
Because a “measure,” according to ĝDৄkara, is that by which a limit is measured, 
“measuring” bifurcates non-dual reality by imposing a boundary on the limitless.908
GauঌDSƗGD states: 
 This is 
exemplified in ĝDৄkara’s comments on MK 3.19. To appreciate the significance of his 
comments, it is first necessary to understand the context.  
This unborn (Self) undergoes modification through PƗ\Ɨ and not in any other 
way. For, if the modifications are to be a reality, the immortal would tend to 
be mortal.909
In this verse, GauঌDSƗGD places PƗ\Ɨin direct opposition to “reality,” which he previously 
defined as follows: 
 
That which does not exist in the beginning and end is also likewise in the 
present. Unreal things, being joined with the eye, are seen as if not unreal.910
The unborn does not undergo any real modification at all. According to GauঌDSƗGD, then, even 
though PƗ\Ɨ is unreal, it is seen as if it is not unreal due to being joined with the eye.  
 
+HUHXSRQĝDৄkara comments: 
That which is non-dual, being the Supreme Reality, is cleaved by measuring, 
just as a man with defective vision sees the one moon as many or as the rope 
                                                                                                                                                                           
PRVWOLNHO\FRPSRVHGE\DQDXWKRUZLWKYLHZVWKDWGLIIHUIURPERWKĝDৄNDUD’s and the author of the first prakara۬D. 
Most notably, the author of the third prakara۬DXQOLNHĝDৄNDUDDQGWKHDXWKRURIWKHILUVWprakara۬D, holds the view 
that there is no real distinction between YDLĞYƗQDUD and taijasa$VDUHVXOWRIWKLVĝDৄNDUDUepeatedly emphasizes 
the reality of external objects of perception and emphasizes that only YDLĞYƗQDUD, not taijasa, is characterized by 
perception. In his nuanced explanation of PƗ\Ɨ in the third prakara۬DĝDৄNDUDLVFDUHIXOWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQD
cognition that is utterly false, such as cognizing a snake on a rope, and cognitions which are true from a 
conventional and even scriptural perspective, but ultimately sublated by realization of nonduality. More simply, 
though, I have also selected the third prakara۬Das the source of these examples because PƗ\Ɨ is discussed far more 
often in this prakara۬D than others, enabling me to draw different examples from a single context. 
908
 MKBh 1.29 and MKBh 3.19. 
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 MK 3.19: ֐֑֑֞֞ ֟֏᳒ֆ֧ ᳭֧ֆ᳖֞᭠֑և֞վե շևᲱ֊ ֿ ֆᱬ֗ֆ֫ ֟֏᳒֐֞֊֧ ֛֟ ֐᭜֑ᭅֆ ե֞ է֐ֆ֣ե ᮯվ֧ֆ֭ ׀ Panoli trans., 425. 
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 MK 2.6: ըֈ֞֗᭠ֆ֧ ռ ֑᳖֞֟᭭ֆ ֗ֆᭅ֐֞֊֧֝֟֌ ֆᱫև֞ ֿ ֟֗ֆևզ֨ ֚ֈ֣֘ ֞զ ֚᭠ֆ֫֝֟֗ֆև֞ թ֗ ֔֟ᭃֆ֞զ ׀ 
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appears differently as a snake, water line, etc., (but that) is not the Self 
because the highest reality does not possess parts.911
That is to say that if the phenomenal manifestation of Brahman is considered to be the highest 
reality, then this misconception can be characterized as an illusion. It is an illusion because it is 
expressly not perception, which requires a fully awake mind in contact with sense organs and a 
perceptible object resulting in a verbal cognition of the mental image.
 
912
The two-moons example has already been discussed. The issue here, as before, involves 
identifying the ailment that is to be removed. ĝDৄkara’s purpose is obviously not to insist that 
only those persons who have an eye disease “cleave” the non-dual Self by measuring. Rather, his 
purpose is to explain conceptualization as the ailment that is to be removed. In the same way that 
the eye disease causes the one moon to be seen as many, conceptualization causes the non-dual 
Self to appear as if dual. In the rope-snake example, the rope is not illusory because it is the 
foundation upon which the false conception is superimposed.
 If PƗ\Ɨ is to be 
understood as “illusion,” then it should be clarified that what is illusory is not that particular 
object which is seen by the eye, but rather the dualistic measure by which the mental image 
thereof is cognized. Neither the particular entity nor its particularity is unreal, but rather the 
conceptualization which is a modification thereof.  
913
 The rope is seen by the eye with 
the form of the rope.914
The point of the example, then, is to diagnose the ailment that is to be removed. By 
juxtaposing the two-moons analogy with the rope-snake analogy, we must note how the two 
 What is illusory is the conception superimposed on the mental image.  
                                                     
911
 MKBh 3.19: ֑᭜֌֒֐֞ևᭅ֚ֈ᳇ֆ֨ե ֐֑֑֞֞ ֟֏᳒ֆ֧ ᳭֧ֆռ֨֟ ֐ᳯ֒շ֞֊֧շռ᭠ᮤ֗ᮤᲯ֡զ ֚֌ᭅ։֞֒֞ᳰֈ֟֏֏ᱷֈᳯ֨֒֗ ֊ ֌֒֐֞ևᭅֆ֫ 
֟֊֑֒֗֗᭜֗֞ֈ֞᭜֐֊զ ֿ 
912
 PMSBh I.1.5 
913
 MKBh 2.32. 
914
 MKBh 3.29. 
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differ and how they are similar. Both directly relate to the SUDPƗ۬a of perception, but highlight 
distinct problems resulting in epistemic error. As emphasized, perception only occurs when there 
is a connection between an alert mind, sense organs, and particular object. In both analogies, this 
connection is obstructed, but at different moments, as illustrated below: 
 
Figure 220Ɨ\ƗLQURSH-snake analogy 
In the two-moons analogy, an eye disease (timira) causes the one moon to appear as many. As 
discussed earlier, ĝDৄkara’s point there is to demonstrate that knowledge alone will not remove 
the disorder. Diagnosis does not heal the patient. The obstruction really exists and must actually 
be removed for perception to occur.915 In the rope-snake analogy, however, the ailment is not 
with the eye. As ĝDৄkara states explicitly, the rope is seen by the eye in the form of a rope.916
                                                     
915
 UMSBh III.2.21. 
 
However, the rope is not perceived because the mental image is not grasped by the internal organ 
of perception. Instead, the mind’s measuring (PƗ\Ɨ) superimposes a snake upon the mental 
916
 MKBh 3.29. 
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image of the rope, which is the foundation or basis of the illusion.917 Unlike timira, the 
obstruction is not real. The snake exists only as a conception.918
0Ɨ\Ɨ as Knowing 
 Because the snake is the unreal 
result of ignorance, it can be removed simply by knowledge. When knowledge of the rope arises, 
the idea of snake is removed, enabling the rope to be perceived as well as seen. The point of the 
analogy is not to suggest that the “world” is unreal, like the snake. Rather, the point is to 
distinguish between the world as it is seen, and the world as it is measured. 0Ɨ\Ɨ is illusory 
when measuring is mistaken as the measured. 
As we have seen, perception is distinct from mere seeing insofar as perception involves 
verbally cognizing the mental image, which takes the form of a particular entity connected to the 
sense organs. If the particular is cognized by means of a word which is merely a modification of 
AUM, then the object is not perceived as AUM, but as a mere measure of AUM. In that case, 
measuring is superimposed upon the buddhi, which has the particular as its basis, and, therefore, 
the particular is not perceived. Stated otherwise, the external organ of perception sees that which 
is measured, but the internal organ of perception sees the measure, mistaking it for the measured. 
Only by dissolving the superimposed measure is the particular object perceived, not otherwise. If 
the particular is cognized by means of a word that is eternally related to that particular and a 
corresponding universal, the cognition constitutes true knowledge. Even in that case, however, 
the resulting knowledge is merely a measure of the immanent Brahman, which is possessed of 
infinite measure, since words are merely modifications of AUM, as established in MUBh 1. 
                                                     
917
 MKBh 2.32 and 3.29. 
918
 MKBh 3.29. 
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It logically follows that even a true cognition, resulting in true knowledge, is nevertheless 
PƗ\Ɨ. ĝDৄkara uses the term PƗ\Ɨ to refer to any cognition which constitutes a measuring of 
Brahman possessed of infinite measure, regardless of the truth of that cognition. In other words, 
while the word PƗ\Ɨ certainly applies to illusory cognitions, such as the rope-snake, it also 
applies to true cognitions. Hence, the word “measuring” signifies “knowing”.919
ĝDৄkara uses the word PƗ\Ɨ in this sense in MKBh 3.24. GauঌDSƗGD states: 
 
From the sacred text “There is no plurality here, etc.” and “Indra on account 
of PƗ\Ɨ, etc.” [it is to be known that] “He being unborn is however born in 
various ways through PƗ\Ɨ.”920
As noted earlier, the ĞUXWL quoted here derives from ৙gVeda VI.47, which is also found in BU 
II.5.19. It is helpful WRH[DPLQHĝDৄkara’s comments in each context. He states: 
 
Therefore, creation, which has not actually occurred, is an allegory for the 
purpose of ascertaining the unity of the Self, like the discourse on SUƗ۬a, 
since what is designated by the word PƗ\Ɨ in the sentence “Indra by means 
of measurings” is an explanation of a non-existent thing.921
Importantly, even though ĝDৄkara admits that PƗ\Ɨ is something which is nonexistent, he 
nevertheless insists that this nonexistent thing is useful. Scriptural accounts of creation do not 
intend to convey information about an historical event. Rather, they are allegories for the purpose 
of ascertaining the unity of the Self.  
 
ĝDৄkara then employs a SǌUYDSDN܈in to shift the discussion away from allegories of 
creation towards an understanding of the role of PƗ\Ɨ in the process of perception: 
                                                     
919
 MKBh 3.24, Panoli 430. 
920
 MK 3.24: ֊֧֛ ֊֞֊֧֟ֆ ռ᳜֑֞֞֞ᳰֈ᭠ᮤ֫ ֐֑֞֞֟֏ᳯ֒᭜֑֟֌ ֿ էվ֑֞֐֞֊֫ ֎ᱟ։֞ ֐֑֑֞֞ վ֑֞ֆ֧ ֆ֡ ֚զ ׀ King’s translation, 
250. 
921
 MKBh 3.24: ֆ᭭֐֞ֈ֞᭜֐֨շ᭜֗ᮧ֟ֆ֌᭜֑և ᭅ֞ շ֟᭨֌ֆ֞ ᳥֣֚֟֒֏֢ֆ֨֗ ᮧ֞օ ե֚֗֞ֈ֗ֆ֭ ֿթ᭠ᮤ֫ ֐֑֞֞֟֏զ (֎֣.ի.ֿׄ׆ֿׂ׊) 
թ᭜֑֏֢ֆ֞ևᭅᮧ֟ֆ֌֞ֈշ֧֊ ֐֑֞֞֘᭣ֈ֊֧ ᳞֌ֈ֧֘ ֞ֆ֭ ֿ Panoli, 430. 
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(3ǌUYDSDN܈a7KDWLVQRWWKHFDVH>EHFDXVH@WKHZRUG³PƗ\Ɨ´VLJQLILHV
“knowing” (prajñƗ). 
(6LGGKƗQWD) That is true. But measuring is not detrimental because it is 
inferred by knowing the senses which consists of ignorance.922
ĝDৄkara is certainly not the first to associate the PƗ\Ɨwith prajñƗ. As Thomas O’Neil notes, 
PƗ\Ɨ is regarded as a synonym of prajñƗ, meaning “wisdom,” “consciousness,” or “knowing,” 
even in the earliest etymological commentaries, the Nirukta and Nigha۬ܒu.
 
923
Commenting on the same scriptural passage in %8,,ĝDৄkara also explains PƗ\Ɨ in 
terms of prajñƗQDJKDQD. Therein, he explains Indra’s creation/emission by means of measurings 
from a different perspective. Rather than having the purpose of ascertaining the unity of the Self, 
as in MKBh III.24, there he explains that Indra manifests as name and form for the purpose of 
making Himself known: 
 More importantly, 
though, the term in this context harkens back to MU 5, wherein SUƗMña is described as a lump of 
consciousness (prajñƗQDJKDQD), as discussed extensively earlier in this chapter.  
If name and form were not manifested, the Self’s unconditioned state called 
‘dense with Intelligence’ would not be known. But when name and form 
become manifested as the body and senses, then its nature becomes 
known.924
ĝDৄkara makes an important distinction between ontological creation and manifestation or 
“unfolding.” Distinguishing between the unmanifest and its manifestation is a primary concern 
for ĝDৄkara in his BUBh.
 
925
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 MKBh III.24: ֊֊֡ ᮧ᭄֞֗ռ֊֫ ֐֑֞֞֘᭣ֈզ ֿ ֚᭜֑֐֭; թ֟᭠ᮤ֑ᮧ᭄֑֞֞ է֗᳒֞֐֑᭜֧֗֊ ֐֑֞֞᭜֗᭤֑֡֌չ֐֞ֈֈ֫֙զ ֿ Panoli 
430. 
 While this topic is certainly beyond the scope of this dissertation, its 
923
 O’Neil, 35. 
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 BUBh II.5.19, Panoli’s translation, 586. 
925
 E.g., BUBh I.4.7 and I.4.10. 
357 
significance is discussed by Haesook Ra in her dissertation, ĝD۪kara as Writer.926 For our 
purposes, it is sufficient to note, from ĝDৄkara’s perspective, that the unmanifest unfolds 
(Y\Ɨkriya) Itself as the manifest for the purpose of making itself seen and thus known, lest it 
remain a mere “lump of cognition.”927 0Ɨ\Ɨ, then, is the measuring of the manifest which is 
seen. Even though PƗ\Ɨis a nonexistent thing (DEKǌWƗUWKD), it is not detrimental (ado܈aۊ) 
because it constitutes the very means by which the manifest becomes known. Without PƗ\Ɨ, in 
fact, there could be no means by which to know Brahman.928
As shown earlier, the absence of duality is not synonymous with the realization of 
Brahman, since the latter requires perception and discrimination.
 
929
107
 Scripture and teacher can do 
no more than indicate that which is to be seen, since knowledge can only arise in accordance 
with a valid means of knowledge suitable to that purpose (p ).930 Likewise, PƗ\Ɨ serves the 
purpose of indicating Brahman possessed of infinite measure, since it is to be known measure-
by-measure.931 Though ultimately nonexistent, PƗ\Ɨ is useful as a means to know Brahman. 
However, since PƗ\Ɨ is nonexistent and because Brahman is devoid of measure, these measures 
must also be progressively dissolved.932 As ĝDৄkara warns, one should not commit the error of 
thinking that the means has the same reality as the end.933
                                                     
926
 Ra, Haesook. Sankara as Writer: Method and Style in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad Bhasya. 2011. Collections of 
the Harvard University Archives. Dissertations. 
 While this method desires to indicate 
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 See also, for example, MKBh 3.33. 
928
 MUBh 7, discussed above. 
929
 MKBh 1.13, discussed above. 
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 UMSBh III.2.21, Shastri, 714-5.  
931
 MKBh 1.11-13. Cf. also MKBh 1.16. 
932
 MUBh 2. 
933
 MKBh 3.26. See also MKBh 2.32ff.  
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the Brahman that is before one’s very eyes and perceptible,934 realization may arise at one time 
and not at another, even though one’s face may be turned towards what is to be seen.935
Having described PƗ\Ɨ as a useful means to an end, ĝDৄkara concludes his comments on 
MKBh 3.24 by affirming that the aim of ĞUXWL is the perception of unity: 
 In other 
words, while measuring (PƗ\Ɨ) and the apophasis thereof are a reliable means to indicate 
Brahman, final realization depends upon perception.  
Since [ĞUXWL] is possessed of the result, which is just the perception of unity, 
that is, without a doubt, the aim of ĞUXWL This is due to the very wording of 
[VHGƗQWD texts] such as: “What delusion and what grief is there for the one 
who sees (DQXSDĞ\DWL) unity” (ƮĞƗ Upaniৢad 7).936
 
 
                                                     
934
 MUBh 7. 
935
 UMSBh III.2.21. 
936
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